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INTRODUCTION  
In 2001, the tribunal in Methanex v. the United States allowed three civil society 
organizations1 to submit written briefs or, in other words, amicus curiae briefs, as non-
disputing third parties. The two sole parties to this arbitration were Methanex, a Canadian 
methanol producer, on the one hand; and the United States, a North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) contracting party, on the other. The applicable law, i.e. NAFTA 
Chapter XI, and the applicable procedural rules, i.e. the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, do not contain any explicit provision that entitles arbitral tribunals to accept 
amicus curiae briefs. Notwithstanding the legal void, the Methanex tribunal relied on its 
discretionary procedural powers to accept these amicus submissions. It based its decision 
on both procedural and substantive interlocking considerations. With respect to the latter, 
the tribunal stated that ‘there is an undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration. The 
substantive issues extend far beyond those raised by the usual transnational arbitration 
between commercial parties’. 2  The decision to accept the amicus submissions in 
Methanex not only set an important precedent, but also established a quasi-consensual 
assumption – the intervention of civil society as amicus curiae in investment treaty 
arbitrations would be considered as a means for addressing the ‘broader’ public interest at 
stake in such arbitrations.  
The phenomenon of civil society’s role in investment treaty arbitration has not, 
however, been confined to the ambit of amicus intervention. Civil society petitioners 
sought access as third party intervenors in other less frequent, yet equally important, 
cases. These cases closely related to public policy or human rights issues that not only 
concerned the public’s ‘broader’ interest, but also affected the direct interests of certain 
communities or groups that those petitioners purported to represent. 
One such case is the Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia arbitration.3 The arbitration arose 
out of Bolivia’s revocation of a privatization concession awarded to Bechtel’s subsidiary 
                                                 
1 Those were the International Institute for Sustainable Development, the Communities for a Better Environment 
and the Earth Island Institute.  
2 Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra  note 428, at para 49 (our emphasis).  
3 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, infra note 533. 
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(Aguas del Tunari)4 for the operation and management of water systems in the city of 
Cochabamba.5 The company had implemented, what is alleged as, a sharp increase in 
water prices.6 It was contended that the price-increasing measures severely affected the 
most disenfranchised segments of Cochabamba’s population. Aguas del Tunari had, 
according to civil society petitioners, effectively undermined Cochabambans’ right to 
access water. Affected communities from Cochabamba and its surrounding areas had 
carried out widespread protests over months, including civil disobedience and the 
blockade of the city. Bolivian police and army forces were deployed en masse and often 
met protesters with violence, which lead to the killing of a protester and the injury of a 
hundred others.7 This tragic series of events was coined as ‘La Guerra del Agua’.  
Perhaps paradoxically, or perhaps not, Bolivia had fully supported, and was 
effectively in need of, Aguas del Tunari’s water distribution investments and services in 
its arguably deficient and poorly managed municipal water systems. This precisely 
echoes the reason why states, such as Bolivia and others, have entered into over 3,000 
international or bilateral investment agreements/treaties (‘IIA’s or ‘BIT’s) in the first 
place.8 By promoting and protecting foreign investments under international law, states 
                                                 
4 Bechtel is a major US multinational, specialized in infrastructure projects including the provision of water 
services. 
5 Bolivia on the other hand is Latin America’s poorest nation and Cochabamba is its third largest city. The city 
has been for long suffering from staggering levels of poverty and deficiencies in access to water. It is also worthy 
to note that indigenous peoples also represent the majority of Bolivia’s population. See C. Ledo, ‘Contaminación 
ambiental y pobreza en Bolivia: El caso de la periferia sur de Cochabamba’, (2010) 18 Revista Brasileira de 
Ciências Ambientais 25, at 32; and World Bank, ‘Bolivia – Highlights: Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Human 
Development in Latin America’, available at: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/0,,contentMDK:20505835~pagePK:1
46736~piPK:14683 ~theSitePK:258554,00.html (last accessed 06 October 2014).  
6 Arguably in order to cover the capital expenditures and operation costs of the water distribution concession. 
7 Civil society also mobilised against Bechtel on a global scale. Joseph Stiglitz branded Bechtel’s measures as 
manifest evidence of ‘corporate evil’. A popular Academy Award-nominated motion picture entitled ‘Even the 
Rain’ also dramatized the events. See J. Stiglitz, supra note 101, at 187. 
8 Proponents of investor-state arbitration such as The Honourable Charles Brower argue that ‘the evidence is 
overwhelming, however, that the current system of international protection for foreign investment benefits 
developing states… There has long been consensus that foreign direct investment increases national income and 
employment and accelerates development and modernization, including by establishing valuable tangible assets 
within the host country, promoting the development of human capital, facilitating the acquisition of technical 
knowledge, and creating network effects that create opportunities for future market access abroad’. See C. 
Brower and S. Blanchard, ‘What’s in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, 
and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States’, (2014) 52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 689, at 701-703. 
Even vehement critics of the current system do concede that ‘there is no doubt’ that foreign investments by 
multinationals benefit host states. See M. Sornarajah, ‘A Law for Need or a Law for Greed?: Restoring the Lost 
Law in the International Law of Foreign Investment’, (2006) 06 International Environmental Agreements 329, at 
331, 333.  
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avidly seek to attract foreign capital into their economies, including in key sectors such as 
water treatment and distribution.  
Bolivia was, however, compelled to change course as a result of the immense 
public pressure by subsequently revoking the concession.9 The Bolivian government’s 
position had been in fact diametrically opposite to that of those adversely affected 
communities in Cochabamba – a crucial point to note for the purposes of this research. 
Crucial because it is now a recurring phenomenon for host states to adopt positions vis-à-
vis foreign investments that conflict with the positions of their populations, or at least 
segments thereof.10  
The revocation of Aguas del Tunari’s concession triggered an arbitral claim 
against Bolivia under the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT.11 Following Bolivia’s unsuccessful 
attempt to dismiss the tribunal’s jurisdiction, 12  the tribunal received a request for 
‘standing’ to intervene as third parties, or in the alternative as ‘amicus curiae’, by a 
number of international and Bolivian civil society petitioners purporting to comprise and 
represent the adversely affected communities who opposed and contested Bechtel’s water 
price increase.13 They contended to have a myriad of facts and legal arguments to raise to 
                                                 
9 Bechtel filed an ICSID case against Bolivia that it later settled due to the immense public pressure and negative 
publicity it faced. Prior to that, Bolivia unsuccessfully contested the ICSID tribunal’s jurisdiction in order to 
dismiss Bechtel’s claim. Again, this may be viewed in many ways as futile given that Bolivia approved the 
privatization and Bechtel’s price-increasing measures all along, resisted those protesting against such measures; 
and, according to Bechtel, ultimately failed to protect the latter’s investments.  
10 Bolivia’s conflicting position is in fact similar to a position adopted by Mexico in the subsequently discussed 
case of Metalclad v. Mexico. See Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, infra note 257. See also C. 
Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, infra note 617, at 1091. 
11 The BIT includes standards such as the right to national treatment, fair and equitable treatment, the most-
favoured-nation treatment, prompt, adequate, as well as effective compensation in case of expropriation, and 
more fundamentally, the right to submit a claim against Bolivia, on the basis of violations of those standards, in 
front of an arbitral tribunal constituted under the ICSID Arbitration Rules. See also Articles 3 and 9 of the 
Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
and the Republic of Bolivia, entered into force 01 November 1994, available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/24#iiaInnerMenu (last accessed 06 October 2014). It is 
worthy to note here that Bolivia terminated this BIT in 2009. See also ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 411. 
Regarding the intricate corporate structures created by multinationals in order to benefit from BIT protection, see 
for instance J. Maupin, infra note 48, at 12. 
12 Bolivia’s objection was later dismissed. See Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, Decision on 
Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdictions of 21 October 2005. 
13 Those were the Coordinadora para la Defensa del Agua y la Vida (meaning the ‘association for the defense of 
water and life’), Federación Departamental Cochabambina de Organizaciones Regantes (meaning ‘Cochabamba 
Federation of Irrigators’ Organizations’), SEMAPA Sur, Friends of the Earth-Netherlands, Oscar Olivera, Omar 
Fernandez, Father Luis Sánchez, and Congressman Jorge Alvarado. The petitioners were represented by 
Earthjustice. See the petitioners’ requests at Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, infra 716, at para 
34, 63. 
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the attention of the tribunal, and essentially alleged that (i) the sharp water price increase 
undermined the Cochabamban community’s ‘right to access water’, including customary 
water usage rights recognized under Bolivian law; and moreover, (ii) the adjudication of 
Aguas del Tunari’s claim could have a significant impact on Bolivia’s ability to promote 
and protect the public welfare.14  
The tribunal unanimously dismissed civil society’s third party intervention 
petitions. It found that it lacked the power to ‘join a non-party to the proceedings’.15 
Indeed, states have architected investment treaty arbitration as a dispute settlement 
process that solely involves two disputing parties with predefined roles, i.e. investors 
from contracting home states as claimants and contracting host states as respondents.16 
This means that no matter how compelling a third party intervention might be, because it 
covers sensitive human rights issues or otherwise; third parties have, according to the 
tribunal, no role to play as additional disputing parties in investor-state arbitration.  
Since the Methanex and Aguas del Tunari decisions, procedural rules governing 
amicus curiae submissions to investor-state tribunals have been gradually formalized. 
Third parties may now submit written briefs as amici curiae – subject of course to the 
applicable treaty and arbitration rules. The issue of third party intervention has been, 
however, left unaddressed. It was assumed that third party intervention equates to the 
addition or joinder of a party to proceedings and that, therefore, it falls outside the 
jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals. Recently, Cecilia Malmström, the EU 
Commissioner for Trade, has brought the issue to the fore with a concept paper that 
includes various proposals for an overhaul of investor-state arbitration. The paper 
provides that ‘[i]n addition to the possibility for the Tribunal to accept amicus curiae 
briefs, the EU proposal should confer a right to intervene to third parties with a direct and 
existing interest in the outcome of a dispute’.17  
                                                 
14 Ibid., at para 18, 23.  
15 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, infra note 539, at 1.  
16 See generally, W. Ben Hamida, L'arbitrage transnational unilatéral: réflexions sur une procédure réservée à 
l'initiative d'une personne privée contre une personne publique (2007).  
17 The paper also mentions that ‘[the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement] and the 
EU/Singapore FTA provide for the possibility that the arbitration tribunal “may” accept amicus curiae briefs 
from third parties under certain conditions, in line with recently agreed UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency. But 
they do not specifically provide for right to intervene to persons with a clear and concrete interest in the case’. 
See C. Malmström, European Commission, ‘Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform: Enhancing 
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In this light, this research is concerned with understanding the regulation of both 
the amicus and third party intervention procedures, the differences between them, and to 
reflect on their adequacy as procedural vehicles for civil society participation in investor-
state arbitration.18  
1. Research aim and problem statement 
i. Research aim 
By first examining civil society’s recently recognized amicus curiae role in 
addressing the ‘broader’ public interest at stake in investor-state arbitration, this research 
aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of civil society’s role as practiced 
hitherto. It then considers whether such role may be equally adequate whenever investor-
state arbitrations closely relate to environmental protection, public health, human rights 
or other public policy issues that could potentially affect the direct interests of certain 
communities or groups who are third parties to arbitration proceedings.  
This research therefore scrutinizes civil society’s amicus role and questions 
whether it constitutes the most enhanced form of access within the jurisdictional ambit 
set by IIAs or BITs, and whether it may be expanded. It will also consider whether third 
party intervention necessarily equates to the joinder of an additional party to arbitration 
proceedings.  
The aim of this research is thus to first understand the current status of civil 
society’s role in investor-state arbitration as amicus curiae and to subsequently assess 
its prospects therein as a third party intervenor.  
                                                                                                                                                 
the right to regulate and moving from current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment Court’, 5 May 2015, 
available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF (last accessed 10 May 2015), at 
7–8 (the “European Commission Concept Paper”). This proposal has been since confirmed in the Commission’s 
draft TTIP text. Article 23(1) of the draft provides that ‘the Tribunal shall permit any natural or legal person 
which can establish a direct and present interest in the result of the dispute (the intervener) to intervene as a third 
party…’. See European Commission, ‘Commission Draft Text TTIP, Chapter II – Investment’, September 2015, 
available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc_153807.pdf (last accessed 1 October 
2015). 
18 In the line of the EU Commission proposal discussed above, other practitioners have also addressed the need to 
consider expanding the amicus curiae practice into third party intervention to the benefit of the European 
Commission, see E. Triantafilou, ‘A More Expansive Role For Amici Curiae In Investment Arbitration?’, 
Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 11 May 2009, available at: http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/05/11/a-more-
expansive-role-for-amici-curiae-in-investment-arbitration/ (last accessed 06 October 2014).  
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ii. Problem statement 
The analysis undertaken in this research serves the purpose of answering the 
following problem statement:  
Which procedural capacity could govern civil society’s participation in investor-
state arbitration and under what conditions? 
iii. Research questions 
Part I is entitled ‘The Function and Modalities of Civil Society Participation 
Before Investor-State Disputes’, it raises the following questions:  
a) What is the underlying background to the acceptance of civil society participation 
as amicus curiae in investor-state disputes? 
b) What is the public interest at stake in investor-state arbitration? 
c) Is there a need for civil society to raise public interest issues in addition to the 
host state? 
d) To what extent does the influence of the international commercial arbitration 
model facilitate or obstruct civil society’s participation in investor-state 
arbitration? 
e) What was the reasoning behind investor-state tribunals’ acceptance of civil 
society participation? 
f) Has the acceptance of civil society participation been formalized? 
g) How is civil society participation regulated? 
h) What are the substantive arguments raised by civil society and are they relevant 
to the adjudication of investor-state disputes? 
i)  Are there any conclusions that may be drawn from civil society’s participation as 
amicus curiae and are there limitations to such role? 
j) To what extent does the current framework offer sufficient access to civil society 
to raise public interest issues? 
 Part II is entitled ‘The Function and Modalities of Civil Society Participation 
Before Other Jurisdictions: Four Models’, it raises the following questions:  
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(a) Which tribunals or jurisdictions allow civil society participation?  
(b) What are the modalities available for civil society in other tribunals or 
jurisdictions? 
(c) How is civil society’s participation as amicus curiae regulated in other 
tribunals or jurisdictions?  
(d) How third party intervention is regulated and is it available to civil society? 
(e) What does standing by civil society entail? 
(f) To what extent could models on civil society participation in other 
jurisdictions be transposed to enhance the status of civil society in investor-
state arbitration? 
Part III is entitled ‘An Enhanced Role for Civil Society Before Investor-State 
Tribunals?’, it finally deals with the following questions:  
(a) Is there a need to transcend the amicus curiae procedure in an investor-state 
dispute settlement context? 
(b) What were civil society’s arguments in requesting third party intervention 
and what did investor-state tribunals decide? 
(c) Are civil society’s access to justice arguments valid? 
(d) How should civil society’s participation under the third party intervention 
procedure be regulated? 
(e) Would investor-state tribunals exceed their jurisdiction by enhancing civil 
society’s role in arbitration proceedings? 
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2. Conceptual framework 
This section aims to capture this research’s understanding of three fundamental 
and systematically recurring concepts, i.e. ‘civil society’, ‘amicus curiae’ and ‘third party 
intervention’. The scope and actual meaning of each of those concepts are divisive. It is 
therefore important to provide, albeit succinctly, a preliminary understanding of these 
concepts for the purposes of the present research.  
 
i. The concept of ‘civil society’ 
The terms ‘civil society’, ‘civil society actors’, or ‘civil society organizations’ 
shall be used interchangeably throughout this study. Given its centrality, this section 
explores the use of the ‘civil society’ concept in international law contexts and then 
delimits its scope specifically for the purposes of this research. Particularly, this aims to 
debunk the perception that NGOs are the sole or primary constituents of civil society. As 
will be shown directly below, the concept of ‘civil society’ is more encompassing and 
faithful to the diversity of the actors that participate in international adjudication.  
a. The socio-political dimension of ‘civil society’  
Although not to be construed as a general rule, civil society organizations are 
often advocates of public interest issues both at the domestic and international levels.19 
This understanding of ‘civil society’ is echoed in various disciplines. From a sociological 
standpoint for instance, Jürgen Habermas sees civil society as including NGOs, 
spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that ‘attuned to how 
societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distil and transmit such reactions in 
the amplified form to the public sphere’.20 Habermas’ definition stresses on another key 
                                                 
19 This is also reflected in Logister’s socio-political analysis of civil society. Logister identifies three theoretical 
models of civil society: an analytical, normative, and ‘public sphere’ models. Under the first model, civil society 
comprises all social associations that extend beyond the family excluding formal political institutions, firms, and 
criminal and terrorist organizations. Under the normative model, it underlines the special ‘civil rationality’ that 
guides its associations towards the realization of their view of a better world, it becomes a metaphor for the good 
society, which means a society that is ‘civil’. Under the latter model, it stresses the importance of active 
citizenship in pursuit of the common interest, by way of public deliberation, rational dialogue and public action. 
See L. Logister, infra note 118, at 165-167 citing Michael Edwards.  
20 J. Habermas, Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1996), at 366-367. 
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feature of civil society: it comprises a network of associations that are concerned with 
questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres. In 
addition, Habermas’ understanding of ‘civil society’ excludes actors linked to economic 
or market interests – in contrast to the Marxist tradition.21 The role of civil society in this 
regard challenges the État providence paradigm. It does not fit for instance with Hegel’s 
view of states as the ‘higher authority, in regard to which the laws and interests of the 
family and community are subject and dependent’.22  
b. Identifying ‘civil society’ in an international law context 
The concept of ‘civil society’ is chimerical, in particular in an international law 
context, because it combines far too many heterogeneous elements. 23  It is also a 
polemical and divisive one; no consensus exists on a single definition. Other adjectives 
are often adjoined to the term ‘civil society’ such as ‘global’24 , ‘international’,25  or 
‘transnational’,26 thereby fuelling further confusion. The versatile use of the terms ‘NGO’ 
and ‘civil society’ exacerbates this. 27  The Aarhus Convention refers to ‘non-
                                                 
21 Ibid., at 366.  
22 A. W. Wood (ed.), Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1991), para 261.  
23 On the chimerical characteristic of civil society, see J. Yvon Thériault, La Société Civile, Ou, La Chimère 
Insaisissable (1985); and M. Amouroux, ‘La société civile globale: une «chimère insaisissable» à l’épreuve de la 
reconnaissance juridique’, (2007) 12:02 Lex Electronica. 
24 See L. Logister, infra note 118, at 165. For a discussion relating to ‘international’ NGOs (both the ‘NGO’ and 
‘civil society’ concepts are used interchangeably) and the concept of ‘global civil society’, see M. Majlessi, infra 
note 110, at 83, 97.  
25 See for instance the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-
Governmental Organisations, entered into force 01 January 1991, available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/124.htm (last accessed 06 October 2014). Article 1 states that: 
‘This Convention shall apply to associations, foundations and other private institutions (hereinafter referred to as 
"NGOs") which satisfy the following conditions: have a non-profit-making aim of international utility; have been 
established by an instrument governed by the internal law of a Party; carry on their activities with effect in at 
least two States; and have their statutory office in the territory of a Party and the central management and control 
in the territory of that Party or of another Party.’. See also Ibid, at 85. 
26 See for instance A. Florini, (ed.), The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (2012).  
27 The fact that the concept ‘civil society’ is resorted to instead of ‘NGOs’ reflects this research’s concern to 
transcend a growing perception that NGOs are essentially human rights and environmental protection lobbying 
‘machines’ made up of organizations based in developed states. This view is somewhat reflected in Sornarajah’s 
following statement which points to the fact that: ‘a new phenomenon that has emerged in the area is the role of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) committed to the furtherance of environmental interests and human 
rights and the eradication of poverty. These NGOs operate within developed states and espouse, to a large extent, 
what they believe to be the interests of the people of the developing world and the world as a whole’. This is also 
echoed due to the participation of renowned NGOs such as Amnesty International in landmark and highly 
publicized cases such as the Pinochet saga in front of UK courts. See M. Sornarajah, infra note 221, at 4. See 
also Regina v Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis ex parte Pinochet (No 1) [1998] 3 WLR 
1456. 
22 
 
governmental organizations’ in its definition of the ‘public concerned’.28 While referring 
to organizations such as the International Association of Penal Law and Amnesty 
International, Judge Van den Wyngaert stated in her dissent in the Arrest Warrant case 
that the ‘opinion of civil society [cannot be] completely discounted in the formation of 
customary international law today’.29 Pascal Lamy stated in a speech that ‘civil society is 
influencing the WTO agenda’. 30  Kofi Anan described ‘civil society’ as the ‘new 
superpower’.31 Both of these figures interchangeably referred to the terms ‘civil society’ 
and ‘NGO’ in their speeches. 
It is important to first note that civil society is primarily a ‘non-state actor’ in 
international law, i.e. it has the same status as foreign investors under international law.32 
Inspired by Fernando Enrique Cardoso’s report on UN-civil society relations, 33  this 
research identifies three basic fundamental assumptions to the concept of ‘civil society’, 
i.e. (i) civil society is free from governmental or corporate influence; (ii) its membership 
                                                 
28 The Aarhus Convention defines the ‘public’ as ‘one or more natural or legal persons, and…their associations, 
organizations or groups’; and the ‘public concerned’ as the: ‘public affected or likely to be affected by, or having 
an interest in, the environmental decision-making; for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental 
organizations promoting environmental protection…shall be deemed to have an interest’. See Articles 2(4) and 
2(5) of the Aarhus Convention, infra note 119 (our emphasis). 
29  Judge Van Den Wyngaert was discussing the issue of the recognition of the principle of individual 
accountability for international core crimes. See  Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), International Court of Justice (ICJ), 14 February 2002, 
Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert, at para 27. 
30  P. Lamy, ‘Civil Society Is Influencing The WTO Agenda’, 04 October 2007, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl73_e.htm (last accessed 10 August 2013). See also WTO, 
‘Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations/Civil Society’, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm (last accessed 02 April 2013).   
31 UN Press Release, ‘Secretary-General Describes Emerging Era In Global Affairs With Growing Role For Civil 
Society Alongside Established Institutions’, 14 July 1998, available at: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980714.sgsm6638.html (last accessed 10 August 2013). 
32  Private corporations, civil society organizations, armed groups, rebel groups, non-state political entities, 
national liberation movements, criminal organizations, and individuals, etc. may all be considered as non-state 
actors – from a general international law perspective. For present purposes, references to non-state actors shall 
solely include individuals, private corporations – including most notably foreign investors and multinationals, as 
well as civil society organizations. Such a definition is more relevant to the international law on foreign 
investment, and serves the purpose of highlighting a key aspect inherent to international adjudication, i.e. there 
are inter-state dispute settlement jurisdictions, which solely involve states such as the ICJ’s; and other hybrid 
jurisdictions which involve non-state actors and states such as investor-state tribunals or international human 
rights jurisdictions. 
33 ‘Civil society refers to the associations of citizens (outside their families, friends and businesses) entered into 
voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas and ideologies. The term does not include profit-making activity (the 
private sector) or governing (the public sector). Of particular relevance to the United Nations are mass 
organizations (such as organizations of peasants, women or retired people), trade unions, professional 
associations, social movements, indigenous people’s organizations, religious and spiritual organizations, 
academic and public benefit non-governmental organizations’. See UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the Panel 
of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations’, dated 11 June 2004 (A/58/817), at 13.   
23 
 
is associative and voluntary; and (iii) its aim excludes the pursuit of profit or the 
representation of corporate or business interests.34  
c. Transcending the ‘NGO paradigm’: The diversity of civil society groups 
involved in international adjudication 
Notwithstanding the nebulousness of civil society, one preliminary, yet 
fundamental, caveat bears stressing: there is an advantage when looking at the concept of 
‘civil society’ from an international adjudication standpoint. The international tribunals 
of interest to this research systematically require civil society petitioners – as in fact any 
other third party – to clearly identify themselves as a general condition for granting them 
access. By looking at cases involving civil society, and through ratione personae criteria, 
one is able to pinpoint in concreto what and who is comprised within ‘civil society’. 
Equally, through ratione materiae criteria, one is able to assess what message or, in other 
words, what factual and legal arguments does civil society purport to raise before 
international tribunals. This conveniently allows this research to adopt an idiosyncratic 
approach to the concept of ‘civil society’ that may not be helpful to other areas of 
international law or policy.35  
As mentioned above, the focus in the literature seems to be primarily on ‘major 
NGOs’ 36  such as Amnesty International, Earthjustice, or the Center for Justice and 
                                                 
34 See M. Majlessi, infra note 110, at 83 et seq. 
35 In a similar vein, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has an accreditation procedure for civil 
society organizations seeking consultative status that does in turn allow it to clearly identify them – again, for its 
own purposes. The consultative status at ECOSOC namely allows civil society organizations to attend meetings, 
propose provisional agenda items, and make written statements. Accreditation requirements include the 
following: applying organization's activities must be relevant to the work of ECOSOC; the NGO must have been 
in existence (officially registered) for at least 2 years in order to apply; the NGO must have a democratic decision 
making mechanism; the major portion of the organization’s funds should be derived from contributions from 
national affiliates, individual members, or other non-governmental components. More generally, its aims and 
purposes should be in conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the UN Charter. As of 01 September 
2013, there were 147 organizations in general consultative status and 2,774 in special consultative status. See 
ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, ‘Consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental 
organizations’, dated 25 July 1996, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996-31.htm 
(last accessed 06 October 2014), ECOSOC, ‘List of non-governmental organizations in consultative status with 
the Economic and Social Council as of 1 September 2013’, dated 04 October 2013, available at: 
http://csonet.org/content/documents/e2013inf6.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014). See also M. Majlessi, infra 
note 110, at 179. 
36 See for instance L. Hitoshi Mayer, supra note 911; S. Charnovitz, ‘The Illegitimacy of Preventing NGO 
Participation’, (2011) 36 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 891, at 898. See also a description of NGOs in 
the context of international adjudication in N. Vajic, ‘Some Concluding Remarks on NGOs and the European 
Court of Human Rights’, in Treves, T., et al. (eds.), Civil Society, International Courts, and Compliance Bodies 
(2005), at 93. See also an elaborate description of Amnesty International's experience in international 
24 
 
International Law, which are often portrayed as the main actors of civil society in 
international adjudication. 37  The diversity and heterogeneity of civil society is often 
forgotten.38 Yet, this research has identified, inter alia, the following groups or actors in 
international adjudication: NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), faith-based 
associations such as the Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas, 
indigenous organizations or associations such as the Quechan Indian Nation or the 
Endorois Welfare Council, 39 gender-focused associations such as the Tanzania Gender 
Networking Programme, epistemic communities or research institutions such as the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), trade unions such as the 
Canadian Union of Postal Workers, and other associational bodies aimed at representing 
local communities or groups, i.e. what the UN call ‘mass organizations’,40  including 
small-scale farmers for example, such as the Coordinadora de Itoiz or the Federación 
Departamental Cochabambina de Organizaciones Regantes.41  
                                                                                                                                                 
adjudication in D. Zagorac, ‘International Courts and Compliance Bodies: the Experience of Amnesty 
International’, in Treves, T., et al. (eds.), Civil Society, International Courts, and Compliance Bodies (2005), at 
11. 
37 These organizations have acted in a number of cases such as the case filed by Amnesty International at the 
ACHPR on behalf of two political dissidents, William Steven Banda and John Lyson Chinula, who were 
deported from Zambia. See Amnesty International v. Zambia, Decision of 5 May 1999, ACHPR (212/98); or the 
case of Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights seeking 
relief from violation resulting from global warming caused by acts and omissions of the United States (2005) 
where Earthjustice and the Center for International Environmental Law filed the petition on behalf of the ICC. 
And, see Hitoshi Mayer’s exhaustive study of the concentration of NGO intervention in international human 
rights jurisdictions, including a study of the cases presented by the CEJIL. See L. Hitoshi Mayer, supra note 911, 
at 932. 
38  E. Tramontana, ‘Civil Society Participation In International Decision Making: Recent Developments and 
Future Perspectives in the Indigenous Rights Arena’, (2012) 16 the International Journal of Human Rights 173, 
at 174. 
39 Tramontana questions whether indigenous organizations or associations (such as the Endorois Welfare Council) 
should be separated from indigenous self-governing organizations and institutions (such as the Quechan Indian 
Nation). Indeed, indigenous organizations or associations refer to bodies created by indigenous peoples at the 
local, national or international level, to promote their interests through collective action and common 
representation; whilst indigenous self-governing organizations and institutions rather refer to bodies which 
administer indigenous communities and have regulatory functions within those communities in variable degrees 
depending on the domestic legislation governing their status. A distinction is not merited in the context of 
international adjudication since both organizations would be, and were effectively, treated as non-state actors 
and/or non-disputing parties depending on the jurisdiction. When soliciting international jurisdictions, both seek 
to ultimately further indigenous concerns and rights in disputes where their constituents were direct stakeholders 
or victims of human right violations. See E. Tramontana, ‘Civil Society Participation In International Decision 
Making: Recent Developments and Future Perspectives in the Indigenous Rights Arena’, (2012) 16 the 
International Journal of Human Rights 173, at 177. 
40 UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations’, 
supra note 33, at 13. 
41 The civil society organizations used as examples above have participated in international cases examined in 
this study. For the WWF, see Shrimps case, infra note 1018; the Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias 
Cristianas, see Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. the Republic of Peru, infra note 943; the Quechan Indian Nation, see 
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The case law therefore shows a wide array of civil society actors who could play a 
potentially active role in international adjudication. This diversity reflects in fact the 
categories set out under the UN’s ECOSOC registration system for civil society 
organizations – the ‘Integrated Civil Society Organization System’.42  
Separately, indigenous civil society groups and associations43 are of a particular 
interest to this research.44 International cases involving indigenous groups are abundant.45 
These groups often forge alliances with other civil society organizations when attempting 
to access international justice.46 Such alliances add to the complexity of the matter and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, infra note 496; the Endorois Welfare Council, see CEMIRIDE and MRG on 
behalf of EWC v. Kenya, infra note 608; the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme, see Biwater Gauff 
(Tanzania) Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania, infra note 456; the IISD, see Methanex Corporation v. United 
States, infra note 428; Canadian Union of Postal Workers, see UPS v. Canada, supra note 517; the Coordinadora 
de Itoiz, see Gorraiz Lizarraga and others v. Spain, infra note 901; and the Federación Departamental 
Cochabambina de Organizaciones Regantes, see Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, infra note 
716. See also E. Tramontana, ‘Civil Society Participation in International Decision Making: Recent 
Developments and Future Perspectives in the Indigenous Rights Arena’, (2012) 16 the International Journal of 
Human Rights 173, at 173.  
42 The system includes – inter alia – over 22,000 NGOs, 1300 associations, 50 trade unions, 1700 indigenous 
people organizations, and 400 disability, development and rights organizations.  See UN Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, ‘Integrated Civil Society Organization System’, available at: 
http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do (last accessed 10 September 2013).   
43 There are nearly 370 million ‘indigenous people’ worldwide and more than one hundred isolated indigenous 
groups with more than half living in the Amazon. See N. Boecher, ‘Third Party Petitions as a Means of 
Protecting Voluntarily Isolated Indigenous Peoples’, (2009) 10 Sustainable Development Law and Policy 58, at 
58.  
44 L. Burgorgue-Larsen, and A. Úbeda de Torres, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Case Law and 
Commentary (2011), at 500.  
45 This is reflected for instance at the IACtHR where it has set up a ‘Rapporteurship on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ which has a website that includes a substantial inventory of all the petitions and cases involving 
indigenous peoples at the IACtHR. See the Rapporteurship’s website: 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/decisions/iachr.asp (last accessed 12 December 2012).  
46 The dynamic of local-transnational alliances has become monnaie courante not only in international litigation, 
but also in international policy and lobbying, which is repeatedly signalled by commentators as one of the most 
pivotal powers and assets of contemporary global civil society. The Council is an organisation representing up to 
150,000 individuals from north Alaska, Canada, Greenland and Russia. The petition of the Inuit Circumpolar 
Council to the Inter-American Commission against the United States is another example as it was submitted in 
association with Earthjustice and the Center for International Environmental Law. The petitioners claimed that 
the US was liable because its greenhouse gas emissions, which are among the highest on the planet, were a 
contributory factor of rapid global warming. This in turn led to adverse effects to the arctic environment, thereby 
threatening the cultural rights of the Inuits. The petitioners argued that the United States violated the right to the 
benefits of culture under Article XIII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Article XIII 
states that ‘Every person has the right to take part in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to 
participate in the benefits that result from intellectual progress, especially scientific discoveries. He likewise has 
the right to the protection of his moral and material interests as regards his inventions or any literary, scientific or 
artistic works of which he is the author’. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. 
XXX, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 
Rev. 9 (2003); 43 AJIL Supp. 133, entered into force 02 May 1948. This case is not subsequently discussed in 
this research. The Commission rejected the petition on the ground that the information provided was insufficient 
to consider possible violations of the American Declaration. See Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Petition to the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights seeking relief from violation resulting from global warming 
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ultimately resonate with ‘the need to take into account the full diversity of the non-
governmental organizations at the national, regional and international levels’.47 
d. The legitimacy of civil society representation and its relevance to third 
party intervention in investor-state arbitration 
A few remarks are merited here on the issue of civil society’s representative 
legitimacy. This issue stirs vigorous debates for not only political and social theorists, but 
also legal theorists and practitioners.48  The socio-political critique of civil society in 
general, and NGOs in particular, points to their undemocratic nature.49 In stark contrast to 
democratically elected states, the role of civil society is often viewed as non-transparent, 
and in some respect illegitimate.50 Skepticism often surrounds the contention that civil 
society fills a gap between individual citizens and states or inter-state organizations by 
altruistically representing the public interest as well as adversely affected communities 
before international fora. Shifting this debate to investor-state arbitration, some argue that, 
‘as a rule’, civil society is understood to oppose foreign investors’ claims and favour host 
states’ pursuit of the public interest.51 
                                                                                                                                                 
caused by acts and omissions of the United States (2005), at 5. The Commission relayed its decision to the 
petitioners in a letter dated 16 November 2006, and also confirmed its position in a hearing on 01 March 2007 
under the heading of ‘Human Rights and Global Warming’, available at: 
http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/audiencias/Hearings.aspx?Lang=en&Session=14  (last access 30 July 2014). See also 
Pasqualucci, ‘International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in Light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, (2009) 27 
Wisconsin International Law Journal 51, at 78; UN General Assembly, United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, resolution adopted on 20 January 1994, A/RES/48/189, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f2770.html (last accessed 18 January 2013), and L. Burgorgue-Larsen, 
and A. Úbeda de Torres, supra note 44, at 517.See Inuit Circumpolar Council, Petition to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights seeking relief from violation resulting from global warming caused by acts and 
omissions of the United States, dated 07 December 2005, available at: 
http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/files/uploads/icc-files/FINALPetitionICC.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014) 
(‘ICC Petition to the Inter-American Commission’). See also K. Anderson, ‘What NGO Accountability Means: 
And Does Not Mean’, (2009) 103 American Journal of International Law 170, at 171. 
47 ECOSOC also acknowledged ‘the breadth of non-governmental organizations' expertise and the capacity of 
non-governmental organizations to support the work of the United Nations’. See ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, 
supra note 35. 
48 K. Anderson, supra note 46, at 176. See also J. Maupin, ‘Public and Private in International Investment Law: 
An Integrated Systems Approach’, (2014) 54:2 Virginia Journal of International Law (forthcoming 2014), at 36, 
41. 
49 L. Logister, supra note 118, at 168. 
50 Ibid., at 166, 168; and A. Kawharu, supra note 393, at 285. 
51  Wälde for instance asserts that ‘third parties, essentially activist NGOs, are allowed to submit amicus 
briefs…the introduction of amicus briefs by NGOs, which as a rule oppose the claimant, increases the cost 
burden on claimants substantially; not only do they have to incur litigation expenditures to raise the claim and 
rebut the respondent, but they now have to review the amicus briefs and attempt to rebut them’. As mentioned 
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However, any blanket presumption to the effect that civil society exclusively acts 
in the public interest to the detriment of foreign investors is not entirely accurate.52 
Amicus or third party intervention allow third parties, indeed ‘any person’ as will be 
emphasized below,53 to channel their interests before investor-state tribunals. If deemed 
adequate and relevant, third parties’ factual and legal arguments should and must first and 
foremost contribute to investor-state tribunals’ fulfillment of their mandate to adjudicate 
the dispute, rather than to support one disputing party over the other. Whether investor-
state tribunals’ justice ends up in favour of either claimants (foreign investors) or 
respondents (host states) is inexorably dependent on the facts and circumstances as well 
as the merits of each particular arbitration. 54  In other words, amicus or third party 
intervention – whether by civil society or ‘any person’ – should always, and primarily, be 
contingent upon a contribution to the adjudication of the investor-state dispute.  
Indeed, because of investor-state tribunals’ application of exacting ratione 
materiae and ratione personae criteria on the admissibility of civil society’s role, 
investor-state tribunals should be able to appreciate and assess who does civil society 
purport to represent, and the rationale behind such representation. When unsatisfied with 
the information provided on civil society’s identity, as well as the adequacy and purpose 
behind its participation, this research will in fact show that investor-state tribunals have 
not hesitated in closing the door in front of civil society. When rendering such decisions, 
investor-state tribunals have to consider the facts and circumstances of each particular 
case which, again, are the primary factors that need to be taken into account. It is 
precisely for these reasons that the debate over the legitimacy of civil society’s role in 
                                                                                                                                                 
above, this research will show that the facts and circumstances of each case are fundamental in assessing the 
burden, and thus the adequacy, of amicus interventions. See T. Wälde, ‘Procedural Challenges in Investment 
Arbitration under the Shadow of the Dual Role of the State: Asymmetries and Tribunals’ Duty to Ensure, Pro-
actively, the Equality of Arms’, (2010) 26:1 Arbitration International 3, at 33 (our emphasis).  
52 See for instance the amicus submission of the Office of the National Chief of the Assembly of Nations (a 
Native American civil society group for the purposes of this research) in support of the claimants in Grand River 
Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, supra note 148. In this case, the claimants, 
representing Native-Canadian tobacco business interests, sought up to $664 million for damages allegedly 
resulting from a 1998 settlement agreement between various US state attorneys general and major tobacco 
companies at the time.  
53  See definitions of ‘amicus curiae’ and ‘third party intervention’ procedures in the section directly below.  
54 ‘Justice’ is of course an elusive concept. The Roman-Latin concept of ‘justitia’ is understood to be strictly 
positivist and unconcerned with aspects other than settling disputes inter-pares. The ancient Greek concept of 
‘diké’ on the other hand, which could also be translated as ‘justice’, reflects a starkly different conception. Diké 
reflects an equitable dispute settlement that takes into account social harmony and general satisfaction. See G. 
Cros, et P. Solberg, Droit et la doctrine de la justice (1936), at 80-82. 
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representing the public interest or affected communities or groups should be nuanced in 
an investor-state dispute settlement context – i.e., the main focus of the present research.  
ii. ‘Amicus curiae’ and ‘third party intervention’ procedures 
The ‘amicus curiae’ and ‘third party intervention’ procedures are two notions of 
fundamental importance to this research. The distinction between both will be extensively 
addressed under Part II and Part III. However, a few remarks are merited here in order to 
elucidate, albeit preliminarily, their actual scope as well as to emphasize the need to 
clearly distinguish between them from the outset. 
Both procedures are in fact fundamentally different but share one common feature, 
i.e. they are both aimed at enabling a third party to intervene in a given dispute.55 
Needless to say that, whether in an investor-state arbitration context or otherwise, in 
essence such a third party may be ‘any person’ that is foreign to the dispute including, 
inter alia, an individual,56 a state,57 an inter-state organization,58 a trade lobby or business 
                                                 
55 See A. Zimmermann, ‘International Courts and Tribunals, Intervention in Proceedings’, (2006) Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law; and P. Sands and R. Mackenzie, ‘International Courts and Tribunals, 
Amicus Curiae, (2008) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 
56 See for instance the amicus submission of Mr. Barry Appleton in Apotex v. United States; see Apotex Holdings 
Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Procedural Order on the 
Participation of the Applicant, Mr Barry Appleton’ as a Non-Disputing Party of 4 March 2013, at 43 (‘Apotex v. 
United States’).  
57 See for instance Morocco’s amicus curiae submission in the WTO dispute of Trade Description of Sardines, 
infra note 1019 or the Netherlands’ in Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-
13. Also, under various IIAs or BITs, as well as before the ICJ, non-disputing third states may intervene as third 
parties as will be further shown under Part II – Section 4.2. 
58  See the European Commission’s amicus curiae submissions in, inter alia, Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak 
Republic, supra note 57; AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22); Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill 
S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20); and Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of 
Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19). See also the more recent submissions by the World Health Organization 
(‘WHO’) and the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Secretariat, and the Pan American Health 
Organization in Philip Morris v. Uruguay, infra note 149. 
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group,59 and of course a civil society organization or group as previously mentioned60 and 
as will be discussed in further detail throughout this research.61  
This conceptual commonality of enabling a third party to intervene in a given 
dispute may precisely explain why both procedures are often conflated.62 Nowhere is this 
more evident than under Article 36 of the ECHR63 whereby third party intervention is 
covered under paragraph 164 and amicus curiae intervention is covered under paragraph 2, 
yet they both fall under the heading of Article 36 which is entitled ‘Third Party 
Intervention’.65   
Both procedures – as practiced before international courts and tribunals – are 
primarily inspired by the common law tradition. 66  In general, the amicus curiae 
procedure is confined to allowing third parties to solely submit a written brief, and assist 
a court as ‘a friend’ by bringing relevant and helpful information to the attention of the 
tribunal.67 Third-party intervention on the other hand is understood in the sense to bring a 
                                                 
59 See for instance the amicus curiae submission of: The American Iron and Steel Institute and the Speciality 
Steel Industry of North America in the WTO dispute of Hot-Rolled Lead infra note 1042; the US Chamber of 
Commerce’s in United Parcel Service v. Canada, infra note 515; the Study Center for Sustainable Finance in 
Apotex v. United States, described as ‘the research and development arm of the Business Neatness Magnanimity 
BNM srl’ – a consulting firm. See Apotex v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Procedural Order 
on the Participation of the Applicant, Bnm, as a Non-Disputing Party of 4 March 2013, at 8.  
60 See supra note 41. 
61 In particular, see Part I – Section 3. Also, it is worthy to note here that, notwithstanding this procedural 
commonality, substantive considerations would need to be taken into account when assessing the adequacy and 
relevance of applying the amicus or third party intervention procedures to each of those actors. It would largely 
exceed the scope of this research if it were to undertake such a substantive analysis. Although some of those 
actors will be mentioned at times, the focus here will be primarily on civil society. 
62 See generally Yves Fortier’s commentary on the UPS decision covering both the amicus curiae and third party 
intervention  procedures, Y. Fortier and S. Drymer, infra note 323. 
63 ECHR, infra note 844.  
64 Article 36(1) allows contracting parties to intervene as third parties as follows: ‘In all cases before a Chamber 
or the Grand Chamber, a High Contracting Party one of whose nationals is an applicant shall have the right to 
submit written comments and to take part in hearings’. Ibid (our emphasis). 
65 By contrast, Article 36(2) allows third parties to submit amicus curiae briefs as follows: ‘The President of the 
Court may, in the interest of the proper administration of justice, invite any High Contracting Party which is not 
a party to the proceedings or any person concerned who is not the applicant to submit written comments or take 
part in hearings’. The wording of these two provisions is substantially similar in some key respects, i.e. the 
submittal of written ‘comments’ and taking part in hearings. Yet, it is generally understood that Article 36(2) 
allows amicus curiae submissions, i.e. written briefs aimed at assisting the Court, but rarely does it include leave 
to make oral observations. Ibid (our emphasis); see also A. Zimmermann, supra note 55, at 2. 
66 France noted at an UNCITRAL Working Group session that ‘the [amicus curiae] procedure is…alien to the 
French legal tradition’. See UNCITRAL, Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) – ‘Compilation of 
Comments by Governments’, infra 501. (discussed below). See also M. Majlessi, infra note 110, at 143, S. 
Krislov, infra note 971, at 694, and P. Sands and R. Mackenzie, supra note 55, at para 1. 
67  An amicus curiae is solely entitled to submit a written brief pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency and ICSID Arbitration Rules – i.e. the most relevant set of rules for the purposes of this research. 
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person or entity into litigation as a third party. 68  Third party intervention does not 
necessarily lead to standing – a fundamental point to note for the purposes of this 
research.69 As will be shown, third party intervenors may act as ‘parties’ or as ‘non-
parties’ depending on their stake in, and the circumstances of, a given dispute. Third 
party intervention as a ‘party’ is often referred to as third party ‘joinder’ whereby ‘joined’ 
third parties gain equivalent procedural rights as disputing parties, i.e. they become a 
party to a dispute. Third party intervention as a ‘non-party’ generally allows intervenors 
to access relevant case materials, submit arguments of fact and law both in oral and 
written form in a similar – but not equal – manner as disputing parties since they are 
typically confined to specific aspects of a dispute and not its entirety.  
More fundamentally, third party intervention is not solely confined to the 
‘assistance of a court as a friend’ through the mere submission of a written brief. Rather, 
once admitted, a third party intervenor has the right to be heard albeit only with regard to 
the specific subject matter of its intervention.70  Third party intervention is generally 
underlying to a third party’s ‘direct’, ‘substantial’ or ‘legal’ interest. 71  By contrast, 
amicus curiae intervention is underlying to a ‘broader’ yet ‘significant’ public interest to 
a given dispute, i.e. a lesser degree of interest than third party intervention. 72  The 
question as to the determination of whether such interest exists and its characterization, 
i.e. whether it is ‘broad’ or ‘direct’, depends of course on a prospective intervenor’s 
allegations as well as a tribunal’s assessment of the facts and circumstances of a case 
before it. In addition, it may be predetermined ipso facto by virtue of a treaty-based right 
                                                                                                                                                 
See article 4(2), UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, infra note 414; and article 37(2), ICSID Arbitration Rules, 
infra note 411. 
68 Ibid., at 1442, 1518. 
69  On the notion of standing before international tribunals, see A. Del Vecchio, ‘International Courts and 
Tribunals, Standing’, (2010) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 
70 A. Zimmermann, supra note 55, at 13. 
71 See E. Triantafilou, supra note 18.  
72 Philippe Sands argues that ‘amicus briefs are more likely to be accepted when submitted in cases involving 
broader issues relating to, for example, the environment, human rights, or essential public services’. See P. 
Sands and R. Mackenzie, supra note 55, at para 2, 31 (our emphasis). In the same vein, Laura van den Eynde 
posits that ‘[t]he amicus can also inform the court of the broader consequences of the cases, by showing the 
potential implications of a decision or to point out unintended consequences for people or groups not party to the 
suit’ (our emphasis). See L. van den Eynde, ‘An Empirical Look at the Amicus Curiae Practice of Human Rights 
NGOs Before the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013), 31:3 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 271, 
at 274. See also P. Palchetti, infra note 1153, at 181. 
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– as set forth for instance under Article 36(1) of the ECHR or a number of BITs or IIAs 
as will be further discussed subsequently.73  
3. Approach and methodology  
i. Research approach 
This research adopts a comparative approach to international law. It considers the 
international law on foreign investment as part of public international law, and therefore, 
it adheres to a systemic approach to international law as a ‘single and ‘unified’ body of 
law.74 According to the ILC, ‘international law is a legal system and that its rules and 
principles act in relation to, and should be interpreted against the background of, other 
rules and principles’.75 This research thus looks at international law as a cohesive system 
where each branch may overlap or complement the other – a view taken by various 
investor-state tribunals including most notably in the landmark case of AAPL v. Sri Lanka. 
The AAPL tribunal indeed found that the Sri Lanka-United Kingdom BIT ‘is not a self-
contained closed legal system’.76 By way of illustration, there is a compelling inter-
                                                 
73 See Part III – Section 4.2.2. 
74 In the Diallo case, Judge Greenwood declared that ‘international law is not a series of fragmented specialist 
and self-contained bodies of law, each of which functions in isolation from the others; it is a single, unified 
system of law and each international court can, and should, draw on the jurisprudence of other international 
courts and tribunals, even though it is not bound necessarily to come to the same conclusions’; see Diallo case, 
Judgement of 19 June 2012, infra note 359, at para 8. The proposition that international law is a ‘system’ that is 
‘more than just disconnected rules’ is also widely held in international law doctrine, see J. Crawford, Chance, 
Order, Change: The Course of International Law – General Course on Public International Law (2014), at 181 
et seq. On the proposition that the international law on foreign investment is part of that system, see M. 
Sornarajah, infra note 221, at 78-79; T. Ishikawa, infra note 108, at 376; J. Maupin, supra note 48, at 4; and R. 
Lorz, ‘Fragmentation, Consolidation, and the Future Relationship Between International Investment Law and 
General International Law’, in F. Baetens (ed.), Investment Law within International Law: Integrationist 
Perspectives (2013), at 482 et seq.  
75 The ILC continues by stating that ‘as a legal system, international law is not a random collection of such norms. 
There are meaningful relationships between them’. See ILC, Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law, Report on the work of its Fifty-eighth session, 1 May to 9 June and 3 July to 11 August 2006, available at: 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20Articles/1_9_2006.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014) 
cited in J. Crawford, supra note 74, at 211.  
76 The tribunal in LG&E et al. v. The Argentine Republic also came to a similar conclusion with respect to the 
Argentina-United States BIT by find that ‘as the tribunal concluded in the Asian Agricultural Products, Ltd. 
(AAPL) v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Award of June 27, 1990 … the [Sri Lanka-United 
Kingdom BIT] is not a self-contained closed legal system limited to provide for substantive material rules of 
direct applicability, but it has to be envisaged within a wider juridical context in which rules from other sources 
are integrated through implied incorporation methods, or by direct reference to certain supplementary rules, 
whether of international law character or of domestic law nature’. See LG&E et al. v. The Argentine Republic, 
infra note 138, at 97 citing Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, infra note 103, at 
21. 
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linkage between international human rights law and the international law on foreign 
investment.77 They are not, in the words of Judge Bruno Simma, ‘separate worlds’.78 
Both in fact aim to protect the individual – as the ‘ultimate’ subject of international law79 
– against wrongful state conduct.80  
The rules and practice of the international jurisdictions addressed in this research 
differ to a substantial extent. Looking at the jurisdictions of interest to the present 
research from a comparative standpoint may be considered as imperfect in a number of 
ways. Indeed, each of these jurisdictions has arguably unique mandates, rules and 
practice. The main common feature between the ICJ, WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, IACtHR, ECtHR, and ACHPR is that they are international jurisdictions. 
Relatively significant importance is also afforded to US court practice. 
It is indeed of fundamental importance to note that the amicus curiae procedure 
had been in fact initially ‘transposed’ by investor-state tribunals from other international 
                                                 
77 This argument is not only brought forward with respect to the interlinkage between international human rights 
law and the international law on foreign investment, but also EU law and the international law on foreign 
investment as manifestly highlighted by the arbitrations of, inter alia, AES Summit Generation Limited and 
AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, supra note 58; and Ioan Micula et al. v. Romania; supra note 
58 where the EU Commission intervened as amicus curiae in order to address, amongst other issues, potential 
conflicts between its mandate and regulatory prescriptions on the one hand and both tribunals’ jurisdiction and 
application of the Energy Charter Treaty, i.e. the applicable IIA to these investor-state arbitrations, on the other. 
See also E. Triantafilou, supra note 18; V. Prislan, infra note 82, at 452-455. 
78 See B. Simma, infra note 196, at 576. In a similar vein, the UN Human Rights Council designated John Ruggie 
as a Special Representative of the Secretary General on ‘the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other enterprises’, with a mandate to articulate the link between business – including foreign investment – 
and human rights. See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises  (2011), available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/TransCorporations/A.HRC.17.32.pdf (last accessed 04 December 2013). 
79 J. Crawford, supra note 74, at 211 citing H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1950), at 70.  
80  Both systems are namely aimed at strengthening the international rule of law, which is essential to the 
protection and promotion of human rights as well as foreign investment and trade. Their common principles 
include, inter alia, the fair and equitable treatment, non-discrimination, freedom of movement and expression, a 
right to recourse and access to justice, a fair trial and compensation against arbitrary conduct, in other words, 
principles that are essential to any individual, organization, or foreign investor. The concept of the rule of law 
also implies an expectation for transparency on the decision making and regulatory fronts, stability, clarity, 
predictability, a rejection of arbitrariness, and publicity. In fact, international economic organizations such as the 
IMF, the World Bank and the WTO systematically promote the rule of law on both the domestic and 
international levels. This is particularly reflected in the context of China’s accession to the WTO, which was 
conditional upon the implementation of measures aimed at strengthening areas such as intellectual property 
protection but also substantial judicial reforms that have had a positive impact on human rights. See B. Simma, 
infra note 196, at 576; S. Tully, Corporations and International Lawmaking (2007), at 107, 306; W. Benedek, 
‘The WTO and Human Rights’, in W. Benedek et al. (eds.), Economic globalisation and human rights (2007), at 
152; D. Schneiderman, infra note 304, at 3; and R. Bratspies, infra note 620, at 242. In that respect, this research 
also discusses the access to justice that is granted to foreign investors by investor-state tribunals and the 
protection afforded against denial of justice before domestic courts. In particular, see Part III – Section 2.2.1. 
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jurisdictions and was precisely inspired by its manifestation under US court practice.81 
When deciding as to whether to accept amicus curiae petitions, investor-state tribunals 
also had to thoroughly consider the practice of other international and domestic 
jurisdictions. The same rationale could potentially apply to third party intervention. In the 
absence of any formal rules, a novel and theoretical approach to civil society access in 
investor-state tribunals as a third party intervenor requires a closer look at how third party 
intervention is regulated in other jurisdictions. This research therefore follows a 
comparative approach that is often undertaken by investor-state tribunals themselves.82  
Regarding the choice of jurisdictions of interest, the ICJ, WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, IACtHR, ECtHR, ACHPR were chosen because they deal with the most 
relevant areas of international law for the purposes of this research, i.e. public 
international law, international law on foreign investment, international trade law and 
international human rights law. It is precisely for this reason that other jurisdictions, 
concerned with different bodies of international law, that allow non-state actor access 
were not included in this analysis. These include the Central American Court of Justice,83 
the European Court of Justice, 84  the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS)85 or the ECOWAS Court.86 Other international organs, such as the UN Human 
                                                 
81  On the relevance of domestic public law practice to investor-state arbitration, including US law, see also A. 
Asteriti, C. Tams, infra note 402, at 817.  
82  Investor-state tribunals’ comparative approach will be highlighted throughout this research. Some have 
referred to this practice as ‘judicial borrowing’, see V. Prislan, ‘Non-Investment Obligations in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: Towards a Greater Role for States?’, in F. Baetens (ed.), Investment Law within International 
Law: Integrationist Perspectives (2013), at 450-451. 
83 Established in 1907, the Court allows individuals to file claims against member-states (other than their national 
state). Indeed, Article 22 of its Statute states that: ‘The Court’s competence includes the following… (c) To hear, 
at the request of any interested party, any matter related to the legal, regulatory or administrative provisions or 
any other type of rules prescribed by a state, when such provisions or rules affect the conventions, treaties or any 
other norm of the Law of Central American Integration, or the agreements or resolutions of its organs or 
organisms’. See Statute of the Central American Court of Justice, entered into force 02 February 1994, 34 I.L.M 
921 (1995), available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20698470.pdf?acceptTC=true&acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true (last 
accessed 06 October 2014). For an extensive analysis on the Court’s mandate and functions, see F. Francioni, 
infra note 882, at 16.   
84 The European Court of Justice ensures the application and interpretation of EU law. It allows member States 
and in princple to ‘any other person which can establish an interest in the result of a case submitted to the Court’. 
See Article 40, Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, published 30 March 2010, available at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/statut_2008-09-25_17-29-58_783.pdf . 
85 Companies and nationals of state-parties have access to the Seabed Dispute Chamber of ITLOS. In certain 
instances, both ‘a State Party or an entity other than a State Party’ may avail itself of the right of intervention. 
That said, ITLOS deals with a specific area of international law that is somewhat remote to this research’s 
interest, which is the main reason why it has not been addressed further. In any event, there have not been 
significant developments at ITLOS with respect to that question. See United Nations Convention on the Law of 
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Rights Committee, 87  the World Bank’s Inspection Panel 88  and the OECD National 
Contact Points 89  were not included because they constitute non-adjudicatory 
mechanisms.90 
ii. Research methodology  
This research globally focuses on the international law on foreign investment91 as 
well as relevant aspects of international trade law, 92  public international law and 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Sea, entered into force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261 (1982), Article 32, Annex VI; and 
Article 100 of the Rules of Tribunal (ITLOS/8), as amended on 17 March 2009, available at: 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic_texts/Itlos_8_E_17_03_09.pdf (last accessed 06 October 
2014). See also E. De Brabandere, infra note 852, at 90; F. O. Vicuña, ‘Individuals and Non-State Entities before 
International Courts and Tribunals’, (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 53, at 58. 
86  The ACHPR was chosen rather than ECOWAS because the latter has primarily an economic mandate 
restricted to the geographic area of fifteen West-African states, and has only recently started considering cases 
involving human rights violations, i.e. cases where civil society is more prone to intervene. In these cases, the 
ECOWAS Court referred to provisions of the Banjul Charter, which is the treaty establishing the ACHPR. See 
A.O. Enabulele, ‘Reflections on the ECOWAS Community Court Protocol and the Constitutions of member 
States’, (2010) 12 International Community Law Review 111, at 113-114. Also, for the purposes of the present 
research, those three jurisdictions shall be collectively referred to as ‘international human rights jurisdictions’. 
87  The UN Human Rights Committee is a UN body that monitors compliance to the ICCPR. It also has 
competence to receive individual complaints pursuant to the First Option Protocol, which states in Article 1 that: 
‘A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the 
Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be 
victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication shall 
be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party to the present 
Protocol’. See UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 19 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3bf0.html  last accessed 6 March 2014). See also M. Scheinin, ‘Access to 
Justice before International Human Rights Bodies: Reflections on the Practice of the UN Human Rights 
Committee and European Court of Human Rights’ in F. Francioni (ed.), Access to Justice as a Human Right 
(2007). 
88 The Panel is an accountability mechanism established by the World Bank’s Board of Directors in 1993. It aims 
to address the social impact of the Bank’s financing activities by providing adversely affected communities a 
forum where they could lodge complaints. See World Bank Inspection Panel website, available at: 
http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/AboutUs.aspx (last accessed 06 October 2014). See also F. 
Francioni, infra note 882, at 19. 
89 The OECD National Contact Points constitute an implementation mechanism to the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, and handle complaints against companies that have allegedly failed to adhere to 
Guidelines’ standards by providing a multi-stakeholder a mediation and conciliation platform. See P. Protopsaltis, 
‘La mise en oeuvre des Principes directeurs de l’OCDE à l’intention des entreprises multinationales: Réflexions 
sur le nouveau mandat des Points de contact nationaux’, (2005) 7 International Law FORUM du droit 
international 251, and D. Collins, infra note 593.  
90 Yet, they could have been deemed as relevant in the sense that those organs are open as well to non-state actors 
and often deal with human rights and foreign investment issues.  
91 This research adheres to Sornarajah’s definition of international law on foreign investment, which is comprised 
of international law norms concerned with the regulation of the transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one 
state to another for the purpose of their use in that state to generate wealth under the total or partial control of the 
owner of the assets. These norms are enshrined in both treaty law (e.g. in BITs) as well as customary 
international law (e.g. protection of foreign investors against denial of justice emanates from customary 
international law). Also, as apparent from the research’s title, it is worthy to emphasize that this research does not 
look into contract-based investor-state arbitration. See M. Sornarajah, infra note 221, at 8. 
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international human rights law. 93  The analysis under each Part is grounded on an 
extensive body of international treaties and jurisprudence, relevant academic literature 
and other publications including those of international organizations such as UNCTAD or 
ECOSOC. The courts and tribunals of interest were all established through various 
treaties and conventions that set out the law and procedure applicable thereto. Concerning 
the foreign investment realm, this research primarily focuses on treaties entered into by 
states, i.e. IIAs or BITs, which set forth the law governing investment promotion and 
protection as well as the underlying dispute settlement mechanisms. The peculiarity here 
is that these treaties do in turn refer to various possibilities for arbitration under, for 
instance, the UNCITRAL’s rules or ICSID’s as norms governing strictly procedural 
aspects. Investor-state tribunals constituted pursuant to these rules then play a crucial role 
in interpreting IIAs or BITs as well as the UNCITRAL and ICSID arbitration rules. It is 
precisely for this reason that this research affords substantial attention to the decisions of 
investor-state tribunals – particularly those relating to the acceptance of amicus curiae 
and dismissal of third party intervention petitions. It is worthy to recall here that, pursuant 
to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, decisions of international jurisdictions are subsidiary 
sources of international law.94 
Part I is thus primarily concerned with the international law on foreign investment 
as contained in treaty provisions, interpreted by investor-state tribunals and commented 
in academic literature. Part I also addresses soft law principles and standards, i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                 
92 ‘International trade law’ is generally used interchangeably with the term ‘international economic law’. It is 
argued that the term has practically become synonymous to WTO law – which fits with this research’s usage of 
the term for the purposes of this study. See M. Majlessi, infra note 110, at 13.  
93 The international human rights referred to in this research are essentially contained in the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, infra note 672, international treaties and conventions, most notably including the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force 23 March 1976, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171 (‘ICCPR’), or the 1966 Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(‘ICESCR’), infra note 672, non-binding instruments such as UN General Assembly resolutions, or in other 
words soft law instruments (e.g. the UN General Assembly Resolution on ‘The Human Right to Water and 
Sanitation’, infra note 689), and regional instruments such as the ECHR, infra note 844, or Banjul Charter, infra 
note 845.  
94 Article 38 of the ICJ Statute states that: ‘1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a). international conventions, whether general 
or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b). international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c). the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d). subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. (2). This provision 
shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto’ (our 
emphasis). See Statute of the International Court of Justice, entry into force 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7 
(‘ICJ Statute’).  
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formulated in international non-binding instruments and declarations essentially relating 
to principles on environmental protection, human rights such as the right to water, and 
indigenous rights.95 These are for the most part non-binding resolutions and declarations 
adopted by states under the auspices of international organizations such as the UN. They 
include the UNCED 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,96 Agenda 
21, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,97 or the various General 
Comments of human rights treaty bodies such as the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR)’s General Comments on the right to water. 98 Although soft 
law instruments cannot be deemed as sources of international law for the purposes of 
Article 38 of the ICJ’s Statute, they remain nonetheless pertinent as states do refer to 
them, and in some cases adopt soft law standards and principles in their constitutions, 
thereby recognizing their importance. 99  In addition, they may open the door for the 
interpretation of relevant treaty provisions as well as clarify the obligations of parties 
thereto.100 More fundamentally, for present purposes, soft law standards and principles 
shed light on the potential for conciliation – or conflict – between state obligations vis-à-
vis foreign investment protection on the one hand and securing the welfare of their 
citizens on the other.  
Because Part II sets out this research’s comparative study, it focuses on other 
international law instruments in addition to those relevant to the international law on 
                                                 
95 Those rights are discussed in further details under Part II – Section 3. 
96 UNCED, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 
(1992), available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm (last accessed 06 
October 2014).  
97 See UNDRIP, infra note 762. 
98 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 15: The Right to 
Water (Art. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), infra note 685. 
99 For instance, in the WTO Shrimps dispute (which will be examines in further detail below), the United States 
argued that the need for the use of turtle excluder devices (TEDs) – aimed at protecting sea turtles from harmful 
shrimp fishing – was consistent with the international community’s recognition to protect endangered species. In 
order to support its argument, which ultimately aimed at justifying the prohibition of the importation of shrimps 
fished in a manner that poses danger to sea turtles, the United States namely referred to paragraph 17.46(c) of 
Agenda 21. Paragraph 17.46(c) states that: ‘States commit themselves to the conservation and sustainable use of 
marine living resources on the high seas. To this end, it is necessary to… Promote the development and use of 
selective fishing gear and practices that minimize waste in the catch of target species and minimize by-catch of 
non-target specie’. See Report of the Panel, Shrimps case, infra note 1018, at para 7.57. See also Agenda 21, 
Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., UN Doc A/Conf.151/26 (1992), 
available at: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf (last accessed 06 October 
2014) (‘Agenda 21’). See also D.A. Dam-De Jong, International Law and Governance of Natural Resources in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations (2013), at 38.  
100 Ibid.  
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foreign investment, including in the areas of international human rights law and 
international trade law. It also looks at certain aspects of Canadian and US law regarding 
the regulation of amicus curiae and third party interventions.  
Part III then considers how third party intervention could apply in investor-state 
arbitration. It thus looks back at relevant legal norms discussed in Part I and Part II while 
essentially focusing on procedural aspects of the international law on foreign investment.  
4. Structure  
This research is divided into three main Parts discussing: ‘The Function and 
Modalities of Civil Society Before Investor-State Tribunals’ (Part I); ‘The Function and 
Modalities of Civil Society Before other Jurisdictions’ (Part II); and ‘An Enhanced Role 
for Civil Society Before Investor-State Tribunals?’ (Part III).  
Part I embarks on an exhaustive understanding of the current regulation of civil 
society’s role within investor-state disputes. An appreciation for the relevance of such 
role requires a discussion of the public interest issues at stake. This section thus aims at 
defining what is understood by the ‘public interest’, depict the interplay between these 
issues and states’ obligations towards foreign investors, as well as the potential 
obligations of the latter. It will be argued that the framework of foreign investment 
promotion and protection has been often criticized as imbalanced, particularly due to its 
ambiguousness concerning the validity of host states’ regulatory measures aimed at 
upholding the public interest in general. More fundamentally, this section sheds light on 
the absence of third party stakeholder representation in investor-state arbitration as part of 
such criticism. Part I then looks at the rules governing civil society’s access to investor-
state arbitration from a procedural standpoint. It traces these rules back to their inception 
as well as their foundation on international commercial arbitration rules, and thus 
highlights the changes that have occurred since. It will be argued there that public interest 
imperatives, and the criticism of imbalance emphasized previously, were underlying to 
these changes and ultimately lead to the acceptance of civil society within investor-state 
disputes as amicus curiae. The arguments raised by civil society as amicus curiae are 
then scrutinized. These arguments are often grounded on the protection of the 
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environment, the promotion of human rights including indigenous as well as minority 
rights or other public policy concerns – from the standpoint of stakeholders affected by 
investor-state disputes. Having extensively discussed the relevant rules and the case law, 
an appraisal of civil society’s role would then be merited, both on the procedural and 
substantive levels. More specifically Part I is divided into the following sections: 
 Following introductory remarks, the aim of Section 1 (‘Identifying the ‘public 
interest’ in an investor-state arbitration context’) – is to illustrate the peculiarity of 
investor-state arbitration in light of foreign investment protection on one hand; 
and the public interest on the other. Again, this sets the context to the rationale 
behind the gradual acceptance of civil society’s role in investor-state arbitration – 
as opposed to international commercial arbitration where it is a priori viewed as 
irrelevant. 
 Section 2 (‘Procedural rules governing civil society’s participation as amicus 
curiae’) – highlights the acceptance of civil society’s amicus curiae role as a 
means to positively address the peculiarity of investor-state arbitration; again, in 
light of the often significant public interest issues at stake. 
 Section 3 (‘From theory to practice: Investor-state tribunals’ regulation of amicus 
curiae participation’) – highlights that the regulation, and therefore, the 
acceptance of the amicus curiae procedure is currently a fait accompli in 
international investment arbitration.  
 Section 4 (‘Civil society participation: Where procedure intertwines with 
substance’) – explores arguments put forward by amici curiae in past cases in 
order to shed light on both the content and purpose of amicus submissions.  
 Section 5 (‘An appraisal of civil society’s amicus curiae role’) – explores both the 
procedural and substantive repercussions triggered hitherto by civil society’s role 
as amicus curiae. 
 Section 6 (‘Concluding remarks’) – highlights that the acceptance of the amicus 
curiae is a benchmark position, a no-turning-back point which paves the way for 
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this research to consider whether a further enhanced role could be conceived to 
the benefit of civil society in investor-state arbitration. 
Part II examines the modalities available to civil society before a wide array of 
jurisdictions. The idea behind this Part is to shed light on the differences, both conceptual 
and practical, between such modalities. In essence, it shows that civil society may be 
granted (i) standing either as a victim of human rights violations or a representative of 
victims, i.e. through actio popularis; (ii) the status of an assistant to the court or, in other 
words, amicus curiae; (iii) access as a third party intervenor. The latter is, however, 
peculiar given that civil society does not benefit of such access before any international 
jurisdiction. The aim of Part II is thus to shed light on the broad spectrum of access to 
justice modalities through the prism of civil society participation. More specifically, Part 
II is divided into the following sections: 
 Following introductory remarks, Section 1 (‘Absent, but not entirely: Indirect 
participation at the ICJ’) – highlights the ICJ’s practice vis-à-vis non-state actors 
in general, and civil society in particular. The aim of this section is to show that 
civil society benefits from a heavily restricted, if not any, access to the ICJ.  
 Section 2 (‘Standing for civil society – A look at international human rights 
jurisdictions’) – sheds light on the concept of standing. Civil society may act as a 
claimant before international human rights jurisdictions to defend rights that are 
recognized under international human rights conventions. The aim of this section 
is to show that standing as a party is the highest degree of access to justice 
available to civil society in international adjudication and to shed light on the 
requirements for such access.  
 Section 3 (‘What is a ‘friend of the court’? – A cross-jurisdictional perspective 
outside the realm of investor-state arbitration’) – will flesh out the features of 
amicus curiae participation in a wide array of jurisdictions. It shows that an 
amicus is far from being considered as a party to proceedings.  
 Section 4 (‘The peculiar case of third party intervention’) – addresses a procedural 
modality that has not been extensively explored in the literature. This section aims 
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at showing that third party intervention lies somewhere between standing and 
amicus participation. It sheds light on the characteristics of this procedure and 
looks at how it is regulated by various courts and tribunals. This is a necessary 
prelude to the discussion in Part III on civil society’s third party intervention 
petitions to investor-state tribunals.  
Part III finally delves into civil society’s potential within investor-state disputes. It 
first identifies the limitations of the amicus curiae procedure from a holistic standpoint. 
Part III then explores civil society’s third party intervention petitions including 
underlying access to justice arguments. It will be posited that, if construed on the basis of 
‘non-party’ intervention, the procedure of third-party intervention could potentially 
present a viable enhancement to the amicus curiae procedure. More specifically Part III is 
divided into the following sections: 
 Following introductory remarks, Section 1 (‘Transcending amicus curiae 
submissions’) – highlights the fundamental differences that exist between the 
amicus curiae procedure on the one hand; and the third party intervention 
procedure on the other by looking at the advantages and disadvantages of both 
from a cross-jurisdictional standpoint. 
 Section 2 (‘Could there be a basis for civil society’s third party intervention?’) – 
questions whether the access to justice principle might constitute the basis for 
broader civil society participation in investor-state disputes – as in fact argued by 
civil society, i.e. whether civil society is entitled to standing before investor-state 
tribunals as before international human rights jurisdictions.  
 Section 3 (‘Potential regulation of third party intervention in investor-state 
disputes’) – looks at the potential modalities for third party intervention in 
investor-state arbitration as well as the underlying procedural and substantive 
challenges.   
 Section 4 (‘Concluding remarks’) – argues that when the ‘direct’ interests of third 
party stakeholders are at stake, and not merely their ‘broader’ interests, there 
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could be a compelling need to secure a more expansive role for civil society in 
investor-state arbitration.  
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PART I: THE FUNCTION AND MODALITIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
PARTICIPATION BEFORE INVESTOR-STATE TRIBUNALS 
Introductory remarks 
The contemporary international framework on foreign investment protection is 
primarily contained in relatively recent international investment agreements (IIAs) as 
well as bilateral investment treaties (BITs).101 States have entered into over 3,000 such 
treaties to date and have, as a result, effectively created a foreign investment ‘regime’.102 
These treaties set forth principles and standards on foreign investment promotion and 
protection. They also systematically allow disputes between investors from contracting 
home-states and contracting host states to be referred to arbitration as a peaceful, non-
politicized, means for dispute settlement. 103  In the wake of an ever-increasingly 
globalized economy,104 states appreciated the necessity to create such a dispute settlement 
                                                 
101 Although the ‘[r]ules of law on foreign investment can be traced back to the early days of colonization and 
European domination’. See N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties in an 
Interdependent World (1995), at 161. See also P. Muchlinski, ‘The Changing Face of Transnational Business 
Governance: Private Corporate Law Liability and Accountability of Transnational Groups in a Post-Financial 
Crisis World’, (2011) 18:2 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 665, at 666. See also most notably J. Stiglitz, 
Making globalisation work (2006), and M. Sornarajah, supra note 8, at 335. In addition, it is worthy to note that 
BITs are often construed as ‘Free Trade Agreements’ (FTAs).  
102 There were over 900 IIAs and BITs at the start of the 1990s. UNCTAD 2014 figures indicate that there are 
now 2,784 BITs and 340 IIAs. See UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last accessed 06 October 2014). See also M. Sornarajah, supra note 8, 
at 337, A. Van Duzer, infra note 171, at 688. See also United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, entered 
into force on January 1, 2005, available at: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/australian-fta (last accessed  06 October 2014). 
103 The first award to be rendered in such disputes only dates back to 1990. See Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. 
(AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3), Final award of 27 June 1990. On the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, see J. Merrils, International Dispute Settlement (1998), at 285; J. Crawford, supra note 74, 
at 183; C. Brower and S. Blanchard, supra note 8, at 696. Also, Article 33 of the UN Charter provides that ‘the 
parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice’; see United 
Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. The pacific settlement of international 
disputes is also the primary mandate of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (‘PCA’), which deals with both inter-
state as well as investor-state disputes; see the founding conventions of the PCA, the 1899 and 1907 The Hague 
Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, infra note 1132. 
104 Globalization as a phenomenon intrinsically relates to the generally systematic and exponential increase in 
foreign investment flows worldwide. Braun argues that ‘foreign direct investment is one of, if not the, most 
important force driving economic globalization’ and that ‘globalization has given rise to a uniquely structured 
regulatory framework in international law that governs foreign direct investment’. In this regard, the author cites 
the 18-fold increase in foreign direct investment flows between 1980 and 2005 when it reached $10.1 trillion. 
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mechanism as a tool to scrutinize host state conduct vis-à-vis foreign investors.105 This 
was seen as instrumental in attracting foreign investment, which is in turn widely 
recognized as a powerful catalyst for development. 106 Through investor-state arbitration, 
states have effectively bestowed upon foreign investors the right to access international 
justice – a peculiar development in international law that mirrors the enhanced access of 
individuals before international human rights jurisdictions.107 Over the past quarter of a 
century, foreign investors have regularly resorted to investor-state arbitration to allege 
violations of their internationally protected rights and seek damages for the resulting 
losses they have incurred.  
Now from a procedural standpoint, IIAs or BITs often refer to the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules or ICSID Arbitration Rules for the initiation and conduct of arbitration 
proceedings.108 These rules had been primarily inspired by the model of international 
commercial arbitration whereby two disputing parties appoint an arbitral tribunal to 
consensually and privately settle their dispute. 109  Under this model, investment 
transactions were deemed as ‘relationships of a commercial nature’.110 Yet, this private 
dispute settlement model has faced destabilizing pressures from third parties. In certain 
                                                                                                                                                 
See T. Rudolf Braun, ‘Globalization: The Driving Force in International Investment Law’, in M. Waibel et al. 
(eds), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration, at 492, 502. 
105 See B. Kingsbury and S. Schill, ‘Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, 
Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law’, (2009) NYU School of Law, Public Law 
Research Paper No. 09-46. See also A. Von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, infra note 162, at 69, 72; C. Brower and S. 
Blanchard, supra note 8, at 697. 
106 Supra note 8. 
107 F. Francioni, infra note 847, at 731; J. Paulsson, Denial of justice in international law (2005), at 28, 55; and P. 
Dumberry, infra note 221, at 112.  
108  That said, there are various other procedural regimes that could potentially govern treaty-based investor-state 
arbitration under the rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, or the 
International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration, for instance. See Article 26, Energy 
Charter Treaty, infra note 606. For further commentary, see T. Ishikawa, ‘Third Party Participation in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration’, (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 373, at 373. 
109 The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration captures the essence of this model and 
provides a reference for domestic legislation. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
24 ILM 1302 (1985), available at: http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/06-
54671_Ebook.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014) (the ‘UNCITRAL Model Law’). 
110 Article 1(1), ibid; M. Majlessi, A Balancing Act: A Framework For Participation of Non- State Actors in the 
World Trade Organization (2008), at 13. Separately, international commercial matters are for instance well-
reflected in most of UNIDROIT’s instruments. UNIDROIT was established in 1926 under the umbrella of the 
League of Nations. It is concerned with the harmonization of private and in particular commercial law by 
formulating uniform law instruments, principles and rules. Those include the: UNIDROIT Convention on 
Agency in the International Sale of Goods, 22 ILM 249 (1983); UNIDROIT 2010 Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts, available at: http://www.unidroit.org/overview-principles-2010 (last accessed 06 October 
2014); UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring, 27 ILM 943 (1988); or UNIDROIT Convention on 
International Financial Leasing, 2321 UNTS 195; 27 ILM 931 (1988). 
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instances, investor-state tribunals received, and accepted, petitions by civil society actors 
to participate in proceedings, as amici curiae or third-party intervenors, where investors’ 
claims closely related to the ‘public interest’.111  
Against this background, Part I aims at fleshing out the underlying considerations 
to the acceptance, and ensuing regulation, of civil society’s procedural role in investor-
state disputes as amicus curiae. There is a need to first understand the nature of such 
disputes and the extent to which they could potentially affect the public 
interest (Section 1). This sets the context to the gradual acceptance and regulation of civil 
society’s role as amicus curiae from a procedural standpoint, which in turn led to the 
formalization of that role under UNCITRAL and ICSID arbitration rules, guidelines by 
NAFTA bodies, as well as provisions under newly signed BITs (Section 2). The rules on, 
and regulation of, amicus curiae participation are complemented by extensive analysis by 
investor-state tribunals on the matter (Section 3). A more substantive approach is then 
warranted in order to grasp the rationale behind civil society’s participation. Here, there 
is a need to identify the environmental protection, human rights, and other public policy 
arguments raised by civil society in investor-state disputes, as well as – more 
fundamentally – their relevance to the latter (Section 4). Part I concludes with an 
appraisal of civil society’s role as an amicus curiae on both the procedural and 
substantive levels (Section 5). This will ultimately set the stage for a consideration of 
whether there is a basis to explore the enhancement of the amicus curiae role under Part 
III.   
1. Identifying the ‘public interest’ in an investor-state arbitration context 
Detractors of investor-state dispute settlement say it curtails states’ ability to 
‘regulate in the public interest’.112 Proponents claim that ‘the posited conflict between the 
current system of foreign investment protection and the public interest is largely 
                                                 
111 Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra  note 428, at para 49. 
112 E. Warren, ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership clause everyone should oppose’, Washington Post, 25 February 
2015, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-
pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html (last accessed 1 March 
2015).  
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illusory’. 113  The ‘public interest’ seems to lie at the heart of the debate over the 
legitimacy of investor-state dispute settlement, even more so in light of the ongoing 
negotiations between the EU and the United States over the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP).114 Civil society primarily seeks to intervene in public 
interest-related investor-state arbitrations. So this raises the need to answer the following 
preliminary, yet pivotal, question: what exactly is the ‘public interest’ identified by the 
Methanex tribunal?  
In this light, a closer look at the ‘public interest’ aspect of investor-state disputes 
is merited (Section 1.1), the regulatory framework defining state responsibility towards 
foreign investors and obligations of the latter (Section 1.2), as well as detailed examples 
of some of the earlier investor-state disputes that have touched upon public interest issues 
and where incidentally civil society was not involved (Section 1.3). This is finally 
followed by a discussion on the criticism triggered by investor-state tribunals’ decisions 
in these disputes (Section 1.4).115  
The purpose of this section is not to set out an exhaustive survey of foreign 
investors’ rights under the international law on foreign investment, nor to argue on the 
existence of potential quid pro quo obligations towards host states’ populations. Rather, it 
attempts to illustrate the peculiarity of investor-state arbitration in light of the need to 
secure foreign investment protection on one hand, and uphold the public interest on the 
other. Again, this sets the context to the rationale behind the gradual acceptance of civil 
society’s role in investor-state arbitration as opposed to international commercial 
arbitration where it is a priori viewed as irrelevant.116  
                                                 
113 C. Brower and S. Blanchard, supra note 8, at 720. 
114  On the TTIP, see European Commission Concept Paper, Cecilia Malmström, supra note 17. 
115 It is worthy to note here that the investor-state disputes mentioned in this section have for the most part been 
adjudicated over a decade ago, and therefore, they may not necessarily reflect the current state of the 
international law on foreign investment. However, understanding the criticism made at the time in respect of 
these disputes should effectively contextualize, and set the background to, the subsequent acceptance of civil 
society’s role as amicus curiae in investor-state arbitration. 
116 See Part I – Section 2. 
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1.1 A structural stress test: ‘public interest’ pressure on foreign investors’ rights 
and host states’ obligations 
The notion of the ‘public interest’ in an international foreign investment law 
context mirrors to a substantial extent the notion of ‘non-trade concerns’ used in the 
WTO context, i.e. it is a catch-all term that encapsulates many heterogeneous concerns 
and affects many actors.117 These ‘non-trade concerns’ comprise interests were hitherto 
confined to the state’s domestic realm. However, they increasingly transcend it and are 
becoming global concerns not only involving states and inter-state organizations, but also 
other stakeholders and actors including multinationals and civil society. 118  This is a 
phenomenon that may be equally viewed through the prism of economic interests such as 
world trade, foreign investment, financial and capital markets regulation, as well as non-
trade interests such as environmental protection,119 sustainable development120 or human 
rights.121  
There is a broad spectrum through which the public interest could be identified in 
investor-state arbitration. If such spectrum were to be visually conceptualized, the base 
                                                 
117 In a WTO context, ‘non-trade concerns’ include issues which lie beyond the trade and economic spheres that 
WTO policy-making, rules, and dispute settlement have had ramifications upon, and include public health and 
environmental issues amongst others. See Part II I – Section 3.2.2. 
118 L. Logister, ‘Global Governance and Civil Society. Some Reflections on NGO Legitimacy’, (2007) 03:2 
Journal of Global Ethics 165, at 166-167; V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘An Emerging International Public Policy?’, in 
U. Fastenrath, et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (2011), 
at 244, 247; W. Benedek, infra note 661, at 203.  
119 The Aarhus Convention recognizes ‘the importance of the respective roles that individual citizens, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector can play in environmental protection’. See Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 
entered into force 30 October 2011, 2161 UNTS 447; 38 ILM 517 (1999) (the ‘Aarhus Convention’).  
120  Sustainable development translates into the imperative of securing ‘the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. It necessarily requires the avail of those 
responsible for economic development. Indeed, the Brundtland Report defines sustainable development as ‘a 
process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of 
technological development; and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future 
potential to meet human needs and aspirations’. See UN World Commission on Environment and Development, 
Our Common Future, A/42/427/1987, at para 15 (Chapter 2) (‘the Brundtland Report’). See also R. Klager, infra 
note 1252, at 197; see also infra note 661. 
121 Article 18(3) of the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of 
Society states that: ‘Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations also have an important 
role and a responsibility in contributing, as appropriate, to the promotion of the right of everyone to a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
other human rights instruments can be fully realized’. See UN General Assembly, UN Declaration on the Right 
and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, resolution adopted by the General Assembly dated 8 March 1999, 
A/RES/53/144, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f54c14.html (last accessed 27 February 2014). 
See also J. Letnar Černič, infra note 695, at 327. 
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line on the one end would demonstrate that the public may have an interest in a dispute 
settlement process whereby host states, acting exclusively as respondents, could pay 
potentially substantial damages from taxpayer funds to foreign investors, including most 
notably multinational corporations,122 acting exclusively as claimants.123  
The median would reflect a dispute settlement process that deals with substantive 
issues that (i) transcend, or ‘extend far beyond’ – to use the Methanex tribunal’s terms – 
the mere adjudication of host states’ responsibility vis-à-vis foreign investors; and (ii) 
could affect the validity of host states’ measures enacted in the public’s ‘broader’ 
interest.124 The alleged breach could be the result of measures by any host state organs, 
such as provinces or municipalities125 or courts.126 These measures in question are public 
                                                 
122 ‘Multinational corporations’ are often referred to as ‘transnational corporations’, most notably in the UN 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to 
Human Rights. See UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 26 August 2003, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/403f46ec4.html (last accessed 26 February 2014) (the ‘UN Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations’). See also J. Letnar Černič, infra note 695, at 308. On the 
definition of ‘multinationals’, see Article I.4, OECD (2011), OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
OECD Publishing, available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en (last accessed 06 October 2014) (the ‘OECD Guidelines’). See 
Article 6, ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 
adopted 16 November 1977 (revised in 2000), available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:61:0 
(last accessed 06 October 2014) (the ‘ILO Tripartite Declaration’). 
123 Foreign investors acting as claimants, whether corporate entities or individuals, should qualify as having (i) 
engaged in an investment activity within the territory of the state-recipient of the foreign investment, i.e. the 
‘host state’, and (ii) suffered damages that were caused by a breach of the latter’s international responsibilities 
and obligations with respect to foreign investment promotion and protection. Furthermore, Sornarajah defines 
foreign investment as the transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one state to another for the purpose of 
their use in that state to generate wealth under the total or partial control of the owner of the assets. See M. 
Sornarajah, infra note 221, at 8. It is worthy to note here, however, that there is no consensus on the definition of 
‘investment activity’, and that the primary source for determining the scope of such activity should be the 
relevant investment treaty. See also J. Maupin, supra note 48, at 13.  
124 Ibid., at para 49 (our emphasis). 
125 On the applicability of international investment law standards to local governments and municipalities, see 
Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, infra note 273, at para 73. In this case the tribunal noted that a reference to a 
state or province includes locals governments of that state or province in accordance with Article 201(2) of 
NAFTA. It also stressed that this approach is in line with principles of customary international law. Indeed, the 
ILC Articles provide that the conduct of ‘an organ of a state, of a territorial government entity or of an entity 
empowered to exercise elements of the Governmental authority, such organ having acted in that capacity, shall 
be considered as an act of the State under international law’ (citing Article 10 of the 1975 ILC Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts). This was also in line with the position of the United 
States, which made a written submission to the Metalclad tribunal pursuant to Article 1128 of NAFTA to that 
effect. See also Article 4(1) of the 2001 ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, infra note 833.    
126 See the analysis of the Loewen case below – Loewen v. United States, infra note 1346. See also articles 4, 5, 8 
and 11 of the 2001 ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, infra note 833. 
See also L. Schicho, ‘Attribution and State Entities: Diverging Approaches in Investment Arbitration’, (2011) 
12:2 The Journal of World Investment & Trade: Law, Economics, Politics 283. 
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both in their nature and their goal. The public aspect could be viewed as a reference to 
those citizens of the host state to whom these measures were intended to benefit, making 
them interested in their implementation and, more fundamentally, their validity.127  
The zenith on the other end would depict a dispute settlement process that closely 
relates to environmental protection, public health, human rights or other public policy 
issues that would not only concern the public’s ‘broader’ interest, but also affect the 
direct interests of certain communities or groups that are third parties to the arbitration, 
including most notably – for the purposes of this research – civil society and those it 
purports to represent.128  
Not all investor-state arbitrations are related to public interest issues in the same 
degree. In many cases, the public’s interest in an investor-state arbitration may be quite 
minimal.129 Moreover, not all investor-state arbitrations that are in fact public interest-
related closely involve environmental protection, public health, human rights or other 
public policy issues that could potentially affect the direct interests of certain 
communities or groups who are third parties to arbitration proceedings.130  
This is clearly reflected in the case-law. Looking at previous investor-state 
arbitrations, one could note that public interest-related investor-state arbitrations have 
touched upon a panoply of issues as varied as, inter alia,131 natural reserves for fauna and 
flora,132 import/export or transport of hazardous or toxic chemical substances,133 sale of 
                                                 
127 See generally, E. De Brabandere, supra note 852. See also the Aarhus Convention, which defines the ‘public’ 
as ‘one or more natural or legal persons, and…their associations, organizations or groups’; and the ‘public 
concerned’ as the: ‘public affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental 
decision-making; for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental organizations promoting environmental 
protection…shall be deemed to have an interest’. See Articles 2(4) and 2(5) of the Aarhus Convention, supra 
note 119 (our emphasis). 
128 Public health, environmental protection and human rights are often referred to as incidental ‘community 
interests’ to investor-state arbitrations. See C. Schreuer and U. Kriebaum, infra note 617, at 1081.  
129 To quote the Methanex tribunal, ‘there are of course disputes involving States which are of no greater general 
public importance than a dispute between private persons’. See Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra  
note 428, at para 49. 
130 UNCTAD made a conclusion to the same effect by stating that not in all, but in ‘many cases foreign investors 
have used ISDS claims to challenge measures adopted by States in the public interest (for example, policies to 
promote social equity, foster environmental protection or protect public health)’. See UNCTAD Report, infra 
note 210, at 3 (our emphasis). Two subsequently discussed cases also reflect this contention, see Loewen v. 
United States, infra note 1346; and Mondev International Ltd v. United States of America, infra note 1325.  
131 The subsequently mentioned examples are not meant to exhaustively cover all public interest-related investor-
state arbitrations as this would largely exceed the scope of this study.  
132 Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, infra note 245; Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, infra note 257; 
Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1, ARB/09/20), Award of 16 May 2012.  
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pesticides, 134  logging export controls, 135  water distribution to urban and rural 
communities, 136  electricity 137  or gas supply 138  concessions, operation of hazardous 
chemicals or industrial waste disposal sites,139 rehabilitation of sacred indigenous sites 
affected by mining,140 environmental degradation and damage related to petroleum141 or 
mineral extraction, 142  affirmative action legislation, 143  municipal zoning, 144 
environmental impact assessments,145  postal services,146  tax refunds on the export of 
cigarettes,147 litigation settlements with tobacco companies,148 packaging for cigarettes,149 
                                                                                                                                                 
133 Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra note 428; Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, 
Award on jurisdictions of 24 June 1998; SD Myers v. The Government of Canada, Final award of 30 December 
2002. 
134 Chemtura Corporation v. Government of Canada, Award of 02 August 2010.  
135 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, Interim Award of 26 June 2000; Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. 
Government of Canada, Award of 31 May 2010.  
136 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, infra note 533; Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. 
The Argentine Republic, infra note 542; Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. 
The Argentine Republic, infra note 378; Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, infra note 658, and Biwater 
Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania, infra note 741.  
137 TECO Guatemala Holdings, LLC v. Republic of Guatemala (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23). 
138 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v. The Republic of Argentina 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1), Decision on Liability of 3 October 2006; and CMS Gas Transmission Company v. 
The Republic of Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8). 
139 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, infra note 257; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. 
The United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2), Award of 29 May 2003; Robert Azinian et. Al. v. 
The United Mexican States, infra note 1345; and Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3), Award of 30 April 2004. 
140 Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, infra note 496. 
141 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA 
Case No. 2009-23 (‘Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador’). See also Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F. 3d 153 - Court of 
Appeals, 2nd Circuit 1998.  
142 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12). 
143 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa, infra note 789. 
144 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile SA v. Republic of Chile (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7), Award of 24 
May 2004.  
145 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7), Award of 13 November 
2000; Vito G. Gallo v. Government of Canada, infra note 172; Bilcon of Delaware Inc. et al. v. Government of 
Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04.  
146 United Parcel Service v. Canada , infra note 515. 
147  Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1), Award of 16 
December 2002. 
148 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, Award of 12 January 2011.  
149 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7) (‘Philip Morris v. Uruguay’); and Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The 
Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12. 
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airport terminal operations,150 banking regulations and restrictions,151 construction near 
UNESCO World Heritage sites, 152 or the phasing-out of nuclear energy.153  
Only a limited number of the public interest-related investor-state arbitrations 
mentioned above were actually closely related to environmental protection, public health, 
human rights or other public policy issues that involved the direct interests of certain 
communities or groups who are third parties to arbitration proceedings. Some of these 
limited cases are also directly linked to a host state’s duty to ‘respect, protect, and fulfill’ 
domestically and/or internationally-recognized human rights, including those of a 
particular community or group of their population. 154 
Yet, such disputes are important from both substantive and procedural 
perspectives. In addition to foreign investors and host states, these disputes could 
potentially involve a specific community or group that has been, or alleges to be, 
particularly affected by the activities or the arbitral claims of foreign investors. This 
therefore creates a tripartite dynamic that inexorably taints the ‘unilateral’ dimension of 
the investor-state dispute settlement process.155 As previously mentioned, this process is 
quintessentially construed to solely determine host states’ responsibility vis-à-vis foreign 
investors under international law. Investor-state tribunals have a strictly predefined 
jurisdictional mandate to decide on alleged violations of foreign investors’ rights under 
IIAs and BITs – a ratione materiae barrier of prime importance. These instruments 
typically do not mention the ‘direct interests’ of any other person, let alone civil society’s.  
In such disputes, and in light of the multiplicity and complexity of the issues at 
stake, investor-state tribunals find themselves drawn into attempting to reach a 
comprehensive understanding of the underlying factual and legal issues in order to ‘arrive 
                                                 
150 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/16), Award of 02 October 2006.  
151 Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, infra note 235. 
152 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8), Award of 11 September 
2007; Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3), 
Award of 1992.  
153 Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v. Federal Republic of Germany 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6), Award of 11 March 2011.  
154  On states’ obligation to ‘protect, respect, and fulfil’ socio-economic and cultural human rights, see as 
previously discussed A. Eide, supra note 669; and J. Letnar Černič, supra note 695, at 334. 
155 Treaty-based investor-state arbitration is described as ‘unilateral’ given that it exclusively positions foreign 
investors as claimants and host states as respondents. For further references on the ‘unilateral’ aspect of investor-
state arbitration, see infra note 208. 
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at a correct decision’.156 Civil society acted (or sought to act) as a representative of 
directly affected stakeholders by bringing forward positions that were construed as 
distinct vis-à-vis both disputing parties’. The purported aim of such action was to 
‘enlighten’ investor-state tribunals of the issues at stake that precisely pertain to directly 
affected stakeholders who are third parties to the dispute.157  
Not all commentators are convinced that there might be a ‘public concern’ that is 
triggered by the subject matter of a given investor-state dispute.158 As mentioned, some 
claim that ‘the posited conflict between the current system of foreign investment 
protection and the public interest is largely illusory’.159  Some investor-state tribunals 
have, on the other hand, made axiomatic statements on the matter. In this respect, the 
description given by the Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentina 
tribunal is apposite:  
Those (water) systems provide basic public services to millions of people and as a result may raise 
a variety of complex public and international law questions, including human rights 
considerations.
160 
 
The tribunal noted that matters of public interest, particularly with regard to the 
legality of governmental measures and the responsibility of a state under international 
law, are at stake and common in ‘virtually all cases of investment treaty arbitration under 
ICSID jurisdiction’.161 Because host states act exclusively as respondents in such disputes, 
the public would therefore ultimately be concerned when foreign investors advancing 
claims based on private interests – and acting exclusively as claimants – contest host state 
conduct or measures related to the interest of the public under the premise of the 
violation of foreign investors’ rights as protected under IIAs or BITs. Investor-state 
tribunals are thus viewed as international jurisdictions where private and public interests 
are balanced against each other.162  
                                                 
156 Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A et. al. v. The Argentine Republic, infra note 555, at para. 23. 
157 The same rationale applies to the European Commission role as a potential third party intervenor in investor-
state disputes, see E. Triantafilou, supra note 18. On third parties role in ‘enlightening’ tribunals, see also S. 
Charnovitz, infra note 1024, at 352. 
158 Y. Fortier and S. Drymer, infra note 323, at 473. 
159 C. Brower and S. Blanchard, supra note 8, at 720. 
160 Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A et. al. v. The Argentine Republic, infra note 555, at para. 18.  
161 Ibid., at para. 19. 
162 It is worthy to briefly note here that the review of governmental conduct has also led other commentators to 
identify investor-state arbitration as a ‘Global Administrative Law’ – whereby the accountability, and decisions, 
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Given that the notion of the ‘public interest’ is inherently broad, the facts and 
circumstances of each dispute are crucial in determining what exactly is, or is covered by, 
the ‘public interest’ at stake and, moreover, its relevance to either the foreign investors’ 
claim or the host state’s defense. 163  This was particularly reflected in ADC Affiliate 
Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic of Hungary where the 
tribunal stated that: 
In the Tribunal’s opinion, a treaty requirement for ‘public interest’ requires some genuine interest 
of the public. If mere reference to ‘public interest’ can magically put such interest into existence 
and therefore satisfy this requirement, then this requirement would be rendered meaningless since 
the Tribunal can imagine no situation where this requirement would not have been met.
164
 
As such, it is worthy to note once more that not all investor-state disputes are 
public interest-related disputes. Some for instance merely relate to, what is alleged to be, 
host state discriminatory conduct towards foreign investors and do not necessarily relate 
to a ‘public interest’ – as manifested in the subsequently discussed disputes of Loewen v. 
United States and Mondev v. United States.165 Moreover, not all public interest-related 
investor-state disputes involve the ‘direct’ interests of affected third parties; however, all 
of those who do involve the latter are intrinsically public interest-related investor-state 
disputes – an issue that will be further discussed in Part III.166 Civil society solely sought 
to intervene, or actually intervened as amicus curiae, in a number of public interest-
                                                                                                                                                 
of domestic regulatory bodies not only have ramifications of a global instead of a domestic nature, but are also 
subject to scrutiny and review by investor-state tribunals. Although far from widespread, this view ultimately 
sheds light on the relevance of the public interest at stake in investor-state arbitration. See, inter alia, A. Kulick, 
infra note  308, at 79; T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 376; and A. Von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, ‘On the 
Functions of International Courts: An Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority’, (2013) 26 
Leiden Journal of International Law 49, at 58. As subsequently shown, the administrative law aspect had been in 
fact explicitly pointed out by civil society actors in order to argue for their participation as amicus curiae in the 
Methanex dispute; they asserted that the dispute raised issues of ‘constitutional importance’ whereby 
governmental authority to implement environmental regulations and private property rights had to be balanced. 
See Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra note 428, para 8. This view is far from consensual.  
163 J. W. Salacuse, infra note 196, at 320.  
164 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic of Hungary, supra note 
150. See also J. W. Salacuse, infra note 196, at 320-321. 
165 Loewen relates to allegations of violations of NAFTA obligations arising out of the decisions of Mississippi 
courts in the wake of a commercial dispute; while Mondev relates to alleged violations of NAFTA obligations 
due to the refusal by Massachusetts courts to enforce a judgement against a municipal body on the grounds of 
statutory immunity. See Loewen v. United States, infra note 1346; and Mondev International Ltd v. United 
States of America, infra note 1325. 
166 This point will be further elaborated as part of the analysis on the scope and regulation of a proposed third 
party intervenor role for civil society, and whether such role should be subject to third parties’ ‘direct’ interests 
in investor-state disputes. See Part III – Section 3.1.2.  
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related disputes and not all of them. 167  It raised arguments that generally aimed at 
upholding the public interest, particularly with respect to health, environmental protection, 
human rights or other public policy issues. These arguments will be the subject of further 
study subsequently.168 It is key to shift at this stage to an analysis of the regulatory 
framework defining host state responsibility towards foreign investors and obligations of 
the latter – particularly in light of those public interest issues that are likely to arise, and 
be relevant to, investor-state disputes.  
1.2 Lots of ‘hard law’ rights, few ‘soft law’ obligations: a look at the 
international framework on foreign investment protection 
This section sheds light on the regulatory framework defining host state 
responsibility towards foreign investors. It aims to briefly identify foreign investors’ 
rights and obligations. One fundamental caveat bears stressing – these rights and 
obligations of course raise highly complex, and rapidly evolving, legal questions for any 
investor-state tribunal to determine, and incidentally, for this research to thoroughly 
address. Again, the purpose here is not to provide a comprehensive study of the interplay 
between host state duty to uphold foreign investor rights on the one hand and address 
public interest issues on the other. 169  Rather, this section serves as a preliminary 
background to a detailed analysis of examples of some of the earlier investor-state 
tribunals’ decisions dealing with the matter as part of the context to the gradual 
acceptance of civil society’s participation in investor-state disputes – i.e., the main focus 
of the present study.  
                                                 
167 Up to 2014, there were 13 cases including: Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra note 428; United 
Parcel Service v. Canada, infra note 515; Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, infra note 533; 
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, infra note 542; Compania de Aguas del 
Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, infra note 378; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) 
Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania, infra note 741; Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, infra note 496; Chevron 
and Texaco v. Ecuador, supra note 141; Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa, 
infra note 789; Bernhard von Pezold and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, infra note 823; Merrill & Ring 
Forestry L.P. v. The Government of Canada, supra note 135; Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. 
United States of America, supra note 148; and Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, supra note 142. 
See also L. Bastin, ‘Amici Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration: Eight Recent Trends’, (2014) 30:1 Kluwer Law 
International 126, at 141. 
168 See Part I – Section 4. 
169 See also Introduction – Section  1.  
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1.2.1 Foreign investors’ rights  
As previously mentioned, arbitration has been designated as a tool for the 
settlement of disputes over international investment rights and obligations.170 These are 
contained in regional or multilateral investment treaties such as NAFTA or ASEAN, as 
well as over 3,000 BITs involving 180 countries – aimed at promoting and protecting 
cross-border investments from arbitrary and discriminatory treatment at the domestic 
level.171 It is of fundamental importance to note that, as a general rule, these treaties 
solely set out international obligations on host states and bestow international rights upon 
foreign investors. 172  Foreign investors’ rights include, inter alia, the right to non-
discrimination, full protection and security, national treatment,173 most-favored nation 
treatment,174  fair and equitable treatment as well as prompt, adequate, and effective 
                                                 
170  See for instance Article 824(1) ‘Submission of a claim to arbitration’ of the Canada-Peru Free Trade 
Agreement which provides that: ‘1. Except as provided in Annex 824.1, a disputing investor who meets the 
conditions precedent in Article 823 may submit the claim to arbitration under: a. the ICSID Convention, 
provided that both the disputing Party and the Party of the disputing investor are parties to the Convention; b. the 
Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, provided that either the disputing Party or the Party of the disputing investor, 
but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention; c. the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or d. any other body of 
rules approved by the Commission as available for arbitrations under this Section.’ See Canada-Peru Free Trade 
Agreement, entered into force 10 August 2009, available at: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/peru-perou/peru-toc-perou-tdm.aspx (last accessed 20 October 2013). Article 1120 
‘Submission of a claim to arbitration’ of NAFTA as well as Article 33 ‘Submission of a claim’ of the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Treaty have substantially similar wordings. See North-American Free Trade 
Agreement, entered into force 01 January 1994, available at: https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&language=en-US (last accessed 20 October 2013); and Association of South 
East Asian Nations Comprehensive Investment Treaty, entered into force 26 February 2009, available at: 
http://www.unescap.org/tid/projects/tisiln-investagreement.pdf (last accessed 20 October 2013). 
171 UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, supra note 102; see also M. Paparinskis, infra note 206. 
172 It is argued that such rights are subject to a ‘quid pro quo’ principle, i.e. foreign investors gain international 
rights and protections under IIAs and BITs as a quid pro quo for a contribution to the economy of host states 
through the injection of foreign capital into their economies. In this respect, the tribunal in Vito Gallo v. Canada 
held that ‘…for investors to enjoy this additional right, there must be a quid pro quo: Given that the stated 
objective of investment treaties is to stimulate flows of private capital into the economies of contracting states, 
the claimant in any investment arbitration must prove that he or she is a protected foreign investor…’. See Vito 
G. Gallo v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 55798, Award of 15 September 2011, at 336. See also 
Professor Zachary Douglas’ opinion to the effect that ‘the notion of a qui pro quo between a foreign investor and 
the host state is the cornerstone for the system of investment treaty arbitration’ in Z. Douglas, The International 
Law of Investment Claims (2012), at 335.  
173 For instance, Article 5(1) of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Treaty provides that: ‘Each member 
State shall accord to investors of any other member State treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the admission, establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory…’. See ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Treaty, supra note 170. 
174 See for instance Article 804 of the Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement provides that: ‘1. Each Party shall 
accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to 
investors of a non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory’. See Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement, 
supra note 170. 
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compensation in case of expropriation.175 A comprehensive discussion over the definition 
and scope of these rights would largely exceed the purposes of this research. However, it 
is worthy to briefly elaborate on the right to (i) fair and equitable treatment and (ii) 
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in case of expropriation. Violations to the 
fair and equitable treatment and claims for compensation as a result of expropriation, or 
measures ‘tantamount’ to expropriation, are systematically raised in disputes of interest to 
this research and, therefore, an understanding of these concepts, albeit succinct, is crucial 
in setting the background to the subject matter of those investor-state disputes in which 
civil society participates.176  
i. Fair and equitable treatment  
The fair and equitable treatment standard is ‘the most frequently invoked standard 
in investment disputes … the majority of successful claims pursued in international 
arbitration are based on a violation [thereof]’.177 It is articulated in a fairly similar manner 
in IIAs or BITs.178 Although simply worded, the concrete meaning of fair and equitable 
treatment clauses remains vague, controversial and difficult to apply.179 There is a priori 
no theory of precedent in investor-state arbitration,180 although this has been put into 
                                                 
175 Maupin asserts that ‘[w]hile there are minor differences in wording across treaties, most of them obligate 
states to do six basic things: provide fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security to the foreign 
investment; guarantee the free transferability of the investment and its associated returns; treat foreign investors 
at least as favorably as the State’s own investors (national treatment) and the investors of any third state (most-
favored national treatment); and not to expropriate the investment except for a public purpose, in accordance 
with due process, and against prompt, adequate and effective compensation – generally interpreted as requiring 
compensation at fair market value’. See J. Maupin, supra note 48, at 14.  
176 This section focuses on these two concepts given that protection against expropriation was historically the 
first objective of foreign investment protection, while fair and equitable treatment is described as ‘one of the core 
concepts in international investment law’. See S. Schill, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule of Law, and 
Comparative Public Law’, in S. Schill, (ed.) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010), 
at 152. 
177 R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2012), at 130.  
178 R. Klager, infra note 1252, at 9, 13.  
179 The tribunal in Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic found that ‘the “ordinary meaning” of the “fair and 
equitable treatment” standard can only be defined by terms of almost equal vagueness’. See Saluka Investments 
BV v. Czech Republic, infra note 235, at 297. See also R. Klager, infra note 1252, at 317, and J. W. Salacuse, 
infra note 196, at 228.  
180 International tribunals in general are not bound by precedent. However, the tribunal in Saipem v. Bangladesh 
articulated the importance of consistency in investor-state arbitration in the following terms: ‘the Tribunal 
considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, it is of the opinion that it must pay due 
consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary 
grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to 
the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the 
harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of 
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question.181 Therefore, the subjectivity inherent to the interpretation of both the terms 
‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ fundamentally varies.182 This may be exacerbated when the fair and 
equitable standard is deemed to reflect customary international law or is combined with 
other standards, such as in NAFTA’s Chapter XI.183  
As a standard of international law, fair and equitable treatment allows measuring 
the conformity of contested host state measures with international law, as opposed to 
domestic law. 184  It is a benchmark against which host state conduct is measured 
depending on the particular facts of each dispute, the evolutionary character of fair and 
equitable treatment, and the appreciation of the general situation of the host state.185 
Notions such as, inter alia, the legitimate expectations of foreign investors,186 right to a 
                                                                                                                                                 
States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law’. See Saipem S.p.A v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7), Award of 30 June 2009, at para 90.  
181 A. Von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, infra note 162, at 57, 71 also citing Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic 
of Bangladesh, supra note 180, para. 90. Criticism has been raised in light of the inconsistencies of arbitral 
awards addressing the Argentinian financial crisis, see A. Martinez, ‘Invoking State Defenses in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration’, in M. Waibel et al. (eds), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration, at 326. See also 
Louis T. Wells, infra note 208. 
182 Ibid., at 228; J. Stone, infra note 188, at 83.  
183 Article 1105(1) of NAFTA states that: ‘Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party 
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security’. See NAFTA, supra note 170. See R. Klager, infra note 1252, at 17; I. Tudor, The Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment (2008), at 48; and J. Stone, infra note 188, at 
81; R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, supra note 177, at 136. On the linkages between the fair and equitable treatment 
and customary international law, see for instance the Merril & Ring tribunal’s finding to the effect that ‘a 
requirement that aliens be treated fairly and equitably in relation to business, trade and investment is the outcome 
of this changing reality and as such it has become sufficiently part of widespread and consistent practice so as to 
demonstrate that it is reflected today in customary international law as opinio juris. In the end, the name assigned 
to the standard does not really matter. What matters is that the standard protects against all such acts or behavior 
that might infringe a sense of fairness, equity and reasonableness. Of course, the concepts of fairness, 
equitableness and reasonableness cannot be defined precisely: they require to be applied to the facts of each case’. 
See Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Government of Canada, supra note 135, at para 210. See also M. Paparinskis, 
infra note 354, at 171 et seq. 
184 In the subsequently discussed case of S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, the tribunal emphasized that ‘the minimum 
standard of treatment provision of the NAFTA is similar to clauses contained in BITs. The inclusion of a 
“minimum standard” provision is necessary to avoid what might otherwise be a gap. A government might treat 
an investor in a harsh, injurious and unjust manner, but do so in a way that is no different than the treatment 
inflicted on its own nationals. The “minimum standard” is a floor below which treatment of foreign investors 
must not fall, even if a government were not acting in a discriminatory manner’. See S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, 
infra note 277, at para 259. For a more elaborate discussion, see R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, supra note 177, at 
133.  
185 R. Klager, infra note 1252, at 122; S. Schill, supra note 176, at 182.  
186 A foreign investor’s legitimate expectations refer to the risks and rewards of contemplated investments that 
have a crucial influence on a foreign investor’s decision on whether or not to invest. It is thus understood that 
when a host state has created certain expectations through its laws and acts that have led a foreign investor to 
invest, it is considered unfair for the host state to take subsequent actions that fundamentally deny or frustrate 
those expectations. It is considered as an integral part of the fair and equitable standard. For instance, a tribunal 
describes it as including the ‘promise of the administration on which the Claimants rely to assert a right that 
needs to be observed’. See PSEG Global, Inc. and Konya Ingin Electrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. 
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fair trial and procedure (denial of justice),187  non-arbitrariness,188  and transparency189 
have been considered by investor-state tribunals as sub-elements of fair and equitable 
treatment. 190  The multiplicity of factors underlying to fair and equitable treatment 
therefore include:  
the obligation to act transparently and grant due process, to refrain from taking arbitrary or 
discriminatory measures, from exercising coercion or from frustrating the investor’s reasonable 
expectations with respect to the legal framework affecting the investment.191  
With that being said, the diversity, and even inconsistencies, in the application 
and interpretation of this standard bear witness to – what is often referred to as – 
‘fragmentation’.192 
ii. Expropriation 
Expropriation, whether direct or indirect, is ‘the most severe form of interference 
with property’.193 It is a rapidly evolving concept in international law.194 As generally 
recognized in IIAs or BITs, it triggers the right for expropriated investors to prompt, 
adequate, as well as effective compensation. It entails the fulfillment of certain conditions 
                                                                                                                                                 
Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5), Award of 19 January 2007, at 241. See also J. W. Salacuse, 
supra note 196, at 231, and I. Tudor, supra note 183, at 233.  
187 As will be further discussed in Part III, the Mondev tribunal delved into an analysis of the principle of access 
to justice, as enshrined under Article 6(1) of the ECHR, and whether it may fall under the fair and equitable 
treatment standard guaranteed under Article 1105 of NAFTA. See Mondev International Ltd v. United States of 
America, infra note 1325. See also Part III – Section 2.2. 
188 The ICJ described ‘arbitrariness’ in the following terms: ‘…by itself, and without more, unlawfulness cannot 
be said to amount to arbitrariness…To identify arbitrariness with mere unlawfulness would be to deprive it of 
any useful meaning in its own right. Nor does it follow from a finding by a municipal court that an act was 
unjustified, or unreasonable, or arbitrary, that act is necessarily to be classed as arbitrary in international law, 
though the qualification given to the impugned act by a municipal authority may be a valuable 
indication…Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something opposed to the rule of 
law. This idea was expressed by the Court in the Asylum case, when it spoke of ‘arbitrary action’ being 
‘substituted for the rule of law’ (Asylum, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 284). It is a wilful disregard of due 
process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety’. See Elettronica Sicula 
S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment of 20 July 1989, [1989] ICJ Rep. 15. See also J. 
Stone, ‘Arbitrariness, the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, and the International Law of Investment’, 
(2012) 25:1 Leiden Journal of International Law 77, at 85-88.  
189 On the link between the notion of transparency and the fair and equitable treatment standard, see for instance 
Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States, infra note 257.  
190 R. Klager, infra note 1252, at 318; J. Stone, supra note 188, at 83. For an exhaustive survey of those sub-
elements, see S. Schill, supra note 176, at 160 et seq.  
191  Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29), 
Award of 27 August 2009, at para 176; see also Y. Banifatemi, ‘Consistency in Investment Rules Interpretation’, 
in R. Echandi and P. Sauvé (eds.), Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy (2013), at 211.  
192 R. Klager, infra note 1252, at 319; A. Kawharu, infra note 393, at 292; and see generally R. Lorz, supra note 
74, at 482 et seq.  
193 R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, supra note 177, at 98. 
194 See Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra note 642, at para 80. 
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in order to be lawful.195 Host state expropriatory measures must necessarily be (a) for a 
public purpose, (b) not arbitrary or discriminatory, (c) done in accordance with the due 
process of law, and (d) accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation 
(the so-called ‘Hull Rule’).196  
The ‘public purpose’ condition entails that the confiscation of a foreign investor’s 
property must be underlying to some genuine public interest.197 It is often a difficult task 
for investor-state tribunals to determine whether expropriatory measures were intended 
for a public purpose such as environmental protection for instance or, rather, for other 
discretionary or discriminatory purposes, e.g. ‘to keep foreigners out of the economy’.198 
This concern is reflected for instance in the subsequently discussed cases of S.D. Myers v. 
Canada 199  and Methanex v. United States. 200  Determining the valuation of the 
compensation amount for the purposes of ‘prompt, adequate, and effective compensation’ 
can equally be challenging – as reflected by the Santa Elena v. Costa Rica case discussed 
below. 201  The payment of compensation necessarily requires a valuation of the loss 
incurred by foreign investors as a result of the expropriation.202 From a more holistic 
perspective, it is argued that not only is compensation key to achieving justice in 
individual cases, but also serves ‘the important goal of assuring respect for investment 
treaty rules and fostering investment regime effectiveness, ultimately preserving the 
                                                 
195 For instance, Article 14(1) of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Treaty provides that: ‘A member State 
shall not expropriate or nationalise a covered investment either directly or through measures equivalent to 
expropriation or nationalisation (“expropriation”), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory 
manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and (d) in accordance with due 
process of law…’. This is also in line with the wording of Article 1110 of NAFTA. See ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Treaty, supra note 170. 
196 Named after Cordell Hull, Secretary of States of the United States between 1933 and 1944. He devised the 
‘prompt, adequate, and effective compensation’ formula in the wake of negotiations with Mexico over losses of 
American farmers that were incurred as a result of Mexican agrarian reforms during the 1920s. See J. W. 
Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (2010), at 320; see also B. Simma, ‘Foreign Investment Arbitration: A 
Place for Human Rights?’, (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 573, at 589. 
197 Ibid., at 320. 
198 M. Sornarajah, infra note 221, at 111. 
199 S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, infra note 277, at para 162. 
200 In the latter, Methanex precisely alleged that ‘local interests often try to use pseudo-environmental measures 
to disguise the more favourable treatment they seek vis-à-vis foreign competitors’. See Methanex Corporation v. 
United States, infra note 631, at 13. 
201 Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, infra note 245; see also J. W. Salacuse, supra note 196, at 323-328. 
202 This entails three elements: (i) a standard of compensation, (ii) a method for applying that standard, and (iii) 
the actual application of the chosen valuation method to the specific assets that have been expropriated. See J. W. 
Salacuse, supra note 196, at 323.  
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regime itself’. 203  Compensation therefore deters discretionary or abusive host state 
conduct and, more fundamentally, it contributes to the upholding of the international rule 
of law.204 
1.2.2 Foreign investors’ obligations 
   The international foreign investment legal framework has been often criticized for 
the lack of normative substance addressing public interest issues, including with regards 
to (i) the definitions of foreign investors’ obligations towards host states and their 
populations, or (ii) exceptions legitimizing host state regulatory power.205 
i. Foreign investors’ obligations towards host states and their populations
To sketch the issue succinctly, IIAs or BITs rarely set out obligations which 
foreign investors are required to abide by when engaging in activities that could 
potentially affect the ‘public interest’ or host state populations. 206  Rather, such 
obligations are primarily incumbent upon host states under international law and, 
accordingly, states, through their executive, legislative, or judiciary powers, enact 
measures in their public’s interest, by for example exerting their duty to ‘respect, protect, 
and fulfill’ human rights.207  
Foreign investors could in turn contest such host state measures, as violations of 
IIAs or BITs, pursuant to, what some describe as, a ‘unilateral’ right to submit claims 
against states before privately constituted arbitral tribunals. 208  Indeed, foreign 
203 In the same vein, it is asserted that effectively obtaining compensation from treaty violators raises the costs of 
treaty violations and should therefore induce other potential violators to respect their bargains with foreign 
investors protected by investment treaties. See J. W. Salacuse, supra note 196, at 323.  
204 See J. Paulsson, supra note 107, at 233.    
205 Sere also Introduction – Section  1. 
206 Previous deliberations over Norway’s model BIT were an example of exceptions in the pipeline that did not 
materialize. In the same vein, a civil society proposed model of a sustainable development BIT was never 
adopted by any state. See also M. Wells-Sheffer, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to Human 
Rights?’, (2012) 39 Denver Journal of International Law 483, at 484. See also K. Von Moltke, ‘A Model 
International Investment Agreement for the Promotion of Sustainable Development’, IISD (November 2004), 
available at: www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade_model_inv.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014). For an exhaustive 
survey, see M. Paparinskis, Basic Documents on International Investment Protection (2012). 
207 See generally J. Crawford, supra note 74, at 206-209; C. Schreuer and U. Kriebaum, infra note 617, at 1085.  
208 See Louis T. Wells, ‘Backlash to Investment Arbitration: Three Causes’, in M. Waibel et al. (eds), The 
Backlash against Investment Arbitration, at 343. See also W. Ben Hamida, infra note 1391, at 264-266. Brower 
and Blanchard attempted to dismiss criticism describing investor-state arbitration as ‘unilateral’ by pointing to a 
number of contract-based investor-state arbitrations where host states were able to submit counter-claims against 
foreign investors. See generally C. Brower and S. Blanchard, supra note 8. 
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investments could potentially affect, and be affected by, a tremendously broad spectrum 
of aspects concerning host states’ and their populations’ interests that could trigger the 
exercize of that ‘unilateral’ right. If upheld, violations of foreign investors’ international 
treaty rights could lead to awards of substantial damages209 that are, moreover, non-
appealable and subject to strictly limited judicial scrutiny, either as part of set-aside or 
enforcement proceedings. 210  States chose to bestow upon foreign investors such a 
‘unilateral’ right, primarily in order to promote and protect the flow of international 
investment and, as previously mentioned, contribute to their socio-economic 
development.211  
The repeatedly expressed concern is the following – while foreign investors, 
including multinationals, benefit from a wide array of international treaty rights, they are 
not concomitantly compelled to international obligations towards host states or their 
populations. 212  Semi-formal legal arrangements govern foreign investors’ wider 
obligations at the international level, i.e. through voluntary codes of conduct or other 
non-binding soft law initiatives and guidelines such as, inter alia, the 1977 ILO Tripartite 
Declaration, 213  the more recent UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations,214 or the UN-sponsored Global Compact.215  
Equally, there is a widespread recognition that harm caused by foreign investors 
should be solely addressed by host states domestically (under municipal law).216 States 
are in fact entitled to control foreign investments on the basis of their illegality under 
209  Although these cases were unrelated to the public interest issues of interest to this research, the shareholders 
of Yukos Oil OJSC filed claims against the Russian Federation of up to $114 billion dollars and an arbitral 
tribunal ultimately awarded them slightly half of this amount. See Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The 
Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 226; Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, 
PCA Case No. AA 227; Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 228. 
210 The description just provided captures the essence of the criticism of investor-state arbitration as noted by an 
UNCTAD Report from 2013. See UNCTAD Report, ‘Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of 
a Roadmap’, IIA Issues Note No.2 (June 2013), available online at: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf  (last accessed 06 October 2014), at 8 (the 
‘UNCTAD 2013 Report’). See also J. Maupin, supra note 48, at 18.   
211 C. Brower and S. Blanchard, supra note 8, at 701-703.  
212 While pointing to the soft law character of corporate obligations at the international level, Crawford opines 
that ‘at the domestic level, there has been no generalized development of a concept of corporate responsibility for 
violations of, or complicity in State violations of, international human rights law’; see J. Crawford, supra note 74, 
at 206-207. 
213 ILO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 122. 
214 UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations, supra note 122. 
215 See UN Global Compact, infra note 661. 
216 See Part I – Section 1.2.2(ii) directly below. 
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municipal law. 217  In this respect, Brower and Blanchard confirm that ‘investors are 
bound by the law of the host state and by their contractual obligations’ and argue that:  
as sovereigns, host states have many tools at their disposal for responding to investor breaches, 
including civil and criminal penalties, legal actions for breach of contract in their own courts, and 
political pressure. The very nature of the relationship means that the foreign investor will typically 
have assets in the host state, guaranteeing enforcement leverage… By contrast, resort to treaty-
based arbitration is often the sole lever available to an investor to enforce its rights if a host state 
treats it inequitably once the investor has expended substantial resources in the host state’s 
territory. Given that the actual power imbalance inherent in this institutional arrangement so 
glaringly favors host states, the persistence of the asymmetry argument is baffling. One might just 
as well criticize the “asymmetry” of international human rights courts.218 
Yet, the silence of the international foreign investment framework on foreign 
investors’ obligations has led, it is argued, to the failure of (i) the inclusion of an 
investment chapter in the Uruguay Round leading to the establishment of the WTO in 
1994;219 and (ii) the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) negotiations 
that ended in 1998.220 The latter was essentially attributed to pressure from a wide array 
of civil society organizations. 221  Their message was simply ‘no rights without 
responsibilities’, i.e. they were against an international regulatory framework that grants 
                                                 
217 In Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. The Republic of Georgia, the tribunal held that ‘“Protection of investments” 
under a BIT is obviously not without some limits. It does not extend, for instance, to an investor making an 
investment in breach of the local laws of the host State. A State thus retains a degree of control over foreign 
investments by denying BIT protection to those investments that do not comply with its laws. As noted by one 
scholar, “no State has taken its fervour for foreign investment to the extent of removing any controls on the flow 
of foreign investment into the host State”’. See Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. The Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/18, Decision on jurisdiction of 6 July 2007, at 182 citing M. Sornarajah, The International Law on 
Foreign Investment (2004), at 106. See also C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, infra note 617, at 1096. 
218 C. Brower and S. Blanchard, supra note 8, at 712-713. 
219 In a similar vein, attempts by the WTO to explore the potential for a multilateral investment instrument at the 
Singapore Ministerial Conference had also failed. See M. Sornarajah, infra  note 221, at 67. 
220 Other reasons leading to the failure of the negotiations included France’s withdrawal, having been unable to 
secure guarantees for cultural exceptions, as well as the deteriorating Asian and Russian financial crisis. See E. 
Kentin, ‘Sustainable Development in International Investment Dispute Settlement: The ICSID and NAFTA 
Experience’, in N. Shrijver, and F. Weiss (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development (2004), at 315. 
221 It is argued that the failure of the MAI negotiations reflects the lack of consensus on the principles of the rules 
on foreign investment protection. Furthermore, Sornarajah points to the fact that ‘the making of investment codes 
is that they emphasize protection of multinational corporations without at the same time taking into account the 
environmental degradation and the human rights abuses of which they are capable’. Sornarajah cites the example 
of the tragic disaster at Bhopal, India in 1984 which involved Union Carbide – a major American industrial 
chemicals multinational. See M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2010), at 68. See 
also S. Picciotto, ‘Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business’, (2004) 42 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 131, at 137, 138; P. Dumberry, ‘L’entreprise, sujet de droit international? Retour 
sur la question à la lumière des développements récents du droit international des investissements’, Revue 
générale de droit international (2004), at 114. 
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foreign investors rights without defining their potential obligations towards host states or 
their populations.222  
ii. Legitimacy of host state public interest regulatory measures 
If foreign investors do not generally have obligations towards host states or their 
populations under IIAs or BITs, then it is argued that – conversely – legitimate host state 
measures aimed at positively asserting public interest issues, such as those relating to the 
protection of the environment or public health for example, should be deemed as such 
and not be characterized by investor-state tribunals as resulting in violations of foreign 
investors’ rights.223  
However, the validity of host state regulatory conduct is typically emphasized in 
general terms under IIAs or BITs – although this has changed in recent years. Under 
NAFTA for instance, which dates back to 1994, the promotion of sustainable 
development by NAFTA parties is set as one of the treaty’s objectives in its preamble.224 
Also, NAFTA parties simultaneously entered into agreements on environmental 
(NAAEC) and labour cooperation (NAALC).225 Pursuant to the NAAEC, NAFTA parties 
(i) aim to ‘foster the protection and improvement of the environment’ and ‘promote 
sustainable development’ and (ii) reaffirm both their duty and right to effectively enforce 
their environmental laws and regulations through appropriate governmental action.226 In 
addition, the imperative of environmental protection is explicitly included under Chapter 
XI which pertains to investment promotion and protection. Article 1114 of NAFTA 
Chapter XI on ‘Environmental Measures’ indeed provides that:  
                                                 
222 Incidentally, it is worthy to note here that the opposition towards the MAI not only fits within the larger 
picture of anti-globalisation movements echoed at WTO conferences, but was also a revelation of the new role 
civil society organizations intended to play in the area of international investment. See M. Sornarajah, supra note 
221, at 68.  
223 See generally M. Sornarajah, supra note 8 and supra note 221. 
224 It is worthy to note here that, as a result of growing criticisms with respect to the adverse environmental 
impacts of its funded projects, the World Bank has a adopted a similar approach by considering sustainable 
developments as part of its core mandate. See V. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 118, at 247.  
225 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, entered into force 01 January 1994, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993), 
available at: http://new.naalc.org/naalc/naalc-full-text.htm  (last accessed 06 October 2014) (the ‘NAALC’).  
226  See Article 1(a) and (b). Article 5 states that ‘With the aim of achieving high levels of environmental 
protection and compliance with its environmental laws and regulations, each Party shall effectively enforce its 
environmental laws and regulations through appropriate governmental action, subject to Article 37, such as: …(j) 
initiating, in a timely manner, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings to seek appropriate sanctions 
or remedies for violations of its environmental laws and regulations’. See North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation, entered into force 01 January 1994, 32 ILM 1482 (1993), available at: 
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=1226&SiteNodeID=567 (last accessed 06 October 2014) (‘NAAEC’).  
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Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or 
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to 
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental 
concerns… 227  
Article 1114 also recognizes that it is ‘inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing 
domestic health, safety or environmental measures’.228 Against this background, it seems 
clear that NAFTA explicitly affords state-parties to the Agreement the right to regulate 
the environment229 which, along with the side agreement on labor cooperation – the 
NAALC, might be considered as indications by NAFTA parties of their willingness to 
take into account the legitimacy of public interest regulatory measures.230  
Yet, whether relating to environmental, labour or other public interest matters, the 
exact scope of host state regulatory measures’ legitimacy is not typically defined in 
concreto under IIAs, including NAFTA, or BITs.231 More specifically, it is not clear 
whether legitimate public interest regulatory measures may be deemed as valid to the 
extent of excepting the right of foreign investors to compensation as a result, for instance, 
of alleged violations to the fair and equitable treatment standard and foreign investors’ 
legitimate expectations. In other words, despite the legitimacy of their purpose, public 
interest regulatory measures may still lead to violations of foreign investors’ rights and, 
                                                 
227 See Article 1114. Also Chapter XI further provides under Article 1101(4) that: ‘Nothing in this Chapter shall 
be construed to prevent a Party from providing a service or performing a function such as law enforcement, 
correctional services, income security or insurance, social security or insurance, social welfare, public education, 
public training, health, and child care, in a manner that is not inconsistent with this Chapter’. See NAFTA, supra 
note 170. 
228 The application of Article 1114 on ‘Environmental Measures’ was in fact relevant within the context of the 
Metalclad v. Mexico case, see section 1.3.1 below; Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States, infra note 
273. 
229 NAFTA also contains a clear-cut over-arching exception rule similar to GATT Article XX(b), however, it is 
understood not to be applicable to Chapter XI obligations relating to NAFTA investments. Article 2101 ‘General 
Exceptions’ of NAFTA states that: ‘For purposes of: (a) Part Two (Trade in Goods), except to the extent that a 
provision of that Part applies to services or investment, and (b) Part Three (Technical Barriers to Trade), except 
to the extent that a provision of that Part applies to services, GATT Article XX and its interpretative notes, or any 
equivalent provision of a successor agreement to which all Parties are party, are incorporated into and made part 
of this Agreement. The Parties understand that the measures referred to in GATT Article XX(b) include 
environmental measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and that GATT Article XX(g) 
applies to measures relating to the conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural resources….’. See 
NAFTA, supra note 170 (our emphasis). See also Canada (Attorney General) v. S.D. Myers Inc., infra note 324, 
at para 47; and Article XX(b) of the GATT, infra note 1031.  
230  C. Brower II, ‘NAFTA’s Investment Chapter: Initial Thoughts about Second-Generation Rights’, in F. 
Beverigde (ed.), Globalization and International Investment (2005), at 384. 
231 See A. Martinez, supra note 181, at 335; J. Maupin, supra note 48, at 53. A clear exception includes various 
BITs signed by New Zealand and South Africa which specifically set out caveats for regulatory measures aimed 
at indigenous peoples’ as well as minority empowerment. However, such BIT provisions are rare. See J. Levine, 
infra note 758, at 123-124; M. Wells-Sheffer, supra note 206, at 503; C. Olivet and P. Eberhardt, infra note 1470, 
at 73. 
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in turn, the payment of substantial damages to foreign investors by host states – as 
reflected by the analysis of some of the earlier case law below. 232  Host state 
responsibility in this regard will of course depend on investor-state tribunals’ assessment 
of the facts and circumstances of each case in light of the applicable law and, more 
fundamentally, their willingness to take into account public interest considerations.233 A 
number of investor-state tribunals have accepted a host state defence to foreign investors’ 
claims based on the legitimate use of sovereign power – including most notably the 
subsequently discussed Methanex v. United States.234 These tribunals essentially found 
that host states would not be liable towards foreign investors as a result of non-
discriminatory, bona fide, regulatory measures of general application that are aimed at 
addressing legitimate public interest concerns.235 The exact scope of host state defense in 
that respect is in fact subject to numerous debates and ‘wide open’ to interpretation, 
which again makes the facts and circumstances of each case highly determinative factors 
as to whether or not a host state exercised its regulatory powers legitimately.236 What is 
interesting to emphasize here is that investor-state tribunals’ recognition of the legitimate 
use of sovereign power is considered by some as a recent development, and as a positive 
                                                 
232 See Part I – Section 1.3. This is also manifestly reflected by the Argentine financial crisis arbitrations, which 
in fact are still on-going. Some of the most emblematic (and contested cases) include: CMS Gas Transmission 
Company v. The Republic of Argentina, supra note 138; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. 
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3), and Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16). For a global discussion of the Argentine arbitrations, see generally H. Samra, 
‘Five Years Later: The CMS Award Placed in the Context of the Argentine Financial Crisis and the ICSID 
Arbitration Boom’, (2007) 38 Miami Inter-American Law Review 667; see also V. Prislan, supra note 82, at 451. 
233 Investor-state tribunals have articulated this assessment in concreto. For instance, in Saluka Investments BV v. 
Czech Republic, the tribunal noted that ‘in order to determine whether frustration of the foreign investor’s 
expectations was justified and reasonable, the host State’s legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic 
matters in the public interest must be taken into consideration as well’. In the same vein, the tribunal in El Paso 
Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic held for instance that ‘legitimate expectations cannot 
be solely the subjective expectations of the investor, but have to correspond to the objective expectations than 
can be deduced from the circumstances and with due regard to the rights of the State. In other words, a balance 
should be established between the legitimate expectation of the foreign investor to make a fair return on its 
investment and the right of the host State to regulate its economy in the public interest’. The tribunal in also 
emphasized that ‘legitimate expectations are more than the investor’s subjective expectations. Their recognition 
is the result of a balancing operation of the different interests at stake, taking into account all circumstances, 
including the political and socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the host State’. See Saluka Investments BV v. 
Czech Republic, infra note 235, at 305; El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15), Award of 31 October 2011, at 358; and Toto Construzioni Generali S.P.A. v. 
Republic of Lebanon (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12), Award of 7 June 2012, at 165 respectively. 
234 Ibid. See also Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra note 428; A. Martinez, supra note 181, at 335.  
235 A. Martinez, infra note 181, at 333 citing Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award of 17th 
March 2006, PCA IIC 210 (2006); Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, supra note 152; and 
Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra note 428.  
236 A. Martinez, supra note 181, at 333.  
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move by investor-state tribunals to address the widespread ‘backlash’ against investor-
state arbitration.237  
Separately, it is also argued that, faced with the risk of engaging in international 
arbitration, and therefore potentially facing liability towards foreign investors, host states 
may be reluctant to adequately and effectively regulate public policy concerns such as 
public health, labour, and environmental concerns through measures that may deemed as 
restrictive on foreign investment.238 It is thus asserted that even if host states were to 
successfully dismiss foreign investors’ claims over such measures, the duration and 
expense of arbitrations might cause a ‘regulatory chill’ in the future, in the sense that 
such host states might self-censor or limit the possible measures aimed at positively 
asserting public interest concerns.239 In the same vein, it is argued that host states, as avid 
seekers of foreign investments, parties to an intricate number of IIAs or BITs, and 
potential respondents to underlying investor-state disputes, become intricately tied to a 
certain set of conduct primarily aimed at promoting and protecting foreign 
investments.240 Numerous host states would be accordingly left with little room to assert 
for example ‘the right to a clean environment as a human right and as a norm 
incorporating higher values’ – to quote Sornarajah – at the expense of foreign investment 
promotion and protection. 241 
In sum, the debate over the legitimacy and validity of host state measures 
affecting foreign investors’ international treaty rights is well-reflected in the case law 
examined directly below whereby the international responsibility of host states, and 
millions of dollars in ensuing damages, was at stake notwithstanding – what was alleged 
as – the legitimate and public interest purpose of contested measures.  
                                                 
237 Ibid., at 337; J. Maupin, supra note 48, at 10.  
238 S. Karamanian, supra note 388, at 424.   
239 It is worthy to note that investor-state tribunals have recently recognized ‘regulatory chill’ as a concern. In 
Bilcon v. Canada, a mining-related claim which raised various socio-environmental issues, the dissenting 
arbitrator found that ‘a chill will be imposed on [Canadian] environmental review panels which will be 
concerned not to give too much weight to socio-economic considerations or other considerations of the human 
environment in case the result is a claim for damages under NAFTA Chapter 11’. See for instsance Bilcon of 
Delaware Inc. et al. v. Government of Canada, Dissenting Opinion of Prof. Donald McRae of 10 March 2015, at 
paras 48, 51. See also B. Simma, supra note 196, at 580. 
240 M. Sornarajah, infra note 221, at 109-110. 
241 Ibid.  
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1.3 Earlier examples of public interest issues raised in investor-state disputes 
Some of the earlier investor-state disputes illustrate the interplay between 
upholding foreign investors’ international treaty rights and the legitimacy and validity of 
public interest measures.242 Below is a look at a number of cases where the latter were 
arguably significant, in particular where the issue of environmental protection was raised. 
It is worthy to note as well that there were no participating civil society organizations in 
these cases, i.e. as amici curiae, given that most of these claims were filed prior to the 
formal acceptance of the amicus curiae procedure. In fact, it is precisely for this reason 
that these cases require a closer look. They constituted a key prelude to the acceptance of 
civil society’s participation in investor-state arbitration. There are numerous additional 
investor-state disputes where public interest issues were pivotal and could have been 
relevant to the analysis engaged in directly below. Some of these disputes will be dealt 
with in a separate section given that various civil society actors were involved. These 
cases are more relevant to this research’s subsequent procedural analysis.243  
As previously mentioned, although not necessarily exhaustive and representative 
of the current state of the international law on foreign investment, the aim in discussing 
some of the earlier case law below is to illustrate the peculiarity of the public interest 
issues at stake in investor-state arbitration. This serves the purpose of emphasizing a clear 
difference vis-à-vis international commercial arbitration, which will be dealt with in the 
subsequent section.244  
1.3.1 Sea turtle protection, an exception to property rights? – Santa Elena v. 
Costa Rica 
The Santa Elena case 245  is an example where the issue of environmental 
protection was central to the dispute. It opposed Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa 
Elena246 and Costa Rica. The dispute arose out of the expropriation of the claimant’s 
                                                 
242 Louis T. Wells, supra note 208. 
243 See Part I  – Section 3.  
244 See Part I – Section 1.5. 
245 Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, SA v Republic of Costa Rica (ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1), Award 
of 17 February 2000 (‘Santa Elena v. Costa Rica’). 
246 A Costa Rican corporation owned by a majority of American shareholders. 
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property – known as Santa Elena.247  The Santa Elena property was acquired by the 
claimant in 1970 and was meant for touristic and residential development, however, it 
was expropriated for conservationist objectives in 1978 as it bordered the Santa Rosa 
natural reserve and contained ‘flora and fauna of great scientific, recreational, educational, 
and tourism value, as well as beaches that are especially important as spawning grounds 
for sea turtles’.248 Costa Rica had been in fact engaged in efforts to list the Guanacaste 
region, including the Santa Elena property, as a UNESCO World Heritage Site due to its 
‘biological and geological significance’.249 The claimant did not contest the expropriation 
in se, however, it objected to the compensation amount – making it the most relevant 
issue to be determined by the tribunal.250 The claimant sought a compensation amount 
calculated on the basis of the current fair market value of the Santa Elena property as 
opposed to its value in 1978. 251 Costa Rica, on the other hand, argued the opposite, that 
under international law, the claimants were solely entitled to compensation on the basis 
of the fair market value of the property in 1978.252  
The tribunal agreed with Costa Rica’s position. However, it granted the claimant 
compounded interest in contrast to nominal interest, thereby significantly increasing the 
compensation amount payable by Costa Rica.253 More fundamentally for the purposes of 
this research, the tribunal explicitly asserted that Costa Rica had a duty to pay 
compensation even in cases of lawful expropriations pursuant to both Costa Rican law 
and international law.254 It then stressed that the fact that the Santa Elena property was 
taken for environmental reasons does not affect either the nature or the measure of the 
compensation to be paid to foreign investors. According to the tribunal, expropriatory 
                                                 
247 Following various lengthy legal proceedings in front of Costa Rican courts, the Compañía del Desarrollo de 
Santa Elena submitted an ICSID claim against Costa Rica pursuant to the ICSID Convention – which was 
ratified by both the US and Costa Rica. 
248 The property consists of 30 kilometers of coastline on the Pacific ocean and comprises rivers, springs, valleys, 
mountains, and forests. See Ibid., at para 15, 18.  
249 Ibid., at para 46.  
250 The property was acquired in 1970 for the sum of $395,000. The compensation amount proposed by Costa 
Rica in 1978 was $1,900,000. However, the claimants sought at that time an amount of $6,400,000. Other 
appraisals and valuations followed, however, the parties had failed to agree on an amount. Ibid., at para 20, 34 
251 $41,200,000 with interest and other amounts. Ibid., at para 29. 
252 In the same vein, it argued that if the tribunal adheres to a valuation of the compensation amount based on the 
current fair market value, as requested by the claimant, it should take into account the existing environmental 
legislation that would significantly restrict, if not outright prohibit, the commercial development of Santa Elena. 
See Ibid., at para 35. 
253 Costa Rica was ultimately ordered to pay $16,000,000. Ibid., at para 106. 
254 Ibid., at para 68. 
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environmental measures are no different than any other expropriatory measures that a 
state may take in order to implement its policies ‘no matter how laudable and beneficial 
to society as a whole’.255 The tribunal thus found that where property is expropriated, 
even for environmental purposes, whether on the basis of a host state’s domestic or 
international obligations, the host state’s obligation to pay compensation remains.256  
1.3.2 Cactus reserves and hazardous chemical waste – Metalclad v. Mexico 
Metalclad v. Mexico257 is a case that is often cited as a leading example of the 
inter-play between environmental protection and the international law on foreign 
investment. Metalclad258 had fully acquired a Mexican company with the aim to develop 
and operate the latter’s hazardous waste transfer station and landfill in the area of 
Guadalcazar located in the Mexican federal state of San Luis de Potosi (SLP). 259 
Although Metalclad claimed to have obtained all the necessary environmental approvals, 
the Guadalcazar municipality had ordered the cessation of all building activities due to 
Metalclad’s failure to obtain a municipal permit.260 The landfill site was later blocked by 
demonstrators, which according to Metalclad were allegedly assisted by state troopers 
and prevented the company from opening the site. 261  Adverse measures, from 
                                                 
255 Ibid., at para 72 (our emphasis). 
256 Having said that, as previously mentioned, the parties had agreed that the dispute solely revolved around the 
amount of compensation that was effectively due to the claimant. The tribunal’s decision, including this last 
point, shall be revisited in the discussion over the criticism of investor-state tribunals’ decisions. Part II – 
Section 1.4. 
257 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1), Award of 30 August 2000 
(‘Metalclad v. Mexico’).   
258 Metalclad is an American waste disposal company incorporated in the state of Delaware. 
259 The acquisition was implemented through its wholly owned Mexican subsidiary – Ecosistemas Nacionales 
S.A. de C.V. –  Confinamiento Tecnico de Residuos Industriales S.A. de C.V. (COTERIN) in 1993. Metalclad 
Corporation v United Mexican States, supra note 257, at para 47-48.  
260  The development and operation of the station were formally authorized, and approved, by the federal 
government and consistently confirmed at various stages whether formally by the grant of licenses or through 
representation by federal officials starting in 1990. The National Ecological Institute (INE), an independent sub-
agency of the federal Secretariat of the Mexican Environment, National Resources, and Fishing (SEMARNAP), 
had also approved the project and granted COTERIN a license to commence construction by 1993, as well as 
subsequent extensions and approvals in mid-1994 and in 1995. The latest approval was an agreement (a 
Convenio) entered into in November 1995 where the Mexican Federal Attorney’s Office for the Protection of the 
Environment (PROFEPA), an independent sub agency of SEMARNAP, along with INE, agreed with Metalclad 
to essentially allow the operation of the landfill contingent upon Metalclad’s commitment to remedy ‘certain 
deficiencies’, which were identified during an audit carried out by the two agencies, within the first three years of 
operation. Metalclad alleged that it was not required to seek a municipal permit based on representation from 
Mexican federal government officials, but ultimately decided to apply for whilst resuming construction. 
261 By December 1995, the Guadalcazar municipality denied Metalclad’s request for a construction permit citing 
two earlier similar decisions issued to COTERIN in 1991 and 1992. Ibid., at para 50. 
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Metalclad’s standpoint, finally culminated in an ecological decree implemented by SLP’s 
governor declaring a natural reserve for rare cactus encompassing the area of the landfill, 
thereby having the effect of permanently blocking its operation.262  
Metalclad thus alleged that Mexico, through actions of the Guadalcazar 
municipality and the federal state of SLP, violated its NAFTA obligations including (i) 
Article 1105 which guarantees Metalclad’s right to ‘fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security’263; and (ii) Article 1110 on expropriation.264 Mexico defended its 
conduct, and argued that Metalclad ‘knew, or should have known’, that the Guadalcazar 
municipal construction permit was required prior to the commencement of the operation 
of its site. 265  It is crucial to note here that Mexico did not base its defense on 
environmental aspects. Indeed, this would have seemed rather contradictory given that its 
environmental agencies approved the Metalclad project all along – notwithstanding the 
opposition of Guadalcazar’s municipality and citizens.  
The tribunal found that Metalclad’s investment was not accorded fair and 
equitable treatment in accordance with Article 1105 of NAFTA, and that Mexico took a 
measure tantamount to expropriation in violation of Article 1110 of the same.266 The 
tribunal upheld its position notwithstanding the fact that the municipal permit was denied 
as a result of the opposition of the local population and ‘ecological concerns regarding 
the environmental effect and impact on the site and surrounding communities’ – to quote 
the tribunal.267 Indeed, in its analysis on environmental issues, the tribunal noted that the 
city of Guadalcazar was located within 70 kilometers of the hazardous waste site, with 
                                                 
262 Ibid., at para 59. 
263 Article 1105 of NAFTA states that: ‘1. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party 
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security…’. See NAFTA, supra note 170. 
264 See Article 1110 of NAFTA, supra note 232. 
265 Ibid., at para 41. 
266  It essentially based its arguments on the facts surrounding the measures taken by the Guadalcazar 
municipality coupled with the seemingly contradictory representations made by federal government officials. It 
considered that the absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal construction permit 
amounts to a failure on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency required by NAFTA – which according to 
the tribunal is set as one of NAFTA’s core objectives pursuant to Article 102(1). Ultimately, the tribunal ordered 
Mexico to pay $16,685,000.00 in damages to Metalclad. See Ibid., at para  88, 131. 
267 The tribunal considered that the rejection to grant Metalclad the municipal construction permit was ‘improper’, 
particularly in light of the fact that Metalclad was not notified of the municipality meeting where the permit 
application was discussed and rejected. In addition, Metalclad was not given any opportunity to participate in 
that process in order to adequately and effectively defend its interests in seeking a construction permit from the 
municipality. Ibid., at para 91-92, 97. 
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800 people living within 10 kilometers of it.268  The tribunal found nonetheless that 
Mexico had effectively exercised its rights under Article 1114 of NAFTA discussed 
above. 269  The article in question affords NAFTA parties the right to ensure that 
investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. 
Mexico’s environmental agencies had approved Metalclad’s project on repeated 
occasions and this, according to the tribunal, indicated that the project ‘was consistent 
with, and sensitive to, its environmental concerns’.270 It is worthy to note here that there 
was no mention by the tribunal as to whether Guadalcazar community members were 
consulted as part of any stage of the environmental licensing approval process. 
Incidentally, Guadalcazar community members, or representative associations, did not 
participate in the proceedings before the Metalclad tribunal – an issue that will be further 
explored below.271  
It is worthy to note as well that Mexico had requested the tribunal at a preliminary 
stage of the proceedings to issue an interim order of confidentiality pursuant to Article 
1134 of NAFTA, partly due to a negative ‘publicity campaign’ carried out by 
Metalclad.272 Whilst noting that ‘one of the reasons for recourse to arbitration is to avoid 
publicity’, the tribunal did not find that there was a general principle of confidentiality 
‘that would operate to prohibit public discussion of the arbitration proceedings by either 
party’.273 It nonetheless recommended both parties to ‘limit public discussion of the case 
to a minimum’.274  This last point shall be revisited as part of the discussion on the 
differences between international commercial arbitration and international investment 
arbitration in general, and the issues of confidentiality and transparency in particular.275 It 
is worthy to finally note that the Metalclad award was later contested on the grounds of 
                                                 
268 Ibid., at para 28. 
269 Article 1114, supra note 227. 
270 Ibid., at para 98. 
271 Part II – Section 1.4. 
272 Article 1134 of NAFTA states that: ‘A Tribunal may order an interim measure of protection to preserve the 
rights of a disputing party, or to ensure that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is made fully effective, including an order 
to preserve evidence in the possession or control of a disputing party or to protect the Tribunal's jurisdiction…’. 
See NAFTA, supra note 227. 
273 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1), Decision on a Request by 
the Respondent for an Order Prohibiting the Claimant from Revealing Information of 27 October 1997, para 2, 
9-10 (our emphasis).  
274 Ibid.  
275 See Part I – Section 1.5.3. 
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excess of jurisdiction before a British Columbia court – an issue that will be revisited 
further below as well. 276  
1.3.3 Persistent organic pollutants as a test for protectionism – SD Myers v. 
Canada  
The S.D. Myers v. Canada case277 is an example that sheds light on the arguments 
that may be raised by foreign investors against host state environmental measures. S.D. 
Myers 278  sought to import PCB wastes 279  from Canada for the purposes of their 
processing and treatment as well as the recycling of decontaminated components in its 
facilities in Ohio.280 As of 1990, Canadian legislation banned the export of PCB waste to 
all countries except the US, subject to the prior approval of the US Environmental 
Protection Agency.281 Canada had temporarily allowed the export of PCB only to reverse 
its decision in 1995. The Canadian ministry of environment then issued successive orders 
banning the export of PCB waste.282 S.D. Myers alleged that Canada’s ban on the export 
of PCB wastes to the US in 1995 breached Canada’s obligations under Chapter XI of 
NAFTA, in particular with respect to non-discrimination283 and national treatment,284 fair 
and equitable treatment, 285  performance requirements 286  and expropriation. 287  Canada 
                                                 
276 Part I – Section 1.4. 
277 S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, Partial award of 13 November 2000.  
278 S.D. Myers Inc. is an Ohio corporation that processes and disposes of PCB waste.  
279 Polychlorinated biphenyls are toxic chemicals. They are dielectric and coolant fluids typically used in electric 
appliances. They are classified as persistent organic pollutants. 
280 S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, supra note 277, at para 91. 
281 Ibid., at para 100. 
282 Following various lobbying attempts, Canada had authorized S.D. Myers, as well as other US companies, to 
import Canadian PCB into the US for treatment pursuant to certain conditions, including most notably a 
prohibition on landfilling PCBs – a decision which was reversed a number times thereafter in 1997 for a total 
period of 5 months that ended as a result of an import ban imposed by the US Court of Appeals. Ibid., at para 
126-128. 
283 The ban was according to S.D. Myers enacted in a discriminatory and unfair manner that constituted a denial 
of justice and a violation of good faith under international law, amounting to a violation of the fair and equitable 
treatment it is bound by under NAFTA. S.D. Myers further asserted that the Canadian ministry of environment 
orders effectively forced operators to dispose of PCB waste in Canada, which resulted in a performance 
requirement to accord preference to Canadian goods and services and to achieve a given level of domestic 
content in violation of Canada’s NAFTA obligations. S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, supra note 277, at para 130, 
135, and 140 
284 The Article provides that: ‘1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable 
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors…’. See NAFTA Article 1102, supra note 170 (our 
emphasis). 
285 See Article 1105 of NAFTA, supra note 263. 
286 Article 1106 provides that: ‘1. No Party may impose or enforce any of the following requirements, or enforce 
any commitment or undertaking, in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct or operation of an investment of an investor of a Party or of a non-Party in its territory: (a) to export a 
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denied on the other hand that S.D. Myers was an ‘investor’ under NAFTA.288 It argued 
that S.D. Myers’ interpretation of Chapter XI would effectively lead to inconsistencies 
with its obligations under the Basel Convention,289 which in any case should prevail over 
Chapter XI obligations.290 It alleged that the export ban was in fact made because it 
believed that ‘PCBs are a significant danger to health and the environment when exported 
without appropriate assurances of safe transportation and destruction’.291  
The tribunal initiated its analysis by emphasizing that ‘by the early 1970s PCBs 
had become recognised as highly toxic substances that harmed both human and animal 
health’.292 The tribunal then noted that both Canada and the US had signed the Basel 
Convention, but only the former ratified it.293 The Convention sets forth an obligation on 
signatories to ensure that hazardous wastes, including PCBs, are managed in an 
environmentally sound manner.294 The tribunal thus concluded that Canada’s position of 
not allowing the export or import of PCBs, and their treatment domestically, was in line 
                                                                                                                                                 
given level or percentage of goods or services; (b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content; (c) 
to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services provided in its territory, or to purchase 
goods or services from persons in its territory… 6. Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade or investment, nothing in 
paragraph 1(b) or (c) or 3(a) or (b) shall be construed to prevent any Party from adopting or maintaining 
measures, including environmental measures: (a) necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations that 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
or health; or (c) necessary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.’. See 
NAFTA, supra note 170 (our emphasis).  
287 See Article 1110 of NAFTA, supra note 232. 
288 Denying that a claimant is an ‘investor’ is a jurisdictional defense commonly resorted to by host state in 
investor-state disputes. According to Canada, PCB export ban does not relate to any investments made by S.D. 
Myers in Canada; and therefore, the extent of S.D. Myers’ arguments would amount to ‘inflating the scope and 
application of Chapter XI out of all proportion’. Canada indeed considered that the dispute was akin to its 
obligations under Chapter XII on ‘cross-border trade in services’, rather than Chapter XI. Ibid., at para 145-148. 
289 See Basel Convention, infra note 295. 
290 Ibid., at para 150. 
291 Ibid., at para 152. 
292 It is worthy to mention that PCB production is now internationally banned under the Stockholm Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants. See Ibid., at para 98. See also Annex A ‘Elimination’, Stockholm Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, entered into force 17 May 2004, 2256 UNTS 119; 40 ILM 532 (2001). 
293 The US only signed on 22 March 1990 the Basel Convention but has not ratified it to date; thus making it a 
non-party at the time of the relevant facts of the dispute. Canada on the other hand ratified the Convention on 28 
August 1992.  
294 More particularly, it prohibits (i) the export and import of hazardous wastes from and to states that are not 
party to the Basel Convention, unless such movement is subject to bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements 
or arrangements whose provisions are not less stringent than those of the Basel Convention; requires (ii) 
appropriate measures to ensure the availability of adequate disposal facilities for the environmentally sound 
management of hazardous wastes that are located within it; and (iii) the transboundary movement of hazardous 
wastes be reduced to the minimum consistent with the environmentally sound and efficient management of such 
wastes and be conducted in a manner that will protect human health and the environment. See Ibid., at para 107 
citing – respectively – Articles 4(5), 11, 4(2)(b), and 4(2)(d) of the Basel Convention.  
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with the Basel Convention.295 In order to comply with the latter as well as the NAAEC,296 
the tribunal nevertheless stressed that Canada was required to choose a regulatory 
alternative that would be the least inconsistent with NAFTA,297 a principle that is also 
recognized by the Rio Declaration.298 The tribunal was of the opinion that the export ban 
was largely enacted as a protectionist measure aimed at protecting the Canadian waste 
treatment industry from foreign competition.299 Having concluded that S.D. Myers may 
be considered as an ‘investor’,300 and by referring to WTO case-law in order to interpret 
the expression ‘in like circumstances’ under Article 1102 on national treatment,301 the 
tribunal found that S.D. Myers should have been afforded the same treatment as its 
Canadian competitors in the waste treatment industry.302 Canada later filed an application 
with the Federal Court in Canada seeking the judicial review of the S.D. Myers tribunal’s 
decision on the grounds of excess of jurisdiction and conflict with Canada’s public policy 
– an issue that will be discussed directly below. 303 
                                                 
295 Ibid., at para 116. See also Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal, entered into force 05 May 1992, 1673 UNTS 126; 28 ILM 657 (1989) (the ‘Basel 
Convention’).  
296 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 226. 
297 The tribunal considered that ‘a state can achieve its chosen level of environmental protection through a variety 
of equally effective and reasonable means, it is obliged to adopt the alternative that is most consistent with open 
trade. This corollary also is consistent with the language and the case law arising out of the WTO family of 
agreements’. Ibid., at para 215 (our emphasis). 
298 The Rio Declaration provides that: ‘States have the right to establish high levels of environmental protection. 
They are not obliged to compromise their standards merely to satisfy the political or economic interests of other 
states; states should avoid creating distortions to trade; [and] environmental protection and economic 
development can and should be mutually supportive’. See Ibid., at para 247 (our emphasis). See also UNCED, 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 96. 
299 This view was reinforced by the fact that Canada had lifted in the export ban in 1997 in the interests of swifter 
elimination of PCB waste. Indeed, the tribunal noted that: ‘Canada’s policy was shaped to a very great extent by 
the desire and intent to protect and promote the market share of enterprises that would carry out the destruction 
of PCBs in Canada and that were owned by Canadian nationals. Other factors were considered, particularly at the 
bureaucratic level, but the protectionist intent of the lead minister in this matter was reflected in decision-making 
at every stage that led to the ban’. See Ibid., at para 162. 
300 The tribunal found that S.D. Myers may be deemed as an ‘investor’ in Canada given that it had incorporated 
an affiliate in Canada, to which it had lent funds, and intended to engage in a joint venture with it; and that 
ultimately, S.D. Myers’ market share in Canada may be considered as an investment. See Ibid., at para 232. 
301 Article 1102 of NAFTA, supra note 170. 
302 This also led the tribunal to conclude that Canada breached its obligation of fair and equitable treatment under 
Article 1105 of NAFTA. However, the tribunal dismissed S.D. Myers’ allegations in relation to performance 
requirements under Article 1116, given that the wording of which ‘clearly does not apply’ to the facts of the 
dispute. On the question of expropriation under Article 1110, the tribunal was of the opinion that – although 
rights other than property rights may be expropriated – expropriation entails the ‘taking’ by a host state authority 
of a foreign investor’s property with a view to transferring ownership of that property to another person. 
According to the tribunal, this was arguably not S.D. Myers’ case. See Ibid., at para 251, and 280-281. 
303 The tribunal ordered Canada to pay S.D. Myers $6,050,000 in damages excluding interest. See S.D. Myers Inc. 
v. Canada, Second partial award of 21 October 2002. 
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1.4 Adjudication à sens unique: Some of the earlier criticism of investor-state 
tribunals’ awards 
The Santa Elena award was criticized as having focused solely on the impact of 
regulatory measures as ‘substantial deprivation of investment’.304 The Metalclad tribunal 
may have, so it is argued, precisely contributed to a widely held perception that investor-
state tribunals are international jurisdictions where private interests effectively ‘trump’ 
public ones.305 In its amicus submission to the Methanex tribunal, the IISD asserted the 
Metalclad tribunal failed to consider ‘environmental and sustainable development 
goals’.306 In a similar vein, civil society groups criticized the S.D. Myers case.307 Both the 
S.D. Myers and Metalclad awards were in fact contested by Canada and Mexico 
respectively on the basis of excess of jurisdiction in set-aside proceedings. Below is a 
more detailed analysis of these criticisms, as well as an emphasis on a fundamental point 
for the purposes of this research, i.e. the total absence of third party stakeholders.  
1.4.1 Environmental protection as a ‘substantial deprivation of investment’: 
Formal and informal contestation of awards 
The S.D. Myers, Santa Elena and Metalclad cases raised a myriad of complex 
international investment law questions. They have been criticized on various fronts, 
including with respect to the scope and application of the notions of fair and equitable 
treatment and expropriation.308 Prior to exploring such criticism, it is worthy to recall the 
holistic function of investor-state tribunals.  
Indeed, notwithstanding the ‘serious controversies’ surrounding some investor-
state tribunals’ decisions, investor-state tribunals are merely ensuring that host states 
abide by their international obligations towards foreign investors.309 In the same vein, 
investor-state tribunals effectively ensure that host state domestic authorities act in 
                                                 
304  B. Simma, supra note 196, at 589. More particularly in relation to Metalclad, see D. Schneiderman, 
Constitutionalizng Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise (2008), at 83-84, and S. 
Tully, Corporations and International Lawmaking (2007), at 58, 322.   
305 See B. Simma, supra note 196, at 579.  
306 Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra note 428, at para 6. 
307 H. Mann, infra note 655, at 4. 
308 For an extensive analysis, see A. Kulick, Global Public Interest in International Investment Law (2012), at 
236, 239.  
309 See J. Paulsson, supra note 107, at 232-233.    
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compliance with international law, and are checked when undermining the international 
rule of law by acting on ‘impulses’ of host state sovereignty which might relate to the 
public’s or the environment’s benefit.310 Paulsson poignantly argues that:  
If politicians of one country insist that international tribunals should have no power to rule on the 
legality of economic discrimination against foreigners because the protection of local business 
interests is essential, and coincides with the welfare of the local community, their posture may be 
practically undistinguishable from that of leaders in other countries who might insist that 
international tribunals should have no power to rule on the legality of the curtailment of civil 
rights because such restrictions reflect the local conception of the will of God, or a local cultural 
attachment to traditional authoritarian rule.311  
The previous passage evidently echoes the need to protect foreign investors from adverse 
host state discretionary and discriminatory conduct. It fits within the larger debate over 
not only the international foreign investment framework, but also globalization as a 
whole, i.e. investor-state arbitration is – simply put – a tool of global governance as 
previously highlighted.312 
The question as to whether investor-state tribunals were, or are in fact, adequately 
balancing foreign investors’ rights and the public interest somewhat exceeds the scope of 
this research. It is worthy to note once more that the preceding investor-state disputes 
have been adjudicated well over a decade ago. Therefore, the awards in these arbitrations 
may not necessarily reflect the current state of the international law on foreign investment. 
The purpose here is to shed light on the criticism made at the time, as further detailed 
below, as it contextualizes, and sets the background to, the acceptance of civil society’s 
role as an amicus curiae in similar disputes – an issue that will be further discussed in the 
subsequent section.313  
i. Contested awards on the basis of excess of jurisdiction – the Metalclad 
case 
The Metalclad case was contested by Mexico in a British Columbia court.314 It 
sought the judicial review of the award, and was supported by submissions from both the 
                                                 
310 Ibid., at 233.  
311 Ibid., at 233. 
312 See Introduction – Section 1. 
313 See Part I – Section 2. 
314 The seat of the Metalclad tribunal was Vancouver, British Columbia in Canada. Mexico lodged a request for 
judicial review of the arbitral award, which was accepted on the basis of the British Colombia International 
Commercial Arbitration Act – based itself on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the law states 
that an arbitral award may be set aside if the applicant establishes that: ‘the arbitral award deals with a dispute 
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Attorney Generals of Canada and Quebec as third party intervenors. Mexico and the 
intervenors essentially argued for a broad-scoped review of the Metalclad award in light 
of – what is argued as – the Metalclad tribunal’s manifest errors in interpreting NAFTA 
provisions. Such review should, according to Mexico, be in line with the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s standard of judicial review of Canadian administrative tribunals’ decisions 
under the so-called ‘pragmatic and functional approach’.315  
The Supreme Court of British Columbia found that judicial review, as practiced 
under Canadian administrative law, cannot be applied to international commercial 
arbitrations for which judicial review is solely restricted to ‘excess of jurisdiction’ or, in 
other words, ‘jurisdictional errors’ in accordance with Article 34 of the British Colombia 
International Commercial Arbitration Act. 316  Having said that, the British Columbia 
Supreme Court found that the Metalclad tribunal partially exceeded its jurisdiction by (i) 
stating that transparency was one of the objectives of NAFTA; (ii) deciding that Article 
1105 of NAFTA on fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security included 
transparency obligations and made its decision in this regard accordingly; as well as (iii) 
resorting to the concept of transparency in determining whether or not Mexico 
expropriated Metalclad’s investment in the meaning of Article 1110. 317  The Court 
therefore set aside parts of the arbitral award but not its entirety.318 
More fundamentally for the purposes of this research, and in contrast to the 
Metalclad tribunal, the Court also noted that COTERIN, Metalclad’s wholly owned 
                                                                                                                                                 
not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on 
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to 
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains 
decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside’. See The United Mexican States v. Metalclad 
Corporation,  2001 BCSC 664 (02 May 2001), available at: http://italaw.com/documents/Metaclad-
BCSCReview.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014), at para 42, 50. 
315 The ‘pragmatic and functional approach’ entails the scrutiny of contested administrative decisions under three 
standards of review: correctness, reasonableness simpliciter and patent unreasonableness. It has been since 
replaced by the Supreme Court by the ‘standard of review analysis’, which contains only two standards of 
judicial review: correctness and reasonableness. Ibid., at para 53-54. See also Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9; and D. Lemieux, ‘Judicial Deference in Canadian Administrative Law: The 
Pragmatic And Functional Approach, Pushpanathan v. Canada’, (1998) 54 Administrative Law Review 757.  
316 Ibid., at para 55. 
317 See Article 1105, supra note 263; and Article 1110, supra note 232. See also Ibid., at para 68-71, 79. 
318 Indeed, the Court did find that the Metalclad tribunal did not exceed its jurisdiction by concluding that the 
SLP Ecological Decree – designating the Metalclad area as a natural reserve for cactuses – amounted to an 
expropriation without compensation. The Court has accordingly limited the interest awared to Metalclad as of 20 
September 1997, which is the date of issuance of the Decree, and not prior to that date. Thereby reducing the 
amount of damages from $15.6 million to $1.1 million. See Ibid., at para 105, 135.    
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subsidiary, had previously dumped 20,000 tons of toxic chemicals on the landfill site 
without treatment (allegedly causing water contamination and sickness amongst the local 
community), as well as allegations that Metalclad bribed Mexican federal officials, 
including its chief witness during arbitral proceedings.319 Having said that, although key 
to understanding the Guadalcazar municipality’s rejection of Metalclad’s construction 
permit application, and the wider opposition to the Metalclad project amongst the local 
community, these facts were seemingly not decisive in the Court’s legal analysis (nor the 
Metalclad tribunal for that matter).  
ii. Contested awards on the basis of excess of jurisdiction – the S.D. Myers 
case 
The outcome was substantially different in this instance. The S.D. Myers award 
was also contested in Canada but in front of the Federal Court pursuant to Article 34 of 
the Commercial Arbitration Code – a schedule to the Commercial Arbitration Act.320 The 
judicial review in question covered the S.D. Myers decision with respect to Canada’s 
violation of its national treatment and fair and equitable treatment obligations under 
NAFTA as well as the ensuing order to pay substantial damages to S.D. Myers.321 At 
issue was not only the fact that the S.D. Myers tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction, 
according to Canada and Mexico, which acted as a third party intervenor, but also that its 
decision effectively contravened Canadian public policy.322  
Civil society groups also submitted an amicus brief to the Federal Court.323 Under 
the banner of the Canadian Alliance on Trade and Environment, the civil society groups 
involved were Sierra Club of Canada, the Canadian Labour Congress, the Polaris Institute 
                                                 
319 Ibid., at para 5, 107. See also D. Schneiderman, supra note 304, at 82. 
320 Canada (Attorney General) v. S.D. Myers Inc. (F.C.), 2004 FC 38, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 368. See also Commercial 
Arbitration Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 17 (2nd Supp.)). Article 34 of the Commercial Arbitration Code contains the 
same provisions as the British Colombia International Commercial Arbitration Act cited above. See supra note 
314. 
321 Ibid., at para 3. 
322 Indeed, Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Commercial Arbitration Code states that: ‘(2) An arbitral award may be set 
aside by the court specified in Article 6 only if: (b) the court finds that…(ii) the award is in conflict with the 
public policy of Canada.’ See Commercial Arbitration Act, supra note 320. 
323 These civil society groups initially sought to participate in the review proceedings as third party intervenors. 
Their petition was, however, dismissed by the Federal Court, and upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal. An 
application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was also denied. See Attorney General of Canada, 
and S.D. Myers, Irlc., and The Council of Canadians, The Sierra Club of Canada and Greenpeace, 2001 F.C.T. 
317, Reasons for Order of 11 April 2001, para. 20. See also Y. Fortier and S. Drymer, ‘Third-Party Intervention 
and Document Discovery’, (2003) 4 The Journal of World Investment 473, at 477. 
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and the Council of Canadians. 324 The arguments contained in the brief particularly reflect 
some of the key issues raised in this research. The amici recognized that judicial review 
of arbitral awards should be restrictive with respect to international commercial 
arbitrations.325 They argued, however, that NAFTA arbitrations could not be considered 
as such because they raise issues of ‘broad public policy importance’ making them public 
and not private disputes – as opposed to international commercial arbitrations.326 More 
fundamentally, the amici questioned the S.D. Myers tribunal’s ‘one-dimensional’ and 
‘trade-centred’ approach as follows:  
the lack of sensitivity to environmental concerns revealed by this Tribunal is reminiscent of 
judicial attitudes that were rejected in Canada more than thirty years ago. The ecological 
imperatives facing our society have, as we know, grown considerably more acute in the 
intervening years. It will not be possible for us to meet these challenges, if both domestic and 
international environmental initiatives are to be subject to review before tribunals that reveal a 
single minded preoccupation with trade policy objectives to the exclusion of all other societal 
goals.327 
In its decision, the Federal Court found that it is bound by a restrained standard of 
judicial review – as opposed to the ‘pragmatic and functional approach’ standard, then 
applicable under Canadian administrative law – with respect to decisions of international 
arbitration tribunals. According to the Court, this is necessary in order to maintain a 
‘system for predictability in the resolution of disputes and to preserve the autonomy of 
the arbitration forum selected by the parties’ even in cases where the arbitral decision is 
based on an error of law or an erroneous finding of fact provided that the decision in 
question lays within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.328 This position is in fact in 
                                                 
324  Canada (Attorney General) v. S.D. Myers Inc., Submissions of the Canadian Alliance on Trade and 
Environment of 16 January 2000, available at: http://www.sierraclub.ca/national/programs/sustainable-
economy/trade-environment/federal-petition-sd-myers.html (last accessed 06 October 2014). The Council of 
Canadians sought to intervene as a third party, or alternatively as an amicus curiae, in the case of  United Parcel 
Service v Canada , infra note 515 – which will be further discussed below. 
325 Ibid., at para 2. 
326 The amici have accordingly requested the Federal Court to review the S.D. Myers tribunal’s decision on the 
grounds that (i) it exceeded its jurisdiction by purporting to determine a claim that is not capable of being 
resolved by arbitration under Canadian law; (ii) it erred in its interpretation of Canada's obligations under the 
Basel Convention; (iii) its decision is contrary to Canadian public policy because it effectively penalizes Canada 
for prohibiting the export of PCBs, a highly toxic waste, to the US when at all material times the importation of 
PCB wastes was unlawful under US law; and (iv) it erred in its interpretation of Canada’s NAFTA obligations, 
and failed to give effect to NAFTA provisions relating to sustainable development and environmental protection. 
Ibid., at para 5. This argument is for instance echoed by W. Burke-White, ‘The Need for Public Law Standards 
of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations’, in S. Schill, (ed.) International Investment Law and Comparative 
Public Law (2010), at 691.  
327 Ibid., at para 16 (our emphasis). 
328 Canada (Attorney General) v. S.D. Myers Inc., supra note 320, at para 39, 42. 
79 
 
line with the Supreme Court of British Columbia’s in the judicial review of the Metalclad 
case.329 The Court also found that public policy does not refer to a political position, in 
other words, to the validity of a ministerial order or measure; rather, it refers to 
‘fundamental notions and principles of justice’. The Court thus found that the S.D. Myers 
tribunal’s decision did not breach fundamental notions and principles of justice so that 
the decision is not in conflict with Canadian public policy. 330 It finally emphasized that 
NAFTA’s Chapter XI allows the protection of NAFTA investors against state 
protectionism or discrimination. It bestows the latter access to an independent dispute 
resolution process, which can be invoked against a NAFTA party allegedly favouring its 
own nationals. Against this backdrop, the S.D. Myers tribunal concluded that Canadian 
measures banning the exports of PCB was not intended for a legitimate environmental 
purpose; but rather for the protection of Canadian industries from U.S. competition – a 
finding that was within the scope of its jurisdiction under NAFTA’s Chapter XI. 331 
Canada’s petition for judicial review was thus fully dismissed.  
iii. Informally contested – the Santa Elena award, a precedent for 
environmental measures as a ‘substantial deprivation of investment’ 
Although not contested on a jurisdictional basis, it is argued that the Santa Elena 
case demonstrates ‘that investment treaties deter actions being taken against polluters as 
the treaties ensure that infringements of existing rights of investors are regarded as 
expropriations under the treaties’.332  
The Santa Elena arbitration merely concerned the issue of quantum.333 In other 
words, Costa Rica was not against compensating the claimant. Perhaps most of the critics 
                                                 
329 Furthermore, it found that Canada failed to contest the jurisdiction of the S.D. Myers tribunal – an essential 
factor to the success of a judicial review for excess of jurisdiction by the Federal Court. United Mexican States v. 
Metalclad Corporation, supra note 314, at para 53-54. 
330  In this regard, the Federal Court found that the S.D. Myers tribunal’s decision was not ‘blatantly 
unreasonable’, ‘clearly irrational’, ‘totally lacking in reality’, or ‘a flagrant denial of justice’. See Ibid., at para 56. 
331 Ibid., at para 76. 
332 M. Sornarajah, supra note 221, at 225. 
333  The tribunal noted that ‘this is, at the end of the day, a case of expropriation in which the fundamental issue 
before the Tribunal is the amount of compensation to be paid by Respondent, Costa Rica, to Claimant, CDSE. 
While a host of sub-issues were raised by the parties in the context of the written and oral procedures, both 
parties agree that such matters are relevant only insofar as they tend to affect this central issue. As mentioned 
above, the Respondent’s right to expropriate the Property is not in dispute, nor (for the purposes of this Award) 
are matters such as the size or the boundaries of the Property. Thus, the sole issue in the present arbitration could 
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of the Santa Elena award were concerned with the tribunal’s lack of interest in taking 
into account any environmental concerns, including the protection of a UNESCO World 
Heritage site, in its analysis on the investor’s legitimate expectation as to the 
compensation amount. 334  The tribunal simply stressed that environmental measures 
should not be regarded any differently from other expropriatory measures – which all 
serve a public interest, without delving into any further analysis on the environmental 
concerns at issue.335  
Critics argue that ‘there is a definite clash here between the protection of the 
environment and the protection of foreign investment’.336 In general, host states have a 
duty to protect the environment as well as human rights and in theory should be, so it is 
asserted, entitled to cancel an investment project or agreement, even after it has 
commenced, if it can be shown that the harm to the environment is irreversible or 
outweighs the benefits of the project.337 According to Sornarajah, such measure would be 
based on: 
the sovereignty of the state which permits the state to protect its territory from environmental harm 
but also from the fact that, in modern international law, a state is a repository of the right to 
safeguard the environment in the interests of humankind. 338  
                                                                                                                                                 
not be more simply stated: What is the amount of compensation now owed to CDSE for the expropriation of the 
Property by Costa Rica?’. See Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, supra  note 245, at para 54-56 (our emphasis). 
334 I. Dubava, ‘The Place of Sustainable Development in Investor-State Arbitration: Extending the Protected 
Interests’ in V. Sancin (ed.), International Environmental Law: Contemporary Concerns and Challenges (2012), 
at 498.  
335 Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, supra note 245, at para 68-72.  See also A. Kulick, supra note 308, at 236-237. 
336 M. Sornarajah, supra note 221, at 110. For a criticism of the Santa Elena award, see also V. Prislan, supra 
note 82.  
337 Judge Bruno Simma cites General Comment No. 14 to the ICESCR, which provides concrete illustrations to 
violations of the state’s duty to protect through: ‘the failure to regulate the activities of… corporations so as to 
prevent them from the violating the right to health of others; the failure to protect consumers and workers from 
practices detrimental to health, e.g., by employers and manufacturers of medicine or food; the failure to 
discourage production, marketing and consumption of tobacco, narcotics and other harmful substances;…and the 
failure to enact or enforce laws to prevent the pollution of water, air and soil by extractive and manufacturing 
industries’. The substantive right to a ‘satisfactory, decent, healthy environment’ might appear chimerical to 
some, but the concept is gaining momentum and is actually transcribed in international instruments such as the 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See 
B. Simma, supra note 196, at 588, and UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the 
Covenant), 11 August 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838d0.html (last 
accessed 17 December 2013). See also T. Meron, infra note 846, at 447. 
338 Sornarajah cites the case of Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1; [1976] HCA 20 
where Australia terminated a concession which had been given to two US corporations to mine sand on Fraser 
Island. An environmental impact study showed that the adverse effects of such sand-mining on the environment 
of the Great Barrier Reef were considerable. The Australian government refused to give customs clearance for 
the export of the minerals, thus in effect terminating the concession. The High Court of Australia – the highest 
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The writings of Sornarajah as well as other critics, including in fact civil society, 
echoed the need for tribunals to further clarify the interlinkages between the upholding of 
foreign investment protection standards on the one hand, such as the right to prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation in the event of an expropriation, and environmental 
protection imperatives on the other, including the protection of UNESCO World Heritage 
sites such as the Guanacaste region – the focal point in the Santa Elena arbitration. 
Critics see host states such as Costa Rica as being ‘punished’ – through the payment of 
damages to foreign investors – by tribunals who adopt one-dimensional views. In sum, 
the perception is that investor-state tribunals are solely concerned with strictly 
commercial aspects, such as the determination of the fair market value of the Santa Elena 
property, in contexts where ‘the substantive issues extend far beyond those raised by the 
usual transnational arbitration between commercial parties’ – to use the wording of the 
Methanex tribunal.339 
1.4.2 A legitimacy deficit: the absence of third party stakeholder 
representation  
The absence of stakeholder representation is equally a source of criticism, i.e. the 
interests of affected third parties were not represented at the investor-state dispute level. 
The deficit in the participation of adversely affected stakeholders is in fact considered as 
part of an existing ‘backlash’ towards investor-state arbitration. 340  In particular, the 
Metalclad case presented the most relevant example of the need to secure such 
participation. Indeed, while Metalclad contested the fact that it was not consulted by the 
Guadalcazar municipality prior to the rejection of its construction permit application, was 
not afforded the right to be heard, and was therefore not treated fairly and equitably; the 
exact inverse could be potentially argued by Guadalcazar community members at the 
level of the Metalclad tribunal.  
                                                                                                                                                 
court in the Australian judicial system – upheld the validity of the conduct of the Australian government. The 
two corporations had spent large sums in setting up the project and the US government intervened diplomatically 
seeking a reversal of Australia’s position. See M. Sornarajah, infra note 221, at 109-110. 
339 Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra  note 428, at para 49 (our emphasis).  
340 See D. Vagts, ‘Forward to the Backlash Against Investment Arbitration’, in M. Waibel et al. (eds), The 
Backlash against Investment Arbitration; J. Maupin, supra note 48, at 10.  
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These were undoubtedly stakeholders to the dispute and could have had a myriad 
of potentially relevant arguments and issues to raise regarding the construction of the 
Metalclad hazardous waste landfill within their community. Stakeholders from 
Guadalcazar could have for instance put forward facts with respect to the widely reported 
sickness caused by the hazardous waste already dumped on the site, or additional 
environmental and scientific evidence or assessments on its potentially adverse effects 
(which would have contradicted both Metalclad and Mexico’s findings).  
Guadalcazar community members, their representatives from civil society groups 
or associations, have not sought to intervene in the arbitration. However, how could this 
have possibly occurred in the absence of a clearly established framework authorizing 
third party or amicus curiae interventions in investor-state disputes? Such a framework 
was indeed non-existent at the time of the rendering of the final award in the Metalclad 
case, i.e. in the year 2000. It is of equal importance to note that the confidentiality of 
proceedings acts as an effective barrier to any meaningful third party participation. 
People in Guadalcazar and Mexico might have been simply unaware of the existence of 
the arbitration while it was on-going.  
Not only were stakeholders from Guadalcazar not given the right to raise 
arguments or issues at any point of the dispute, but also they did not seem to have been 
involved in the Mexican federal government’s environmental license issuance process. In 
fact, the only forum where they seem to have had access is the Guadalcazar municipality 
meeting in which Metalclad was denied the right to a construction license for its 
hazardous waste landfill. This begs a central question concerning the role of host states in 
representing adversely affected citizens before investor-state tribunals. Should not the 
representation of wider concerns by affected citizens, i.e. third parties to investor-state 
disputes, be inherent to the functions and indeed purpose of the host state? More 
specifically, is Mexico not, as a sovereign state, the sole and rightful representative of its 
citizens’ rights and interests internationally, including the rights and interests of the 
Guadalcazar community before an investor-state tribunal?  
Again in this particular instance, it would have seemed difficult in a number of 
respects for Mexico to adequately represent the interests of the Guadalcazar community 
before the Metalclad tribunal. Firstly, although Mexico did defend its measures and 
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conduct, the Mexican federal government and its environmental agencies had approved 
the Metalclad project all along, whereas the Guadalcazar community vehemently 
opposed it. As previously mentioned, Mexico did not base its defense on environmental 
protection. It is against this backdrop that the Metalclad tribunal considered that Mexico 
could not have resorted to Article 1114 of NAFTA on ‘Environmental Measures’ given 
that Mexico’s environmental agencies had approved Metalclad’s project on repeated 
occasions. This indicated that the project ‘was consistent with, and sensitive to, its 
environmental concerns’.341 The Mexican federal government’s interests in this particular 
instance were thus not congruent to those of the Guadalcazar community. This is a 
situation that is increasingly seen as typically akin to investor-state disputes whereby 
segments of host state populations oppose certain foreign investment projects; whereas 
host states approve and support them.342 In any case, it would have been difficult for 
Mexico as a respondent to bring in witnesses from the community, as well as expertise 
supporting the community’s arguments and concerns, as credible counter-arguments to 
those raised by Metalclad, particularly regarding the adverse environmental impacts of 
the project on local citizens – again because it had approved the project all along.  
In sum, it is questioned whether host states may be in a position, or may be even 
interested, in putting forward defenses to foreign investors’ claims based on 
environmental protection or human rights arguments. 343  This may be due to tactical 
considerations,344 a desire not to exacerbate the arbitration,345 or out of reluctance to be 
perceived as unfavorable to foreign investors by raising such exceptions to the conduct of 
                                                 
341 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, supra note 257, at para 98. 
342 In considering whether host states could be potentially espouse the claims of adversely affected segments of 
their populations against foreign investors, Francioni notes that hosts-states may often not be interested in 
bringing environmental and human rights concerns to bear on the arbitration process, particularly given that host 
states authorize such investments often against the wishes of these segments of their populations. See F. 
Francioni, infra note 847, at 738. See also the case of Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, infra 
note 533. 
343 This is reflected by the existing case law. See Part I – Section 4. See also C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, infra 
note 617, at 1091. 
344 Such as focusing on jurisdictional exceptions to foreign investors’ claims. See also T. Ishikawa, supra note 
108, at 393. 
345 Shelton points out that in international proceedings in general ‘a state may feel that raising certain sensitive 
issues, such as human rights, will exacerbate the dispute between the parties or be counterproductive to the 
improvement sought’. See D. Shelton, ‘The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International 
Judicial Proceedings’ (1994), 88:4 The American Journal of International Law 611, at 615. See also F. Francioni, 
infra note 847, at 738. 
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the latter’s activities. 346  In fact, in the particular case of Metalclad, Mexico was 
concerned by a negative ‘publicity campaign’ carried out by Metalclad and requested the 
tribunal to issue a confidentiality order as previously mentioned. 347  Other deterring 
factors may include lack of resources or difficulty in gathering evidence, which could be 
more relevant to foreign investors’ claims against least-developed host states.348  
As will be shown directly below, the absence of third party stakeholder 
representation is in fact symptomatic of the impact of international commercial 
arbitration rules on investor-state disputes.  
1.5 Impact of the international commercial arbitration model on investor-state 
arbitration and civil society’s role 
This section starts by looking into the historical background of investor-state 
arbitration and the reasons behind the relevance of international commercial arbitration 
rules thereto. It then fleshes out some of the key differences between the two, which 
essentially translate into the absence of public interest issues in international commercial 
arbitration and the need for transparency in investor-state arbitration.  
1.5.1 The decline of diplomatic protection and other virtues of the 
international commercial arbitration model 
Arbitration is a powerful alternative to diplomatic protection. Ibrahim Shihata, an 
Egyptian lawyer and former Secretary-General of ICSID, asserted that the ICSID 
Convention:  
provide[s] developing countries with a response which, compared to the Calvo Doctrine, is both 
more adequate in the depoliticization of disputes and more effective in the encouragement of 
foreign investment, without inviting the abuses of diplomatic protection.349  
                                                 
346 A. Kawharu, infra note 393, at 283. 
347 Article 1134 of NAFTA states that: ‘A Tribunal may order an interim measure of protection to preserve the 
rights of a disputing party, or to ensure that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is made fully effective, including an order 
to preserve evidence in the possession or control of a disputing party or to protect the Tribunal's jurisdiction’. See 
NAFTA, supra note 227, Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States, supra note 273, para 2, 9-10.  
348 See for instance Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, infra note 740. See also C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, infra note 617, 
at 1091. 
349 Quoted in S. Puig, infra note 1403, at 246; see also I. Shihata, ‘Towards a Greater Depoliticization of 
Investment Disputes: The Role of ICSID and MIGA’, (1986) 01 ICSID Review 01, at 11.  
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With the creation of ICSID and the adoption of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
a system was established with the aim of settling investor-state disputes under the same 
precepts that govern international commercial disputes – as further detailed below.  
i. Diplomatic protection of foreign investors 
Diplomatic protection, often coupled with ‘gunboat diplomacy’ has been 
historically resorted to as the principal means of securing international protection of 
individuals in general, and foreign investors in particular.350 It is viewed in international 
law through the prism of state responsibility for injuries to aliens. An investor would seek 
the protection of its home state when it unsuccessfully seeks appropriate redress before 
host state domestic courts or administrative organs following violations of its rights. In 
turn, the home state would espouse the individual’s claim and resort to diplomatic 
protection.351 This has always been a ‘sensitive’ issue in international relations and is 
inherently associated with power dynamics of international politics.352 Towards the early 
XXth century, eminent Argentinian jurist, Carlos Calvo, denounced diplomatic protection 
as a violation of sovereignty and judicial independence of host states.353 Calvo’s doctrine 
articulated an obligation on foreign investors to exhaust domestic remedies prior to 
resorting to diplomatic protection. Calvo also argued that by entering a host state, aliens – 
including most notably foreign investors – implicitly accept the risk of being treated like 
nationals.354 
More specifically, diplomatic protection necessarily entails that (i) a host state 
breached an international obligation towards a national of another home state, and (ii) the 
                                                 
350 C. Brower and S. Blanchard, supra note 8, at 697. 
351 Diplomatic protection implied that no individual right of access to justice would exist at the international level, 
since, once local remedies failed, diplomatic protection by the national state would ‘transform’ the individual 
claim into a state claim with the effect of almost nullifying the role of the individual in the international remedial 
process. See the PCIJ Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case where the Court ruled that: ‘by taking up the 
case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, 
a State is in reality asserting its own right – its right to ensure in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of 
international law’. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ Series A, n°2 (30 August 1924), at 12; F. 
Francioni, infra note 882, at 9.  
352 Indeed, the ICJ noted that ‘diplomatic protection deals with a very sensitive area of international relations, 
since the interest of a foreign State in the protection of its nationals confronts the rights of the territorial 
sovereign’. See Barcelona Traction case, infra note 357, at para 37. 
353 P. Dumberry, supra note 221, at 112. 
354 For a more elabore discussion, see M. Paparinskis, International Minimum Standard and International Law-
Making (2013), at 30; D. Shea, The Calvo Clause: A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and 
Diplomacy (1955), at 106-110.   
86 
 
home state may bring a claim in respect of such breach.355 A home state thus espouses the 
individual claim of a foreign investor as its own – as reflected by, inter alia, the ICJ cases 
of Mavrommatis,356 Barcelona Traction, 357 ELSI,358 and the more recent Diallo case.359 It 
is a ‘fiction’ that was particularly necessary at a time when foreign investors had ‘no 
place, no rights in the international legal order’.360 
In the Barcelona Traction case, Belgium sought reparations from Spain on the 
basis of damages incurred by Belgian nationals, who were shareholders in the Barcelona 
Traction Light and Power Company (a corporation incorporated in Canada),361 as a result 
of various acts committed by organs of the Spanish state. These acts most notably 
included a denial of justice in bankruptcy proceedings before Spanish courts, which 
ultimately led to the transfer of the Company’s control in favour of Spanish nationals.362 
The Belgian government made successive unsuccessful diplomatic representations to its 
Spanish counterpart, which also rejected proposals to settle the dispute through 
arbitration. Belgium then filed a claim against Spain before the ICJ. However, the ICJ 
found that international law authorizes the home state of the Company alone to make a 
claim against the breaching host state, i.e. Canada and Spain respectively. 363  It thus 
dismissed Belgium’s claim because the alleged acts have not been taken in relation to any 
                                                 
355 Barcelona Traction case, infra note 357, at para 35 citing Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the 
Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1949] ICJ Rep 174, at 181-182.  
356 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, supra note 351. 
357 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) [1970] (‘Barcelona Traction 
case’).  
358 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), supra note 188. 
359 The case concerned the violations of the rights of a Guinean citizen – Ahmadou Sadio Diallo – which 
included his arbitrary arrest and detention in the DRC. Guinea brought the case against the DRC before the ICJ 
and requested reparations and an apology from the latter. See Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, (Guinea 
v. the Democratic Republic of the Congo) [2007] (‘Diallo case’).  
360 In the commentaries to the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, the ILC provided that ‘in the early years 
of international law the individual had no place, no rights in the international legal order. Consequently if a 
national injured abroad was to be protected this could be done only by means of a fiction – that an injury to the 
national was an injury to the State itself. This fiction was, however, no more than a means to an end, the end 
being the protection of the rights of an injured national. Today the situation has changed dramatically. The 
individual is the subject of many primary rules of international law, both under custom and treaty, which protect 
him at home, against his own Government, and abroad, against foreign Governments … This protection is not 
limited to personal rights. Bilateral investment treaties confer rights and protection on both legal and natural 
persons in respect of their property rights. The individual has rights under international law but remedies are few’. 
See United Nations, Draft articles on Diplomatic Protection, 2006, available at: 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_8_2006.pdf (last accessed 01 May 2015), at 24. 
361 The company was incorporated in Canada for the purposes of creating an electric power production and 
distribution system in Catalonia.  
362 Barcelona Traction case, supra note 357, at para 2, 15.  
363 Ibid., at para 88-96.  
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Belgian national but to the Company itself – which has both a personality and nationality 
that is entirely distinct of its shareholders.364  
ii. Diplomatic protection: new challenges in a de-colonized and globalized 
world 
Although it may be argued that the relevance of the Calvo Doctrine may have 
long elapsed, the dynamics of the Cold War, the appearance of newly-decolonized ‘third-
world’ states, fueled further challenges to foreign investment protection. This coincided 
with increasing calls for a ‘New International Economic Order’, whereby decolonized 
states asserted their right to control foreign investment, including their right to 
expropriate or nationalize foreign property in order to fund their much-needed 
development – as reflected by the 1962 General Assembly resolution on ‘Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources’365 as well as the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States.366 In fact, during the 1970s, there were more than 1,000 instances 
whereby developing host states nationalized foreign investors’ assets. 367  Against this 
background, the pressing need to de-politicize international commercial relations in 
general, and foreign investment protection in particular, became more evident and the 
importance of IIAs and BITs, as well as the ‘value of arbitration’, as recognized by the 
UN General Assembly, gained more relevance as further discussed below.368  
iii. The creation of ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration 
UNCITRAL was created in 1966 for the purposes of the modernization and 
harmonization of international trade law. It drafted a Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration in 1985. Indeed, the UN General Assembly had noted back then 
                                                 
364 For further analysis on both cases, see M. Sornarajah, supra note 221, at 11. 
365 UN General Assembly, Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 14 December 1962, A/RES/5217, 
available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1803(XVII).   
366 See Article 2(a) of the CERDS, which provides that: ‘Each State has the right: To regulate and exercise 
authority over foreign investment within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and 
in conformity with its national objectives and priorities. No State shall be compelled to grant preferential 
treatment to foreign investment’. UN General Assembly, Resolution 29/3281, ‘Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States’, dated 12 December 1974, available at: http://www.un-documents.net/a29r3281.htm (last 
accessed 06 October 2014). See also S. Picciotto, supra note 221, at 136; J. Maupin, supra note 48, at 7; C. 
Brower and S. Blanchard, supra note 8, at 697. 
367 M. Wells-Sheffer, supra note 206, at 485. 
368 N. Rubens, Opening the Investment Arbitration Process: At What Cost, for What Benefit?, in C. Klausegger et 
al. (eds.), Austrian Arbitration Yearbook (2009), at 488. On the relevance of IIAs and BITs, see also S. Picciotto, 
supra note 221, at 136. 
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a number of fundamental points in relation to the Model Law’s objectives, including a 
recognition of (i) ‘the value of arbitration as a method of settling disputes arising in 
international commercial relations’ and (ii) the contribution of the Model Law to the 
development of harmonious international economic relations.369 The Model Law was to 
give a wide interpretation of the term ‘commercial’ – as per the provisions of Article 1(1) 
– to cover ‘all relationships of a commercial nature’ including investment transactions.370 
The recognition of the ‘value of arbitration’ had been initially stated with the adoption of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules back in 1976. In addition, the UN General Assembly 
had made a generalized recommendation for the use of the Rules in the settlement of 
disputes arising in ‘the context of international commercial relations’.371 Since then, the 
Rules have been used for the settlement of a broad range of disputes, including disputes 
between private commercial parties, investor-state disputes, as well as inter-state disputes. 
Arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules was thus meant to reduce the 
prospects of intervention by foreign investors’ home-states and the historical role 
diplomacy played in the protection of foreign investment, i.e. to essentially de-politicize 
the investment process.372  
A similar rationale applies to the creation of ICSID under the auspices of the 
World Bank earlier in 1965, which was to establish a neutral forum for both foreign 
investors and states to peacefully settle disputes without the intervention of the investor’s 
                                                 
369 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 109.  
370 The Law contains an explanatory footnote to the term ‘commercial’ which provides that it ‘should be given a 
wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether 
contractual or not. Relationships of a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: 
any trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial 
representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering; licensing; 
investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms 
of industrial or business cooperation; carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail or road’. See Ibid.  
371  UN General Assembly, Resolution 31/98, ‘Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law’, dated 15 December 1976, available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdfhttp://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/477/79/IMG/NR047779.pdf?OpenElement (last accessed 01 
September 2013). 
372 The aim to reduce the role of diplomatic protection in relation to investment disputes is well-reflected in 
Article 34(3) of the ASEAN Investment Treaty, which partly states that: ‘A member State shall not give 
diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its investors and the 
other member State have consented to submit or have submitted to arbitration under this Section…’. See ASEAN 
Investment Treaty, supra note 173. See also Jan Paulsson, supra note 107, at 28, 55; and N. Blackaby and C. 
Richard, infra note 828, at 272. 
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home state. 373  ICSID Arbitration Rules are somewhat similar to other international 
commercial arbitration rules such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or the ICC Rules 
of Arbitration, 374  particularly in terms of their structure and key contents. 375  The 
procedural rules governing investor-state arbitration are based on the ones applicable for 
international commercial arbitration – initially construed for private parties to settle 
international commercial disputes. 376  Under the international commercial arbitration 
model, the private nature of proceedings meant that solely foreign investors on the one 
hand, to the exclusion of their home states, and host states on the other377 would be 
involved in a dispute settlement process governed by an impartial tribunal, under a fair 
and efficient procedure, that renders a binding and non-appealable decision that would be 
subject to domestic judicial review in only a limited number of cases, covering mostly 
jurisdictional grounds.378  
                                                 
373 An ICSID tribunal indeed noted that: ‘One of the main objectives of the mechanisms instituted by the [ICSID] 
Convention was to put an end to international tension and crises, leading sometimes to the use of force, generated 
in the past by the diplomatic protection accorded to an investor by the State of which it was a national’. See 
Banro American Resources, Inc. and Société Aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema S.A.R.L. v. Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (ICSID Case No. ARB/98/7), Award of the Tribunal of 01 September 2000, para 15 (‘Banro 
American v. Congo’). See also Article 27, ICSID Convention, infra note 379. 
374  International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration (2012), available at: 
http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/Rules-of-arbitration/Download-
ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration-in-several-languages/ (last accessed 06 October 2014).  
375 T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 374. For an exhaustive survey of these rules, see generally G. Born, infra note 
1173. 
376 Ibid., at 373. 
377 The Banro American v. Congo tribunal in fact emphasized that: ‘once ICSID arbitration is available for 
settling a dispute related to a foreign private investment, diplomatic protection is excluded: the investor no longer 
has the right to seek diplomatic protection, and the investor’s home State no longer has the right to grant the 
investor diplomatic protection’. See Banro American v. Congo, supra note 373, at para 15. 
378 Albeit ICSID arbitral decisions are final and non-subject to appeal, there exists nonetheless an annulment 
procedure under limited grounds pursuant to Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. Article 52(1) provides that: ‘(1) 
Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing addressed to the Secretary-General 
on one or more of the following grounds: (a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal 
has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) 
that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to 
state the reasons on which it is based.’ Both the recourse to, and success of, this procedure were typically rare 
although there seems to be a recent reversal of the trend. See L. Johnson, ‘Annulment of ICSID Awards: Recent 
Developments’, IISD IV Annual Forum for Developing Country Investment Negotiators Background Papers 
(2010), available at: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/dci_2010_annulment_icsid_awards.pdf (last accessed 02 May 
2013). It is worthy to mention that one of the cases examined in the present study involves an annulment 
procedure submitted by Argentina, which argued that one of the arbitrators, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, lacked 
independence and impartiality due to the fact that she sits on the board of UBS, the largest shareholder in 
claimant Vivendi. See Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. The Argentine 
Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3), Decision of 10 August 2010 on the Argentine Republic’s Request for 
Annulment of the Award rendered on 20 August 2007. See also T. Christakis, ‘Quel remède à l’éclatement de la 
jurisprudence CIRDI sur les investissements en Argentine? La décision du comité ad hoc dans l’affaire CMS c. 
Argentine’, Revue générale de droit international (2007), at 879. 
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As previously mentioned, NAFTA Chapter XI disputes are often governed by 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules – which were quintessentially construed for international 
commercial arbitration. The historic reason for this is that for quite some time only the 
US had ratified the ICSID Convention379 among the NAFTA parties.380 
 Resorting to arbitration thus presents a number of key procedural advantages 
such as the confidentiality and private nature of the proceedings (as opposed to the public 
nature inherent to domestic tribunals), the finality of arbitral decision as well as their 
quasi-universal enforceability. Awards rendered pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules and the ICSID Arbitration Rules are enforced pursuant to the 1958 New York 
Convention (ratified by 156 states) 381  and the ICSID Convention (ratified by 159 
states)382 respectively.  
It is in this light that investor-state arbitration provides foreign investors with a 
right of action that sanctions host state non-compliance, i.e. they have direct access to 
international jurisdictions that issue effectively enforceable decisions. 383  Indeed, the 
‘fiction’ of diplomatic protection has become increasingly unnecessary – as poignantly 
stated by the tribunal in Corn Products International Inc. v. Mexico: 
However, there is no need to continue that fiction in a case in which the individual is vested with 
the right to bring claims of its own. In such a case there is no question of the investor claiming on 
behalf of the State. The State of nationality of the Claimant does not control the conduct of the 
case. No compensation which is recovered will be paid to the State. The individual may even 
                                                 
379 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 18 
March 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 4 I.L.M. 532 (entered into force 14 October 1966) (‘ICSID Convention’).   
380 The US had ratified the ICSID Convention on 10 June 1966. Canada only ratified it on 1 November 2013 and 
Mexico still has not. See ICSID, ‘List of Contracting States and Other Signatories to the Convention’, available 
at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&langu
age=English (last accessed 5 January 2015).  
381 U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 and Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, opened for signature March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. See also, New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Website, available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last accessed 14 
November 2013) (the ‘New York Convention’). 
382  See ICSID, ‘List of Contracting States and Other Signatories to the Convention’, available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&langu
age=English (last accessed 5 January 2015). 
383  K. Supnik, ‘Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Competing Interests in 
International Investment Law’, (2009) 59 Duke Journal of International Law 343, at 347.  
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advance a claim of which the State disapproves or base its case upon a proposition of law with 
which the State disagrees.384  
Having said that, some of those procedural advantages that are underlying the 
international commercial arbitration model have been put into question, including most 
notably the confidentiality of proceedings – as will be further elaborated below.  
1.5.2 Does civil society’s role really matter?: the irrelevance of public 
interest issues under international commercial arbitrations 
International commercial arbitration rules were initially tailored to govern 
disputes covering ‘all relationships of a commercial nature’ including investment 
transactions. 385  This definition thus covered investor-state disputes opposing foreign 
investors who had engaged in investment activities within the territory of a host state, and 
claimed to have suffered damages that were caused by a breach of the international 
responsibilities and obligations of the latter. As previously mentioned, this breach is often 
the result of regulatory measures that are generally enacted under the banner of the public 
interest. 386  Although international commercial arbitration rules have been used 
interchangeably in investor-state disputes as well as strictly commercial disputes amongst 
private parties, it is worthy to question how the subject matter dealt with in investor-state 
disputes compares to general international commercial disputes.  
Following the Methanex award, international arbitrators, Yves Fortier and 
Stephen Drymer, articulated the difference between investor-state arbitration and 
international commercial arbitration in the following terms:  
Investor-State arbitration, whether conducted under bilateral investment treaties (BITS) or 
multilateral instruments, invariably raises fundamental issues of public interest of a type typically 
foreign to international commercial arbitration. Indeed, a purely private commercial dispute, in 
which the issues to be resolved concern exclusively the rights and obligations of the parties 
interest, bears little resemblance to a treaty arbitration, in which the compliance of domestic 
legislative or regulatory measures with norms of international law is at issue. It is no surprise, then, 
that the traditional arbitral “model” developed in the context of international commercial 
arbitration is frequently acknowledged to be inappropriate in investor-State disputes.387 
                                                 
384 Corn Products International Inc. v. Mexico (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01), Decision on responsibility of 
15 January 2008, at para 173.  
385 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 109. 
386 See Part I – Section 1.4. 
387 Y. Fortier and S. Drymer, supra note 323, at 473 (our emphasis).  
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It is indeed hard to conceive that issues related to human rights, environmental 
protection, or the representation of indigenous groups or minorities for instance, would be 
raised in international commercial arbitration – in stark contrast to investor-state 
arbitration. 388  This precisely explains why the amicus curiae practice has not yet 
expanded to the realm of international commercial arbitration in the way it has in 
investor-state arbitration – a crucial point to note for the purposes of this research.389  
As previously shown, public interest issues appear to be inherent to a significant 
number of investor-state disputes. The relevance of public interest issues in investor-state 
disputes stirs vigorous debates on the appropriateness of arbitration rules that were 
essentially inspired by the international commercial arbitration model. The question 
asked at the time was whether the procedural rules designed for the latter actually fit the 
former. 390  Investment arbitration entails the review of governmental conduct, while 
commercial arbitration is about settling private disputes. Both are thus fundamentally 
different from a substantive standpoint. The review of governmental conduct by an 
arbitral tribunal is a peculiar aspect akin to investor-state arbitration that transcends the 
realm of international commercial arbitration. In this light, transposing international 
commercial arbitration rules to public interest-related investor-state arbitrations is often 
described as a ‘misappropriation of institutions’.391 
It is argued on the other hand that if rules applicable in investor-state arbitration 
were modified towards a path far off from the international commercial arbitration model, 
i.e. towards greater third party involvement and openness or transparency of public 
interest-related proceedings, investor-state arbitration would become politicized and risk 
the loss of numerous procedural advantages it gained under the international commercial 
                                                 
388 S. Karamanian, ‘The Place of Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration’, (2013) 17 Lewis & Clark Law 
Review 423, at 424.   
389 T. Bevilacqua, ‘Voluntary Intervention and Other Participation of Third Parties in Ongoing International 
Arbitrations: A Survey of the Current State of Play’, (2007) 01:4 World Arbitration and Mediation Review 507, 
at 533. 
390 T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 377; C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, infra note 617, at 1097. 
391  See K. Moltke and H. Mann, ‘Misappropriation of Institutions: Some Lessons from the Environmental 
Dimension of the NAFTA Investor-State Dispute Settlement Process’, (2001) 01 International Environmental 
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 103.  
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arbitration model such as party autonomy.392  It also might undermine the equality of 
arms. Indeed, numerous arbitration insiders and practitioners did not welcome greater 
third party involvement through the gradual acceptance of the amicus curiae 
procedure.393  
The issue of confidentiality and transparency of arbitral proceedings, further 
explored directly below, captures the divergence between the two models and reflects the 
concerns raised against applying arbitration rules to both international commercial and 
investor-state disputes interchangeably, and lies at the heart of the tensions related to 
access of third parties to arbitration proceedings. It will be used as a general example to 
put the contentions raised here to the test.  
1.5.3 Confidentiality and transparency issues as testaments of inadequate 
interchangeability 
The issue of confidentiality and transparency in investor-state arbitration is 
controversial and divisive.394 International commercial arbitral proceedings are typically 
held in camera, i.e. unlike domestic judicial jurisdictions, arbitral tribunals are in general 
not open to the public.395 It is furthermore recognized that – what is perceived as – the 
‘closed and secret character’ of investor-state arbitral proceedings is mainly the result of 
international commercial arbitration rules.396 In a rather telling passage, Wälde criticizes 
the ‘lifting of the confidentiality of the proceeding’ in the following terms:  
A feature of modern investment arbitration, in particular under the NAFTA but also ICSID, has 
been the lifting of the traditional confidentiality of the proceeding. Not only the awards, but also 
the submissions of the parties and interim orders by the tribunal are published. Access is provided 
to the hearing itself. Third parties, essentially activist NGOs, are allowed to submit amicus briefs. 
All this is generally applauded by Western governments, NGOs and academics as a move towards 
greater transparency required by the public interest at stake in investment disputes. The supporters 
of such procedural reforms going significantly beyond the arbitration procedures referred to in 
                                                 
392 N. Rubens, supra note 368, at 488. However, on the limitations of party autonomy, see M. Livingstone, ‘Party 
Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration: Popular Fallacy or Proven Fact?’, (2008) 25:5 Journal of 
International Arbitration 529, at 532; T. Wälde, supra note 51, at 33. 
393 A. Kawharu, ‘Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in Investment Arbitration as Amici Curiae’,  in 
in M. Waibel et al. (eds), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration, at 281; J. Maupin, supra note 48, at 26.  
394 A. Asteriti, C. Tams, infra note 402, at 788.  
395 A. Van Duzer, supra note 171, at 685.  
396 E. De Brabandere, infra note 852, at 103; C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, infra note 617, at 1097. 
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investment treaties have not been interested in an examination of how such instruments affect the 
equality of arms.397 
As mentioned previously, the Metalclad tribunal indeed noted that ‘one of the 
reasons for recourse to arbitration is to avoid publicity’. 398 The tribunal did not find, 
however, that there was a general principle of confidentiality ‘that would operate to 
prohibit public discussion of the arbitration proceedings by either party’ under the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules. Further to a petition by Mexico, it nonetheless recommended 
both parties to ‘limit public discussion of the case to a minimum’. The Metalclad tribunal 
explicitly identified confidentiality as a commonly perceived advantage of international 
commercial arbitration by emphasizing that ‘one of the reasons for recourse to arbitration 
is to avoid publicity’.399 Accordingly, the wider public had no access to the proceedings 
or its documents. The privacy and confidentiality of proceedings are fundamental 
concepts of international commercial arbitration as trade and business aspects relating to 
the disputing parties’ activities often require confidentiality and protection from wider 
public disclosure. In addition, it precluded the parties from facing any negative publicity 
that could be potentially linked to the dispute.   
Having said that, the Metalclad case raised a myriad of polemical issues that 
directly affected Guadalcazar community members, i.e. those who vehemently opposed 
the construction and operation of Metalclad’s hazardous chemical waste landfill within 
their community. Community members did not have the right to attend or have any 
access to the proceedings or any of its documents. In addition, the protection of the 
environment – a ‘common concern of humanity’ – was a focal point of the dispute.400 
Again, no potential attendance or access could have been granted to civil society actors 
who are concerned with environmental protection.401 The confidentiality of proceedings 
                                                 
397 T. Wälde, supra note 51, at 33. On the question of burden and prejudice to disputing parties, generally as 
included in the concept of ‘equality of arms’, see the criteria enacted by ICSID and UNCITRAL under Part I – 
Section 2.2.  
398 Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States, supra note 273, at para 2, 9-10 (our emphasis).  
399 See Ibid. See also E. Kentin, ‘Sustainable Development in International Investment Dispute Settlement: The 
ICSID and NAFTA Experience’, in N. Shrijver, and F. Weiss (eds.), International Law and Sustainable 
Development (2004), at 322. 
400 D. Shelton, ‘Common Concern of Humanity’, (2009) 01 Iustum Aequum Salutare 33, at 34-35.  
401 The recognition of civil society as advocates of international environmental protection is reflected in the 
Aarhus Convention, which defines the ‘public’ as ‘one or more natural or legal persons, and … their associations, 
organizations or groups’; and the ‘public concerned’ as the: ‘public affected or likely to be affected by, or having 
an interest in, the environmental decision-making; for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental 
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was effectively a barrier to any meaningful third party participation. People in 
Guadalcazar and Mexico might have been simply unaware of the existence of the 
arbitration while it was on-going. This seemed paradoxical since the three NAFTA 
parties, i.e. the United States, Canada, and Mexico, have transparent and open judicial 
proceedings where cases of public importance – similar to the Metalclad dispute – would 
not have been conducted in quasi-complete secrecy.402  
In this light, it is not an uncommonly held view that opacity ‘risks to kill 
investment arbitration’ as the public will not tolerate ‘unknown and unelected people to 
dispose of the destiny of nations in dark and secret rooms’.403 States are well aware of 
this criticism. For instance, while arguing in favor of the acceptance of amicus curiae 
briefs, the US pointed out that NAFTA Chapter XI dispute resolution is increasingly 
perceived as being ‘exclusionary and secretive’ – a significant statement by the US, 
which is the leading proponent of the North-American and global foreign investment 
protection regime.404     
It is worthy to briefly note as well that in reaction to such criticism, NAFTA 
parties adopted measures aimed at increasing transparency and clarifying confidentiality 
measures. In 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) adopted the ‘FTC 
Interpretive Note on Transparency’, which provides that:  
Nothing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the disputing parties to a 
Chapter Eleven arbitration, and… nothing in the NAFTA precludes the Parties from providing 
public access to documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal. 405 
The Note reflects the NAFTA parties’ understanding that Chapter XI proceedings do not 
entail a general duty of confidentiality apart from the ‘limited exceptions’ set forth under 
relevant arbitration rules. The FTC also articulated exceptions that would impose 
                                                                                                                                                 
organizations promoting environmental protection … shall be deemed to have an interest’. See Articles 2(4) and 
2(5) of the Aarhus Convention, supra note 119 (our emphasis). 
402 A. Van Duzer, supra note 171, at 695. Also, a study of US, English, French, German and Greek law suggests 
the same. See in A. Asteriti, C. Tams, ‘Transparency and Representation in the Public Interest in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration’ in S. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010), at 798. 
403 A. Moore, supra note 1040, at 266. 
404  Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra note 428, at para 22 (our emphasis). On the US role in 
promoting the investor-state ‘regime’, see J. Maupin, supra note 48, at 3.  
405 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, ‘Notes of Interpretation of Certain NAFTA Provisions’ (31 July 2011), 
available at: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-
diff/NAFTA-Interpr.aspx?lang=eng (last accessed 01 May 2013) (the ‘FTC Interpretive Note on Transparency’).  
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confidentiality under a number of conditions.406 Although regarded as a positive measure, 
the FTC Interpretive Note on Transparency might be considered lacunary as it solely 
covers the publication of case documents and does not address the issue of access to 
hearings, for which it defers to the applicable arbitration rules.407 
Greater transparency and openness towards the public of both proceedings and 
case materials has been also identified as a growing trend in BITs.408 For instance, the 
Canada-Peru BIT provides that hearings shall be in principle open to the public but that 
portions of hearings may be held in camera if the protection of confidential information 
is required. 409  The BIT also confirms the publicity of all documents issued by, or 
submitted to, the tribunal ‘unless the disputing parties otherwise agree, subject to the 
deletion of confidential information’.410 
 Both UNCITRAL and ICSID also amended their respective arbitration rules to 
the same effect. At the level of ICSID, its arbitration rules were amended in 2006 and 
contain, alongside rules on third party access which will be discussed in detail later, 
measures aimed at enhancing the transparency of arbitral proceedings. Article 32(2) 
states that:  
Unless either party objects, the Tribunal, after consultation with the Secretary-General, may allow 
other persons, besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts 
during their testimony, and officers of the Tribunal, to attend or observe all or part of the hearings, 
subject to appropriate logistical arrangements.411  
The amended version of Article 32(2) requires an objection from the parties to prevent 
access to hearings as opposed to a positive consent thereto. 412  This is in significant 
contrast with the previous wording of Article 32, which provided that a tribunal could 
                                                 
406 ‘(ii) Each Party agrees to make available to the public in a timely manner all documents submitted to, or 
issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal, subject to redaction of: a. confidential business information; b. information 
which is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under the Party's domestic law; and c. information 
which the Party must withhold pursuant to the relevant arbitral rules, as applied. (iii) The Parties reaffirm that 
disputing parties may disclose to other persons in connection with the arbitral proceedings such unredacted 
documents as they consider necessary for the preparation of their cases, but they shall ensure that those persons 
protect the confidential information in such documents.’ See Ibid.  
407 A. Van Duzer, supra note 171, at 704. 
408 N. Blackaby and C. Richard, infra note 828, at 273.  
409 Article 835(1), Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement, supra note 170.  
410 Ibid, Article 835(3).  
411  ICSID Arbitration Rules, entered into force 10 April 2006, available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf (last accessed 20 November 
2013). 
412 A. Van Duzer, supra note 171, at 706. 
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only act in this regard with the consent of both parties.413 Effective as of April 2014, the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration set the 
publicity of proceedings as the general over-arching rule as well, and confidentiality as 
the exception. Article 6 states that ‘hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral 
argument…shall be public’.414 This is in stark contrast with the previous corresponding 
provision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, prior to their revision in 2010, which 
state that hearings ‘shall be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise’.415  
In sum, the issue of transparency reflects a wider need for a clear distinction 
between international commercial arbitration and international investment arbitration. In 
the latter, the lack of inclusiveness of stakeholders, transparency, and publicity are ever 
more difficult to sustain; whereas in the former, confidentiality and non-disclosure are 
clear advantages to parties wary of protecting their business information and 
reputation.416  
Investment treaty arbitration and international commercial arbitration show a 
substantive difference on the one hand, and a procedural similarity on the other.417 This 
procedural similarity has been reduced with (i) the increasing recognition by arbitral 
tribunals for the necessity of a shift in procedure where the public interest is at stake; (ii) 
both ICSID and UNCITRAL amending existing, or adopting new, arbitration rules; (iii) 
NAFTA parties setting out new guidelines to increase third-party participation and 
transparency under Chapter XI disputes; and (iv) newly negotiated BITs adhering to 
                                                 
413 The previous version of Article 32(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules stated that: ‘The tribunal shall decide, 
with the consent of the parties, which other persons besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, 
witnesses and experts during their testimony, and officers of the Tribunal may attend the hearings’.  
414 Article 6 continues to set out the exceptions to the rule by providing that: ‘(2) Where there is a need to protect 
confidential information or the integrity of the arbitral process pursuant to Article 7, the arbitral tribunal shall 
make arrangements to hold in private that part of the hearing requiring such protection. (3) The arbitral tribunal 
shall make logistical arrangements to facilitate the public access to hearings (including where appropriate by 
organizing attendance through video links or such other means as it deems appropriate). However, the arbitral 
tribunal may, after consultation with the disputing parties, decide to hold all or part of the hearings in private 
where this becomes necessary for logistical reasons, such as when the circumstances render any original 
arrangement for public access to a hearing infeasible’. See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based 
Investor-State Arbitration, effective on 01 April 2014, available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/pre-release-UNCITRAL-Rules-on-
Transparency.pdf  (last accessed 20 November 2013) (‘the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency’). 
415 See Article 25(4), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 371. 
416 D. Dimitrov and L. Shore, ‘The Public Interest In Private Dispute Resolutions’, in C. Klausegger et al. (eds.), 
Austrian Arbitration Yearbook (2009), at 163; A. Asteriti, C. Tams, infra note 402, at 790; J. Maupin, supra note 
48, at 34. 
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similar principles. 418  These developments indeed marked a clear paradigm shift, i.e. 
investor-state arbitration is thus increasingly perceived as distinct – both substantively 
and procedurally – from international commercial arbitration. This is reflected in more 
detail in the analysis of the case law directly below.  
1.5.4 The gradual shift towards the acceptance of civil society’s 
participation in investor-state disputes: a fait accompli? 
The disputes discussed hitherto were conducted in accordance with international 
commercial arbitration rules, i.e. confidentially and privately without any participation by 
third parties.419  Since then, those concerned by the validity of public interest-related 
measures have sought to intervene as either third parties or amici curiae in order to raise 
factual and legal arguments in favour of the protection of the public interest, i.e. their 
interest, in disputes that are far from ‘typical’ commercial arbitrations that have ‘a 
significant effect extending beyond the two Disputing Parties’.420 In such disputes, host 
states are confined to answer to foreign investors’ claims by raising legal counter-
arguments and perspectives that are not necessarily the same as those that can be 
potentially raised by third party stakeholders.  
Against this background, the role of civil society can be perceived as (i) that of an 
advocate to ‘voice the concerns of the public’ not only at the international sphere in 
general, but also before investor-state tribunals; and (ii) a balancing act to crucial arbitral 
awards that could trigger serious consequences for host states and, more fundamentally, 
their populations in cases where public-interest measures are challenged by foreign 
investors.421 Having seen the limitations that bound Mexico in the Metalclad case, it 
appears that civil society actors could have brought forward additional information, 
perspectives, and arguments that are distinct from those made by Mexico and that could 
have potentially enabled the Metalclad tribunal to reach a less contested, more balanced 
                                                 
418 See also A. Asteriti, C. Tams, supra note 402, at 793 et seq.  
419 C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, infra note 617, at 1097. 
420 Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra note 428, at para 17. 
421 A. Moore, infra note 1040, at 265. See also T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 376. On the shift of civil society’s 
attention from the domestic to the international sphere, see S. Cummings, ‘The Internationalization of Public 
Interest Law’, (2008) 57 Duke Law Journal 891, at 907; C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, infra note 617, at 1097. 
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decision.422 Again, host states, such as in Mexico in Metalclad, may not necessarily be in 
a position, or even interested, in putting forward the same arguments as third parties.423 
In sum, earlier investor-state disputes such as Metalclad reflect the debate over 
host states’ duty to uphold foreign investors’ rights on the one hand, and positively assert 
public interest issues on the other. These disputes preceded, and indeed set the 
background to, the acceptance of civil society as amicus curiae – as will be further 
detailed directly below.  
2. Procedural rules governing civil society’s participation as amicus curiae  
The access granted by investor-state tribunals to civil society as amicus curiae 
comes as a destabilizing phenomenon to the investor-state dispute settlement regime. It 
was not initially foreseen when the system was created. Treaty-based investor-state 
arbitration inherently – and solely – opposes foreign investors, acting as claimants; and 
host states, acting as respondents. As discussed, the international commercial arbitration 
model was meant to ensure the private settlement of disputes between foreign investors 
and host states under the same rules that govern international commercial disputes 
between two private persons. This was construed as an alternative to diplomatic 
protection, and the interference of capital-exporting states. Such arbitration rules were not 
initially tailored to the ‘particular needs’ of investor-state disputes where significant 
public issues appear to be at stake.424 Again, international commercial arbitration allows 
business competitors for instance to settle their disputes while protecting trade secrets and 
avoiding any potentially negative publicity, or public-listed companies to avoid adverse 
effects on their stock price. Under such a model, no potential role for third parties that are 
concerned with the public interest could have been foreseen. 
However, it will be argued that the impact of the international commercial 
arbitration model on investor-state arbitration eventually receded in certain respects with 
(i) the increasing recognition by arbitral tribunals – starting with the Methanex v. United 
                                                 
422 J. Maupin, supra note 48, at 32; A. Kawharu, supra note 393, at 283. 
423 See supra note to 343 note 348. 
424 The term ‘particular needs’ of investor-state arbitration was coined by the Methanex tribunal – as will be 
further discussed below. See Methanex Corporation v. United States, infra note 428, at para 26-27. 
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States tribunal’s decision425 – for a shift in procedure where the public interest is at stake 
(Section 2.1); (ii) both ICSID and UNCITRAL amending existing, or adopting new, 
arbitration rules; (iii) NAFTA parties setting out new guidelines to increase third-party 
participation and transparency under Chapter XI disputes; and (iv) newly negotiated BITs 
adhering to similar principles (Section 2.2).  
The aim of this section is thus to highlight the acceptance of civil society’s amicus 
curiae role as a means to positively address the peculiarity of investor-state arbitration 
vis-à-vis international commercial arbitration; again, in light of the often significant 
public interest issues at stake.  
2.1 Acceptance of civil society’s participation as amicus curiae  
Following the relative success at the WTO with the Shrimps426 case and earlier 
precedents from the Iran-US tribunal case law, and in light of the prevalence of the 
practice in domestic jurisdictions,427 civil society organizations have sought to push for 
the acceptance of the amicus curiae procedure in investor-state disputes where public 
interest issues were at stake. Methanex Corporation v. United States presented in 2001 
the first investor-state arbitration in which civil society actors have successfully made 
such a request.428 Numerous arbitral decisions later confirmed the acceptance of amicus 
curiae briefs. However, the amicus curiae practice was only endorsed in a binding 
manner once the substantive rules governing investor-state disputes were amended. This 
was indeed the case for the ICSID Arbitration Rules, the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency, and a number of newly signed BITs.  
                                                 
425 Ibid.  
426 Report of the Appellate Body, United States: Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
infra note 1027. 
427 Two South African human rights organizations, the Legal Resources Centre and the Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies, requested to intervene in the Piero Foresti ICSID dispute partly on the basis of this rationale. See J. 
Brickhill and M. Du Plessis, ‘Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Public Interest Intervention in Investor-State 
Arbitration (Piero Foresti v South Africa)’, (2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 152, at 152. Also, 
a more detailed analysis of the regulation of the amicus curiae procedure under US law will be undertaken in 
Part III – Section 3.1. 
428 Methanex Corporation v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene 
as Amici Curiae of 15 January 2001. See also E. De Brabandere, infra note 852, at 98. 
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2.1.1 The Iran-US Claims Tribunal precedent  
As will be subsequently shown in this research, the WTO Appellate Body’s 
decision in the Shrimps case marked a turning point in international adjudication and 
presented a pivotal precedent for international jurisdictions in terms of accepting amicus 
curiae submissions by non-state actors in general, and those made by civil society in 
particular.429 The Shrimps decision dated back to 1998, i.e. three years preceding the 
Methanex decision. In addition to the Shrimps decision, the Methanex tribunal relied as 
well on the practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, an earlier precedent given that the 
Tribunal was established in 1981. Its mandate covers the settlement of disputes that 
ensued the November 1979 hostage crisis at the US embassy in Tehran, and the 
subsequent global freezing of Iranian assets. It has jurisdiction to decide, inter alia, 
claims of US nationals against Iran, and conversely of Iranian nationals against the US, 
which arise out of debts, contracts, expropriations or other measures affecting property 
rights; as well as claims between US and Iranian banks.430 It has operated for nearly 
twenty-five years and has produced a substantial jurisprudence that has triggered changes 
beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunal – as illustrated by its interpretation of Article 15(1) 
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (detailed below).431 The function of the tribunal is 
reminiscent of various post-conflict ad hoc mixed claim dispute settlement organs, such 
as the arbitral tribunals instituted under Article 304 of the Treaty of Versailles. It has set 
an important precedent for subsequent international organs such as the UN Compensation 
Commission, which was established following Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait in 
1990.432 
                                                 
429 See P. Sands, infra note 1048. For a review of the analysis on the Appellate Body’s decision, see Part III – 
Section 3.2. 
430 Claims had to be filed with the Tribunal by 19 January 1982. Approximately 4,000 claims were filed. 
431 See F. Francioni, infra note 882, at 20. 
432 Article 304 of the Treaty of Versailles gave ad hoc arbitral tribunals the competence to adjudicate a variety of 
claims lodged by citizens of the allied powers against Germany, which included those concerning war damage 
suffered as a consequence of ‘exceptional war measures’, such as requisition and other measures affecting the 
property of claimants, and claims arising in connection with disputes over contracts concluded before the entry 
into force of the treaty. See F. Francioni, supra note 882, at 16, and at 21 regarding UN Compensation 
Commission.   
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The Tribunal has its own arbitration rules, inspired by the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, and contains interpretive notes to each of their provisions. The most 
relevant of these provisions is Article 15(1) ‘General Provisions’ which states that:  
…the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, 
provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each 
party is given a full opportunity of presenting his case.433  
The interpretive notes provide that:  
(5) The arbitral tribunal may, having satisfied itself that the statement of one of the two 
Governments — or, under special circumstances, any other person — who is not an arbitrating 
party in a particular case is likely to assist the tribunal in carrying out its task, permit such 
Government or person to assist the tribunal by presenting oral or written statements.434 
Although third parties made a limited number of submissions before the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, both the Methanex and UPS tribunals resorted to the Tribunal’s interpretation 
of Article 15 and did in fact cite a number of its cases where amicus curiae submissions 
were effectively made.435 These did not include submissions by civil society per se. 
Rather, they most notably included ‘certain interested’ banks.436  
In light of the absence of any explicit guidance under Article 15(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on the question of amicus curiae, the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal’s interpretation allowed the Methanex tribunal to find that the procedure is 
acceptable under international arbitration, and not just under common law proceedings – 
as will be shown directly below.  
2.1.2 The Methanex precedent – a point of no return 
Methanex Corporation v. United States is a seminal case. It paved the way for 
investor-state tribunals to accept amicus curiae submissions. It shall be dealt with at this 
stage mainly from a procedural standpoint, whereas a more substantive analysis will be 
                                                 
433  Iran-US Claims Tribunal, ‘Tribunal Rules of Procedure’ (03 May 1983), available at: 
http://www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/5-TRIBUNAL%20RULES%20OF%20PROCEDURE.pdf (last 
accessed 02 December 2013).  
434 Ibid (our emphasis).   
435 See UPS v Canada, infra note 517, at para 64 citing Iran v United States case A/15 Award No. 63 – A/15 – FT; 
2 Iran – US CTR 40, 43. See also E. De Brabandere, infra note 852, at 99. 
436 Ibid. 
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engaged subsequently on civil society’s arguments with respect to the protection of the 
environment.437  
Methanex, a Canadian company and major producer of methanol, filed a claim 
against the US on the ground that a Californian ban on MTBE,438 a methanol-based fuel 
additive, amounted to expropriation in violation of NAFTA’s Chapter XI. The decision 
explored here was merely a procedural order dealing with the amicus curiae issue; thus, 
the Methanex case will be considered from the perspective of (i) the amicus curiae 
petitioners; (ii) Methanex; (iii) the US; and finally (iv) the tribunal. Concluding 
observations will then highlight some of the major points raised by the decision for the 
purposes of the present research (v).  
i. The amicus petitioners 
The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), the Communities 
for a Better Environment and the Earth Island Institute submitted separate petitions for 
leave to file amicus curiae briefs:  
on the basis of the immense public importance of the case and the critical impact that the 
Tribunal’s decision will have on environmental and other public welfare law-making in the 
NAFTA region.439  
Their petitions included requests to (a) make oral and written amicus curiae submissions; 
(b) participate in the arbitration proceeding as amici curiae; (c) have the opportunity to 
review pleadings of the parties (preferably prior to submitting the briefs) and any other 
submissions or orders in the proceedings; and (d) attend and gain observer status at oral 
hearings. 440  The petitioners argued that the tribunal has the authority to grant such 
requests under its general procedural powers contained in Article 15(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and that there are no contrary provisions under NAFTA 
Chapter XI which would preclude the tribunal from doing so. They further asserted that 
the acceptance of the amicus curiae practice at the WTO Appellate Body as well as 
judicial instances in both Canada and the US should serve as a relevant precedent.  
ii. The claimant 
                                                 
437 See Part II – Section 4.2. 
438 MTBE stands for: Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether. 
439 Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 428, at para 5. 
440 Ibid., at para 5-8. 
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 Methanex made a number of arguments against the acceptance of the amicus 
curiae petitions that were based on three fundamental principles: (a) confidentiality, (b) 
jurisdiction, and (c) fairness. 441  Firstly, the principle of confidentiality meant that, 
pursuant to Article 25(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, hearings are to be held in 
camera, i.e. not only meaning that solely the disputing parties had the right to attend the 
hearings, but also all documents of the proceedings were to be kept confidential. 
Secondly, the principle of jurisdiction precluded the tribunal from adding a party to the 
proceedings without the disputing parties’ consent. Methanex clearly considered that 
granting the petitioners the status of amicus curiae would amount to adding them as 
parties to the dispute in clear contradiction with NAFTA provisions, which restrict access 
to arbitral tribunals to the disputing parties, as well as NAFTA parties pursuant to Article 
1128.442 Finally, the principle of fairness would not be upheld given that the disputing 
parties would have no opportunity to cross-examine the factual basis of the amici’s 
contentions. It is precisely for this reason that, according to Methanex, only NAFTA 
parties should raise public interest issues pursuant to Article 1128 and not any other 
person. Methanex also suggested that the NAFTA disputing party would have the 
possibility to call on any of the petitioners as witnesses, thereby making cross-
examination possible. Methanex’ argument plainly suggests that legal arguments in 
favour of the public interest rest within the sphere of the state, who should be the sole 
entity asserting it, and not the petitioners.  
iii. The respondent 
 The US on the other hand was in favour of the acceptance of the amicus curiae 
petitions by the tribunal on the basis that the tribunal (a) had the power to accept amicus 
curiae submissions; and (b) would benefit from the assistance it would be afforded by the 
petitioners.  
According to the US, Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules grants 
the tribunal a wide discretion to conduct arbitral proceedings subject to both parties being 
treated equally and given a full opportunity to present their case. This discretion includes 
                                                 
441 Ibid. at para 12-14.  
442 Article 1128 of NAFTA states that: ‘On written notice to the disputing parties, a Party may make submissions 
to a Tribunal on a question of interpretation of this Agreement’. See NAFTA, supra note 170. 
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the authority to accept amicus curiae submissions as the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and 
WTO Appellate Body, particularly in light of the public international law issues and 
‘substantial public interests’ at stake in the dispute. The US emphasized the need to 
distinguish the dispute from ‘typical’ commercial arbitration given that it could have ‘a 
significant effect extending beyond the two Disputing Parties’.443 It also pointed out that 
an amicus curiae is not a party to the dispute. However, it acknowledged that it did cause 
an additional burden that could be nonetheless justified if the tribunal deems the amicus 
submission as helpful.444  
The US then asserted that the petitioners might have valuable knowledge or 
expertise. The US’ arguments reveal its seemingly pressing concern to mitigate the 
perception of NAFTA Chapter XI dispute resolution as being ‘exclusionary and 
secretive’.445 Citing this precise same reason, it also consented to the open and public 
hearing of all proceedings as well as disclosure of documents to the extent permissible by 
the tribunal.  
It is worthy to note that both Canada and Mexico made written submissions to the 
tribunal, pursuant to Article 1128 of NAFTA, containing opposite positions with regard 
to the acceptance of the amicus curiae petitions.446 Indeed, the latter was for an outright 
dismissal of amicus petitions; whereas the former favoured their acceptance for the sake 
of enhancing openness and transparency of NAFTA proceedings. Mexico in fact 
reiterated its opposition towards the amicus curiae procedure in the UPS case – discussed 
subsequently below.447    
iv. The tribunal’s decision 
                                                 
443 Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 428, at para 17. 
444 Ibid. at para 21. 
445 Ibid. at para 22 (our emphasis).  
446 On the one hand, Mexico opposed the acceptance of the amicus curiae petitions. It argued that NAFTA did 
not provide for the participation of non-disputing parties in a given dispute other than in the case set forth by 
Article 1128. It also pointed out that, unlike in the US and Canada, its domestic courts do not have the authority 
to accept amicus curiae petitions, and that the dispute settlement mechanism established under Chapter XI of 
NAFTA was meant to strike a balance between those common law states, and Mexico as a civil law state. As 
such, the fact that the procedure is accepted in common law domestic jurisdictions does not mean it could be 
‘transported to a transnational NAFTA arbitration’. On the other hand, Canada asserted that it supports greater 
openness in arbitration proceedings, as well as the tribunal’s acceptance of the amicus curiae petitions whilst 
pointing out that only NAFTA parties had the right to make submissions on questions of interpretation of 
NAFTA. See Ibid., at para 9-10. 
447 UPS v Canada, infra note 517, at para 10. 
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The tribunal’s decision may be broadly scrutinized under three headings: (a) its 
discretionary powers under Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; (b) the 
rights afforded to amici curiae; and finally (c) transparency and confidentiality issues as 
well as the public interest arguments that were raised by both the petitioners, the US, and 
Canada.   
First, the tribunal noted that there were no provisions under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules or NAFTA Chapter XI that expressly authorize or preclude the tribunal 
from accepting amicus curiae submissions. The tribunal found that the amicus curiae 
issue falls under Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The Article allows 
the tribunal ‘to conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate’ and is 
intended to provide it with ‘the broadest procedural flexibility’. It noted that the provision 
is one of the ‘hallmarks’ of international arbitration and enabled it to adapt to the 
‘particular needs’ of a given arbitration.448 As mentioned previously, the tribunal then 
referred to the practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and cited its interpretive note (5) 
on Article 15(1).449 According to the tribunal, not only both the US and Iran resorted to 
this provision in order to request leave to make written submissions, but also other ‘non-
state third persons’ such as foreign banks.450 Against this backdrop, it asserted that it did 
not need to rely on the relevance of the amicus curiae procedure in the respective 
domestic jurisdictions of NAFTA parties.451  
Second, the tribunal had to consider whether amici curiae would be potentially 
granted any rights if their petitions would be accepted – as contended by Methanex. It 
noted that accepting amicus curiae submissions does not confer third parties any 
substantive rights. Petitioners would in no way acquire the rights of disputing parties nor 
NAFTA parties as set forth by Article 1128 of NAFTA. In reaching this conclusion, the 
tribunal referred to WTO case law as well. It looked at the Appellate Body’s report in the 
Hot-Rolled Lead and Carbon Steel dispute, which emphasized that solely WTO member 
states have a ‘right to be heard’ by the Appellate Body and that the acceptance of amicus 
                                                 
448 Ibid., at para 5, 26-27 (our emphasis).  
449 Iran-US Claims Tribunal, ‘Tribunal Rules of Procedure’, supra note 433. 
450 Ibid. at para 32. 
451 Ibid., at para 47. 
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curiae submissions is a mere matter of discretion rather than third-party rights.452 The 
tribunal indeed noted that WTO case law demonstrates that the acceptance of such 
submissions ‘confers no rights, procedural or substantive, on such persons’. 453  It is 
worthy to note here that Methanex pointed to the limited scope of the amicus curiae 
practice at the WTO, and stressed that it should not therefore constitute an example.454 
The tribunal seemingly acknowledged this limited scope but has nonetheless used it to 
back its conclusion and clarify an essential, as well as a systematically recurring, 
characteristic of amici curiae: they do not have the right to take part in proceedings, or in 
other words, the right to be heard. In reasserting its discretion on whether to accept or 
even consider amicus curiae submissions, the tribunal noted that the additional burden 
that could be potentially caused would be mitigated by the fact that (i) submissions would 
be made solely in writing in a form and subject to limitations set by the tribunal; and (ii) 
it would be for the tribunal ‘to decide what weight (if any) to attribute to those 
submissions’.  
On the petitioners’ request to attend hearings and access case materials, the 
tribunal found that, pursuant to Article 25(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
hearings are to be held in camera unless both parties consent otherwise, thereby 
excluding members of the public – including ‘non-party third persons’, i.e. the petitioners. 
Although the US was in favour to open hearings to the public as previously mentioned, 
Methanex categorically opposed it; thus, the tribunal rejected the petitioners’ request in 
this regard. As to the disclosure of case materials, the tribunal found that the disputing 
parties had concluded a ‘Consent Order’ regarding disclosure and confidentiality, it 
therefore deferred to the parties to decide on that matter.455    
More fundamentally, the tribunal’s procedural analysis was further complemented 
by the recognition of the public importance of the case in its concluding remarks:  
There is an undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration. The substantive issues extend far 
beyond those raised by the usual transnational arbitration between commercial parties. This is not 
merely because one of the Disputing Parties is a State: there are of course disputes involving 
States which are of no greater general public importance than a dispute between private persons. 
                                                 
452 Ibid., at para 33. See also WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, Hot-Rolled Lead and Carbon Steel case, infra 
note 1042. 
453 Ibid., at para 33. 
454 Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 428, at para 15.  
455 Ibid., at para 41, 46. 
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The public interest in this arbitration arises from its subject-matter, as powerfully suggested in the 
[amicus] Petitions. In this regard, the Tribunal’s willingness to receive amicus submissions might 
support the process in general and this arbitration in particular, whereas a blanket refusal could do 
positive harm.456 
Here, the tribunal explicitly referred to arguments raised by the IISD, the Communities 
for a Better Environment and the Earth Island Institute, on the public importance of the 
case. The public interest in this instance was both used as an underlying rationale for 
procedural contentions, as well as substantive ones. The tribunal seemingly accepted it 
from a procedural standpoint, and explicitly referred to the public interest as 
complementary to its analysis of Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
Incidentally, this raises the need to assess the weight of the amici’s substantive arguments, 
which would be later put to the test in the tribunal’s subsequently discussed final 
award.457  
v. Concluding remarks 
By focusing on public interest arguments, and stating that accepting amicus 
curiae submissions ‘might support the process in general and this arbitration in particular, 
whereas a blanket refusal could do positive harm’, the tribunal responded to an argument 
raised by the IISD and other civil society actors to the effect that the participation of an 
amicus curiae ‘would allay public disquiet as to the closed nature of arbitration 
proceedings’ under NAFTA’s Chapter XI.458 The fact that the tribunal acquiesced to this 
argument echoes the growing recognition by arbitral tribunals for greater transparency in 
investor-state disputes. This was also an argument raised by both Canada and the US. The 
tribunal’s conclusion is diametrically opposed to the position of the Metalclad tribunal 
mentioned previously, whereby the latter recommended the parties to ‘limit public 
discussion of the case to a minimum’.459 The Methanex tribunal indeed showed how both 
issues of transparency and third-party participation are intertwined and confirmed the 
need to address them in investor-state arbitrations where public interest issues are at stake. 
Methanex’s concerns regarding third-party intervention resonate with those 
preoccupied with the consensual nature of arbitration and other fundamental principles of 
                                                 
456 Ibid., at para 49 (our emphasis).  
457 See Part II – Section 4.1. 
458 Ibid., at para 5. 
459 See Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, supra note 273. 
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international commercial arbitration. As mentioned, international commercial arbitration 
has been used as a tool to settle both disputes arising from (i) ‘all relationships of a 
commercial nature’, as defined by the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, as well as (ii) ‘investment transactions’. 460  Investor-state 
arbitration is in such case viewed as solely fulfilling the function of an international 
dispute settlement mechanism that should not be concerned with law-making, 
standardization, or legitimation functions of other international jurisdictions.461 In other 
words, investor-state tribunals should solely focus on settling disputes between foreign 
investors and host states without the need to consider other functions, imperatives or 
objectives.  
Yet, the Methanex tribunal dismissed such concerns. The acceptance by the 
Methanex tribunal of the amicus curiae practice is portrayed as a procedural innovation. 
It clearly departed from the general practice of international commercial arbitration and 
adapted the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules proceedings in order to ‘fit the 
particular needs’ – to use the terms of the tribunal – of investor-state arbitration.462 In 
other words, it confirmed the need to distinguish between international commercial 
arbitration and investor-state arbitration where public interest issues are at stake.  
2.2 Formalization of amicus curiae participation – the opening up to ‘third 
persons’ 
Not long after the Methanex decision, ICSID amended its arbitration rules, 
UNCITRAL followed suit by adopting new rules specifically ‘tailored’ for investor-state 
arbitrations, and NAFTA parties confirmed, through interpretative statements, the 
Methanex tribunal’s approach. This was also confirmed by a number of other states in 
newly negotiated BITs. With ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration rules governing the 
overwhelming majority of investor-state proceedings, these measures effectively 
                                                 
460 See Article 1(1), UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 109. See also T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 373. 
461  A. Von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, supra note 162, at 59, 63. Also citing Romak SA (Switzerland) 
v.Uzbekistan, PCA Case No. AA280, Award of 26 November 2009, at para. 171. On the wider functions of 
international jurisdictions, see also Shany’s arguments with respect to the European Court of Justice or the WTO 
Appellate Body in Y. Shany, ‘No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New 
International Judiciary’, (2009) 20 The European Journal of International Law 73, at 82.  
462 Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 428, at para 27 (our emphasis). See also A. Van Duzer, 
supra note 171, at 685.  
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constitute the formalization of amicus curiae participation in investor-state disputes. 
They merit close attention at this stage in order to be fleshed out prior to the analysis of 
the case law in the subsequent section.463  
2.2.1 Amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules 
The Methanex precedent was supported by an increasing recognition in public and 
academic discourse of the need for greater transparency and third party participation in 
investor-state arbitration.464 The ICSID Arbitration Rules were amended on 10 April 
2006. The amended rules were implemented following consultations with member states 
and recommendations made by the ICSID Secretariat as early as 2004. According to the 
latter, the amended rules aim to achieve a more efficient and transparent process.465 Not 
only do they cover access of third parties to proceedings and publication of awards, but 
also preliminary procedures concerning provisional measures, expedited procedures for 
the dismissal of unmeritorious claims as well as additional disclosure requirements for 
arbitrators. In this sense, the amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules were considered 
as substantially extensive and not merely as a response to public pressure regarding the 
pivotal issues of transparency and third party participation.466 
As mentioned above, the amended version of Article 32(2) requires an objection 
from the parties to prevent access to hearings as opposed to a positive consent to 
access. 467  More fundamentally for the purposes of this research, Article 37(2) now 
explicitly grants arbitral tribunals the authority to accept amicus curiae briefs subject to 
certain conditions:  
After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity that is not a party to the 
dispute (in this Rule called the “nondisputing party”) to file a written submission with the Tribunal 
regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to allow such a filing, 
                                                 
463 See Part I – Section 3. 
464 See generally, Y. Fortier and S. Drymer, supra note 323. 
465  See ICSID Annual Report (2006), available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnualRe
ports# (last accessed 01 July 2013), at 3.  
466 R. Buckley, and P. Blyschak, ‘Guarding the Open Door: Non-party Participation Before the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes’, (2007) 22 Banking and Financial Law Review 353, at 354-355. 
467 Article 32(2) states that: ‘Unless either party objects, the Tribunal, after consultation with the Secretary-
General, may allow other persons, besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts 
during their testimony, and officers of the Tribunal, to attend or observe all or part of the hearings, subject to 
appropriate logistical arrangements’. See ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 411. 
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the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to which: (a) the non-disputing party 
submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the 
proceeding by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of 
the disputing parties; (b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the 
scope of the dispute; (c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding.  
The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not disrupt the proceeding 
or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both parties are given an opportunity 
to present their observations on the non-disputing party submission.468 
Although the term is not explicitly mentioned under the amended Rules, (i) the ‘public 
interest’ subject-matter of a given dispute, and (ii) the role of the civil society 
organization as a representative of that interest, could be viewed as sine qua non 
conditions to the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs by civil society actors. It is indeed 
expected from these amici curiae to ‘represent a “public”, that is, a non-state, non-
corporate interest’.469 This is in addition to a clearly articulated condition on the utility of 
the briefs, i.e. they should assist the tribunal by covering arguments that are distinct from 
those of the disputing parties.470 It is important to emphasize that the Rules are not 
exclusively aimed at civil society organizations; rather, they open the door to ‘a person or 
entity that is not a party to the dispute’.  
In sum, the amended rules signal a clear departure from the international 
commercial arbitration model initially construed by the World Bank when ICSID was 
created.471 In turn, this has also led UNCITRAL to adapt its own arbitration rules to the 
particular needs of investor-state arbitration – as further detailed below.  
2.2.2 Adoption of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 
Proposals to adapt the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules – typically used for most 
NAFTA Chapter XI disputes – to the same effect as the ICSID Arbitration Rules have 
been recently enacted. The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency are an attempt to adapt to 
the ‘particular needs’ of investor-state arbitration.472 In contrast to the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency do not consist of an amendment to the 
                                                 
468  Article 37(2), ICSID Arbitration Rules, entered into force 10 April 2006, available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf (last accessed 20 November 
2013).  
469 E. De Brabandere, supra note 852, 103. 
470 Ibid., at 103. 
471 A. Van Duzer, supra note 171, at 706, 722-723. 
472 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 414. See also Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra 
note 428, at para 27. 
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UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules per se – which were recently amended in 2010. Rather, 
the Rules are essentially meant to apply to investor-state arbitration initiated under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules pursuant to an investment treaty concluded following 1 
April 2014 and/or those concluded prior to 1 April 2014 if (i) the disputing parties agree 
to their application, or (ii) the parties to an investment treaty have agreed to their 
application.473 This has effectively allowed UNCITRAL to establish two separate sets of 
procedural rules for each type of arbitration and is, therefore, a positive response to calls 
for a distinct procedural approach in investor-state arbitration as discussed above.474  
It is worthy to note here that the question of transparency in general, and amicus 
curiae participation in particular, stirred seemingly extensive debates amongst 
UNCITRAL’s Working Group members. As early as 2006, some members argued for 
Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to be amended in order to provide that (i) 
all documents received or issued by the arbitral tribunal should be published; and (ii) the 
arbitral tribunal should have the discretion to allow persons or entities other than the 
disputing parties to submit amicus curiae briefs.475 Arguments were also made in favour 
of amending Article 25(4) to provide that hearings should be open to the public rather 
than in camera and that Article 32(5) should provide for the systematic publication of 
awards. Most Working Group members had noted, however, that investor-state arbitration 
was ‘still developing’, and had agreed to maintain a generic approach applicable to all 
types of arbitration irrespective of the subject matter of the dispute. 476 Certain issues such 
as wider transparency concerns, particularly akin to investor-state arbitration, would be 
dealt with subsequently but as ‘a matter of priority’. This indeed materialized with the 
adoption of the new Rules.477  
Effective as of April 2014, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency thus set the 
publicity of proceedings as the general over-arching rule, and confidentiality as the 
                                                 
473 See Article 1. Ibid.  
474 See Part I  – Section 1.5. 
475UNCITRAL, Report of the Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), 46th session, 5-9 February 2007 
(A/CN.9/592), available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html 
(last accessed 12 November 2013), at para 61.   
476Ibid., at para 62.   
477 UNCITRAL, Report of the Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), 53rd session, 4-8 October 2010 
(A/CN.9/712), available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html 
(last accessed 12 November 2013), at para 2.   
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exception.478 More fundamentally, Article 4(1) adopts the wording of the first part of 
Article 37(2) of the amended ICSID Arbitration Rules479 by stating that:  
After consultation with the disputing parties, the arbitral tribunal may allow a person that is not a 
disputing party, and not a non-disputing Party to the treaty (“third person(s)”), to file a written 
submission with the arbitral tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute.  
There are differences between the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency and the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules in the subsequent paragraphs. The UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency adopt a two-pronged test on the acceptance of amicus curiae submissions. 
The first deals with information required from potential amici when applying for leave to 
make submissions; whilst the second provides guidance to arbitral tribunals in deciding 
whether or not to grant such leave.  
First, third persons wishing to act as amicus curiae are requested to submit 
significantly detailed information regarding their: (i) identity, (ii) connection to disputing 
parties; (iii) sources of funding; (iv) interest in the dispute; and (v) arguments of facts or 
law in the arbitration they would like to address.480 Regarding the issue of identity, the 
Rules provide interesting insight by requiring a description of the ‘third person’ that 
would include its ‘legal status (e.g., trade association or other non-governmental 
organization)’ thereby leaving the door open to both civil society actors as well as 
business or trade groups to file amicus curiae briefs. This is effectively in line with WTO 
case law. For instance, in the previously discussed Hot-Rolled Lead and Carbon Steel 
case, the American Iron and Steel Institute and the Speciality Steel Industry of North 
America groups filed amicus curiae submissions.481 Also, in UPS v. Canada, the US 
                                                 
478 See Article 6, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra  note 414. 
479 Article 37(2), ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 411. 
480 Article 4(2) states that: ‘2. A third person wishing to make a submission shall apply to the arbitral tribunal, 
and shall, in a concise written statement, which is in a language of the arbitration and complies with any page 
limits set by the arbitral tribunal: (a) Describe the third person, including, where relevant, its membership and 
legal status (e.g., trade association or other non-governmental organization), its general objectives, the nature of 
its activities and any parent organization (including any organization that directly or indirectly controls the third 
person); (b) Disclose any connection, direct or indirect, which the third person has with any disputing party; (c) 
Provide information on any government, person or organization that has provided to the third person (i) any 
financial or other assistance in preparing the submission; or (ii) substantial assistance in either of the two years 
preceding the application by the third person under this Article (e.g. funding around 20 per cent of its overall 
operations annually); (d) Describe the nature of the interest that the third person has in the arbitration; and (e) 
Identify the specific issues of fact or law in the arbitration that the third person wishes to address in its written 
submission.’. See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 414. 
481 Report of the Appellate Body, United States: Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead 
and Bismut Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, infra note 1042. 
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Chamber of Commerce filed an amicus brief.482 It confirms the prevalent understanding 
that a ‘third person’ in an investor-state arbitration context does not exclusively refer to 
civil society actors, but simply covers any ‘third person’ to the dispute in the literal sense 
– as is the case under the ICSID Arbitration Rules.483  
Second, tribunals are required to consider the following:  
In determining whether to allow such a submission, the arbitral tribunal shall take into consideration, 
among other factors it determines to be relevant: (a) whether the third person has a significant interest 
in the arbitral proceedings; and (b) the extent to which the submission would assist the arbitral tribunal 
in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the arbitral proceedings by bringing a 
perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties.484 
Again, as is the case under the ICSID Arbitration Rules, the ‘public interest’ subject-
matter of a given dispute is not an explicitly identified criterion. As mentioned above, 
both civil society actors as well as business or trade groups may file amicus curiae briefs. 
That said, civil society actors wishing to participate in arbitral proceedings arguably need 
to make a case for their interest, i.e. they will need to assert that there is a significant 
public interest at stake.  
In addition, in line with Article 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency address the issue of the potential burden and 
prejudice to disputing parties. Indeed, the potentially adverse effect of amicus 
intervention on equality of arms is a commonly expressed concern amongst arbitration 
practitioners.485 Article 4 of the Rules provides that:  
5. The arbitral tribunal shall ensure that any submission does not disrupt or unduly burden the arbitral 
proceedings, or unfairly prejudice any disputing party. 
6. The arbitral tribunal shall ensure that the disputing parties are given a reasonable opportunity to 
present their observations on any submission by the third person. 486 
Finally, another key recurring criterion is setting the purpose of amicus curiae 
submissions as the assistance of the tribunal, rather than the exercise of any substantive 
                                                 
482 United Parcel Service v. Canada, infra note 515. 
483 Although it is worthy to note that submissions made by states are covered by Article 5 (‘Submission by a non-
disputing Party to the treaty’). See Ibid.  
484 Article 4(3), ibid.  
485 On the impact of the amicus curiae submissions on the ‘equality of arms’ of disputing parties, see for instance 
T. Wälde, supra note 51, at 33. 
486 Article 4(5) and 4(6), Ibid.   
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right the amicus might have.487 This is also reflected in the FTC Statement, which will be 
discussed directly below.  
2.2.3 Acknowledgment through state practice – NAFTA parties and newly 
negotiated BITs 
Prior to the amendment of the ICSID Arbitration Rules in 2006, measures were 
taken at the NAFTA level and through newly negotiated BITs to enhance transparency in 
general, and confirm amicus curiae participation in particular. These measures are 
complementary to the amendments at the ICSID level and the adoption of new rules at 
UNCITRAL.488 Indeed, IIAs or BITs systematically refer to either set of arbitration rules 
as the applicable procedural rules governing investor-state dispute proceedings. It is 
important to discuss these measures since they have in many respects paved the way for 
the amendment to the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the adoption of the new UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency. 
i. NAFTA 
Although the measures undertaken at the NAFTA level do not amount to an 
amendment of the treaty per se, they were viewed as a positive response to those who 
called for the amendment of investment treaties to confirm the possibility for third-parties, 
including civil society actors, to make amicus curiae submissions when relevant. The aim 
here was to avoid uncertainties, as well as to clearly set out criteria that would guide 
arbitral tribunals in their decisions as to whether or not to accept such submissions. The 
FTC Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation (the ‘FTC Statement’) 489  was 
passed on 07 October 2003 confirming the amicus curiae practice developed hitherto by 
arbitral tribunals. It asserted the discretionary authority of arbitral tribunals to accept 
                                                 
487 Article 4(3)(b). Ibid.  
488 Having said that, IIA or BIT provisions allowing amicus participation may be crucial in UNCITRAL disputes 
to which the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency do not apply (given their entry into force only in 2014).  
489  NAFTA Free Trade Commission, ‘Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-disputing Party 
Participation’ (7 October 2003), available at: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Nondisputing-en.pdf (last accessed 01 July 2013). The FTC is made up of ministerial 
representatives from NAFTA parties. Its mandate includes the supervision of the implementation of NAFTA and 
the provision of assistance in resolving disputes arising from its interpretation. It also oversees the work of 
NAFTA committees, working groups and other bodies. 
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amicus curiae submissions by non-disputing parties.490 As the FTC Statement does not 
amount to an amendment of Chapter XI provisions, some doubt the extent to which the 
FTC Statement may bind arbitral tribunals.491  
In its first section, the FTC Statement clearly sets out that no NAFTA provision 
‘limits a Tribunal’s discretion to accept written submissions from a person or entity that 
is not a disputing party’. It also specifies the information that should be provided along 
with the application for leave to file amicus curiae briefs (section A):  
(d) disclose whether or not the applicant has any affiliation, direct or indirect, with  
any disputing party;  
(e) identify any government, person or organization that has provided any financial or 
other assistance in preparing the submission;  
(f) specify the nature of the interest that the applicant has in the arbitration;  
(g) identify the specific issues of fact or law in the arbitration that the applicant has  
addressed in its written submission;  
(h) explain, by reference to the factors specified in paragraph 6, why the Tribunal  
should accept the submission.492 
Furthermore, the FTC Statement provides guidance to arbitral tribunals in deciding on 
whether or not to grant leave (section B). Tribunals are advised to assess the extent to 
which: 
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination  
of a factual or legal issue related to the arbitration by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge 
or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties;  
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address matters within the scope of the  
dispute;  
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the arbitration; and  
(d) there is a public interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration. 
The Tribunal will ensure that:  
(a) any non-disputing party submission avoids disrupting the proceedings; and  
(b) neither disputing party is unduly burdened or unfairly prejudiced by such submissions.493 
Again, and in line with arbitral precedents, the FTC Statement stressed the fulfillment of 
the quintessential role of an amicus curiae; i.e. its sole purpose is to assist the tribunal by 
raising arguments, perspectives, and expertise that the disputing parties have not been 
raised. The FTC highlighted another key condition, i.e. the ‘public interest’ subject-
matter of the dispute. This could be viewed as a sine qua non condition to the acceptance 
490 E. De Brabandere, infra note 852, 100. 
491 See A. Van Duzer, supra note 171, at 706, 721. 
492 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, FTC Statement, supra note 489. 
493 Ibid.  
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of civil society amicus curiae briefs. By contrast, the ICSID Arbitration Rules and 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency do not explicitly refer to the notion of the ‘public 
interest’ as mentioned previously. The FTC Statement also confirms the position 
reiterated in several arbitral precedents by clearly dismissing the idea that amici curiae 
may be entitled to any procedural or substantive rights.494  
In sum, the FTC Statement solely provides guidance to tribunals. From a legalistic 
standpoint, arbitral tribunals maintain their discretion, they are not bound by the 
Statement in deciding whether or not to accept amicus curiae briefs.495 NAFTA case law 
suggests that the Statement has nevertheless provided useful guidance to arbitral 
tribunals. This is clearly reflected in the subsequently discussed Glamis Gold case.496  
ii. Recently signed BITs
Recently signed BITs confirm numerous decisions of arbitral tribunals in 
accepting amicus curiae briefs and reiterate the position adopted through the amendment 
to the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the adoption of the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency. In fact, as early as 2004, the US BIT model contained a provision allowing 
arbitral tribunals to accept amicus curiae briefs.497 The exact provision has been retained 
in the 2012 US Model BIT.498 It has been adopted in the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement concluded by the US and the following states: the Dominican Republic, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.499 This is also reflected in 
the recently signed US and Peru BIT, as well as BITs signed by Canada with Columbia, 
Chile, and Peru. In sum, it is fair to expect that the US and Canada would essentially 
494 Section B(9) of the FTC Statement states that: ‘The granting of leave to file a non-disputing party submission 
does not require the Tribunal to address that submission at any point in the arbitration. The granting of leave to 
file a non disputing party submission does not entitle the non-disputing party that filed the submission to make 
further submissions in the arbitration’. 
495 A. Van Duzer, supra note 171, at 709. 
496 Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, Award of 8 June 2009. 
497 Article 28(3): ‘The tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from a 
person or entity that is not a disputing party’. See United States of America Bilateral Investment Treaty Model 
(2004), available at: http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/U.S.%20model%20BIT.pdf (last accessed 12 
November 2013).  
498  See United States of America Bilateral Investment Treaty Model (2012), available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf (last accessed 12 
November 2013). 
499 See Article 10.20(3), Central American Free Trade Agreement, entered into force 01 January 2009, available 
at: http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file328_4718.pdf (last accessed 
12 November 2013( (‘CAFTA-DR’).  
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transpose provisions similar to the amended ICSID Arbitration Rules into their BITs over 
a decade ago. Both had indeed supported greater transparency and third-party 
involvement from the outset when the issue was first raised in the Methanex case as 
previously mentioned.500  
Although some EU states such as France had expressed reservations with regard 
to the amicus curiae practice in investor-state arbitration, 501  the EU’s Economic 
Partnership Agreement, amongst other agreements, with the CARIFORUM states allows 
it for instance.502 The EU position vis-à-vis this issue has never been clearer, particularly 
in the wake of the TTIP negotiations.503 The trend also seems to have echoed in BITs 
concluded amongst non-North American and non-EU states. Chile for instance has 
entered into BITs with Mexico (1999), South Korea (2004), Japan (2007), Peru (2009), 
Australia (2009) and Colombia (2009), which explicitly authorize arbitral tribunals to 
accept amicus curiae submissions under their respective investment-related chapters.504  
                                                 
500 Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 428, at para 17.  
501 See France’s comments on the use of the amicus curiae procedure at the UNCITRAL Working Group II 
regarding the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules: ‘This procedure can be useful for the parties and for the judge, if 
the intervention of the amicus curiae clarifies the subject under discussion and thus contributes to the quality of 
the arbitration process and the settlement of the case. The procedure is, however, alien to the French legal 
tradition. It may, moreover, give rise to abuse and inequalities. Its use should therefore be strictly limited. The 
intervention of amicus curiae may actually extend a dispute to people not parties to the case. Such an intervention 
will also entail additional costs, which may be borne by both parties, even though only one party will benefit 
from the submissions concerned.’ (our emphasis). See UNCITRAL, Working Group II (Arbitration and 
Conciliation) – ‘Compilation of Comments by Governments’, 53rd session, 4-8 October 2010 
(A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add.3), available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html (last accessed 12 November 
2013), at 5.   
502 CARIFORUM states include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, the Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Christopher 
and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. Article 217 of the Agreement states that: ‘At the request of a Party, 
or upon its own initiative, the arbitration panel may obtain information from any source, including the Parties 
involved in the dispute, it deems appropriate for the arbitration panel proceeding. The arbitration panel shall also 
have the right to seek the relevant opinion of experts as it deems appropriate. Interested parties are authorised to 
submit amicus curiae briefs to the arbitration panel in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. Any information 
obtained in this manner must be disclosed to each of the Parties and submitted for their comments’. See EC-
CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement, entered into force 30 October 2007 (L 289/I/3), available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:289:0003:1955:EN:PDF (last accessed 06 
October 2014). 
503 European Commission Concept Paper, Cecilia Malmström, supra note 17. 
504 See for instance Article 11.20(3), Acuerdo de Libre Comercio Chile – Perú, entered into force 01 March 2009, 
available at: http://www.direcon.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/TLC-Chile-Per%C3%BA_Parte2.pdf (last 
accessed 12 November 2013). See also UNCITRAL, Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) – 
‘Compilation of Comments by Governments’, 53rd session, 4-8 October 2010 (A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add.4), 
available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html (last accessed 12 
November 2013).   
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Separately, BITs often provide guidance on the criteria governing the acceptance 
of amicus curiae submissions. Recently signed BITs contain similar criteria as the ones 
set out by ICSID, UNCITRAL, and the NAFTA FTC. Below is a look at criteria in the 
Canada-Peru FTA, as well as the United States-Peru BIT. 505  Other interchangeable 
examples exist – amicus curiae participation is indeed finding its way in an increasing 
number of BITs.  
The Canada-Peru FTA entitles ‘any person other than a disputing party’ to apply 
for leave in order to file a written submission. Such written submissions are required to 
be concise, only covering matters within the scope of the dispute, and in no case longer 
than twenty pages. The Canada-Peru FTA does not afford amici curiae an absolute right 
to file written submissions. Article 836 ‘Submissions by Other Persons’ sets forth the 
criteria governing the acceptance of those submissions:  
4. In determining whether to grant the leave the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the 
extent to which: 
a. the applicant's submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal 
issue related to the arbitration by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is 
different from that of the disputing parties; 
b. the applicant's submission would address a matter within the scope of the dispute; 
c. the applicant has a significant interest in the arbitration; and 
d. there is a public interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration. 
 
5. The Tribunal shall ensure that: 
a. any applicant's submission does not disrupt the proceedings; and 
b. neither disputing party is unduly burdened or unfairly prejudiced by such submissions.506 
These conditions are in line with the FTC Statement. Furthermore, the fact that 
the amicus curiae does not benefit from any substantive rights is well-reflected in the 
following sub-paragraph of Article 836: 
7. The Tribunal that grants leave to file a submission to an applicant is not required to address the 
submission at any point in the arbitration, nor is the person that files the submission entitled to 
make further submissions in the arbitration. 
Although not explicitly mentioned by the ICSID Arbitration Rules, or the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, this provision clearly is in line with arbitral 
precedents discussed hitherto. Amici curiae are not entitled to make submissions pursuant 
                                                 
505 See United States Trade Promotion Agreement with the Republic of Peru (2006), available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/peru/asset_upload_file144_9539.pdf (last accessed 
12 November 2013). 
506 Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement, supra note 170 (our emphasis). 
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to a substantive right such as for instance the right of affected third persons to be heard; 
rather, tribunals followed the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and WTO Appellate Body’s 
approach in restricting the matter to the mere procedural discretion of arbitrators.  
Similar provisions exist under the United States-Peru BIT. Article 21.10 ‘Rules of 
Procedure’ states that:  
…the Panel will consider requests from non-governmental entities in the disputing Parties’ 
territories to provide written views regarding the dispute that may assist the panel in evaluating the 
submissions and arguments of the disputing Parties.507 
Tribunals would then assess whether or not to grant leave on the basis of (i) the identity 
of the ‘non-governmental entity’ (or ‘NGE’), including its membership and sources of 
financing; (ii) the issues of fact or law relevant to the dispute that it wishes to address; (iii) 
the degree to which it may assist the tribunal; and (iv) its independence vis-à-vis 
disputing parties.508  
In sum, that the US and Canada have embraced the amicus curiae procedure is 
not anomalous given that it is a common law procedure that is widely used in their 
respective domestic jurisdictions. 509  They have also embraced the need to ensure 
transparency by providing that proceedings under their BITs will be public. 510  It is 
worthy to note here that provisions on amicus curiae participation are much more 
restrictive, in the procedural sense, from those regulating third party interventions by 
non-disputing BIT parties, i.e. contracting states – as will be further explored in Part 
III.511  
                                                 
507 United States-Peru BIT, supra note 505. 
508 Specifically, the US Model Rules of Procedure for Dispute Settlement, state that: ‘The request shall: (a) 
contain a description of the NGE submitting the request, including, if applicable, the nature of its activities, its 
membership, legal status, sources of financing, and the address in the territory of a Party; (b) identify the specific 
issues of fact and law directly relevant to any legal or factual issue under consideration by the panel that the NGE 
will address in its written views; (c) explain how the NGE’s written views will contribute to resolving the dispute 
and why its views would be unlikely to repeat legal and factual arguments that a Party has made or can be 
expected to make, or why it brings a perspective that is different from that of the Parties; (d) contain a statement 
disclosing whether the NGE has any relationship, direct or indirect, with either Party as well as whether it has 
received or is expected to receive any assistance, financial or otherwise, from any Party, other governments, 
persons, or organizations other than its members or its counsel in the preparation of its request or written 
views…’. See Article 55, US Model Rules of Procedure for Dispute Settlement (2012), available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/model-rules-of-procedure-for-dispute-
settlement (last accessed 06 October 2014).   
509 A. Van Duzer, supra note 171, at 696. 
510 Although tribunals are granted powers to protect confidential information, see Article 835, Canada-Peru Free 
Trade Agreement, supra note 170; and Article 21.10(d), United States-Peru BIT, supra note 505. 
511 See Part II – Section 4.2.2.  
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It is worthy to finally note that both the US and Canada are major capital-
exporting economies, particularly in areas where environmental and human rights 
problems are ubiquitous such as the exploitation of natural resources. The BITs signed by 
both states with various Latin American states aim in several ways to support the 
activities of both American and Canadian petroleum and mining companies. The past 
years have seen numerous instances of unprecedented, and often violent, conflict between 
American and Canadian multinationals on the one hand, and local as well as indigenous 
communities on the other.512 Potential arbitrations under those BITs may well involve 
numerous amicus petitions by such communities or their representatives. The recently 
signed BITs clearly grant investor-state tribunals the authority to accept such petitions.  
3. From theory to practice: Investor-state tribunals’ regulation of amicus curiae 
participation 
Having looked at the substantive issues raised by amici curiae, and thereby 
identifying the underlying rationale for their participation in investor-state arbitrations, a 
closer look at the criteria regulating such participation is now merited. As mentioned 
previously, the amendment to the ICSID Arbitration Rules, as well the adoption of the 
                                                 
512 The controversy surrounding the Tia Maria project in Peru is one of such many examples. The project 
involves Southern Copper, an American mining multinational, which had been planning for a number of years to 
implement a major copper mining project in the Islay region in Peru. The project required over a billion dollars’ 
worth of initial investments and its annual production capacity was estimated at 120,000 tons. It was thus highly 
promoted by the Peruvian government. Peru is indeed aiming to become the world leading exporter of copper 
and has been striving to meet an increasing demand for the metal from China and other emerging markets. 
However, local communities were concerned by the potentially adverse environmental impacts of the project, 
particularly with respect to the magnitude of forecasted mining activities and the ensuing risks of contamination 
of fresh water sources used both for drinking as well as local agriculture. Civil society and municipal authorities 
had organized a consulta, a common form of public consultation or local referendum in Latin America, where 
roughly 80% of voters expressed their opposition to the project. The Peruvian government had indicated that it 
would not be bound by the consulta results. Local communities carried out demonstrations, road-blocks, and 
strikes against the project over months and were often met with violence by government troops. Civil society 
organizations condemned the violence and Peru’s handling of the situation. The government ultimately 
suspended plans to exploit the mine in 2011. Despite ongoing discussions over the continuation of the project 
and the possibility of a renewed approval by Peru, it is still not clear whether Southern Copper intends to file any 
claim against Peru under the United States-Peru BIT as a result of the project’s suspension. See FIDH, ‘La FIDH 
condena represion y violencia para resolver conflicto minero en Islay’ (8 April 2011), available at:  
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/Article_PDF/Article_a9491.pdf (last accessed 01 April 2013); BBC, ‘Peru cancels Tia 
Maria copper mine after protest’ (9 April 2011), available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-
13025971 (last accessed 06 October 2014). See also World Finance, ‘Southern Copper Corporation provide 
benchmark for mining transactions’,  (31 October 2013) available at: 
http://www.worldfinance.com/infrastructure-investment/project-finance/southern-copper-corporation-provide-
benchmark-for-mining-transactions (last accessed 06 October 2014). Similarly, see also The Renco Group, Inc. v. 
The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. UNCT/13/1 – a dispute governed by the US-Peru BIT. 
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UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, explicitly allowing, and regulating, amicus curiae 
submissions now ensures consistency at the level of ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitral 
decisions.513 At the NAFTA level, the FTC has issued a statement on the matter, which 
has been effectively used by arbitral tribunals as guidance. Numerous recently negotiated 
BITs also confirm the acceptance of the amicus curiae procedure. The aim of this section 
is thus to highlight that the regulation, and therefore acceptance, of the amicus curiae 
procedure is currently a fait accompli in international investment arbitration.  
Investor-state tribunals’ treatment of the amicus curiae procedure may be divided 
into two groups; i.e. (i) those who applied the Methanex criteria (Section 3.1) and (ii) 
those applying the newly-enacted criteria of the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules (Section 3.2).  
3.1 Tribunals that applied the Methanex precedent  
Below is a closer look at investor-state tribunals’ procedural analysis of the 
amicus curiae issue in the disputes of UPS v Canada, Aguas del Tunari SA v. Republic of 
Bolivia, and Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador. These were some of the earlier cases 
dealing with civil society’s petitions to intervene as amicus curiae. Equally, these 
arbitrations raise a number of core substantive public interest issues that shed light, from 
a holistic perspective, on the relevance of amicus curiae intervention, including most 
notably the provision of basic public services (UPS), the human right to access to water 
(Aguas del Tunari), and indigenous peoples’ rights and interests (Chevron).  
3.1.1 Amicus acceptance as a mere matter of procedural discretion: UPS v. 
Canada 
In UPS v. Canada, UPS – an American postal and courier services company – 
essentially alleged that Canada violated the protection and promotion of fairness 
enshrined by NAFTA, and in particular Article 1102514 by not providing ‘UPS and UPS 
                                                 
513 See ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 411, and UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 414. 
514 NAFTA Article 1102 provides that: ‘1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments. 2. Each 
Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in 
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Canada with the best treatment available to domestic competitors’, i.e. Canada Post, 
which is a state-run company that benefits from a partial monopoly.515  
The Canadian Union of Postal Workers and the Council of Canadians submitted 
amicus petitions. They requested to address the potential ramifications of the tribunal’s 
decision on Canadian postal workers and consumers, an issue that neither Canada nor 
UPS raised.516 The petitioners’ request to the tribunal included, inter-alia, (i) standing as 
parties to certain proceedings; (b) alternatively, the right to intervene as amicus curiae in 
the proceedings ‘on terms that are consistent with the principles of fairness, equality, and 
fundamental justice’; as well as (c) the disclosure of case materials.517  
It is worthy to note that an amicus curiae petition was subsequently submitted by 
the US Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber’s interest was said to be significant as (i) it 
is a proponent of free trade, consistently supports ambitious and comprehensive free trade 
agreements, and remains a staunch advocate of NAFTA; as well as (ii) its members are 
collectively responsible for a substantial portion of overseas investment activity, and that 
the matters at issue directly implicate the interests and reasonable expectations of those 
investors. 518  The US and Mexico have also provided comments on the petitioners’ 
requests pursuant to Article 1128 of NAFTA.519 
The tribunal first noted the disputing party’s position with regards to the 
petitioners’ requests. Although both clearly opposed the petitioners’ request for third 
                                                                                                                                                 
like circumstances, to investments of its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments. 3. The treatment accorded by a 
Party under paragraphs 1 and 2 means, with respect to a state or province, treatment no less favorable than the 
most favorable treatment accorded, in like circumstances, by that state or province to investors, and to 
investments of investors, of the Party of which it forms a part. 4. For greater certainty, no Party may: (a) impose 
on an investor of another Party a requirement that a minimum level of equity in an enterprise in the territory of 
the Party be held by its nationals, other than nominal qualifying shares for directors or incorporators of 
corporations; or (b) require an investor of another Party, by reason of its nationality, to sell or otherwise dispose 
of an investment in the territory of the Party.’. See NAFTA, supra note 170. 
515 United Parcel Service v Canada, Final Award of 11 June 2007, at para 13 (‘UPS v Canada’). 
516 T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 402. 
517 United Parcel Service v. Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as 
Amicus Curiae of 17 October 2001, at para 1. 
518 The Chamber’s submission was essentially concerned with Canada’s arguments in relation to the scope of its 
national treatment obligations under Article 1102 of NAFTA. In this regard, it contended that Canada cannot 
avoid international responsibility by taking treaty inconsistent measures through state enterprises that it controls, 
i.e. Canada Post. See United Parcel Service v Canada, Amicus curiae submission by the Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States of 20 October 2005, at para 5-6. It is worthy to note as well that neither Canada nor UPS 
objected to Chamber’s submission, but only the former responded to it. Having said that, the tribunal did not 
revisit any of the Chamber’s arguments – as was the case with the other amici. See United Parcel Service v 
Canada, Final Award of 11 June 2007, at para 3.  
519 Article 1128 of NAFTA, supra note 442. 
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party intervention, both UPS and Canada were not necessarily against granting petitioners 
‘an amicus curiae status’, and did indeed recognize that the tribunal may grant such 
status by virtue of its discretional authority pursuant to Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.520 As in the Methanex case, Canada expressed its support for greater 
openness in NAFTA Chapter XI proceedings as well as ‘its appreciation of the 
contribution that transparency brings to building public confidence in the investor-state 
dispute settlement process’.  
Having said that, both disputing parties conversely specified the conditions that 
should govern the tribunal’s acceptance of granting such status, most notably in order to 
mitigate the potential burden on the costs and efficiency of proceedings.521 By following 
the criteria governing the practice in its domestic judicial system, Canada proposed the 
following four factors for the tribunal to consider:  
In exercising its discretion, the Tribunal should consider whether:  
 
(a) There is a public interest in the arbitration;  
(b) The Petitioners have sufficient interest in the outcome of the arbitration;  
(c) The Petitioners’ submissions will assist in the determination of a factual or legal issue related 
to the arbitration by bringing a perspective or particular knowledge that is different from that of 
the disputing parties; and  
(d) The Petitioners’ submissions can be received without causing prejudice to the disputing 
parties.522 
UPS on the other hand specified that the amicus status should (i) not be granted at – what 
was then – an early stage of the proceedings; (ii) not entail the attendance of hearings or 
access to any material submitted to the tribunal; and (iii) be restricted to a written 
submission of a limited number of pages on specific issues to be determined by the 
tribunal.523 Mexico proposed an outright dismissal of the amicus petition, on the basis of 
the absence of express provisions under NAFTA allowing its submission, as well as the 
inexistence of the amicus procedure under Mexican law. Both disputing parties as well as 
the US were against allowing amici to make submissions on the tribunal’s jurisdiction or 
the place of arbitration.524  
                                                 
520 UPS v Canada, supra note 517, at para 6(i), 7(ii).  
521 For instance, Canada proposed that potential amicus briefs should not exceed 20 pages, whilst UPS suggested 
10 pages. See Ibid., at para 54.  
522 Ibid., at para 7(iii). 
523 Ibid., at para 5(iii).  
524 Ibid., para 9-10. On Mexico’s arguments, see para 56-58. 
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It is worthy to note for now that the tribunal rejected the petitioners’ request for 
standing as third-parties in the dispute by finding that it did not have the authority to join 
a party without both disputing parties’ consent.525 It also noted that such a question does 
not fall under its discretionary authority pursuant to Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules. 526  Following the same rationale, the tribunal did not allow the 
disclosure of case materials nor the attendance at hearings in light of the lack of both 
disputing parties’ consent.527  
In deciding on the scope of Article 15(1), and whether it allows tribunals to accept 
amicus submissions, the tribunal explicitly referred to the Methanex precedent, but also to 
the practice of both the Iran-US Claims tribunal and the WTO Appellate Body.528 While 
recognizing the public interest nature of the dispute, the tribunal acknowledged that it had 
the power to accept amicus curiae submissions pursuant to Article 15(1) and emphasized 
that ‘it is a matter of its power rather than of third party right’.529 In the same vein, it 
acknowledged the criteria proposed by Canada and noted that those were indeed in line 
not only with Canadian court practice, but also those developed by the WTO Appellate 
Body in the Asbestos case530 as well as the Methanex tribunal.531 More fundamentally, the 
tribunal emphasized once more a fundamental and consistently applied principle in 
relation to amici curiae, i.e. they are not entitled to make submissions pursuant to a 
procedural or substantive right such as the right of affected third persons to be heard; 
rather, the acceptance of amicus curiae submissions is merely a matter of procedural 
discretion. In addition, in agreement with both disputing parties, it found that the amici 
could not make submissions in relation to the tribunal’s jurisdiction nor the place of 
arbitration.532 The tribunal asserted that the requirement of equality and the parties’ right 
to present their cases do limit the power of the tribunal to conduct the arbitration in such 
manner as it considers appropriate. That power is to be used not only to protect the rights 
                                                 
525 The issue of third-party standing will be discussed in further detail in Part III. 
526 Ibid., at para 36-37. 
527 Ibid., at para 68. 
528 Ibid., at para 64 citing Iran v United States case A/15 Award No. 63 – A/15 – FT; 2 Iran – US CTR 40, 43.  
529 Ibid., at para 61 (our emphasis). 
530 Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities: Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, infra note 1030. See also our discussion of those criteria in our WTO analysis in Section – 4.2 of Part 
II.  
531 Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 428. 
532 UPS v. Canada, supra note 517, at para 53. 
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of the disputing parties, but also to investigate and determine the matter subject to 
arbitration in a just, efficient and expeditious manner. The power of the tribunal to permit 
amicus submissions is not to be used in a way that is unduly burdensome for the parties 
or which unnecessarily complicates the tribunal process. The tribunal envisaged that it 
would place limits on the submissions to be made in writing in terms, for instance, of 
their length. The third parties would not have the opportunity to call witnesses and, as a 
result, the disputing parties would not face the need to cross-examine or call 
contradictory evidence. The disputing parties would also be entitled to have the 
opportunity to respond to any such submissions. 
3.1.2 Exclusion of amicus at the jurisdictional phase: Aguas del Tunari v. 
Republic of Bolivia 
Aguas del Tunari SA v Republic of Bolivia533 is the first ICSID case in which the 
third-party standing and amicus curiae issues have arisen. A number of activists and civil 
society organizations,534 including the Coordinadora para la Defensa del Agua y la Vida, 
a local Bolivian civil society organization, requested ‘permission to intervene in the 
arbitration’ shortly after the tribunal was constituted.535 As in the Methanex case, the 
petition was presented as an enhancer of the transparency of arbitral proceedings. 
Petitioners argued that they had a ‘direct’ interest in the case and could provide ‘unique 
expertise and knowledge’.536 Their primary request was for the tribunal to grant them 
standing, through Earthjustice acting as their ‘representative’, and therefore to participate 
as parties ‘in any proceedings convened to determine AdT’s claim, and to afford the 
petitioners all rights of participation accorded to other parties’. 537  Alternatively, the 
petitioners sought leave to participate in the proceedings as amici curiae, which 
according to them entailed (i) making submissions concerning the procedural aspects of 
the tribunal, its jurisdiction, the arbitrability of the claims raised by AdT and their merits; 
                                                 
533 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia (ICSID Case no. ARB/02/3) (the ‘Bechtel’ case).  
534  Those were: La Federación Departamental Cochabambina de Organizaciones Regantes, SEMAPA Sur, 
Friends of the Earth-Netherlands, Oscar Olivera, Omar Fernandez, Father Luis Sánchez, and Congressman Jorge 
Alvarado.  
535 See the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction, Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra note 12, 
at 3-4. 
536 Ibid., at 4. 
537 Ibid., at 3. 
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(ii) attending all hearings; (iii) making oral presentations during hearings of the tribunal; 
and, (iv) having immediate access to all submissions made to the tribunal. In addition, 
petitioners requested that the tribunal: (i) publicly disclose all statements, including 
written submissions, concerning the claims and defenses of both Parties; (ii) open all 
hearings to the public; and, (iii) visit the area of Cochabamba.538  
In a letter addressed to Earthjustice dated 29 January 2003, the tribunal 
considered that, in the absence of both disputing parties’ consent, the intervention of a 
third party would contravene the consensual nature of investment arbitration.539 The same 
rationale applied with regards to granting access to hearings to non-disputing parties 
and/or the public in general, as well as disclosure of case materials and documents. In 
each of these cases, the tribunal needed both parties’ consent in order to acquiesce to the 
petitioners’ requests. Furthermore, and partially due to the early jurisdictional stage of the 
proceedings, the tribunal discarded the amicus curiae request while reserving the right to 
subsequently ‘call witnesses or receive information from non-parties on its own 
initiative’. 540  Therefore, the tribunal did not entirely discard the possibility of a 
subsequent participation by civil society petitioners. It did finally emphasize that it was 
confined to the authority it receives from the underlying investment treaties and 
arbitration rules, and for that matter it noted that amicus curiae participation had been 
recognized under the US-Singapore BIT; but that this was arguably not the case with the 
relevant Netherlands-Bolivia BIT.541  
3.1.3 Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. Argentina – the first amicus 
ICSID case  
The case of Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v Argentina542 became 
the first ICSID case where amicus curiae briefs were filed.543 It concerned the protection 
                                                 
538 Ibid., at 3. 
539 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, Letter to NGO regarding petition to participate as amici 
curiae of 29 January 2003, available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0019_0.pdf 
(last accessed 06 October 2014). See also E. De Brabandere, supra note 852, 101. 
540 Ibid., at 5. 
541 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra note 539, at 2. 
542 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. 
The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case no. ARB/03/19) (‘Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona case’ or 
‘Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic’). 
543 E. De Brabandere, infra note 852, 101. 
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of foreign investments in a privatisation concession for water distribution and wastewater 
treatment services in the city of Buenos Aires in the wake of the country’s financial 
crisis. 544  The claimants alleged that Argentina’s refusal to apply previously agreed 
incremental tariff adjustments, and the ensuing termination of their concession, 
essentially amounted to expropriation, and violations of their right to fair and equitable 
treatment as well as the full protection and security of their investments.545  
The case was regarded in the same vein as the Bechtel case as it raised 
fundamental issues relating to human rights and access to water. Five civil society 
organizations546, including local grassroots Argentine associations such as the Asociación 
Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia and the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, filed a 
‘Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae’ on the basis of ‘the right 
of every person to participate and make their voices heard in cases where decisions may 
affect their rights’.547 They referred to the Methanex and UPS precedents. Their requests 
included (a) access to hearings; (b) an opportunity to submit amicus curiae briefs; and (c) 
unrestricted access to materials of the case. 
By an order dated 19 May 2005, the tribunal rejected the petitioners’ request to 
access hearings in light of the absence of both parties’ consent to that effect – in line with 
the provisions of Article 32(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules.548 It deferred its decision 
on access to materials of the case until it decided on whether or not to grant leave to the 
petitioners to submit amicus curiae briefs.549 Referring to the Methanex precedent, the 
tribunal found that it had in principle the authority to accept amicus curiae briefs 
                                                 
544 The claims were therefore made pursuant to the France, Spain and United Kingdom BITs entered into with 
Argentina. Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, Decision on liability of 30 July 
2010, at para 2.  
545 Ibid., at para 127. 
546  The remaining three were: the Center for International Environmental Law, Consumidores Libres 
Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de Servicios de Acción Comunitaria, and Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores.  
547 Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, infra note 731, at 2 (our emphasis). 
548 Article 32(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules states that: ‘The tribunal shall decide, with the consent of the 
parties, which other persons besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts during 
their testimony, and officers of the Tribunal may attend the hearings’. See Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 547, at 3. 
549 In its order of 12 February 2007, the tribunal dispensed itself from ‘resolving the general question of a non-
party’s access to the record’ as it deemed the petitioners to have had already sufficient information on the case. 
Ibid., at 8; and Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, Order in response to a 
petition by five non-governmental organizations for permission to make an amicus curiae submission of 12 
February 2007, at 12.  
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pursuant to its discretionary authority under Article 44 of the ICSID Convention states 
that:  
Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section 
and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the 
date on which the parties consented to arbitration. If any question of procedure arises which is not 
covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal 
shall decide the question.550  
In applying such authority, the tribunal stated that it had to take into account three basic 
criteria, i.e. ‘the appropriateness of the subject matter of the case’; ‘the suitability of a 
given non-party to act as amicus curiae in that case’; and ‘the procedure by which the 
amicus submission is made and considered’. 551  The tribunal provided further 
requirements to be met by non-disputing parties wishing to submit amicus curiae briefs. 
In particular, the tribunal expected the petition to include details regarding ‘the identity 
and background of the petitioner’; the nature of its interest in the case; whether the 
petitioner had received financial or any other support from any of the disputing parties; 
and the reasons why the tribunal should accept its brief.552 In setting these conditions, the 
tribunal’s intention was to establish three factors of importance: expertise, experience, 
and independence.553 A petition was indeed submitted accordingly on 1 December 2006. 
The tribunal then issued an order dated 12 February 2007 finally accepting the petition 
and in which it noted that:  
the five petitioners are respected nongovernmental organizations and that they have as a group 
developed an expertise in and are experienced with matters of human rights, the environment, and 
the provision of public services.554  
This is in contrast with an earlier decision in 2006 by the same tribunal in a related 
dispute – Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe and others v. Argentina – where it rejected an 
amicus curiae petition submitted by the Fundación para el Desarrollo Sustentable, a 
civil society organization based in Argentina, on the basis of the three factors mentioned 
above: expertise, experience, and independence. 555  The tribunal found that no 
                                                 
550 See ICSID Convention, supra note 379. 
551 Ibid., at 5.  
552 Ibid., at 7. 
553 Ibid., at 6. 
554 Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 549, at 8. 
555 The petition also included three individuals identified as experts in human rights law: Professor Ricardo 
Ignacio Beltramino, Dr. Ana María Herren, and Dr. Omar Darío Heffes. See Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe 
S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. 
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information had been provided on the nature and size of the Fundación’s membership, 
the qualifications of its leadership, the expertise of its staff, and the activities in which it 
had been engaged. The tribunal was therefore unable to determine the Fundación’s 
expertise and experience. As to the evaluation of its independence, the tribunal expected 
additional information on the Fundación’s membership, which again was, according to 
the tribunal, lacking. In addition, the tribunal further elaborated on the requirements it 
expected with respect to the interest criterion. It found that ‘it is not enough for a 
nongovernmental organization to justify an amicus submission on general grounds that it 
represents civil society or that it is devoted to humanitarian concerns’.556 In this light, the 
tribunal found that the Fundación stated its interest in the case in ‘the most general of 
terms’ solely by specifying that it is ‘a civic organization concerned with the 
management of sustainable development and with policies affecting environmental and 
human needs’.557 
Against this background, the Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona tribunal 
cautiously reiterated that the role of the petitioners is not that of a litigant and is solely 
restricted to the assistance of the tribunal, i.e. ‘the traditional role of an amicus curiae’.558 
Petitioners should therefore not challenge arguments or evidence put forward by the 
disputing parties. The tribunal had defined the ‘traditional role of an amicus curiae’ as 
consisting of assisting the decision maker arrive at its decision by providing it with 
arguments, perspectives, and expertise that the litigating parties may not provide’, i.e. as 
‘a volunteer’ whose offer the tribunal is ‘free to accept or reject’.  
3.1.4 No assistance, no participation: Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador 
The case of Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador is a highly complex investor-state 
dispute governed by the US-Ecuador BIT.559 Chevron’s claims against Ecuador most 
notably relate to Ecuadorian court decisions in the Lago Agrio litigation and their 
                                                                                                                                                 
The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case no. ARB/03/19), Order in response to a petition for participation as 
amicus curiae of 17 March 2006 (‘Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A et. al. v. The Argentine Republic’). It is 
worthy to note that this case was later joined to the Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona case, supra note 
547. 
556 Ibid., at para 33. 
557 Ibid., at para 30-34. See also A. Van Duzer, supra note 171, at 719.  
558 Ibid., at 10, 13. 
559 Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador, supra note 141. 
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enforcement. Chevron/Texaco face nearly $18 billion of damages to be paid to 
indigenous groups inhabiting the Oriente region in Ecuador, as well as others inhabiting 
the downstream area in Peru. The IISD and Fundación Pachamama sought to intervene 
in the arbitration as amicus curiae. The amicus petitioners recognized that their 
intervention primarily focused on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and the 
justiciability of Chevron/Texaco’s claim.560  
The tribunal dismissed their petition in its entirety. In light of both Chevron and 
Ecuador’s objection, they were denied the request to attend oral hearings pursuant to 
Article 25(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Given that the tribunal was at a 
preliminary stage dealing with jurisdictional and justiciability issues, it agreed with both 
parties that an amicus intervention would not assist it given that these issues were strictly 
legal and had been already extensively discussed by both disputing parties. Citing its 
discretionary powers under Article 15(1) of the Rules, the tribunal thus rejected the 
amici’s petition.561  
In this case, the outright dismissal of the amicus petition clearly sheds lights on (i) 
the fact that host states do not necessarily consider civil society’s amicus interventions as 
additional support to their position; and (ii) investor-state tribunals’ exercise of discretion 
on the matter, i.e. the acceptance of amicus curiae submissions is far from being 
considered as automatically granted by investor-state tribunals – in stark contrast to other 
jurisdictions such as international human rights jurisdictions as shown subsequently in 
Part II.  
3.2 Tribunals that applied the recently-enacted criteria  
Below are cases that have considered newly-enacted criteria under ICSID 
Arbitration Rules or referred to the ones set forth under the FTC Statement. Those were: 
Glamis Gold v. the United States; Biwater Gauff v. the Republic of Tanzania; and Piero 
Foresti et al. v. the Republic of South Africa. Similar to the arbitrations discussed in 
Section 3.1, these were some of the first tribunals to accept civil society’s petitions to 
intervene as amicus curiae. Equally, these arbitrations raise a number of core substantive 
                                                 
560 Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador, infra note 803, at para 3.3 
561 Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador, Procedural Order No. 8 of 18 April 2011, at para 17-20.  
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public interest issues that shed light, from a holistic perspective, on the relevance of 
amicus curiae intervention, including most notably indigenous peoples’ rights and 
interests (Glamis and Piero Foresti) and the human right to access to water (Biwater).  
3.2.1 Clear guidelines and no objections: Glamis Gold v. the United States  
Glamis Gold is a case that concluded following the release of the FTC Statement. 
The Quechan Indian Nation, which is a federally recognized tribe in the US, sought to 
intervene in the dispute as amicus curiae. In fact, had it not been through the amicus 
curiae procedure, the Nation – which is a direct stakeholder to the dispute – would not 
have had any access to the tribunal.562 Friends of the Earth Canada and Friends of the 
Earth United States, the National Mining Association, and Sierra Club and Earthworks 
also made submissions. These submissions were accepted as appropriate in accordance 
with the principles stated in the FTC Statement.563 The tribunal acknowledged receipt of 
the petitioners’ application and referred them to section B of the FTC Statement.564 It 
noted that accepting amicus curiae submissions falls within its discretionary authority 
under Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and that the parties have not 
made objections to that effect (subject to the submissions being made in accordance with 
the FTC Statement). It also stated that no undue burden or delay would be caused.565 The 
authority of the tribunal to accept amicus curiae briefs was not questioned given that the 
proceedings began following the release of the FTC Statement. In fact, Glamis did not 
object to any of the briefs made by the amici except the one submitted by Friends of the 
Earth as it largely addressed the nationality of Glamis, i.e. a jurisdictional issue that 
exceeded the agreed scope of amicus curiae submissions.566  
3.2.2 Bringing issues unaddressed by disputing parties to the fore – Biwater 
Gauff v. the Republic of Tanzania  
The case was concluded following the amendment of the ICSID Arbitration Rules 
and provided useful guidance as to how the new rules applied. Amicus curiae petitions 
                                                 
562 E. De Brabandere, infra note 852, at 105. 
563 Ibid., at 101. 
564 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, FTC Statement, supra note 489. 
565 Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, supra note 496, at 127.  
566 Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, supra note 496, at 130. 
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were made by five civil society organizations567 including renowned international civil 
society organizations such as the IISD, but also local Tanzanian grassroots organization 
such as the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme. The tribunal accepted to grant the 
petitioners leave to submit an amicus curiae brief, notwithstanding Biwater Gauff’s 
objection, by virtue of the newly amended Article 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
Although the tribunal had such authority in accordance with the amended ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, it nonetheless cited the Methanex decision to highlight the public 
interest at stake as a rationale for accepting amicus curiae submissions.568 
 The tribunal also dismissed the claimant’s contention that the amici could add 
nothing ‘which could not be said by either party’ and thus failing the test of 37(2)(a) of 
the Rules. The tribunal clearly noted the amici’s distinct position and perspectives vis-à-
vis both parties.569 Tanzania had indirectly relied on human rights arguments and did not 
articulate the aspects raised by the amici, i.e. it did not invoke the access to water as a 
human right as part of its defense.570 The tribunal denied, however, their request to attend 
oral hearings in light of Biwater Gauff’s objection.571 As in the Sociedad General de 
Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentina decision, the petitioners were requested to submit 
a single joint amicus curiae brief. The tribunal considered that information in the public 
domain was sufficient for the amici to make their submission and did not grant them 
access to the record. In their brief, the amici lamented this decision as the inability to 
properly access the record necessarily meant that their submission was based on an 
incomplete set of factual information. They were unaware of the legal arguments made 
                                                 
567  The Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team, the Legal and Human Rights Center, the Tanzania Gender 
Networking, the Center for International Environmental Law, and the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development. See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22), 
Final award of 24 July 2008.  
568 Ibid., at para 358. 
569 ‘The five Petitioners comprise NGOs with specialised interests and expertise in human rights, environmental 
and good governance issues locally in Tanzania. They approach the issues in this case with interests, expertise 
and perspectives that have been demonstrated to materially differ from those of the two contending parties, and 
as such have provided a useful contribution to these proceedings’. See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. United 
Republic of Tanzania, infra note 741, at para 359. 
570 For further analysis on this point, see C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, infra note 617, at 1091.  
571 Indeed, Article 32(2) states that: ‘(2) Unless either party objects, the Tribunal, after consultation with the 
Secretary-General, may allow other persons, besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses 
and experts during their testimony, and officers of the Tribunal, to attend or observe all or part of the hearings, 
subject to appropriate logistical arrangements. The Tribunal shall for such cases establish procedures for the 
protection of proprietary or privileged information’. See Ibid., at para 63-65. 
134 
 
by both parties or the facts they alleged; and therefore, they could not comment on the 
parties’ positions.572 
3.2.3 Unprecedented access to case materials in Piero Foresti et al. v. the 
Republic of South Africa  
The South African Legal Resources Centre and the Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies’ – acting amongst others as petitioners573 – requests included leave to submit a 
written amicus curiae brief, access to specifically identified case materials, attend 
hearings and present key submissions orally. The tribunal indeed granted the petitioners 
leave by applying the conditions set out under Article 41(3) of the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules, which mirrors Article 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules and provides 
the same conditions.574 The tribunal emphasized that its decision was guided by two 
principles:  
(1) [Non-disputing party (‘NDP’)] participation is intended to enable NDPs to give useful 
information and accompanying submissions to the Tribunal, but is not intended to be a mechanism 
for enabling NDPs to obtain information from the Parties. 
(2) Where there is NDP participation, the Tribunal must ensure that it is both effective and 
compatible with the rights of the Parties and the fairness and efficiency of the arbitral process.
 575
 
On the basis of the above, in an unprecedented decision, the tribunal also partially 
accepted the petitioners’ request to access certain case materials. 576  It requested the 
parties to agree on submitting redacted versions of the Memorial and Counter-Memorial, 
as well as legal opinions, and a non-descriptive list of witnesses and experts that had 
provided evidence on facts and damages.577 The basis for the tribunal’s decision in this 
regard was simply logical. It found that:  
                                                 
572 Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, infra note 744, at paras 13-14.  
573 The remaining two other petitioners are renowned organizations: the International Centre for the Protection of 
Human Rights and the Centre for International Environmental Law.  
574  ICSID Additional Facility Rules, entered into force 10 April 2006, available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf (last accessed 01 June 2013). 
575 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa, Letter regarding non-disputing parties of 
05 October 2009, available at: http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0334.pdf (last accessed 06 
October 2014). For additional commentary, see also J. Brickhill and M. Du Plessis, supra note 427, at 160. 
576 Ibid (our emphasis).  
577 The tribunal made this decision on the basis that: ‘(1) that NDP participation is intended to enable NDPs to 
give useful information and accompanying submissions to the Tribunal, but is not intended to be a mechanism 
for enabling NDPs to obtain information from the Parties; and (2) where there is NDP participation, the Tribunal 
must ensure that it is both effective and compatible with the rights of the Parties and the fairness and efficiency 
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NDPs must be allowed access to those papers submitted to the Tribunal by the Parties that are 
necessary to enable the NDPs to focus their submissions upon the issues arising in the case and to 
see what positions the Parties have taken on those issues. The NDPs must also be given adequate 
opportunity to prepare and deliver their submissions in sufficient time before the hearing for the 
Parties to be able to respond to those submissions.578 
The tribunal had deferred making a final decision on the request relating to 
attendance of the hearings and oral submissions. As mentioned, the case was later 
discontinued following a settlement between the parties to the dispute.  
3.3 Common procedural grounds 
The UNCITRAL and ICSID cases examined hitherto show fairly consistent 
attitudes by investment treaty arbitration tribunals. Primarily, tribunals have asserted their 
discretion in accepting amicus curiae briefs while emphasizing that non-disputing parties 
do not benefit from any substantive right to file such briefs.579 By acknowledging their 
authority to accept amicus curiae briefs, as mentioned previously, tribunals have also 
sought to establish three factors of importance relating to petitioners, i.e. their expertise, 
experience, and independence. They also systematically expected petitioners to clearly 
establish and articulate their interest in the dispute, which has to necessarily be distinct 
from either disputing party’s. As to attendance at hearings, oral submissions, and access 
to case materials, tribunals have generally found that they did not have the authority to 
acquiesce to such requests in the absence of both disputing parties’ consent (with the 
exception of the Piero Foresti tribunal).  
Again, more fundamentally for the purposes of this research, the most salient 
common denominator here is that there is clearly no right per se entitling non-disputing 
parties to submit amicus curiae briefs, i.e. non-disputing parties – whether represented by 
civil society actors or not – do not have the right to be heard by investor-state tribunals. 
As mentioned above, civil society actors sought to intervene as amicus curiae in the 
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona on the basis of ‘the right of every person to 
participate and make their voices heard in cases where decisions may affect their 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the arbitral process’. See Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa, infra note 789, 
at para 27-28. 
578 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa, supra note 575. 
579 T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 388-389. 
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rights’. 580  It has been consistently pointed out that this argument is not relevant. 
Tribunals have regarded the amicus curiae issue as a strictly procedural one 
notwithstanding the significance of the public interest at stake. In this light, petitioners 
were particularly requested to limit their briefs to the sole and unique purpose of assisting 
tribunals by bringing arguments, perspectives, and expertise other than those of the 
disputing parties, i.e. amici curiae are not expected to, and should not, act as litigants, in 
other words, they should not challenge arguments or evidence put forward by the 
disputing parties, nor deal with jurisdictional or justiciability issues. In the same vein, 
investor-state tribunals fully exercise their discretion on the matter and have not shied 
away from entirely dismissing amicus petitions.581  
4. Civil society participation: Where procedure intertwines with substance 
Investor-state tribunals are solely concerned with adjudicating international treaty 
rights of foreign investors, as well as the obligations of host states under international law 
as set out under IIAs and BITs.582 This research does not purport to suggest otherwise – a 
fundamental point to note for the ensuing discussion on environmental protection and 
human rights. Notwithstanding this widely recognized fact, civil society petitions have 
sought to put forward before investor-state tribunals issues that are underlying to the 
‘broader’ public interest and/or ‘direct’ interests of third parties. If looked at through the 
prism of human rights, the discourse on civil society participation in investor-state 
arbitration is therefore not about advancing the adjudication of human rights before 
investor-state tribunals ‘at the expense’ of the adjudication of foreign investors’ rights.583 
Rather, it is about recognizing that the human rights of third parties to investor-state 
disputes, whether recognized under municipal law or international law instruments, either 
‘hard’ or ‘soft’, could nonetheless translate into third party interests at the investor-state 
                                                 
580 Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, infra note 731, at 2 (our emphasis). 
581  See, as mentioned, Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador, supra note 561, at para 17-20; Aguas Provinciales de 
Santa Fe S.A et. al. v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 555, at para 30-34; see also Section 5.1. 
582 In addition, depending on the drafting of the relevant treaty, contractual obligations as well.  
583  C.E. Côté, La participation des personnes privées dans le règlement des différends internationaux 
économiques : L’élargissement du droit de porter plainte à l’OMC (2007), at 416, 419. 
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dispute level.584 These interests only become worthy of consideration by investor-state 
tribunals if and when they are relevant to the adjudication of a given dispute. Indeed, the 
adequacy of accepting factual and legal arguments concerning these interests primarily 
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.585  
As an independent third party to an investor-state dispute, an amicus is expected 
to present factual and legal arguments that the parties do not make before the tribunal. 
Although civil society’s amicus participation is generally perceived as supporting host 
states against claimants, civil society petitioners have nonetheless raised specific 
arguments on public health, environmental, human rights or other public policy issues 
underlying the ‘broader’ public interest and/or ‘direct’ interests of third parties that were 
not necessarily asserted by host states. Host states could deliberately omit such arguments 
because of tactical considerations, e.g. by focusing on raising jurisdictional objections to 
foreign investors’ claims, or out of reluctance to shed light on their shortcomings in 
addressing these interests – as reflected for instance by the previously mentioned 
Metalclad v. Mexico and Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia cases. Accordingly, host states do 
not systematically favour transparency or, for that matter, civil society participation in 
investor-state disputes.586  
Against this background, it is necessary to take a closer look at civil society’s 
arguments as amicus curiae as this sheds light on its role in not only addressing the 
‘broader’ public interest at issue in investor-state disputes, but also in raising, asserting, 
and defending the ‘direct’ interests of affected third parties.587 This section will consider 
substantive arguments put forward in relation to the protection of the environment 
(Section 4.2) and human rights, including most notably the promotion of the human right 
to water (Section 4.3), as well as indigenous and ethnic minority rights (Section 4.4) – 
these three systematically appear in public interest-related investor-state arbitration, they 
                                                 
584 It is important to note that this section refers interchangeably to rights and obligations contained in both ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ law instruments, such as for instance the human right to water.  
585 See procedural analysis above, Part II – Section 3. 
586 In particular, see Mexico’s request to the Metalclad tribunal to order the parties to ‘limit public discussion of 
the case to a minimum’. See Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, supra note 273. See also, T. 
Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 393. See Part I – Section 1.4.2; Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador, supra note 561, at 
para 17-20. 
587 A more elaborate analysis will also be undertaken on this point in the wake of the analysis of the scope and 
regulation of a proposed third party intervenor role for civil society, and whether such role should be subject to 
third party interests or rights (that would be potentially at stake in investor-state disputes). See Part III – 
Section 3.1. 
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are therefore worthy of a closer look. That said, a preliminary discussion over the debate 
on the relevance of such issues to investor-state arbitration is merited (Section 4.1). 
4.1 Are environmental protection and human rights issues relevant to the 
adjudication of investor-state disputes? 
The debate over the relevance of environmental and human rights issues to 
investor-state disputes is an immense subject that could easily exceed the scope of this 
research. There is nonetheless a need to address this debate, particularly in light of the 
arguments raised by civil society as amicus curiae. If environmental and human rights 
issues are deemed irrelevant to the adjudication of host state responsibility towards 
foreign investors; then, the idea of civil society participation in investor-state disputes 
becomes altogether obsolete.588 Investor-state disputes involving both environmental or 
human rights issues and civil society are arguably limited in number. 589  Many 
practitioners often regard the relevance of human rights issues to the international law on 
foreign investment as overstated.590  
If human rights issues are raised, these would often relate to rights such as, for 
instance, the human right to access water. It is argued that, in any event, international 
human rights obligations are solely incumbent upon states. 591  Host states have an 
international duty to, inter alia, ‘respect, protect, and provide’ the economic and social 
                                                 
588 This section is not concerned with the human rights violations that may be claimed by foreign investors. 
Denial of justice vis-à-vis foreign investors is discussed under Part III – Section 2.2.1. See also the examples of 
Antoine Biloune (Syria), Marine Drive Complex Ltd (Ghana) v. Ghana Investments Centre, the Government of 
Ghana, UNCITRAL, Awards of 27 Oct 1989 and 30 June 1990; Mr. Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7), Award of 9 February 2004 cited in C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, infra 
note 617, at 1090. On the relevance of human rights to foreign investors’ claims, see also J. Levine, infra note 
758, at 109.  
589 13 investor-state disputes in total as previously mentioned, see supra note 167. Although it is worthy to note 
that civil society actors have only gained limited access to arbitral tribunals – through the amicus curiae 
procedure – recently, and therefore their seemingly limited involvement should be placed into perspective. 
590 B. Simma, supra note 196, at 578. 
591 International human rights jurisdictions generally reassert the state’s duties in protecting human rights, and 
their positive obligations to protect individuals and groups against private actors. Therefore, it is argued that a 
host state should be the primary respondent when multinationals commit violations since it is primarily 
responsible for the protection of human rights within its realm. See A. Nienaber, infra note 928, at 543; C. 
Schreuer and U. Kriebaum, infra note 617, at 1085.  
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rights of their citizens. This makes it arguably futile to address wrongdoing or harm, or 
even abuses, allegedly committed by foreign investors before investor-state tribunals.592  
States have a concomitant international duty to promote and protect foreign 
investments. Investor-state tribunals are essentially mandated with censoring a host 
state’s performance of its international obligations under IIAs or BITs, i.e. they are not 
adequate fora to deal with allegations of environmental or human rights abuse nor accept 
civil society participation. It is therefore argued that the proper fora for civil society 
participation should be rooted in the domestic court system, before international human 
rights jurisdictions, other non-judicial avenues such as the OECD National Contact 
Points, 593  or the various consultation mechanisms set forth under IIAs such as the 
NAFTA National Administrative Offices and Commission for Labor Cooperation.594 
There are various counter-arguments to these contentions. Judge Bruno Simma 
submits that solely emphasizing the scarcity of such cases is a ‘myopic way’ of viewing 
the matter. 595 The attraction by host states of substantial sums of foreign capital, as well 
as the need to supply an exponential global demand in natural resources, requires an 
increasingly complex balancing exercise with local community rights and concerns as 
                                                 
592 B. Simma, supra note 196, at 579. 
593 As mentioned previously, the grievance mechanism set forth through the OECD National Contact Points is 
concerned with the application of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Several scholars have 
promoted the OECD National Contact Points as a suitable forum for individuals and civil society to assert 
environmental, and human rights concerns linked to foreign investors’ activities. It has in fact an effervescent 
case inventory where civil society organizations are increasingly representing local stakeholders in disputes with 
multinationals, including: Frente de Defensa Miguelense Coalition v. Goldcorp, Final statement of 3 May 2011, 
OECD National Contact Point Canada; The LEAD Group v. Innospec, Final statement of 1 February 2012, 
OECD National Contact Point United States of America; Centro de Derechos Humanos y Ambiente et al. v. 
Nidera, Final statement of 2 March 2012, OECD National Contact Point Netherlands; Sakhalin Environment 
Watch and Stroitel v. Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Charter, Barclays, and Royal Bank of Scotland, Claim filed 
31 July 2012, OECD National Contact Point United Kingdom; European Center for Constitutional and Human 
Rights et al. v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse SA, Final statement of 29 February 2012, OECD National 
Contact Point Switzerland. For a further analysis, see P. Protopsaltis, supra note 89, at 255; and D. Collins, 
‘Alternative Dispute Resolution for Stakeholders in International Investment Law’, (2012) 15 Journal of 
International Economic Law 673. 
594 The NAALC set forth a mechanism whereby each NAFTA party maintains a National Administrative Office 
(NAO) within its labor ministry, which receives and responds to public communications regarding labor law 
matters arising in another NAFTA country. It is nonetheless heavily criticized for its ineffectiveness. See HRW, 
‘NAFTA Labor Accord Ineffective: Future Trade Pacts Must Avoid Pitfalls’, 16 April 2001, available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2001/04/15/nafta-labor-accord-ineffective (last accessed 06 October 2014). See 
NAALC, supra note 225. 
595 B. Simma, supra note 196, at 578-579. 
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reflected for instance by the impact of mining activities on water sources and local 
agriculture.596  
Civil society has sought access not only to international human rights jurisdictions, 
but also to investor-state tribunals, where it seeks to uphold the validity of environmental 
and human rights principles contained under a vast array of international norms and 
separate international legal regimes or even under municipal law.597 It is to be recalled 
that the impact of an investor-state tribunal’s decision inexorably binds the host state and 
could potentially cause adverse repercussions on the host state’s population.598 In such 
cases, investor-state tribunals would have to weigh between both these populations’ 
rights and foreign investors’.599 This raises several difficult questions:  
Once a tribunal has before it the applicable human rights norms, it must decide whether or how 
these rules affect the arguments advanced by the parties… Are a State’s obligations to its own 
population to be weighed against investor rights under BITs? How can we harmonize the host 
State’s obligations under the two regimes? This will always be a difficult exercise and sometimes 
compliance with both set of obligations will be virtually impossible.600  
The dynamics of foreign investment necessarily set the finality of host state 
measures as defenses by host states that have interfered in allegedly harmful 
investments. 601  In this light, it is argued that the protection guaranteed to foreign 
investors under IIAs or BITs should be reduced if (i) cases of harm or abuses are 
                                                 
596 It is worthy to note here that water is used by the mining industry for processing and transport of ore and 
waste, minerals separation, dust suppression, washing of equipment, and human consumption at sites. 
Furthermore, the direct disposal of mining waste and wastewater has the potential of causing widespread water 
contamination – and numerous examples of such occurrences exist. See D. Kemp, et al. ‘Mining, Water, and 
Human Rights: Making the Connection’, (2010) 10 Journal of Cleaner Production 1553, at 1554. See also the 
Dongria Kondh indigenous community of Eastern India discussed above, infra note 695. See also G. Akpan, 
‘Litigation Problems that Arise from Natural Resources Exploitation in Foreign Courts: Impediments to Justice’, 
(2002) 20 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 55, at 78. 
597  The major difference between both types is that the latter render internationally enforceable decisions, 
whereas the former do not. The benefit of intervening in jurisdictions such as ICSID tribunals and obtaining a 
favourable decision appear evident: the binding and enforceable character of the decision is crucial in providing 
adequate relief. On the distinction between ‘first’ and ‘second generation’ tribunals, see G. Born, ‘A New 
Generation of International Adjudication’, (2012) 61 Duke Law Journal 775, at 810. See also I. Feichtner, ‘The 
Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO for a Political Debate on the Reconciliation of Competing 
Interests’, (2009) 20:3 European Journal of International Law 615, at 615-616; see also E. Tramontana, ‘Civil 
Society Participation In International Decision Making: Recent Developments and Future Perspectives in the 
Indigenous Rights Arena’, (2012) 16 the International Journal of Human Rights 173, at 174; and M. Wells-
Sheffer, supra note 206, at 491 
598 G. Akpan, supra note 596, at 77-78. 
599 Judge Bruno Simma argues that pressing calls for balance in the international investment regime are no longer 
solely associated with anti-globalization movements, they presently stem from a wide array of actors. See B. 
Simma, supra note 196, at 573-574.  
600 Ibid., at 591. 
601 Ibid., at 577. 
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established before investor-state tribunals; and (ii) host states take adverse measures 
towards them for such reason.602 This is manifestly reflected in the Metalclad v. Mexico 
case – as mentioned previously. Although it was established that Metalclad’s subsidiary 
had dumped 20,000 tons of untreated toxic waste near the Guadalcazar community, 
Metalclad still successfully obtained damages from Mexico due to the discretionary and 
inequitable treatment it allegedly suffered as a result of state and municipal authority 
measures.603 But again, Mexico never grounded its defense on the basis of its duty to 
protect the environment of the Guadalcazar community.604 How could it credibly do so if 
it had granted Metalclad various federal environmental approvals? The more fundamental 
question is: should the dumping of 20,000 tons of untreated toxic waste by a foreign 
investor be considered relevant by an investor-state tribunal adjudicating the rights of that 
foreign investor and the obligations of the host state towards it under international law? 
The answer to this question is heavily dependent on the facts and circumstances of each 
case.  
Indeed, in response to an objection by the host state against the consideration of 
human rights issues affecting the claimant’s executives, the Hulley Investments v. Russia 
tribunal explicitly said that it ‘recognizes that it is not a human rights court’.605 However, 
                                                 
602  Sornarajah further asserts that the creation of competing objectives of protecting human rights and the 
environment from the abuse of multinational corporations leads to a recognition of the regulatory right of the 
host state to interfere in circumstances where the former abuses human rights such as labour rights or causes 
environmental damage. The increasing recognition of such a regulatory right should contribute to balance the 
aim of investment protection and require the recognition that a host state has the right to intervene in an 
investment that poses a danger to the environment or involves an abuse of human rights. In practice, however, 
with FDI being prescribed as a key instrument to economic development and progress, few host states are 
inclined, or are in fact in a position, to step up such a confrontation with foreign investors or multinationals. In 
general, quite the contrary occurs, it is recognized that host states, particularly developing ones, are rather in a 
staunch competition amongst each other to attract FDI and multinationals to their economies. M. Sornarajah, 
supra note 221, at 78, 147 
603 United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, supra note 314.  
604 Rather, Mexican federal authorities had approved the Metalclad project, from an environmental standpoint, all 
along. This situation echoes with Pogge’s idea on ‘the human rights of the global poor’. According to Pogge, the 
widespread violation of human rights also plays a decisive role in explaining the global deficit in civil and 
political human rights which demand democracy, due process, and the rule of law. He asserts that poor citizens 
from developing and least-developing states are often physically and mentally stunted due to malnutrition in 
infancy, illiterate due to lack of schooling, and much preoccupied with their family’s survival – and can cause 
little harm or benefit to the state officials who rule them. Such rulers therefore have far less incentive to attend to 
the interests of their constituents compared with the interests of agents more capable of reciprocation, including 
foreign governments, companies, and tourists. See T. Pogge, ‘Recognized and Violated by International Law: the 
Human Rights of the Global Poor’, (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 717, at 718, 727. See also See 
NAFTA Article 1114, supra note 170. 
605 ‘Respondent observes that “the alleged violations of the human rights of Messrs. Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and 
others . . . are outside the scope of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction, unless Claimants can establish that any such 
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it found that the alleged human rights violations constituted relevant factual evidence to 
conclude that the expropriation of the claimant’s investments was not done in accordance 
with the ‘due process of law’ as required by the Energy Charter Treaty.606 The Hulley 
tribunal’s findings here were specific to a set of facts and circumstances that may not be 
relevant to other cases. Yet, the tribunal clearly articulated how issues that typically fall 
outside investor-state tribunals’ jurisdiction – such as human rights issues – may 
nonetheless remain relevant to the adjudication of foreign investors’ claims.607  
Against this backdrop, civil society is often viewed as an essential actor that could 
potentially raise, assert, or defend relevant non-jurisdictional issues that are underlying to 
the ‘broader’ public interest and/or the ‘direct’ interests of third parties before investor-
state disputes – as will be shown directly below.  
4.2 The leitmotiv of environmental protection 
A substantial number of civil society actors consider environmental protection as 
their leitmotiv. These actors have been particularly active as amici curiae at the WTO, but 
also other jurisdictions such as the IACtHR or ACHPR.608 This is also true for investor-
state disputes, as particularly manifested by the Methanex v. the United States case. Aside 
from its procedural importance, the Methanex case was also a case that presented 
                                                                                                                                                 
violations directly impaired the management or operation of their investments.”… The Tribunal recognizes that 
it is not a human rights court. Nevertheless, it is within the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider the 
allegations of harassment and intimidation as they form part of the factual matrix of Claimants’ complaints that 
the Russian Federation violated its obligations under Part III of the ECT. The Tribunal’s task includes 
determining whether the Russian Federation “in any way impair[ed] by unreasonable or discriminatory measures 
[Claimants’] management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal” of its investment, or subjected Claimants’ 
investment to measures having the effect equivalent to an expropriation. In the context of that inquiry, the 
Tribunal will set out the evidentiary record with respect to the alleged “campaign of harassment and 
intimidation.”’. See Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 226, 
Final award of 18 July 2014, at para 764-765 (our emphasis).  
606  Ibid., at 1583-1585; Energy Charter Treaty, 2080 UNTS 95; 34 ILM 360 (1995), available at: 
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf. 
607  For a more elaborate discussion on the human rights dimension of the Yukos arbitrations, see E. De 
Brabandere, ‘Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation Complementarity or Conflict? 
Contrasting the Yukos Case before the European Court of Human Rights and Investment Tribunals’ (2015), 30:2 
ICSID Review 345.  
608  See Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities: Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, supra note 1030; Report of the Appellate Body, United States: Import Prohibitions of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Product, supra note 1027.  
Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v. Kenya, Decision of 4 February 2010, ACHPR (276/2003); and The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
Tingni Community v. Republic of Nicaragua, supra note 1066; and SERAC and Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria, infra note 931.  
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complex environmental issues that merit further scrutiny. The Methanex case will serve 
as an example that illustrates civil society’s quest in promoting the protection of the 
environment before investor-state tribunals. Prior to that, it is worthy to briefly discuss 
the issue of environmental protection from a general normative perspective as prelude to 
the case analysis.  
4.2.1 The environment: An exclusive affair for states? 
A detailed look at the applicable law on environmental protection would largely 
exceed the scope of the present research. The purpose here is to further articulate the 
previously mentioned inter-play between environmental protection and investor-state 
arbitration. Indeed, international environmental treaties cover, inter alia, enhancing 
access to environmental information (the Aarhus Convention), 609  restrictions on 
greenhouse gas emissions (most notably the Kyoto Protocol), 610  persistent organic 
pollutants (the Stockholm Convention),611 international trade in hazardous chemicals (the 
Rotterdam Convention), 612  or the control of transboundary movements of hazardous 
waste and their disposal (the Basel Convention). 613  There are also a myriad of 
environmental norms contained in non-binding instruments.614 In equal importance, each 
state adopts its own domestic environmental regulations or measures, which could be the 
subject of investor-state tribunals’ scrutiny. Domestic environmental regulations or 
measures such as, for instance, requirements for environmental impact assessments on 
                                                 
609 See Aarhus Convention, supra note 119.  
610  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, entry into force 16 
February 2005, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 37 ILM 22 (1998).  
611 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, entry into force 17 May 2004, 2256 UNTS 119; 40 
ILM 532 (2001).  
612 Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade, entry into force 24 February 2004, 2244 UNTS 337; 38 ILM 1 (1999) (‘Rotterdam 
Convention’).  
613 Basel Convention, supra note 295. In fact, the tribunal in the previously mentioned S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada 
dispute extensively scrutinized the Convention, see Part I – Section 1.3.3. See also S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, 
supra note 277. 
614 Although contained in non-binding instruments, it is also argued that, there is a substantive obligation on host 
states to impose environmental impact assessments in order to ensure that economic activity is not carried out at 
the expense of the environment. They are also held to be consistent with BITs when contained in domestic 
legislation. For instance, the rigorous application of environmental impact assessment requirements by the 
Spanish authorities was held to be perfectly consistent with the applicable Argentina-Spain BIT. See Maffezini v. 
Spain, supra note 145. See also N. Craik, The International Law of Environmental Impact Assessments (2008), at 
87. 
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mining activities 615  or noise-control in oil pipeline construction aimed at protecting 
belugas and caribous616 have been, or could potentially be, scrutinized before investor-
state tribunals.  
That being said, there are a plethora of stakeholders who have an interest in 
upholding environmental protection at all levels, including before investor-state tribunals. 
The environment has progressively emerged as a ‘common concern of humanity’ or an 
intérêt general. 617 Environmental protection imposes duties on society as a whole and 
each of its individual members.618 In fact, any person from the ‘public’, including civil 
society, is deemed to have an ‘interest’ in promoting environmental protection under 
international law as reflected by the Aarhus Convention.619 Climate change for instance, a 
primary environmental concern, has become one of the main contemporary societal 
challenges. 620  Along with other compellingly urgent environmental concerns, climate 
change brings environmental protection to the fore of international law.621  
Finally, as public interest concerns, environmental protection and human rights 
issues overlap in significant ways.622 International environmental law and human rights 
law are two distinct realms, particularly because human rights focus on protecting human 
beings from environmental degradation, rather than protecting the environment in se.623 
Yet, the overlap between them is most notably evidenced by the numerous references to 
                                                 
615 Vito G. Gallo v. The Government of Canada, supra note 172. 
616 CBC News, ‘Quebec denies TransCanada approval to resume work in Cacouna: Environment ministry says 
it's not persuaded pipeline company will respect noise levels to protect belugas’, 15 October 2014, available at: 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-denies-transcanada-approval-to-resume-work-in-cacouna-
1.2799981 (last accessed 05 January 2015).  
617 D. Shelton, supra note 400, at 37; C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, ‘From Individual to Community Interest in 
International Investment Law’ in U. Fastenrath, et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in 
Honour of Bruno Simma (2011), at 1080.  
618 D. Shelton, supra note 400, at 37.  
619 The Aarhus Convention defines the ‘public’ as ‘one or more natural or legal persons, and…their associations, 
organizations or groups’; and the ‘public concerned’ as the: ‘public affected or likely to be affected by, or having 
an interest in, the environmental decision-making; for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental 
organizations promoting environmental protection…shall be deemed to have an interest’. See Articles 2(4) and 
2(5) of the Aarhus Convention, supra note 119 (our emphasis). 
620 R. Bratspies, ‘Human Rights and Environmental Regulation’  (2012), 19 New York University Environmental 
Law Journal 225, at 243. 
621 R. Rayfuse, and S. Scott, ‘Mapping the Impact of Climate Change on International Law’, in R. Rayfuse, and S. 
Scott (eds.), International Law in the Era of Climate Change (2012), at 19. 
622 G. Alfredsson, ‘Human Rights and the Environment’ in D. Leary, and B. Pisupati (eds.), The Future of 
International Envrionmental Law (2010), at 127. See also A. Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where 
Next?’, (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 613, at 614.  
623 It is in this regard that human rights law is viewed as ‘anthropocentric’. See R. Bratspies, supra note 620, at 
245. 
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environmental protection in international human rights instruments relating to the rights 
to life, food, water, health, home, property, political participation, freedoms of 
information, association and expression, in addition to cultural rights including those of 
indigenous peoples.624 In fact, one of the earliest and most reflective instruments of this 
duality is the 1972 Stockholm Declaration.625 It is also well-manifested under the Banjul 
Charter;626 and indeed, in the subsequently discussed case of SERAC v. Nigeria.627 Also, 
the right to a healthy environment is enshrined in several constitutions.628 The Bolivian 
constitution for instance provides that ‘persons have a right to a healthy, protected, and 
balanced environment’.629 
                                                 
624 See Ibid., at 128-129 citing those mentioned rights set forth under the ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNESCO Convention. See ICCPR, supra note 93; ICESCR, supra note 
672; CEDAW, infra note 675; UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, infra note 673; and the Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, entry into force 15 December 1975, 1037 
UNTS 151; 27 UST 37; 11 ILM 1358 (1972) (‘UNESCO Convention’).  
625 Principle 1 provides that: ‘Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, 
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears the solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations’. See Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, dated 16 June 1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 
1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972) (our emphasis). See also R. Bratspies, supra note 620, at 245. 
626 Article 24 provides that ‘All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to 
their development.’. See Banjul Charter, infra note 845. 
627  In this case, the ACHPR ordered Nigeria to undertake significant clean-up measures to remedy the 
environmental harm suffered by the Ogoni People. Notwithstanding those arguably close inter-linkages, some 
argue that there is no generally recognized human right to a healthy environment under international law. See 
SERAC and Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, infra note 931; see also R. Bratspies, supra note 
620, at 239. 
628 Constitutionalization is often viewed a signal that a given state has accepted the validity of a human right 
norm. For instance, there have been repeatedly unsuccessful efforts to implement an amendment to the US 
Constitution to the effect that ‘every person has the inalienable right to a decent environment. The United States 
and every state shall guarantee this right’. In fact, it is worthy to mention that US courts have shown reticence 
with respect to admitting environmental wrongs as violations of the law of nations. See Ibid., at 232.  
629 Article 33 goes on to provide that ‘the exercise of such right should enable individuals and collectivities of 
present and future generations, in addition to other living creatures, to develop in a normal and permanent 
manner’. It is worthy to note as well that Article 34 further enables any individual or collectivity to engage legal 
proceedings in defense of the right to a healthy environment. In addition, Article 312(III) provides that all forms 
of economic organizations have the obligation to protect the environment. In fact, the constitution is unique in 
referring to the concept of ‘Pachamama’, or in other words, ‘Mother Earth’ – which holds significant value to 
indigenous peoples from the Andes region. Similar provisions exist in the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan 
constitutions. These constitutions cannot, however, be viewed as reflective of general state practice on the matter. 
See Constitución Política del Estado, infra note 724; Venezuela’s constitution, Chapter IX ‘Environmental 
Rights’, Constitución de La Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela (1999), Gaceta Oficial Extraordinaria N° 
36.860 de fecha 30 de diciembre de 1999. 
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4.2.2 NAFTA’s sustainable development goal – The example of Methanex 
Previously discussed from a procedural standpoint,630 it is worthy to revisit the 
Methanex case in a more substantive light as it clearly manifests those issues relating to 
environmental protection that are susceptible of arising in investor-state disputes. The 
dispute was highly complex and extensively discussed scientific and technical evidence 
with respect to the potentially adverse effects of MTBE on public health and the 
environment.  
The US had considered the Californian ban on MTBE as a measure to protect 
public health as well as the environment. California in fact enacted the ban following a 
scientific evaluation by the University of California. Methanex on the other hand 
considered that there was no valid environmental, health, or safety justification for the 
MTBE ban. Methanex denounced the ban as a protectionist measure in the following 
terms: ‘local interests often try to use pseudo-environmental measures to disguise the 
more favourable treatment they seek vis-à-vis foreign competitors’.631 Indeed, it alleged 
that California sought to replace the use of MTBE with ethanol-based additives (ETBE), 
which can also serve as octane and oxygenate for gasoline just like MTBE except that 
they are manufactured from biomass feedstocks. A competitor of Methanex, Archer 
Daniels Midland, a major US-based producer of ethanol, is alleged to have made 
significant contributions to the election campaign of the Governor of California around 
the time of the ban.632  
Against this background, Methanex argued that the ban was meant to grant 
preferential treatment to manufacturers of ‘like products’. It thus submitted a NAFTA 
Chapter XI claim on the basis of a violation of the right to national treatment (Article 
                                                 
630 See Part I  – Section 2.1.2. 
631 Methanex Corporation v. United States, Final award on jurisdiction and merits of 03 August 2005, at 13. 
632 Ibid., at 5.  
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1102),633 fair and equitable treatment (Article 1105)634 and compensation as a result of 
expropriation (Article 1110).635  
i. Amicus allegations and arguments 
The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), the Communities 
for a Better Environment and the Earth Island Institute submitted separate petitions for 
leave to file amicus curiae briefs:  
on the basis of the immense public importance of the case and the critical impact that the 
Tribunal’s decision will have on environmental and other public welfare law-making in the 
NAFTA region.636  
The IISD asserted that there was ‘an increased urgency in the need for amicus 
participation’ in light of the Metalclad award,637 which – according to the IISD – failed to 
consider ‘environmental and sustainable development goals’. 638  It also argued that 
Chapter XI of NAFTA should reflect legal principles underlying the concept of 
sustainable development and that its submission aims to assist the tribunal in that regard. 
It finally pointed out that given the absence of any right of appeal under investment 
arbitration, the tribunal should ensure that there should be no errors ‘resulting from the 
lack of a fresh and relevant perspective’ which IISD could provide with respect to the 
underlying environmental protection and sustainable development issues.639 Communities 
for a Better Environment and the Earth Island Institute asserted that the dispute raised 
issues of ‘constitutional importance’ where (a) governmental authority to implement 
environmental regulations and (b) property rights had to be balanced. As previously 
discussed, this argument echoes the idea that investor-state arbitration presents aspects of 
‘Global Administrative Law’, i.e. where the accountability, and decisions, of domestic 
regulatory bodies have ramifications of a global instead of a domestic nature.640 The 
amici thus placed the Californian measures in a wider context of environmental 
                                                 
633 The Article provides that: ‘1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable 
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors…’. See NAFTA Article 1102, supra note 170 (our 
emphasis). 
634 See Article 1105 of NAFTA, supra note 263. 
635 See Article 1110 of NAFTA, supra note 232. 
636 Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 428, at para 5. 
637 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, supra note 257. 
638 Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 428, at para 6. 
639 Ibid., at para 5. 
640 Ibid., at para 8. See also Part II – Section 1.5.2 for a review of the analysis on the ‘Global Administrative 
Law’ aspects of investor-state arbitration. 
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protection and raised the issue of the host state’s right to protect the environment and 
promote sustainable development.641  
Both civil society organizations subsequently submitted detailed amicus briefs 
that directly tackled Methanex’s arguments. On the alleged violations of national 
treatment and fair and equitable treatment, the IISD essentially asserted that Methanex’s 
arguments were construed to establish environmental protection as an exception to 
international foreign investment rules. This would amount to incorrectly incorporate 
certain trade law rules into Chapter XI, as well as to incorrectly impose the limitations set 
forth under the exceptions of Article XX of the GATT and NAFTA itself into Chapter XI, 
which deals with investment-related as opposed to trade-related obligations of host 
states.642 This would go, so the IISD argued, against a clear recognition of environmental 
protection and sustainable development in NAFTA’s preamble, which should guide the 
interpretation of NAFTA provisions. The IISD further posited that the environmental 
goals and objectives of NAFTA were reconfirmed in the NAAEC.643 This should thus 
influence the interpretation of NAFTA provisions pursuant to Article 31(2)(a) of the 
Vienna Convention.644  
With respect to Methanex’s allegation that a ban on MTBE was meant to favour 
US ETBE manufacturers, the IISD argued that Methanex’s interpretation of NAFTA in 
light of WTO law and practice is misappropriated, particularly in light of its 
interpretation of Article 1102 on national treatment. Methanex should not be viewed as 
‘in like circumstances’ with producers of other gasoline oxygenates such as ETBE.645 In 
addition, ‘circumstances’ cannot be limited to the physical characteristics of a product 
produced by a foreign investor or constitute an investment in se. The IISD contended that 
                                                 
641 T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 402. 
642 Methanex Corporation v. United States, IISD amicus submission of 09 March 2004, at 23. 
643 According to the IISD, the NAAEC explicitly reconfirms the importance of environmental protection the 
following terms of its preamble: ‘Reconfirming the importance of the environmental goals and objectives of the 
NAFTA, including enhanced levels of environmental protection’. See NAAEC, supra note 226. 
644 Article 31(2)(a) provides that: ‘2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, 
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was 
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty’. See Vienna Convention, infra note 
1051.  
645 Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 642, at para 33-36. 
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investments are not only physical ‘things’, but also leave a ‘footprint’ on the ground in 
terms of impacts on the environment and the community.646  
On the last point relating to expropriation, the IISD noted that there is a source of 
concern about ‘the disputed notion’ of regulatory measures, whereby the diminution of 
economic value due to a regulation that protects the public interest becomes the basis for 
a finding of expropriation.647 The IISD rebuked Methanex’s reliance on the previously 
discussed Santa Elena v. Costa Rica case.648 It argued that the substantive issues of the 
latter are not relevant given that the tribunal in that case was faced with a prior 
determination by both parties that an expropriation had effectively taken place. The 
tribunal therefore did not scrutinize whether there was expropriation, but solely 
adjudicated upon the amount of compensation due; and accordingly, it ruled that once an 
expropriation had taken place, compensation is due even if it is for an environmental 
purpose. In turn, the IISD posited that bona fide public health and welfare measures fall 
outside the concept of expropriation, i.e. they are not expropriations of any kind, and are 
therefore not subject to compensation.649 This position is in fact in line with the US’s 
response to Methanex’s claim.  
ii. The tribunal’s response 
In its final award, the tribunal scrutinized in great detail the scientific and 
technical evidence presented by both parties, including the study prepared by the 
University of California. It noted that the study involved more than 60 researchers and 
comprised 17 papers covering ten distinct topics including – inter alia – (i) an assessment 
of the risks and benefits to human health and the environment of MTBE and its 
combustion byproducts found in air, water and soil, and a comparison of those risks and 
benefits to ETBE and ethanol which could be used as a replacement of MTBE in gasoline; 
and (ii) an evaluation of the scientific peer-reviewed research and literature on the human 
health and environmental effects of MTBE.650 Although there was no evidence that air 
quality was significantly affected by the use of MTBE as a fuel additive, the study found 
                                                 
646 Ibid., at para 39.  
647 Ibid., at para 82.  
648 Ibid., at para 87-89. See also Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, supra note 245. 
649 Ibid., at para 86. 
650 Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 631, at 160. 
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that there were important risks and costs associated with water contamination due to the 
use of MTBE. Various public hearings and consultations were in fact subsequently held 
to discuss the findings of the University’s study. The tribunal then noted that Californian 
authorities had detected water contaminations in South Lake Tahoe, Santa Monica, Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, Santa Clara, and other locations, as well as low levels of MTBE 
in drinking water; and finally, acknowledged the existence of widespread public support 
for a ban on MTBE.651  
The tribunal then had to consider Methanex’s allegations of discriminatory 
treatment. It found that political contributions to candidates for office in the US are not 
prohibited. Equally, there were no allegations by Methanex that ADM’s contributions 
were made illegally. A long regulatory process on the MTBE ban had started long before 
the Governor’s election. More fundamentally, the ban’s implementation was subject to 
the findings of the scientific study of the University of California, which was followed by 
public hearings, public testimony and peer review. The tribunal thus asserted that the 
Governor ‘(whoever he or she might have been)’ had no discretion to deviate from the 
results and recommendations of the study. From a substantive standpoint, the tribunal 
dismissed Methanex’s claim with respect to national treatment (Article 1102) given that 
the MTBE ban irrespectively applied to all manufacturers, i.e. it did not receive treatment 
less favorable than US investors in ‘like circumstances’ – as set forth under Article 
1102.652 In this light, it also dismissed Methanex’s claim under Article 1105 on fair and 
equitable treatment. With regards to expropriation (Article 1110), the tribunal found that 
there is no expropriation decree or a creeping expropriation, i.e. a ‘taking’ in the sense of 
any property of Methanex being seized and transferred; nor was the Californian ban 
‘tantamount to expropriation’. In order to be successfully claimed, the latter requires the 
establishment of discriminatory conduct towards foreign investors in the following terms:  
an intentionally discriminatory regulation against a foreign investor fulfils a key requirement for 
establishing expropriation. But as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory 
regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which 
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable 
unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating government to the then putative 
                                                 
651 Ibid., at 173. 
652 The term ‘like circumstances’ was also held not too cover ‘like goods’ or ‘products’; thereby dismissing 
Methanex’s argument with regards to the preferential treatment afforded to producers of ETBE – which may be 
considered under a ‘like product’ interpretation consistent with WTO law. See Ibid., at 253, 260. 
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foreign investor contemplating investment that the government would refrain from such 
regulation.653 
It is worthy to finally note that the tribunal did not revisit procedural aspects nor 
summarize the content of the amici’s submission. However, it noted the IISD’s ‘carefully 
reasoned Amicus submission’ in which it argues against Methanex’s contention that 
‘trade law approaches can simply be transferred to investment law’.654  
Civil society organizations such as the IISD viewed the decision favorably.655 
Particularly in light of the tribunal’s finding that government measures (i) aimed at 
ensuring a public purpose; (ii) that are non-discriminatory; and (iii) enacted ‘in 
accordance with due process’, are in principle not deemed as expropriatory and 
compensable. This finding was in line with the IISD’s amicus curiae arguments. A more 
detailed assessment of the amici’s impact on the tribunal’s final award will be undertaken 
further below.656  
4.3 Civil society as a human rights advocate  
Human rights issues have been raised in in a number of investor-state disputes, 
particularly those relating to both the Argentine financial crisis of 2001 and access to 
water. This section looks at three cases: Aguas del Tunari SA v. Bolivia, Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentina, and Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania.657 
                                                 
653 Ibid., at 278 (our emphasis). It is worthy to note that the principle set out by the Methanex tribunal was 
confirmed in a similar NAFTA dispute. The dispute concerned a ban on the sale of lindane pesticide by the Pest 
Management Regulatory Agency of Canada (PMRA). In this respect, the tribunal stated that ‘[it] considers in any 
event that the measures challenged by the Claimant constituted a valid exercise of the Respondent’s police 
powers. As discussed in detail in connection with Article 1105 of NAFTA, the PMRA took measures within its 
mandate, in a non-discriminatory manner, motivated by the increasing awareness of the dangers presented by 
lindane for human health and the environment. A measure adopted under such circumstances is a valid exercise 
of the State’s police powers and, as a result, does not constitute an expropriation’.  See Chemtura Corporation v. 
Government of Canada, supra note 134, at para 266.  
654 Ibid., at 258.  
655 Mann argues that ‘the Methanex Tribunal has applied a modern regulatory approach to the police powers 
concept, an approach long argued for by IISD and other civil society groups’. See H. Mann, ‘The Final Decision 
in Methanex v United States: Some New Wine in Some New Bottles’, International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, August 2005, available at: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/commentary_methanex.pdf (last accessed 
06 October 2014).  
656 See Part I – Section 5.2. 
657 Aguas del Tunari SA v. Bolivia, infra note 716, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine 
Republic, infra note 542, and Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, infra note 740. Other disputes not addressed include: 
Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, infra note 658. 
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These were seminal, and some of the first, arbitrations dealing directly with issues related 
to the human right to access water.  
4.3.1 The need for foreign investment in water distribution 
As a human rights issue, access to water is a manifest example of transcendent 
public interests and, incidentally, it has been the subject matter of a number of investor-
state disputes of importance to this research.658 884 million people lack access to safe 
drinking water and more than 2.6 billion do not have access to basic sanitation. 659 
Enhancing access to water is part of the UN Millennium Development Goals,660 which 
are in se multi-stakeholder concerns.661 Although considered as a public good, water may 
be deemed as an economic good as well due to its increasing ‘marchandisation’. Private 
corporations may profit from states delegating the provision of water distribution services, 
the outright privatization of such services, or the acquisition of water resources and 
rights. 662  Privatization is often linked to World Bank and IMF loans or structural 
adjustment programs – as reflected for instance in the cases of Aguas del Tunari v. 
                                                 
658 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, infra note 533; Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. 
The Argentine Republic, infra note 542; Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. 
The Argentine Republic, infra note 378; and Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12), and Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania, infra note 741. 
659 UN General Assembly, Resolution 64/292, ‘The Human Right to Water and Sanitation’, dated 28 July 2010, 
infra note 689. 
660 Target 7.C sets a goal to ‘halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water and basic sanitation’. See UN Millennium Development Goals, infra note 682. In order for states 
to achieve viable solutions to this problem, they require – inter alia – the technology, know-how, experience, and 
more fundamentally, the capital of private corporations; as well as the support of inter-state organizations and 
donors, but also civil society organizations such as those representing affected communities or those working 
directly with them ‘at the bottom of the pyramid’. For instance, it is estimated that the EU is channelling more 
than two-thirds of its relief aid through NGOs. This fact reflects the advantages for civil society of working ‘at 
the bottom of the pyramid’. See L. Logister, supra note 118, at 167. 
661 It is widely recognized that multi-stakeholder efforts, and not just state or inter-state ones, are required in 
order to achieve those goals. As reflected by initiatives such as the UN Global Compact, Business Call to Action, 
or CEO Water Mandate. Those widely endorsed initiatives bring together multiple stakeholders including 
companies, states, civil society, and international organizations. They are most notably aimed at the respect and 
promotion of sustainable development goals and human rights by companies in general, and multinationals in 
particular. All of which are UN-endorsed initiatives. See UN Global Compact, available at: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last accessed 06 October 2014; Business Call to Action, available at: 
http://www.businesscalltoaction.org/about/about-us/ (last accessed 06 October 2014); and CEO Water Mandate, 
available at: http://www.ceowatermandate.org/ (last accessed 06 October 2014). See also in W. Benedek, ‘Multi-
Stakeholderism in the Development of International Law’ in U. Fastenrath, et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to 
Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (2011), at 203. 
662 See Ibid., at 592. Also, A. Taithe, L’eau. Un bien? Un droit? (2008), at 40.  
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Bolivia and Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania.663 That said, private corporations’ investments 
constitute a much-needed component for the enhancement of water access and, thus, 
development.664 As an example, it is estimated that Suez, the French parent company and 
majority shareholder of the claimants in the case of Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona v. Argentina, 665  invested $1.7 billion between 1993 and 2002 on water 
distribution and treatment infrastructure in Buenos Aires.666 Some corporations in the 
water ‘business’ distribute water to over 100 million persons worldwide. 667  These 
corporations are, for the most part, quintessentially ‘multinational’ and inherently engage 
in foreign investments. Yet, privatization is often perceived as symptomatic of the 
‘state’s retreat’.668 The privatization of basic public services such as water distribution 
implies that private corporations may replace states in this regard and, as a result, 
overshadow states’ duty to ‘respect, protect, and fulfil’ the ‘right to access water’.669 
Foreign investment in privatized basic public services raises serious concerns in light of 
                                                 
663 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra note 533; and Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, infra note 
740. 
664 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)’s Agenda 21 in many ways 
does confirm such recognition. See clause 2.34 of Agenda 21: ‘It is necessary to establish … economic policy 
reforms that promote the efficient planning and utilization of resources for sustainable development through 
sound economic and social policies, foster entrepreneurship and the incorporation of social and environmental 
costs in resource pricing, and remove sources of distortion in the area of trade and investment.’ See Agenda 21, 
infra note 99. See also J. Letnar Černič, infra note 695, at 306. On the World Bank’s role in promoting such an 
approach, see V. Petrova, supra note 668, at 578, 582, 585; C. Schreuer and U. Kriebaum, supra note 617, at 
1082.  
665 Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 544.  
666 This sum was equivalent to two to three times the average capital expenditure made by the Argentinian state 
entity previously in charge of the project. See A. Taithe, supra note 662, at 45.  
667 Out of 15 companies servicing water to more than 13 million persons each, 7 engage in cross-border activities, 
including most notably the French multinationals Veolia Environnement (servicing 131,260,000 persons), and 
Suez Environnement (servicing 117,350,000 persons) – both of which are affiliated to the claimants in Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, infra note 542 (discussed below). For further details 
regarding those statistics, see: Pinsent Masons, Water Yearbook Report (2012-2013), available at: 
http://wateryearbook.pinsentmasons.com/ (last accessed 06 October 2014). See also J. Letnar Černič, infra note 
695, at 307; V. Petrova, supra note 668, at 578, 590; M. Sornarajah, supra note 8, at 333; and M. Majlessi, supra 
note 110, at 82. 
668 This expression is inspired by the title of a book published in 1990s. See S. Strange, The Retreat of the State: 
The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (1996). The ‘state’s retreat’ is also seen as linked to Washington 
Consensus policies, a term designating a set of 10 policies that the US government and the World Bank and IMF 
promoted to increase global economic growth. See WHO, ‘Trade, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Health: the 
Washington Consensus’, available at: http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story094/en/ (last accessed 06 October 
2014). On the IMF and the World Bank’s promotion of privatizations through structural adjustment loans and 
other debt programmes, see also V. Petrova, ‘At the Frontier for the Rush for Blue Gold: Water Privatization and 
the Human Right to Water’, (2006) 31 Brooklynn Journal of International Law 577, at 578; M. Majlessi, infra 
note 110, at 95; E. De Brabandere, infra note 699 at 3. 
669 States’ obligation to protect, respect, and fulfill socio-economic and cultural human rights was first articulated 
by the UN Special Rapporteur, Asbjørn Eide, in his 1987 report. See Report prepared by Asbjørn Eide,  The 
Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23. See also J. Letnar Černič, infra note 695, at 
334; V. Petrova, supra note 668, at 593; E. De Brabandere, infra note 699 at 3. 
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the constraints it could potentially pose on state regulatory powers, particularly when 
promoted and protected under the umbrella of an IIA or BIT. 670  
4.3.2 Is there a ‘human right to water’? 
A human right to access water is considered as an embryonic and widely 
contested human right. 671  It is solely enshrined explicitly in ‘soft’ international law 
instruments. Few human rights instruments treat the right to water as a human right per 
se.672 The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child673 is the first such instrument to 
explicitly mention water, environmental sanitation, and hygiene.674 Other international 
instruments include the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
                                                 
670 An academic statement of ‘concern about the international investment regime’ – the Osgoode Statement –
points to ‘the harm done to the public welfare by the international investment regime, as currently structured, 
especially its hampering of the ability of governments to act for their people in response to the concerns of 
human development and environmental sustainability’. The signatories include, inter alia, M. Sornarajah, Peter 
Muchlinski, Sol Picciotto, Gus Van Harten, and David Schneiderman. See York University – Osgoode Hall Law 
School, Public Statement on The International Investment Regime, dated 31 August 2010, available at: 
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement (last accessed 06 October 2014) (‘the Osgoode Statement’). In 
the same vein, a recent UNCTAD report points that investor-state claims and awards ‘can still exert significant 
pressures on public finances and create potential disincentives for public-interest regulation, posing obstacles to 
countries’ sustainable economic development’. See UNCTAD 2013 Report, supra note 210, at 3. 
671 For an overall view of the historic development of the human right to water and the debate surrounding its 
recognition, see V. Petrova, supra note 668, at 593; M. Gavouneli, ‘A Human Right to Groundwater’ (2011), 13 
International Community Law Review 305, at 318.  
672 It is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, it could fall within 
the scope of Article 25(1), which provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care…’. See 
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, dated 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available 
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html (last accessed 15 December 2013). The same applies to the 
ICESCR, although the right to water was considered to fall within the scope of Article 11(1): ‘The States Parties 
to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his 
family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions’. 
See UN General Assembly, ICESCR, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, available 
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html (last accessed 15 December 2013). For further details on this 
issue, see F. Marrella, infra note 693, at 338. 
673 Article 24(2) provides that: ‘States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particular, 
shall take appropriate measures: …(c) to combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of 
primary health care, through, inter alia, the application of readily available technology and through the provision 
of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of 
environmental pollution…’. See UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, dated 20 
November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html (last accessed 15 December 2013) (‘UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child’).  
674 UN-Water Decade Programme on Advocacy and Communication, ‘The Human Right to Water and Sanitation: 
Milestones’ (2011), available at: 
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/pdf/human_right_to_water_and_sanitation_milestones.pdf (last accessed 
14 December 2013).  
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against Women (‘CEDAW’), 675  the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities;676 and regionally, the European Charter on Water Resources,677 the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,678 and the Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women.679 International humanitarian 
law instruments also allude to the right to water.680  
Numerous declarations and resolutions, which are inherently non-binding, later 
built up on the notion.681 Access to water was included in the Millennium Development 
Goals under ‘Goal 7 – Ensure Environmental Sustainability’.682 Interestingly, the Biwater 
                                                 
675  See Article 14(2)(h) which states that: ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that 
they participate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the right… 
To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, 
transport and communications.’. See UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3970.html (last accessed 26 February 2014).   
676 Article 28(a) provides that: ‘States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities to social protection 
and to the enjoyment of that right without discrimination on the basis of disability, and shall take appropriate 
steps to safeguard and promote the realization of this right, including measures…To ensure equal access by 
persons with disabilities to clean water services, and to ensure access to appropriate and affordable services, 
devices and other assistance for disability-related needs’. See UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities: resolution / adopted by the UN General Assembly, dated 24 January 2007, 
A/RES/61/106, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/45f973632.html (last accessed 26 February 2014). 
677 Article 5 provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to a sufficient quantity of water for his or her basic needs. 
International human rights instruments recognise the fundamental right of all human beings to be free from 
hunger and to an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families. It is quite clear that these two 
requirements include the right to a minimum quantity of water of satisfactory quality from the point of view of 
health and hygiene…’. See Council of Europe, dated 17 October 2001, available at: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=231615 (last accessed 26 February 2014). 
678 Article 14(2)(c) states that: ‘Every child shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical, 
mental and spiritual health. States Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to pursue the full implementation 
of this right and in particular shall take measures…to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking 
water’. See Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, dated 
11 July 1990, CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38c18.html (last 
accessed 26 February 2014).  
679 Article 15 provides that: ‘States parties shall ensure that women have the right to nutritious and adequate food. 
In this regard, they shall take appropriate measures to: provide women with access to clean drinking water.’ See 
African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
dated 11 July 2003, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f4b139d4.html (last accessed 26 February 
2014). 
680 These most notably include the Geneva Convention. Article 26(3) states that: ‘Sufficient drinking water shall 
be supplied to prisoners of war…’. See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, dated 12 
August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Generally, for an exhaustive account of reference to the human right to water, see 
J. Letnar Černič, infra note 695, at 311-314. 
681 Ibid. 
682 Target 7.C sets a goal to ‘halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water and basic sanitation’. In order to achieve this goal, five normative criteria for the full realization 
of the right to water have been identified: availability, accessibility, quality/safety, affordability, and 
acceptability; with five-cross cutting ones: non-discrimination, participation, accountability, impact, and 
sustainability. See F. Marrella, infra note 693, at 340. See also UN Millennium Development Goals, available at: 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml (last accessed 01 September 2013). 
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Gauff tribunal explicitly mentioned this – as will be further discussed below.683 Other 
instruments most notably include the CESCR’s General Comment No. 15 on the right to 
water on the basis of Articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR.684 Article I.1 states that ‘the 
human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity. It is a 
prerequisite for the realization of other human rights’.685 Comment No. 15 also defined 
the right to water as including available and affordable water for personal and domestic 
uses.686 The CESCR articulated the need to ‘respect, protect, and fulfil’ the human right 
to water by ensuring its availability, accessibility, and affordability.687 In a similar vein, 
there is also a three-pronged procedural component to the right to water relating to the 
right to information, the right to participate in policy and decision-making, and the right 
to effective judicial remedies.688  
The human right to water was further supported by a UN General Assembly 
resolution of 28 July 2010, in which the Assembly ‘recognizes the right to safe and clean 
drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of 
life and all human rights’.689 The right to water has also gained further impetus as a result 
of its constitutionalization by an increasing number of states, particularly from Latin 
                                                 
683 See infra note 838. 
684 Article 12 states that: ‘1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 2. The steps to be taken by the States 
Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: (a) 
The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of 
the child; (b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, 
treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions 
which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness’. See ICESCR, supra 
note 672. 
685 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 15: The Right to 
Water (Art. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), 11-29 November 2003, E/C.12/2002/11, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838d0.html (last accessed 17 December 2013). 
686 See 12(a) ‘Availability’: ‘The water supply for each person must be sufficient and continuous for personal and 
domestic uses…’; and 12(c)(ii) ‘Economic Accessibility’: ‘Water, and water facilities and services, must be 
affordable for all. The direct and indirect costs and charges associated with securing water must be affordable, 
and must not compromise or threaten the realization of other Covenant rights’. Ibid.  
687 J. Letnar Černič, infra note 695, at 306. 
688 Article 55 of General Comment 15 states that: ‘Any persons or groups who have been denied their right to 
water should have access to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at both national and international 
levels’. See General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, supra note 686. See also V. Petrova, supra note 668, 
at 596. 
689 UN General Assembly, Resolution 64/292, ‘The Human Right to Water and Sanitation’, dated 28 July 2010, 
available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/292 (last accessed 01 September 
2013) (our emphasis).  
157 
 
America and Africa, which more recently included Tunisia.690 Ecuador’s constitution is 
apposite, it provides that ‘the human right to water is fundamental and inalienable. Water 
constitutes a national strategic patrimony of public use, [that is] inalienable, 
imprescriptible, indefeasible and essential for life’.691 It is worthy to note as well that 
such constitutional measures often cover the protection of other essential public services 
from privatization.692 In such cases, the right to water would not be considered as merely 
hortatory given that the privatization of water distribution would be unequivocally illegal 
under municipal law, thereby ensuring that access to water remains public. 
States have a duty to protect, respect, and fulfil – inter alia – the human right to 
water. Conversely, states bound by IIAs or BITs are seemingly compelled to undertake 
their human right to water duties in a manner that is consistent with foreign investors’ 
right to due process and predictability, rule of law, fair and equitable treatment, and 
compensation in the event of expropriation, amongst other potentially relevant 
international investment protection obligations.693  The human right to water thus fits 
within the challenge states face in promoting economic development in general, and 
foreign investments in particular, while abiding by their human rights obligations.694 
There is, however, an underlying problem for states in addressing both. The right to water 
may often conflict with economic development such as mining for instance.695 Foreign 
                                                 
690 Uruguay and Ecuador have actually unconstitutionalized the privatization of water services. Other states’ 
constitutions that have referred to the right to water include – inter alia – Bolivia, Laos, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Guatemala, Panama, Uganda, South African, Venezuela, and Zambia. For instance, the Article 27 of the South 
African Constitution states that: ‘(1) Everyone has the right to have access to… (b) sufficient food and water… 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realization of each of these rights’. See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (No. 108 of 
1996), available at: http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014). 
Tunisia’s recently promulgated constitution provides under Article 44 that: ‘Le droit à l'eau est garanti. La 
préservation de l’eau et son utilisation rationnelle sont un devoir pour l’Etat et la société.’ See Constitution de 
La République Tunisienne, dated 26 January 2014, available at: http://www.marsad.tn/fr/constitution# (last 
accessed 02 February 2014). See also F. Marrella, infra note 693, at 339, and J. Letnar Černič, infra note 695, at 
320-321 for an exhaustive analysis of state constitutions mentioning access to water. 
691 Article 12, Constitución de la Republica de Ecuador (2008), Registro Oficial 449 de 20 Octubre 2008.  
692 For instance, in 2009, Bolivia passed a new constitution in which it enshrines the ‘right of every person to 
universal and equal access to drinking water, sanitation, electricity, domestic gas, postal, and telecommunications 
basic services’. See Article 20(I), Constitución Política del Estado, infra note 724. See also V. Petrova, supra 
note 668, at 580. 
693 See F. Marrella, ‘On the Changing Structure of International Investment Law: the Human Right to Water and 
ICSID Arbitration’, (2010) 12 International Community Law Review 335, at 335, 336.  
694 This is in continuation to the discussion initiated under Introduction – Section 1. 
695 Černič gives the example of the Dongria Kondh indigenous community, inhabiting the Niyamgiri Hills in 
Eastern India, where the Indian government approved a project to mine bauxite which is widely reported to have 
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investors – or corporations in general – may, through their actions or omissions, 
ultimately undermine the human right to water. For instance, they may deprive 
individuals of their access to water through contamination (in the case of mining 
activities), the excessive use of water, 696 or substantially increase the price of water (in 
the case of privatized water supply and services),697  which could potentially lead to 
preventing the poorest segments of a given population of their right to access water.698  
Addressing these problems is incumbent upon states since it is clearly established, 
under international law, that human rights cannot be enforced against corporations in 
general as no binding international instrument imposes human rights obligations on 
them.699 Human rights obligations are quintessentially directed at states – the primary 
subjects of international law700 – and include the duty to protect against human rights 
violations through adequate ‘policies, legislation, regulations, and adjudication’. 701 
Having said that, there is an increasing recognition that corporations have a responsibility 
to respect human rights, such as the right to water, which means that business enterprises 
should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to address 
adverse impacts caused by their activities.702  This due diligence obligation is clearly 
reflected in the Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania case. 703  
                                                                                                                                                 
serious adverse effects on fresh water sources from the Hills. See J. Letnar Černič, ‘Corporate Obligations under 
the Human Right to Water’, (2011) 39 Denver Journal of International Law 303, at 303-304.  
696 See the case of Perumatty Grama Panchayat v State of Kerala, which involved Coca Cola’s activities in the 
Indian state of Kerala; and more specifically, its allegedly excessive use of fresh groundwater in its 
manufacturing processes. Perumatty Grama Panchayat v State of Kerala, High Court of Kerala, India, W.P. (C ) 
No. 34292 of 2003, Judgement of 16 December 2003. 
697  See Aguas del Tunari SA v Bolivia, infra note 716, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The 
Argentine Republic, supra note 542, and Biwater Gauff v Tanzania, infra note 740 cases, which will be 
discussed further below. See also Ibid., at 317. 
698 Ibid., at 306. 
699  Ibid., at 310. See also E. De Brabandere, ‘State-Centrism and Human Rights Obligations: Challenging 
‘Stateless’ Approaches towards Direct Corporate Responsibility’, International Law Association – Research 
Seminar on Non-state Actors (March 2009), at 14. 
700 James Crawford explains that ‘there is an expanding range of actors in the international system, but states very 
much remain the key-holders and gate-keepers of personality’. See J. Crawford, supra note 74, at 211. 
701 See for instance the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which state that: ‘[the] Guiding 
Principles are grounded in recognition of: (a) States’ existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’. See UN Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, dated 21 March 2011, UN 
General Assembly A/HRC/17/31, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf (last accessed 02 February 
2014). See also J. Letnar Černič, supra note 695, at 325. 
702 This is not only reflected in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, but also the OECD 
Guidelines which state that: ‘Enterprises should… Respect the internationally recognised human rights of those 
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Against this backdrop, it is posited that the realization of the human right to water 
requires responsive and accountable institutions, with a clear designation of 
responsibilities and coordination between different entities involved. In cases of 
violations – be it by state organs or non-state actors – states have to provide accessible 
and effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at both national and international 
levels. Victims of violations should be entitled to adequate reparation, including 
restitution, compensation, satisfaction and/or guarantees of non-repetition. 704  Yet, 
concessions on the privatization of water services for instance do not include the 
‘privatization’ of a given state’s international obligations in terms of protecting, 
respecting, and fulfilling human rights, ‘including the right to water of the people’.705 
Indeed, foreign investors often find themselves engaged in activities involving sensitive 
human rights obligations incumbent upon states.706 In order to attract foreign investments, 
host states have allowed multinationals to charge higher bills to citizens for water with 
the result of potentially undermining human rights. Faced with growing discontent, 
governments have then often been compelled to issue administrative measures (such as 
price-freezing) to the detriment of foreign investors, resulting in potential breaches of 
international investment obligations.707  
In sum and in concreto, notwithstanding the fact that the right to water is 
ambiguously regulated under international law, it could be deemed in any event, whether 
it is recognized as ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ law under international law, as a ‘legally protectable 
interest’ that could potentially justify the intervention of third parties in investor-state 
arbitrations.708  
4.3.3 Privatizations, protests, and problems – A look at some of the key 
decisions 
i. Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia 
                                                                                                                                                 
affected by their activities’. See Ibid., at 4, and Principle II.2 of the OECD Guidelines. See also Letnar Černič, 
supra note 695, at 327. 
703 Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, infra note 740. 
704 F. Marrella, supra note 693, at 342. 
705 Ibid., at 342. 
706 C. Schreuer and U. Kriebaum, supra note 617, at 1085.  
707 Ibid., at 348. 
708 The definition of ‘legally protectable interest’ is addressed in Part III – Section 4.1.2. 
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This is the first investor-state dispute that dealt with the polemical issue of access 
to drinking water. It is also the first ICSID case in which both the third-party intervention 
(or standing) and amicus curiae issues have arisen. It is therefore a highly publicized case; 
the underlying events were coined as the ‘Water War’ where for the first time a conflict 
over water did not oppose two states or peoples; but rather, a multinational and those 
local citizens opposed to its operations.709 
As mentioned, the case involved Aguas del Tunari, a subsidiary of Bechtel – a 
major American infrastructure company – which had been granted a 40-year water and 
sewage services privatization concession by the government of Bolivia for the city of 
Cochabamba.710 The government of Bolivia revoked the concession following a steep 
increase in water prices and ensuing widespread protests by the local population. As a 
result, Aguas del Tunari filed an ICSID claim against Bolivia pursuant to the 
Netherlands-Bolivia BIT.  
a. Amicus allegations and arguments 
From the outset, civil society organizations including the Coordinadora para la 
Defensa del Agua y la Vida and the Federación Departamental Cochabambina de 
Organizaciones Regantes,711 sought standing as parties to the dispute or alternatively as 
amici curiae.712 Petitioners mainly argued that they had a ‘direct’ interest in the dispute. 
The Coordinadora is a coalition of community organizations, labour groups, human 
rights organizations, farmers’ associations, students and other broad-based civil society 
networks from the region of Cochabamba. It opposed AdT’s concession from the outset 
and had also carried out a public consulta, a common form of popular consultation 
process in Latin America, whereby 60,000 people voted against the concession. The 
Bolivian government even involved the Coordinadora during the AdT concession 
negotiations to represent those opposed to the privatisation process.713 It was also actively 
involved in the protests that ultimately lead to AdT’s exit from Bolivia. As for the 
                                                 
709 A. Taithe, supra note 662, at 13.  
710  In fact, it is worthy to mention here that Bechtel is engaged in a myriad of projects including civil 
infrastructure, energy, mining, oil and gas, and water – which has become one of the world’s largest industries. 
711 Meaning ‘the Cochabamba Federation of Irrigators’ Organizations’. 
712 These were SEMAPA Sur, Friends of the Earth-Netherlands, Oscar Olivera, Omar Fernandez, Father Luis 
Sánchez, and Congressman Jorge Alvarado.  
713 Ibid., at para 5. 
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Federación Departamental Cochabambina de Organizaciones Regantes, it is an 
association of small-scale farmers from the Cochabamba region aimed at protecting 
customary water usage rights and practices, as well as the access and management of 
local water irrigation sources.  
The petitioners’ aim was essentially to demonstrate that (i) Bechtel’s subsidiary 
increased water prices by an average rate of 50%; and (ii) thereby significantly restricted 
Cochabamba’s residents’ access to water, particularly poorer ones.714 They have also 
contended that their position is distinct from the Bolivian government’s as the latter 
might be ‘encumbered by conflicting objectives’ given the ‘strong pressure to attract 
foreign investment’, and that it does not ‘fully represent Petitioners’ interests in this 
arbitration’.715 Again, this is a situation similar to the Metalclad case where the Mexican 
federal government approved the construction of the hazardous chemical waste landfill, 
whereas the local community surrounding the project vehemently opposed it. Here, the 
Bolivian government approved the privatization of water services in favour of Bechtel’s 
subsidiary, despite widespread opposition from the citizens of Cochabamba. Indeed, 
Bolivia would not have raised factual and legal arguments against AdT’s claim by 
asserting ‘the right of its citizens’ to water’ as an exception to AdT’s international foreign 
investment rights when it had initially agreed to privatize water distribution to the benefit 
of AdT. According to the petitioners, Bolivia only revoked the concession at a much later 
stage that followed a failure to control protesters, including a week long general strike 
which entirely shut down the city of Cochabamba, through an imposed state of 
emergency and suspension of constitutional rights, as well as repression that lead to the 
death of a seventeen year-old protester and the injury of a hundred others.716 In several 
ways, the result of the ‘Water War’ was not only perceived as a defeat for Bechtel and 
AdT, but also for Bolivia, which was compelled to concede to Cochabamban civil 
society’s demands. 717  It is worthy to note here that the petition to intervene had 
                                                 
714 Ibid., at para 35. 
715 Ibid., at para 36. 
716 The concession was granted in September 1999 and ceased to be effective in April 2000. See Aguas del 
Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia (ICSID Case no. ARB/02/3), Petition by NGOs and people to participate 
as an intervening party or amici curiae of 29 August 2002, at para 1 (the ‘Bechtel Case’ or ‘Bechtel v. Bolivia’).  
717  This was the perception of some civil society organizations. See L. Sanchez Gomez, and P. Terhorst, 
‘Cochabamba, Bolivia: Public-Collective Partnership after the Water Water’, available at: 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/books/watercochabamba.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014).  
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galvanized widespread support. Over 300 civil society organizations from Bolivia, the 
Netherlands, the US, and 38 other countries sent letters to the tribunal to express their 
concerns towards AdT’s claims and urge the tribunal to allow the petitioners to 
intervene.718 
b. The tribunal’s response 
Having said that, the tribunal responded to the petitioners by a letter in 2003 – 
considered unfavorable – as previously mentioned. 719  The tribunal did not have the 
chance to examine any further amicus petitions nor the merits of the case as Bechtel’s 
subsidiary ultimately dropped its claim and both parties settled the dispute. 720  The 
tribunal only managed to issue a decision rejecting Bolivia’s objection to jurisdiction in 
2005, which was essentially based on the following arguments: (i) Bolivia did not 
consent to ICSID jurisdiction; and (ii) AdT is not a Dutch national as defined by the 
Netherlands-Bolivia BIT.721  
It is worthy to mention here that, following the election of Evo Morales, the 
country’s first indigenous president, who personally criticized ICSID, Bolivia withdrew 
from the ICSID Convention (the withdrawal took effect as of November 2007) and 
terminated its BIT with the Netherlands in 2009.722 A move that was later followed by 
both Ecuador and Venezuela, while other states such as Nicaragua as well as Argentina 
have been contemplating to follow suit.723 In 2007, Bolivia also revoked a concession 
granted to the French multinational – Suez, which is involved in the subsequently 
discussed case of Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. Argentina – for water 
                                                 
718 Ibid., at para 4. 
719 See Part I – Section 1.3.2. 
720 It is worthy to note that Bechtel’s claim was portrayed as a telling sign of the ‘evils of globalisation’. The fact 
that it dropped the case has been portrayed by civil society organizations  as ‘victory’. See Earthjustice, 
‘Victories: Bechtel Drops Case in Bolivia Water Case’, available at: 
http://www.earthjustice.org/our_work/victory/?issue=&region=&office=27410256 (last accessed 06 October 
2014). See also J. Stiglitz, supra note 101, at 187; and IISD, ‘Bolivian water dispute settled, Bechtel forgoes 
compensation’, Investment Treaty News, available at: www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_jan20_2006.pdf (last accessed 
06 October 2014). 
721 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia (ICSID Case no. ARB/02/3), Decision on Respondent's 
Objections to Jurisdiction of 21 October 2005, para 5.  
722 UNCTAD, ‘Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact on Investor State Claims’, IIA Issues 
Note No. 2 (December 2010), available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf (last accessed 
15 December 2013), at 1. 
723  IISD, ‘Venezuela’s Withdrawal From ICSID: What it Does and Does Not Achieve’, available at: 
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-achieve/ (last 
accessed 10 December 2013).  
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distribution in the capital, La Paz. In addition, in 2009, Bolivia passed a new constitution 
in which it enshrined the ‘right of every person to universal and equal access to drinking 
water, sanitation, electricity, domestic gas, postal, and telecommunications basic 
services’.724 Water concessions and privatizations have also been un-constitutionalized.725  
ii. Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. Argentina  
 The case involved a number of companies and their shareholders concerning their 
investments in a 30-year privatization concession for water distribution and wastewater 
treatment services in the city of Buenos Aires and its 10 million inhabitants.726 This case 
is considered as a landmark investor-state dispute, not only because it dealt with complex 
international law questions, but also it presented the first instance in which an ICSID 
tribunal accepted to receive amicus curiae submissions, as mentioned above.  
a. The facts  
The concession granted to Suez, the French parent company and majority 
shareholder of the claimants,727 was, back in 1993, the largest privatization concession of 
its kind.728 The country’s financial crisis starting in 2000 led Argentina to enact ‘price-
freezing’ measures across a wide range of sectors, which included water distribution. The 
claimants alleged that Argentina’s refusal to apply previously agreed incremental tariff 
adjustments, including the ensuing termination of their concession, essentially amounted 
to expropriation, and violations of their right to the full protection and security of their 
investments as well as fair and equitable treatment.729 The case was regarded in the same 
vein as Bechtel as it raised fundamental issues in relation to human rights and access to 
                                                 
724 Article 20(I). See Constitución Política del Estado (February 2009), Gaceta Oficial del Estado Plurinacional 
de Bolivia, available at: http://www.gacetaoficialdebolivia.gob.bo/normas/view/36208 (last accessed 15 
December 2013).  
725 Article 20(III). Ibid.  
726 The claims were therefore made pursuant to the France, Spain and United Kingdom BITs entered into with 
Argentina. Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, Decision on liability of 30 July 
2010, supra note 544, at para 2.  
727 It is also noteworthy that Suez is the world’s largest water distribution multinational and services water to 
more than 117 million persons worldwide. Suez Environnement services 117,350,000 persons worldwide. For 
further details regarding those statistics, see Pinsent Masons, Water Yearbook Report (2012-2013), supra note 
667. 
728 A. Taithe, supra note 662, at 41. 
729 Ibid., at para 127. 
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water. Indeed, Argentina’s responsibility and obligation to secure its citizens’ right to 
access water was at issue.  
b. Amicus allegations and arguments 
Five civil society organizations, 730  including local grassroots Argentine 
associations such as the Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia and Centro de 
Estudios Legales y Sociales, filed a ‘Petition for Transparency and Participation as 
Amicus Curiae’ on the basis of ‘the right of every person to participate and make their 
voices heard in cases where decisions may affect their rights’. 731  The amici clearly 
intended to put forward crucial issues related to, and arguments in favor of, Argentina’s 
domestic and international obligations to uphold the human right to water. In their joint 
amicus curiae submission, the amici cited General Comment No. 15 and contended that 
the right to water is essential for sustaining human life and is protected under Article 11(1) 
of ICESCR.732 They also cited the recommendation of the CESCR to the effect that water 
must at all times be available, of acceptable quality, and accessible in both the physical 
and economic sense. The amici then contended that Argentina has ratified most 
international human rights instruments covering the human right to water, including most 
notably the ICESCR. These were fully incorporated into, and conferred ‘constitutional 
hierarchy’ under, Argentine law. Argentina was, therefore, both domestically and 
internationally compelled to positively protect the right to water.733  
c. The tribunal’s response 
In its decision on liability, the tribunal noted the amici’s contentions to the effect 
that Argentina’s measures sought to secure its citizens’ access to water as a human right:  
Human rights law…required that Argentina adopt measures to ensure access to water by the 
population, including physical and economic access, and that its actions in confronting the crisis 
fully conformed to human rights law. Since human rights law provides a rationale for the crisis 
                                                 
730 The remaining three were the Center for International Environmental Law, Consumidores Libres Cooperativa 
Ltda. de Provisión de Servicios de Acción Comunitaria, and Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores.  
731 Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, Order in Response to a Petition for 
Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae of 19 May 2005, at para 2.  
732 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v 
The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case no. ARB/03/19), Amicus curiae submission of 04 April 2007, at 4. See 
General Comment No.15, supra note 685. 
733 Ibid., at 10.  
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measures, they argue that this Tribunal should consider that rationale in interpreting and applying 
the provisions of the BITs in question.734 
Although noting that the Argentine financial crisis was ‘undoubtedly one of the most 
severe in its history’, the tribunal asserted that, however, the severity of a crisis, no matter 
the degree, is not sufficient to allow a plea of necessity to relieve a state of its treaty 
obligations, i.e. the applicable BITs. 735  The tribunal reiterated that customary 
international law on the matter, as enshrined by Article 25 of the ILC Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, sets forth strict conditions in 
order for states to succeed in upholding a defense of necessity.736 It also asserted that it 
was important for states to abide by such conditions; otherwise, violations of their 
international obligations risk destabilizing the ‘very fabric of international law’ and ‘the 
system of international relations’. More specifically, and in looking at the conditions of 
Article 25 of the ILC Articles, the tribunal first found that Argentina had other available, 
and more flexible, means in order to safeguard an essential interest – i.e. the provision of 
water and sewage services to the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires, which was vital to 
the health and well-being of nearly ten million people – without violating the claimants’ 
right to fair and equitable treatment. Because Argentina refused to abide by the tariff 
adjustment procedure set forth under its concession agreement with the claimants, forced 
the renegotiation of, and ultimately terminated, the latter, it violated the fair and equitable 
treatment standard it owes the claimants as protected foreign investors.737 The legitimate 
expectations of the latter were key to the tribunal’s analysis. The claimants had, 
according to the tribunal, the legitimate expectation that Argentina, and its organs, would 
exercise regulatory authority and discretion within the rules of the detailed legal 
framework that Argentina had itself established under the concession. 738  Second, it 
                                                 
734 Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 544, at para 256. 
735 Ibid., at para 257-258.  
736 Article 25 ‘Necessity’ provides that: ‘1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: (a) Is the 
only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) Does not 
seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the 
international community as a whole. 2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for 
precluding wrongfulness if: (a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking 
necessity; or (b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity. See Ibid., at para 249, 259. See also ILC 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, infra note 833. 
737 Ibid., at 246.  
738 Ibid., at 237.  
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concluded that Argentina had not violated the essential interests of other states, and that 
the applicable BITs concluded with France, Spain, and the UK did not explicitly exclude 
a defense on the basis of necessity; thereby, asserting Argentina’s fulfilment of the 
second and third conditions of Article 25. However, with respect to the fourth condition, 
it was of the opinion that Argentina contributed to the financial crisis it faced, which – 
according to the tribunal – cannot be solely accounted on external factors.739 It thus failed 
on the first and fourth tests, and was held responsible for violations of its respective BIT 
obligations but solely under the breach of the fair and equitable treatment.  
Having said that, the tribunal’s decision on damages is still not public and it 
remains unclear whether the human rights considerations might have any effect on issues 
of quantum.  
iii. Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania  
The Biwater Gauff740 is important because it delved in quite significant detail into 
human rights questions in general, and extensively scrutinized amicus arguments in 
particular.  
a. The facts  
The case revolves around a concession granted to an Anglo-German consortium 
for the management and operation of a water supply and sanitation project in the 
Tanzanian capital Dar es Salam. The government of Tanzania subsequently revoked the 
concession due to numerous complications in the implementation of the project by 
Biwater Gauff (which claimed that those were directly or indirectly caused by the 
government of Tanzania), most notably including a decline in the availability of water in 
many parts of Dar Es Salam.741 The case was regarded in the same vein as the Bechtel 
                                                 
739 The tribunal cited the following factors as evidence of Argentina’s contribution to the crisis: excessive public 
spending, inefficient tax collection, delays in responding to the early signs of the crisis, insufficient efforts at 
developing an export market, and internal political dissension and problems inhibiting effective policy making. 
See Ibid., at para 264. 
740 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22. 
741 It is worthy to note that the appointment of a private operator was a condition to a World Bank, African 
Development Bank, and European Investment Bank funding of USD 140,000,000. Following the revocation of 
its concession, Biwater Gauff submitted a claim to ICSID pursuant to the United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT. See 
Ibid., at para 3. 
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and Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona cases since it raised fundamental issues in 
relation to human rights and access to water. Amicus curiae petitions were made by five 
civil society organizations742 including renowned international civil society organizations 
such as the IISD, but also local Tanzanian grassroots organization such as the Tanzania 
Gender Networking Programme.  
b. Amicus allegations and arguments 
The amici argued that when engaging in activities that might entail serious risks 
for a given population at large, foreign investors then have the ‘highest level of 
responsibility to meet their duties and obligations’. In this case, because of the subject 
matter of the dispute, human rights and sustainable development considerations impact 
the balance of rights and obligations between foreign investors and the host state. The 
alleged significant decline in the availability of water in many parts of Dar es Salaam 
originated in Biwater Gauff’s lack of business competence, and ultimately amounted to a 
failure to uphold the human rights and sustainable development goals underlying to the 
implementation of the water distribution project.743  
In concreto, the joint amicus brief first suggested that foreign investors have three 
main responsibilities consisting of the duty to (i) apply proper business standards to the 
investment process, including proper due diligence procedures that involve background 
checks and an adequate assessment of investment risks in developing country economies 
such as Tanzania’s; (ii) observe the principle of pacta sunt servanda; and (iii) act in good 
faith both prior to and during the investment period. 744  Accordingly, the claimant’s 
apparent strategy of making a low bid and then forcing concession renegotiation was a 
violation of these responsibilities. Biwater Gauff’s business failure should only be 
attributed to it, and in this regard, the applicable UK-Tanzania BIT should not be resorted 
to by the claimant as an ‘insurance policy’.745 On the issue of access to water, the amici 
cited the objectives set forth under the Millennium Development Goals746 and the World 
                                                 
742  The Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team, the Legal and Human Rights Center, the Tanzania Gender 
Networking, the Center for International Environmental Law, and the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development. 
743 Ibid., at para 379-383. 
744 Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, Amicus curiae submission of 26 March 2007, at para 9.  
745 Ibid., at para 16. 
746 UN Millennium Development Goals, supra note 682. 
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Summit on Sustainable Development.747 What is crucial here is that the amici provided 
evidence that Biwater Gauff itself explicitly represented its:  
willingness to work with all stakeholders to contribute to the achievement of the MDGs… Biwater 
is already working to increase provision of safe and affordable access to clean water and sanitation, 
which is not only a Millennium Development Goal – it’s our core business.748  
The amici then asserted that access to clean water is an independent basic human right as 
recognized by General Comment no. 15.749 Again, a fact explicitly recognized by Biwater 
Gauff in its corporate publications in the following terms ‘every man, woman and child 
has the right to a reliable system of clean water and good sanitation’. According to the 
amici, such international and corporate recognition should be afforded legal significance. 
Foreign investors operating in this sector have ‘the highest level of responsibilities’ 
because of risks associated with failures in the provision of water access, particularly 
with respect to vulnerable segments of the population including the poor, women, and 
children – both of which are also protected by specific treaties which mention access to 
water, as previously discussed.750 
Although the amici’s arguments would lead to uphold Tanzania’s termination of 
Biwater’s concession in order to ensure that its affected citizens had access to water, the 
amici clearly emphasized that their arguments should not be construed as mitigating 
factors of host state liability if violations of BIT obligations are established. They rather 
suggest that human rights and sustainable development issues must be factors that 
‘condition the nature and extent’ of the foreign investors’ responsibilities, and equally, 
the balance of rights and obligations between foreign investors and host states.751 Foreign 
investors should therefore ensure the abidance by the ‘highest level of responsibilities’ 
prior to seeking the protection of international law in front of investor-state tribunals.  
c. The tribunal’s response 
                                                 
747 The Declaration of the Summit states that: ‘We welcome the focus of the Johannesburg Summit on the 
indivisibility of human dignity and are resolved, through decisions on targets, timetables and partnerships, to 
speedily increase access to such basic requirements as clean water, sanitation, adequate shelter, energy, health 
care, food security and the protection of biodiversity’. See Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable 
Development, dated 4 September 2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20, available at: http://www.un-
documents.net/jburgdec.htm (last accessed 06 October 2014).  
748 Ibid., at para 47. 
749 General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water , supra note 686. 
750 Ibid., at para 50. See also CEDAW, supra note 675; UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 
673. 
751 Ibid., at para 51, and A. Kawharu, supra note 393, at 292. 
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The tribunal extensively revisited the amici’s contentions with respect to the 
human right to water, a right which was explicitly acknowledged by Biwater Gauff. The 
former mentioned as well the target set by the Millennium Development Goals to reduce 
by half the number of people without access to potable water.752 Indeed, the tribunal 
extensively scrutinized the arguments raised by the amici.753 It noted their contention as 
to foreign investors’ duties in conducting due diligence, applying proper business 
standards, including a responsibility of carrying out proper risk assessments, to observe 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda, as well as to act in good faith.754 It further reiterated 
that foreign investors are also bound by the highest level of responsibility to meet their 
duties and obligations as their investments carry ‘very serious risks’ to the population 
affected by their investments.755 More fundamentally, the tribunal also mentioned the 
amici’s contention with respect to the failure by foreign investors to meet their 
contractual obligations – in a privatization context – puts the welfare of citizens at risk, 
which the privatization was actually mandated to enhance.756 Although the tribunal found 
that Tanzania expropriated the claimant’s investment, it nonetheless concluded that the 
latter failed to establish any of its claims on damages.757 
4.4 Representing the under-represented: Civil society and indigenous groups  
Issues related to indigenous peoples’ and minority rights have been raised in 
investor-state disputes.758 This section will primarily focus on the cases of Glamis Gold v. 
the United States, Piero Foresti and others v. South Africa, and more recently, Chevron 
and Texaco v. Ecuador. These were seminal and some of the first arbitrations directly 
dealing with issues related to indigenous peoples’ rights and interests. 
                                                 
752 See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra note 741, at para 379.  
753 It dedicated roughly 10 pages for a substantive analysis of those arguments. See Ibid., at para -370-392. 
754 Ibid., at para 374. 
755 Ibid., at para 380. See also T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 407. 
756 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra note 741, at para 377. Ibid., at para 377. 
757 Again in this case, the impact of the amici arguments on the tribunal’s award will be discussed subsequently. 
See Part I – Section 5.2. 
758 J. Levine, ‘The Interaction of International Investment Arbitration and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ in F. 
Baetens (ed.), Investment Law within International Law: Integrationist Perspectives (2013), at 106-107.  
170 
 
4.4.1 Legal principles on the protection of indigenous peoples 
Both municipal law 759  and international law are increasingly extending 
protections to indigenous peoples.760 The landmark UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), recently entered into force following years of elaborate 
negotiations,761 is an example of such robust international protections.762 It is argued that 
the UNDRIP marks a ‘tremendous advance in international human rights because 
collective rights of indigenous peoples are now recognized as human rights’. 763  It 
provides key provisions on – inter alia – land and resource rights, the protection of 
indigenous peoples’ territorial integrity, 764  as well as their right to free, prior, and 
informed consent: 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through 
their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the 
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in 
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other 
resources.765  
The right to free, prior and informed consent is also emphasized in Article 6 of the 
ILO Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which entered into force 
years prior to the UNDRIP.766 This right is crucial because, in a foreign investment 
                                                 
759 Nicaragua is an example of such national jurisdiction recognizing indigenous rights at a constitutional level. 
Article 5 of the Political Constitution of Nicaragua (1995) stipulates that ‘the state recognizes the existence of 
indigenous peoples, who have rights, duties and guarantees set forth in the Constitution, and especially those of 
maintaining and developing their identity and culture, having their own forms of social organization and 
managing their local affairs, as well as maintaining communal forms of ownership of their lands, and also the use 
and enjoyment of those lands, in accordance with the law. An autonomous regime is established in the 
Constitution for the communities of the Atlantic Coast’. See also L. Burgorgue-Larsen, and A. Úbeda de Torres, 
supra note 44, at 500-501, 503. 
760 J. Crawford, supra note 74, at 209-210. For an exhaustive survey of such protections, see J. Levine, supra 
note 758, at 111. 
761 According to Karen Engle, these negotiations elapsed over a period of two decades of preparatory work. 
Carried under the auspices of the UN Working Group on the Rights of Indigenous Populations, established in 
1982, the negotiations involved indigenous peoples, their representatives (including civil society organizations), 
and states. See K. Engle, ‘On Fragile Architecture: the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
Context of Human Rights’, (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 141, at 143.  
762 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res. 61/295, 13 Sept. 2007 (UNDRIP), 
available at: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014). 
763 One of the first rights recognized, perhaps concomitantly the most pivotal and most controversial, is the right 
to self-determination (Article 3). Innovative provisions include the right not to be subjected to forced 
assimilation (Article 8), and the right to indigenous spirituality (Article 34). See also K. Engle, supra note 761, at 
147-148. 
764 Respectively, Articles 26 and 10, UNDRIP. See also K. Engle, supra note 761, at 146. 
765 Article 32(2), UNDRIP.  
766 ‘1. In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall: (a) consult the peoples concerned, 
through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration 
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context, the consent and approval of the host state may simply be insufficient.767 Also in 
a foreign investment context, the environmental degradation resulting from natural 
resource exploitation could have potentially devastating effects on indigenous peoples’ 
rights including the right to the enjoyment of the communal property of ancestral 
lands.768 
That said, regional human rights instruments such as the Banjul Charter are hailed 
as granting extensive rights to indigenous peoples, such as the right of peoples to ‘freely 
dispose of their wealth and natural resources’. 769 Indigenous peoples increasingly turn to 
regional human rights jurisdictions, not only to assert their rights to their lands, cultures, 
identity, and ultimately their survival, but also to safeguard their natural resources 
rights.770 In fact, the ACHPR and IACtHR have articulated indigenous people’s rights in 
                                                                                                                                                 
is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly; (b) establish means by 
which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors of the population, at all 
levels of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and 
programmes which concern them; (c) establish means for the full development of these peoples’ own institutions 
and initiatives, and in appropriate cases provide the resources necessary for this purpose. 2. The consultations 
carried out in application of this Convention shall be undertaken, in good faith and in a form appropriate to the 
circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures’. See Article 6, 
International Labour Organization (ILO), Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27 June 
1989, C169, online at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ddb6d514.html (last accessed 29 September 2012). 
See K. Sing’Oei, ‘Engaging the Leviathan: National Development, Corporate Globalisation and the Endorois’ 
Quest to Recover their Herding Grounds’, (2011) 18 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 515, at 
520. It is worthy to note that the World Bank does no longer finance projects unless the state has engaged in ‘free, 
prior, and informed consultation’ with potentially affected indigenous communities. See Pasqualucci, supra note 
46, at 87. 
767  The author cites the example of the World Bank’s Operational Directive 4.10, which mandates the 
development of an indigenous peoples’ development plan as a prelude to any investment in land occupied by an 
indigenous group. See K. Sing’Oei, supra note 766, at 537. This was also reflected by the case of Burlington 
Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador where the claimant alleged that protests and threats by indigenous 
communities in opposition of its activities resulted in violations of Ecuador’s BIT obligations. The tribunal did 
not extensively delve into the interplay between foreign investment protection and indigenous rights given that 
the part of the claim that was most relevant to indigenous opposition was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 
Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5), Decision on jurisdiction of 02 
January 2010, at paras 30-34; and Decision on Liability of 14 December 2012. See also J. Levine, supra note 758, 
at 113-114.  
768 G. Alfredsson, supra note 622, at 133; K. Sing’Oei, supra note 766, at 532-533.   
769 The Banjul Charter indivisibly recognizes rights such as the right to ‘personal liberty and protection from 
arbitrary arrest’ (Article 6), the right to ‘freedom of association’ (Article 10), the right of peoples to ‘freely 
dispose of their wealth and natural resources’ (Article 21), as well as the right of peoples to ‘their economic 
development’ (Article 22), and all of which are relevant to indigenous peoples. From a procedural standpoint, it 
has shown innovativeness by unprecedentedly allowing video-testimony, therefore, ‘bringing the voices of an 
oppressed community many miles away to the halls of justice’. However, serious procedural impediments might 
arise that could affect the procedural integrity of the trial such as the impossibility of cross-examining a witness 
whose testimony was already recorded. See Ibid., at 531. 
770 L. Alvarado, ‘Prospects and Challenges in the Implementation of Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in 
International Law: Lessons from the Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua’, (2007) 24 Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 609, at 609, 617. 
172 
 
the context of the degradation caused by oil and gas or mining activities.771 A quick look 
at an example from the case law is merited directly below given that the amici curiae in 
Glamis v. United States and Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador in fact referred to the 
practice of regional human rights jurisdictions on the matter.772 
In the case of CEMIRIDE and MRG on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. 
Kenya, the ACHPR applied the UNDRIP’s Article 26 (‘recognition of indigenous peoples 
right to ancestral lands’), and Article 27 (‘implementation by states of a fair process to 
adjudicate rights pertaining to these lands’) in order to stress the importance of 
indigenous peoples participation as ‘active stakeholders’ in development processes.773 
The ACHPR found that the mining exploitation of red rubies severely affected the 
community’s access to clean drinking water, and that such exploitation should have been 
preceded by prior and informed good faith-consultations, as well as ensuing 
compensation.774 By also relying on the IACtHR’s case law, the ACHPR found that with 
the eviction of the Endorois from the area of Lake Bogoria, and restricting their access to 
the same, Kenya had violated their right to freely dispose of their wealth and natural 
resources (Article 21) 775  as well as their right to development (Article 22). 776  This 
                                                 
771  Indeed, cases at international human rights jurisdictions, including the ACHPR, adjudicating indigenous 
peoples’ rights involved foreign investment activity. Now, this section looks at the inverse; i.e. cases adjudicating 
foreign investors’ rights involving indigenous peoples’ rights. See also L. Alvarado, supra note 770, at 614; K. 
Sing’Oei, supra note 766, at 532-533.   
 772 The amici particularly referred to The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Republic of Nicaragua 
case, supra note 955. See Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, infra note 496; and Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador, 
supra note 141. Indeed, the IACtHR has come up with criteria applicable to the facts of each case allowing it to 
judge on the exploitation of natural resources in indigenous lands. This has meant that the IACtHR has not 
simply and plainly chosen to trump indigenous or human rights over trade, investment, or property rights of 
foreign investors. See Saramaka People v. Suriname, supra note 776. J. Pasqualucci states that ‘the right to 
property under the American Convention is not absolute’, see Pasqualucci, supra note 46, at 82, 84.   
773  The evidence presented by civil society to the ACHPR includes reports that mining activities caused heavy 
pollution to the Wasseges River, an important source of fresh water to the Endorois, due to the heavy metals and 
chemicals used to treat the extracted minerals, which allegedly caused widespread sickness, vomiting, and 
diarrhea. CEMIRIDE and MRG on behalf of EWC v. Kenya case, supra note 608, para. 283. See also K. Sing’Oei, 
supra note 766, at 522. 
774 Ibid., at 534. 
775  The ACHPR was of the view that indigenous peoples have the right to natural resources contained within 
their traditional lands, and therefore the Endorois can claim the protection provided by Article 21. This right is 
not absolute. States benefit from the exception provided under Article 14, which states that: ‘The right to 
property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general 
interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws’. See CEMIRIDE and MRG 
on behalf of EWC v. Kenya case, supra note 608, para 267. 
776 In deciding on this issue, the ACHPR referred to the IACtHR’s landmark decision in Saramaka v. Suriname, 
and applied its three-pronged test on state exploitation of natural resources on indigenous peoples’ ancestral 
lands: ‘that the specific natural resource falls outside the traditional and cultural use of the indigenous 
community; that the exploitation and exploration does not imperil the survival, development and continuation of 
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decision incidentally makes the ACHPR the first international jurisdiction to decide on 
the right to development and its violation.777 
4.4.2 ‘Extracting the sacred’ – Examples of the dilemma of protecting 
indigenous peoples in the wake of investments in extractive industries 
i. Glamis Gold v. United States  
Glamis Gold778 is a NAFTA Chapter XI dispute involving an apparent conflict 
between mining activities conducted by foreign investors and indigenous cultural rights. 
It opposed Glamis, a Canadian mining company and a subsidiary of Goldcorp, a major 
Canadian mining multinational, and the US.  
a. The facts  
Glamis challenged legislation and regulations adopted by California that required, 
inter alia, financially burdensome backfilling of all open pits and recontouring of the land 
following the cessation of mining activities. It alleged that these measures constituted a 
violation of the fair and equitable treatment (Article 1105) and amounted to expropriation 
(Article 1110). The US argued that these measures were intended to: (a) ensure that 
mined lands are returned to a usable condition and pose no danger to public health and 
safety; and (b) provide protection to Native American sacred sites. The Quechan Indian 
Nation, which is a federally recognized tribe in the US, sought to intervene in the dispute 
as amicus curiae. Friends of the Earth, the National Mining Association, and Sierra Club 
and Earthworks also made submissions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
an indigenous groups’ way of life; and where the natural resources are not relevant to traditional livelihoods their 
exploitation within indigenous territories may negatively affect the integrity of and access to other resources that 
are significant to the cultural life and survival of the community’. See Ibid., at 534 citing Saramaka People v. 
Suriname, Judgement of 28 November 2007, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (series C) No. 72 (2007), 
para 120-126. 
777 The ACHPR found that: ‘the right to development is a two-pronged test, that it is both constitutive and 
instrumental, or useful as both a means and an end. A violation of either the procedural or substantive element 
constitutes a violation of the right to development. Fulfilling only one of the two prongs will not satisfy the right 
to development. The African Commission notes the Complainants’ arguments that recognising the right to 
development requires fulfilling five main criteria: it must be equitable, non-discriminatory, participatory, 
accountable, and transparent, with equity and choice as important, over-arching themes in the right to 
development’. Also, the ACHPR cited Article 22 of the Banjul Charter which provides that: ‘1. All peoples shall 
have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity 
and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. 2. States shall have the duty, individually or 
collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development’. See Ibid., para. 277. See also G. Lynch, supra 
note 910, at 26. 
778 Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, infra note 496. 
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b. Amicus allegations and arguments 
The Nation, Friends of the Earth, the Sierra Club and Earthworks submitted three 
separate amicus briefs. The first, and most relevant here, put forward two main arguments 
to the effect that (i) the preservation and protection of indigenous rights in ancestral land 
is an obligation under customary international law which must be observed, by both the 
NAFTA parties and the arbitral tribunal, in accordance with the principle of good faith; 
and (ii) NAFTA investors seeking compensation for an alleged expropriation of property 
cannot rely upon a claim to acquired rights in which no legitimate expectation to enjoy 
such rights existed.779 Indeed, the Nation alleged that Glamis had ample notice of the 
presence of sacred sites in question. It even commissioned its own cultural surveys, 
which confirmed the sacred character of this land; and thereby, cannot possibly claim that 
its legitimate expectations were breached as a result of the US measures. Indeed, the 
Nation asserted that expropriation requires: 
only vested rights, for which a legitimate expectation of the enjoyment of property exists, are 
capable of expropriation, whether direct or indirect. An expectation to enjoy the profits of a 
mining development that endangers or destroys sacred indigenous land controlled by a State — 
where that State is obligated under international law to safeguard that land for the benefit of the 
indigenous peoples — is not per se “reasonable” under international law.780 
It thus contended that Glamis could not possibly claim a legitimate expectation that 
would allow it to, grosso modo, destroy or damage those sites, deny the Nation access to 
them, or prohibit the Nation from engaging in its longstanding cultural, spiritual or 
religious practices related to those sites.  
The Nation then argued that customary international law norms with respect to 
indigenous rights should be held as relevant in the interpretation of NAFTA pursuant to 
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.781 Although acknowledging that a great deal of those 
norms concerning the protection of indigenous peoples and their cultural rights are set 
forth under non-binding declarations, e.g. the UNDRIP, the Nation argued that they may 
nonetheless constitute international practice that contributes to the generation of custom 
which is expressive of international law principles.782 Indeed, in asserting the need to 
                                                 
779 Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, Submission of the Quechan Indian Nation of 16 October 2006.  
780 Ibid., at 10.  
781 See Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, supra note 94.  
782 Ibid., at 2.  
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protect indigenous sacred sites, cultural, and land rights, the Nation namely cited the 
UNDRIP as well as various international instruments such as – inter alia – the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ICCPR, ILO Convention concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples and UNESCO Convention.783 The Nation also referred to the World 
Bank and the International Finance Corporation’s various policies and standards to that 
effect. In addition, it referred to the IACtHR’s practice on the matter.784 The Nation 
posited that NAFTA tribunals are required to settle NAFTA Chapter XI provisions in 
accordance with NAFTA rules and applicable rules of international law.785 Therefore, in 
their interpretation of NAFTA provisions on the fair and equitable treatment (Article 
1105) and expropriation (Article 1110), NAFTA tribunals should give careful 
consideration to other international norms. This would avoid requiring certain host state 
conduct that could conflict with international norms on the protection of indigenous 
peoples in general, and the Quechan Tribe in particular. 
c. The tribunal’s response 
The tribunal did not revisit the amici’s arguments. It did note, however, that the 
Nation had repeatedly raised concerns regarding the potential adverse effects of gold 
mining on the tribe itself, its cultural resources and beliefs (including the network of 
sacred trails running through the project area), wildlife habitats, groundwater and air 
quality.786 Having said that, the tribunal found that California’s various acts and measures 
affecting Glamis were not egregious and shocking, a gross denial of justice, manifest 
arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, 
or a manifest lack of reasons. It asserted that a violation of NAFTA Article 1105 on the 
fair and equitable treatment requires the establishment of host state acts that exhibit a 
high level of shock, arbitrariness, unfairness or discrimination.787 As to the expropriation 
claim under Article 1110, the tribunal undertook an extensive valuation analysis in order 
to assess the impact of the backfilling measures on Glamis’ project and found that a post-
                                                 
783 Articles 18 and 27 of the ICCPR, supra note 93; Article 11, 25 and 26 of the UNDRIP, supra note 762; 
Article 5(d) of the UNESCO Convention, supra note 624; and Article 5 of the ILO Convention concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, supra note 766. 
784 The amici particularly referred to The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Republic of Nicaragua 
case, infra note 955. 
785 Article 1131(1) of NAFTA, supra note 170. 
786 Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, infra note 496, at 48.  
787 Ibid., at 353.  
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backfilling valuation exceeded $20 million. It found that Glamis could not claim that 
those measures had a sufficiently adverse impact on its investments that would amount to 
expropriation and require compensation.788 In sum, the tribunal dismissed the entirety of 
Glamis’ claims.  
ii. Piero Foresti et al. v. South Africa  
The Piero Foresti789 case involved a claim for expropriation by a number of 
Italian foreign investors and a Luxembourg-incorporated entity against the Republic of 
South Africa.790 Both the Italy-South Africa and Belgium Luxembourg Economic Union 
(BLEU) South Africa BITs governed the dispute. The case was eventually discontinued, 
however, it remains nonetheless important in reflecting some of the key issues discussed 
in this research.  
a. The facts  
The claimants 791  alleged that the effects of the ‘affirmative action measures’ 
contained in the South African Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
(MPRAD) and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) objectives of the 
Mining Charter ultimately led to the expropriation of their existing mineral rights and 
their replacement with less valuable rights.792 
b. Amicus allegations and arguments 
                                                 
788 Ibid., at 230. 
789 It is worthy to note nonetheless that the parties agreed that the dispute be governed by the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules as South Africa is not a party to the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Arbitration Rules were 
therefore not applicable. See Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa (ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/07/1), Award of 04 August 2010. 
790  The claim was therefore filed pursuant to both the Italy-South Africa BIT and the Belgo-Luxembourg 
Economic Union-South Africa BIT. The claimants alleged expropriation by the Republic of South Africa through 
the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 on 1 May 2004, which extinguished certain 
putative old order mineral rights allegedly held by the claimants; and secondly, by the coming into effect of the 
MPRDA, when combined with the Mining Charter dated 13 August 2004, which introduced compulsory equity 
divestiture requirements with respect to the claimants’ shares in their operating companies. See Ibid., at para 53.  
791 Although not representing a major multinational mining company, the claimants are a group of individual 
foreign investors who were believed to control – at the time of the dispute – around 80% of South Africa’s stone 
exports. See M. Wells-Sheffer, supra note 206, at 498. 
792 J. Brickhill and M. Du Plessis, supra note 427, at 156. 
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Four civil society organizations sought to intervene as amici curiae, including two 
organizations based in South Africa – the Legal Resources Centre and the Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies.793  
By highlighting the permissibility of ‘special measures’ under international 
human rights law, the amicus petition aimed to emphasize the public importance of the 
MPRDA, the validity of which was being challenged by the claimants, for the following 
over-arching reasons:  
human rights advancement, and in particular the pursuit of substantive equality; sustainable 
development; environmental protection; sound and prudent stewardship of the nation’s natural 
resources; and the need proactively to redress the apartheid history of exploitative labour practices, 
forced land deprivations, and discriminatory ownership policies which previously characterised 
South Africa’s mining sector for decades.794 
More specifically, the amici alleged that the government operates under 
constitutional obligations to bring about the realization of substantive equality in South 
Africa, including through the enactment of the MPRDA.795 They further noted that such 
‘special measures’ solely aimed at securing adequate advancement of certain racial or 
ethnic groups or individuals, i.e. without discrimination, was recognized by international 
treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
– to which South Africa is a contracting party.796 In the same vein, the amici also cited 
references to the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the CEDAW, and the Banjul Charter with respect 
to states’ duties in undertaking affirmative action measures. 797  
The amici posited that human rights law is relevant in determining whether South 
Africa breached its fair and equitable treatment obligation and the expropriation claims 
                                                 
793 The remaining two are renowned organizations: the International Centre for the Protection of Human Rights 
and the Centre for International Environmental Law.  
794 J. Brickhill and M. Du Plessis, supra note 427, at 157. 
795 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa, Petition for Limited Participation as 
Non-Disputing Parties of 17 July 2009, at para 4.6. 
796 Article 1.4 of the Convention states that ‘Special Measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate 
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in 
order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a 
consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be 
continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved’. See  UN General Assembly, 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3940.html (last 
accessed 06 October 2014).  
797 See Article 1(2) of the ICCPR, supra note 93; Article 2 of the ICESCR, supra note 672; Article 4 of the 
CEDAW, supra note 675; and Article 14 of the Banjul Charter, infra note 845.  
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made by the foreign investors. A consideration of South Africa’s legal obligations under 
human rights law – both domestic and international – is directly pertinent to the question 
of whether the regulatory scheme promulgated by the MPRDA may be considered to 
have been enacted arbitrarily, in bad faith, or in a discriminatory fashion – which are 
essential in determining BIT violations.798 Finally, the amici called on the tribunal to 
adopt an ‘interconnected approach’ to international law aimed at avoiding irreconcilable 
conflict between the relevant BITs and South Africa’s constitutional and human rights 
obligations.799 
These arguments were never put to the test as the case was discontinued and an 
actual amicus brief was not submitted. The tribunal’s final award essentially covered the 
issue of costs. The discontinuance of the case is in several ways a source of lament since 
it could have provided a clear example of the interplay between international human 
rights law and international investment law.800  
iii. Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador  
The case of Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador is a highly complex investor-state 
dispute governed by the US-Ecuador BIT.801  
a. The facts  
Chevron’s claims against Ecuador most notably relate to contesting Ecuadorian 
court decisions in the Lago Agrio litigation, and their enforcement, on nearly $18 billion 
of damages to be paid by Texaco (acquired by Chevron, both US-based multinationals) to 
indigenous groups inhabiting the Oriente region in Ecuador, as well as others inhabiting 
the downstream area in Peru. These damages relate to environmental and personal 
injuries that allegedly resulted from Texaco’s exploitation, through a consortium 
involving the Ecuadorian oil state company, of the Lago Agrio site from 1964 to 1992. 
                                                 
798 Ibid., at 4.13. 
799 Ibid., at 4.14-15. 
800 B. Simma, note 196, at 585.  
801 Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador, supra note 141. 
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The case is also heavily influenced by developments in other related cases in front of US, 
Argentine, and Brazilian courts in which decisions on enforcement are still pending.802 
Two civil society organizations, IISD and Fundación Pachamama, jointly 
submitted an amicus curiae brief that was dismissed in light of the early stage of the 
proceedings.803 Various admissibility, jurisdictional, and interim measure awards have 
been rendered to date, however, a final award and settlement of the dispute is still 
pending.804  
b. Amicus allegations and arguments 
The amici started by summarizing some of the key orders sought by the claimants, 
which most notably include a request for the arbitral tribunal to declare that, pursuant to a 
settlement agreement entered into with Ecuador, the claimants have:  
no liability or responsibility for environmental impact, including but not limited to any alleged 
liability for impact to human health, the ecosystem, indigenous cultures, the infrastructure, or any 
liability for unlawful profits, or for performing any further environmental remediation arising out 
of the former Consortium.805 
The amici’s arguments essentially focused on jurisdictional issues and the 
justiciability of the claim. They contended that the claimants’ were seeking interference 
on the part of the arbitral tribunal in the Lago Agrio litigation in front of Ecuadorian 
courts, in which the government of Ecuador was not party to; and to preempt the 
enforcement of any resulting decisions in other jurisdictions.806 The amicus submission 
raised important issues with respect to human rights and indigenous rights that were 
directly linked to Chevron’s claim. By referring to the increasing recognition in 
international law of the need to protect indigenous peoples from the ‘disproportionate 
losses and damages’ caused by oil and gas, mining, and other extractive activities, and 
including some of the landmark IACtHR decisions;807 the amici requested the tribunal to 
                                                 
802 See Jota v. Texaco, supra note 141, at para 156; and Ashanga v. Texaco Inc., infra note 1336. 
803 Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador, Submission of amici of 05 November 2010.  
804 The latest award was rendered in 27 September 2013. For further details on the successive awards rendered to 
date, see the Investment Treaty Arbitration Website Portal, available at: http://www.italaw.com/cases/257 (last 
accessed 06 October 2014).  
805 Ibid., at para 2.1.  
806 Ibid., at para 2.2-2.3. 
807 The amici particularly referred to The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Republic of Nicaragua 
case, infra note 955. 
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respect indigenous groups’ right to access justice in front of Ecuadorian courts, and to 
uphold Ecuador’s duty to fulfill such right by not undermining in the Lago Agrio 
litigation.808 The amici also cited relevant international instruments on the right to access 
justice including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, and the 
IACHR. 809  They referred to the ILO Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples810, and particularly to Article 40 of the UNDRIP which provides that:  
indigenous peoples have the right of access to and to prompt decision through just and fair 
procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes…as well as to effective remedies for all 
infringements of their individual and collective rights.811 
Ecuador would thus be under a clear obligation – both domestic and international – to 
afford its indigenous citizens meaningful avenues to secure remedies and relief for 
violations of their rights. Accordingly, the amici plainly argued that if the Chevron 
tribunal accepted jurisdiction, and affords the claimants the remedies sought, it would be 
effectively removing the rights of indigenous citizens to have their own case heard in 
Ecuador, i.e. accepting jurisdiction would conflict with Ecuador’s domestic and 
international law obligations with respect to the protection of its indigenous citizens.812  
c. The tribunal’s response 
As mentioned, a final award has not been rendered yet where the bulk of 
substantive human rights issues are likely to be addressed in more detail. Again, the 
amici’s brief was not taken into account by the tribunal in its decision on jurisdiction for 
a variety of reasons that were previously discussed. 813  The main premise for such 
dismissal, however, was the fact that the tribunal had been looking into jurisdictional 
issues – which, as will be shown below, is generally understood to be out of the scope of 
amicus curiae involvement.  
                                                 
808 Collective rights of indigenous peoples in Ecuador had only been constitutionally recognized in 1998. Ibid., at 
para 4.8. 
809 Those provisions will be further detailed within the discussion over civil society’s access to justice in Part III 
– Section 2.1. 
810 ILO Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, supra note 766. 
811 Article 40 of the UNDRIP, supra note 762.  
812 Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador, supra note 803, at 4.13, 5.20. 
813 See Part I – Section 3.1 
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5. An appraisal of civil society’s amicus curiae role 
Having looked at a significant number of rules and cases, it is worthy at this stage 
to provide an assessment – from this research’s perspective – on the possible impact civil 
society might have had on investor-state tribunals’ decisions. This impact shall be 
considered from both procedural (Section 5.1) and substantive (Section 5.2) standpoints. 
The aim of this section is thus to explore whether civil society has had any effects on the 
decisions discussed hitherto.  
5.1 Procedural developments: Amicus curiae intervention crystallized 
Part I has shown that international commercial arbitration typically covered 
disputes arising from international relationships of a commercial nature, which include 
investment activities.814 As previously mentioned, concerns regarding the amicus curiae 
procedure often stem from those preoccupied with the consensual nature of arbitration 
and other fundamental principles of international commercial arbitration, which in 
essence could be credited to the receding practice of the diplomatic protection of foreign 
investors, and thus, the de-politicization of investor-state disputes.  
However, the rules and cases examined hitherto show that there exists a relative 
departure from the international commercial arbitration model appearing as a fait 
accompli with (i) the increasing recognition by arbitral tribunals for a shift in procedure 
where the public interest is at stake; (ii) both ICSID and UNCITRAL amending existing, 
or adopting new, arbitration rules; (iii) NAFTA parties setting out new guidelines to 
increase third-party participation and transparency under Chapter XI disputes; and (iv) 
newly negotiated BITs adhering to similar principles. In fact, numerous arbitration 
practitioners have not welcome greater transparency and third party involvement.815 
The Methanex case was the starting point for civil society actors to solicit arbitral 
tribunals in that regard. The IISD, the Communities for a Better Environment and the 
Earth Island Institute had successfully submitted petitions for leave to file amicus curiae 
briefs ‘on the basis of the immense public importance of the case’. The tribunal explicitly 
                                                 
814 See supra note 110. 
815 For an overview, see A. Kawharu, supra note 393, at 281.  
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referred to arguments raised by the amici on the public importance of the case. The 
Methanex tribunal upheld these arguments as it ultimately acknowledged its authority to 
accept amicus curiae submissions. This triggered NAFTA parties to issue the FTC 
Statement notwithstanding their apparent reluctance to amend Chapter XI. The Statement 
is considered as compelling guidance as shown by the Glamis tribunal as well as 
others.816 The acceptance by Methanex of the amicus curiae practice is clearly portrayed 
as a procedural novelty. 817  Resorting to similar arguments in the case of Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v Argentina,818 civil society actors succeeded in 
convincing ICSID tribunals to accept amicus curiae submissions prior to the amendment 
of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Civil society actors should be credited to a large extent 
for the acceptance of the amicus curiae procedure. It has allowed third parties such as the 
Quechan Indian Nation to make its voice heard.819 Without the amicus procedure, the 
Nation would not have had any access to the Glamis tribunal.820  
That said, the acceptance of amici curiae does not amount to the recognition of 
any third party right. Rather, it is a matter of procedural discretion. This was once more 
confirmed recently in the highly sensitive Philip Morris v. Uruguay arbitration. While 
accepting the submission of an amicus brief by the Pan American Health Organization, 
the tribunal emphasized that ‘the need to safeguard the integrity of the arbitral process 
requires in fact that no procedural rights or privileges of any kind be granted to the non-
disputing parties’.821  
Moreover, investor-state tribunals do not shy away from rejecting amicus curiae 
petitions based on their procedural discretion – even if there is a close nexus between the 
subject matter of a dispute and public interest and/or human rights issues. The previously 
                                                 
816  Following the Glamis arbitration, the Merrill & Ring tribunal accepted amicus submissions by 
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, the United Steelworkers, and the British 
Columbia Federation of Labour without much controversy. Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Government of 
Canada, supra note 135, at paras 22, 50. 
817 A. Van Duzer, supra note 171, at 685.  
818 Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 544. 
819 Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, supra note 496. 
820 E. De Brabandere, infra note 852, at 105. 
821 The tribunal stated that ‘under the terms of Rule 37(2), the Tribunal has discretion whether to accept a written 
submission by a non-disputing party. Acceptance of a submission shall confer to the petitioner neither the status 
of a party to the arbitration proceeding nor the right to access the file of the case or to attend hearings. The need 
to safeguard the integrity of the arbitral process requires in fact that no procedural rights or privileges of any kind 
be granted to the non-disputing parties’. See Philip Morris v. Uruguay, Procedural Order No. 4 of 24 March 
2015, at para 24 (our emphasis).  
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discussed Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe decision.822 The more recent Bernhard von 
Pezold v. Republic of Zimbabwe decision clearly manifest this.823 Although the tribunal in 
this last case did recognize that proceedings may well have an impact on the interests of 
indigenous communities, it dismissed an amicus petition made by the European Center 
for Constitutional and Human Rights as well as four Zimbabwean indigenous 
communities citing doubts over the petitioners’ independence and neutrality vis-à-vis 
Zimbabwe.824 As previously mentioned, petitioners’ independence and neutrality is a sine 
qua non condition under Article 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 825 The fulfilment 
of such condition is subject to tribunals’ assessment and appraisal of civil society 
petitioners. The tribunal’s rejection in Bernhard von Pezold v. Republic of Zimbabwe 
sheds light on a recurring and fundamental point for the purposes of this research, i.e. the 
adequacy of civil society participation as amicus curiae heavily depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each case. In this light, and as previously mentioned, investor-state 
tribunals do not, and should not, shy away from determining the adequacy of amicus 
petitions and dismissing them if need be.826  
5.2  ‘Mixed results’ – Do investor-state tribunals consider amici’s substantive 
arguments? 
Notwithstanding the procedural developments mentioned above, numerous 
commentators doubt the substantive impact of amicus curiae submissions on arbitral 
                                                 
822 Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A et. al. v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 555. 
823 Bernhard von Pezold and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15), Procedural Order 
No. 2 of 26 June 2012.  
824 Those were the: Chikukwa, Ngorima, Chinyai and Nyaruwa peoples who inhabit the region of Chimanimani, 
in South-Eastern Zimbabwe, on which the claimant’s properties are located. Ibid., at para 18, 62.  
825 See also Article 37(2), ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 411. 
826 More recently, although not related to an amicus submissions by civil society, the tribunal in Apotex v. the 
United States dismissed two amicus petitions submitted by (i) an individual – Mr. Barry Appleton, which was 
denied in part because Mr. Appleton was vested in a ‘particular and professional interest and not a “public 
interest” affecting him personally’; as well as (ii) the Study Center for Sustainable Finance, which was 
essentially denied because ‘the Tribunal considers that while BNM seems to have a general interest in the 
Tribunal adopting interpretations of NAFTA that support its apparent interest in narrowing the scope of drug 
manufacturers’ intellectual property protection, BNM has not demonstrated its significant interest’; see Apotex v. 
the United States, supra note 56, at 43-44 and note 59, at 33, 37 respectively. Another tribunal adjudicating the 
same dispute in parallel proceedings under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules had come to the same conclusion, 
see Apotex Inc. v. the United States, Procedural Order No.2 On the Participation of a Non-Disputing Party of 11 
October 2011. In both cases the tribunal found that the amicus submissions would unduly burden the proceedings 
and prejudice the disputing parties.  
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tribunals’ final awards. It is indeed argued that the extent to which amicus submission has 
influenced, or even may influence, arbitral tribunals’ final awards is not clear.827 In a 
similar vein, others argue that arbitral tribunals rarely quote or refer to amici’s legal 
arguments, and thereby their overall relevance might be put into question.828  This is 
perhaps reflected in UPS v. Canada, where aside from one descriptive paragraph, the 
substantive issues raised by the amicus curiae briefs were not addressed in the tribunal’s 
final award.829 A look back below at some of the other key decisions mentioned in this 
Part I is thus merited to put these arguments to the test.   
In Methanex v. the United States, the tribunal did not revisit procedural aspects 
nor summarize the content of the amici’s submission but noted the IISD’s arguments 
against Methanex’s contention that ‘trade law approaches can simply be transferred to 
investment law’. Methanex had also argued that there was no valid environmental, health, 
or safety justification for the MTBE ban and that it aimed at protecting and promoting 
‘local interests’ in a protectionist manner to the disadvantage of ‘foreign competitors’.830 
In addition, the tribunal emphasized the validity of the legitimate exercise of sovereignty 
as a host state defence against foreign investors’ claims, i.e. it found that government 
measures (i) aimed at ensuring a public purpose; (ii) that are non-discriminatory; and (iii) 
enacted ‘in accordance with due process’, are in principle not deemed as expropriatory 
and compensable – which is a finding that was in line with the IISD’s amicus curiae 
arguments.831 Ultimately, Methanex’s claim was rejected and the decision was hailed by 
civil society organizations such as the IISD.832 
In Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v Argentina, the amici’s 
arguments did not seem to alter the tribunal’s position in terms of determining 
Argentina’s liability towards the claimants. It relied on the criteria set forth by Article 25 
                                                 
827 F. Francioni, infra note 847, at 741. 
828 A. Moore, infra note 1040, at 269; See also T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 404; N. Blackaby and C. Richard, 
‘Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for Legitimacy in Investment Arbitration’, in M. Waibel et al. (eds), The Backlash 
against Investment Arbitration, at 270; J. Maupin, supra note 48, at 29.  
829 United Parcel Service v Canada , supra note 515. See also T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 406. 
830 Methanex Corporation v. United States (Final award on jurisdiction and merits of 03 August 2005), at 13. 
831 See also A. Martinez, supra note 181, at 331. 
832  H. Mann, ‘The Final Decision in Methanex v United States: Some New Wine in Some New Bottles’, 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, August 2005, available at: 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/commentary_methanex.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014).  
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of the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts833, 
indicating that ‘the severity of a crisis, no matter the degree, is not sufficient to allow a 
plea of necessity to relieve a state of its treaty obligations.’834 Ultimately, it did not 
consider that Argentina expropriated the claimants’ investments, nor did Argentina 
violate the claimants’ right to full protection and security. It did however find that they 
were not afforded fair and equitable treatment. A decision on quantum is still not public; 
therefore, it remains to be seen whether amicus arguments might have been further 
considered.  
In Glamis Gold v. the United States, the Quechan Indian Nation, Friends of the 
Earth, the National Mining Association, and Sierra Club and Earthworks made amicus 
submissions.835 The tribunal acknowledged but did not address human rights arguments 
that were particularly raised by the Quechan Indian Nation. The tribunal focused on 
factual issues and California’s treatment of Glamis Gold. It nonetheless concluded the 
case by denying Glamis Gold’s claims under both NAFTA Articles 1110 on 
expropriation and 1105 on the fair and equitable treatment. 
Perhaps the case where civil society actors seemed to have caused most impact is 
the Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania case. 836  This is paradoxical given that, as mentioned 
previously, the amici particularly lamented not having had access to the arbitral record; 
and therefore, claimed they could not adequately scrutinize the arguments or facts alleged 
by the parties. While citing the Methanex precedent, the tribunal acknowledged the wider 
public interest that is relevant to the dispute in the following terms: ‘this arbitration raises 
a number of issues of concern to the wider community in Tanzania’.837 As mentioned 
above, the tribunal extensively summarized the amici’s contentions with respect to the 
human right to water, and noted that Biwater Gauff explicitly acknowledged such right 
prior to the dispute. It also mentioned the target set by the Millennium Development 
                                                 
833 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ 
(November 2001), available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (last 
accessed 01 September 2013) (‘ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’).  
834 See Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 544, at para 249, 259. 
835 Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, supra note 496. 
836 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania, supra note 741. 
837 Ibid., at para 358. 
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Goals to reduce by half the number of people without access to potable water. 838  It 
ultimately found that Tanzania had indeed expropriated Biwater Gauff’s investment, and 
therefore violated the United Kingdom-Tanzania BIT. However, it considered that the 
claimant failed in sustaining any of its claims for damages.839  
In Piero Foresti et. al v. South Africa, the South African Legal Resources Centre 
and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies’ – acting amongst others as amicus 
petitioners840 – presented quite extensive and robust arguments on South Africa’s human 
rights obligations in implementing, inter alia, affirmative action measures aimed at 
promoting the economic welfare of African-descendant citizens that were being contested 
by the claimants. The Piero Foresti tribunal was the first ICSID tribunal to have partially 
accepted the amicus petitioners’ request to access certain case materials – which were 
then redacted by the disputing parties. 841  However, the case was discontinued. It is 
therefore not possible to draw any conclusions on civil society’s impact in this particular 
case.  
In sum, while looking back at the arguments raised by civil society, it 
undoubtedly appears that civil society benefited from a unique opportunity as amicus 
curiae to raise a plethora of environmental protection and human rights arguments in 
front of investor-state tribunals. However, although it appears as a seemingly a limited 
one, it is difficult to accurately assess the degree of influence these arguments might have 
had on investor-state tribunals’ final awards. What is clear is that investor-state tribunals 
focus on the respective parties’ arguments in great detail and that the same cannot be said 
about amicus arguments, which is in line with the limited role of amici as non parties. 
More fundamentally, for the purposes of this research, it is also clear that investor-state 
tribunals have systematically asserted that amici curiae are not additional parties to 
disputes. This is a fundamental limitation that merits further elaboration in Part III.  
                                                 
838 ‘BGT itself has acknowledged the existence and importance of this right, stating that “every man, woman and 
child has the right to reliable system of clean water and good sanitation” (the tribunal had cited material from the 
company’s website). See Ibid., at para 379.  
839 Ibid., at para 812. 
840 The remaining two other petitioners are renowned organizations: the International Centre for the Protection of 
Human Rights and the Centre for International Environmental Law.  
841 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa, supra note 575. See also J. Brickhill and 
M. Du Plessis, supra note 427, at 160. 
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6. Concluding remarks  
Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, civil society may have the 
capacity to act as amicus curiae in front of investor-state tribunals. This position is no 
longer in doubt and seems to be confirmed not only by arbitral precedents, but also 
through the amendment of the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the adoption of the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, as well as under several recently signed BITs. This 
is a benchmark position, a no-turning-back point. Indeed, this is well-reflected in 
Francioni’s argument to the effect that:  
… amicus curiae participation has become and will remain in the foreseeable future an important 
feature of the administration of justice in the field of foreign investment.842  
The background to this procedural development is arguably substantive. It comes 
as a recognition that the subject matter of investor-state arbitration could potentially (i) 
affect the public’s broader interest; and, in some cases, (ii) closely relate to 
environmental protection, public health, human rights or other public policy issues that 
could affect the direct interests of certain communities or groups who are third parties to 
arbitration proceedings. Indeed, the adjudication of host state responsibility vis-à-vis 
foreign investors has, in numerous cases, required tribunals to apprehend facts and norms 
that relate to ‘non-investment concerns’ such as sustainable development or the human 
right to access water. These inherently transcend the narrow scope of the law on foreign 
investment protection, which enticed tribunals wary of getting a complete understanding 
of the subject matter to accept ‘assistance’ in this respect from third parties.   
As opposed to international human rights jurisdictions where civil society is 
entitled to adopt three different procedural roles, i.e. that of a victim/claimant, a 
representative of victims of human rights violations, or an amicus curiae in on-going 
proceedings; its role in investor-state disputes has been until now solely confined to the 
status of an amicus curiae, i.e. that of an ‘assistant’. This role entails procedural functions 
that are far less extensive from those of a party to the dispute. Indeed, a salient and 
recurring feature of this procedure is that its sole and unique purpose is the assistance of 
the tribunal by bringing arguments, perspectives, and expertise other than those of the 
                                                 
842 F. Francioni, infra note 847, at 740. 
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disputing parties. More fundamentally, amici curiae – whether represented by civil 
society actors or not – do not benefit from the right to take part in proceedings, or in 
other words, the right to be heard by investor-state tribunals. They cannot act as litigants. 
In other words, they cannot challenge arguments or evidence put forward by disputing 
parties. This constitutes a limited access to justice that has nevertheless allowed civil 
society organizations to raise factual and legal arguments aimed at advancing 
environmental and human rights issues and ultimately influencing arbitral tribunals’ 
interpretation of international investment law – even if the degree of such influence 
remains unclear.  
Having said that, BITs are construed in a manner that solely provides foreign 
investors the right to file claims against host states. There is no opportunity really for 
civil society actors to access arbitral tribunals other than via the amicus curiae procedure 
under the current regime. Against this background, it is now merited to shift onto Part II, 
which considers the procedural modalities that may be available to civil society before 
other jurisdictions. Part III then questions whether civil society could benefit from other 
procedural avenues that would allow it to enhance its participation before investor-state 
tribunals.  
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PART II: THE FUNCTION AND MODALITIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
PARTICIPATION BEFORE OTHER JURISDICTIONS: FOUR MODELS 
Introductory remarks 
Part II provides a comparative analysis of the role of civil society in international 
adjudication. It looks at the procedural rules and practice of a number of international 
forums and jurisdictions allowing for the access of civil society. Attention is particularly 
given to the ICJ, the WTO dispute settlement system, and the following international 
human rights jurisdictions: the ECtHR, IACtHR (and the Commission), and ACHPR.  
Unlike the ICJ and the WTO dispute settlement system, which are limited by a 
solely inter-state procedure, the ECtHR, IACtHR, and ACHPR grant access to any 
person in general, and open their doors de facto to civil society organizations. Article 44 
of the IACHR843 and Article 34 of the ECHR844 specifically entitle ‘any person’ to file a 
complaint to the Inter-American Commission or an application to the ECtHR against a 
state-party to the treaty in question. As for the Banjul Charter, Article 55 separates 
communications into two categories, those emanating from states parties to the Charter 
and those who are made by ‘other than those of States parties to the present Charter’.845  
A closer understanding of the rules governing civil society’s access is necessary. 
The main question to be addressed here is what are the modalities for civil society’s 
access to justice in front of each of those jurisdictions. The aim of Part II is to look at 
those rules governing civil society access in general, and the regulation of third party 
                                                 
843 Article 44 states that: ‘Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in 
one or more member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing 
denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party’. See American Convention on 
Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S.123, entered into force 18 July 1978 (the ‘IACHR’). 
844 Article 34 states that: ‘The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation 
or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the 
rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder 
in any way the effective exercise of this right’. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (the ‘ECHR’), entry into force 04 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
845 Article 55 states that: ‘1. Before each Session, the Secretary of the Commission shall make a list of the 
communications other than those of States parties to the present Charter and transmit them to the members of the 
Commission, who shall indicate which communications should be considered by the Commission’. See 
Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the ‘Banjul Charter’), entry into 
force 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
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intervention in particular, in order to better understand civil society’s petitions for third 
party intervention in investor-state proceedings and place them into perspective – as will 
be further elaborated in Part III.  
At the heart of this discussion is the principle of access to justice.846 In essence, 
access to justice847 entails a right to initiate, or take part in, proceedings.848 Civil society’s 
access to international justice falls under four different roles: that of indirect participation, 
which solely concerns the ICJ (Section 1), standing as a victim/claimant (Section 2), a 
representative of victims of human rights violations (Section 3), or amicus curiae in on-
going proceedings (Section 4). The last, and most relevant, category of procedural 
modalities is third party intervention, which is incidentally unavailable to civil society in 
international jurisdictions but is available to civil society before domestic jurisdictions 
such as US and Canadian courts (Section 5).  
1. Absent, but not entirely: Indirect participation at the ICJ  
The ICJ plays a central role in the application and interpretation of international 
law.849 It was established for the purposes of resolving disputes amongst states pursuant 
to Articles 93 and 94 of the UN Charter. It has a contentious function and an advisory one. 
The ICJ’s Statute and the Rules of Court do not envisage a role for persons in general, 
including individuals, civil society, or corporations, as is the case in international human 
rights jurisdictions for instance. 850  The main reason for such absence lies in the 
quintessentially inter-state nature of proceedings at the ICJ. This applies to both 
contentious and advisory proceedings. The aim of this section is to consider whether civil 
                                                 
846 This principle will be extensively discussed at a later stage of this research in Part III – Section 2.1. 
847 Francioni defines access to justice as: ‘the individual’s right to obtain the protection of the law and the 
availability of legal remedies before a court or other equivalent mechanism of judicial or quasi-judicial 
protection’. See F. Francioni, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law’, (2009) 20 
European Journal of International Law 729, at 729. 
848 T. Meron, The Humanization of International Law (2006), at 318. 
849 While referring to the ICJ’s formulation of the ‘effective control’ test for the attribution of state conduct, 
particularly in light of its judgement in the Bosnian Genocide case, Crawford opines that ‘despite the lack of 
formal hierarchy between international courts and tribunals, the pronouncements of the [ICJ], the only permanent 
tribunal of general jurisdiction, carry particular weight’. See J. Crawford, supra note 74, at 291; Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia 
and Montenegro), Judgement of 26 February 2007; ICJ Rep. 1997, at para 399 (the ‘Bosnian Genocide’ case). 
850 E. Valencia-Ospina, ‘Non-Governmental Organizations and the ICJ’, in Treves, T., et al. (eds.), Civil Society, 
International Courts, and Compliance Bodies (2005), at 227. See also P. Sands and R. Mackenzie, supra note 55, 
at para 6. 
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society has had any participation at ICJ contentious (Section 2.1) or advisory proceedings 
(Section 2.2), and whether it may have a potential for broader participation therein.  
1.1 Contentious proceedings  
Contentious proceedings are solely accessible to states. Article 34 of the ICJ’ 
Statute provides that:  
1. Only states may be parties in cases before the Court. 
2. The Court, subject to and in conformity with its Rules, may request of public international 
organizations information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such information presented 
by such organizations on their own initiative…851 
Is it plausible to consider that article 34(2) paves the way for civil society 
organizations to file amicus curiae briefs if they are considered as ‘public international 
organizations’? The prevalent understanding is that this category only includes 
‘international organizations of states’ as defined by article 69(4) of the Rules of Court.852 
In the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 Case for instance, the ICJ invited the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to provide certain information regarding ICAO 
council proceedings. 853 It seems clear that article 34 of the ICJ’s Statute does not open 
the door to civil society in contentious proceedings. 854  The Court has previously 
confirmed this position in the Asylum Case by rejecting a petition of the International 
League for the Rights of Man – an NGO with consultative status at the ECOSOC – for it 
to be considered as a ‘public international organization’ in the sense of article 34(2) of 
the Statute.855  
                                                 
851 Article 34, ICJ Statute, supra note 94. 
852 Article 69(4) states that: ‘In the foregoing paragraph, the term “public international organization” denotes an 
international organization of States.’ See ICJ Rules of Court, entered into force 01 July 1978. See also E. De 
Brabandere, ‘NGOs and the “Public Interest”: the Legality and Rationale for Amicus Curiae Interventions in 
International Economic and Investment Disputes’, (2011) 12 Chicago Journal of International Law 85, at 92. 
853 Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988, Iran v United States, [1996] ICJ Rep 9, ICGJ 93. Similar invitations were 
made in: Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), Judgment (Provisional measures) of 26 May 1959, 
ICJ Rep. 1959; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Judgment (Preliminary Objections), 
ICJ Rep. 1988; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Judgment (Preliminary 
Objections) of 27 February 1998, ICJ Rep. 1998. See also P. Sands and R. Mackenzie, supra note 55, at para 6. 
854 P. Sands and R. Mackenzie, supra note 55, at para 6. 
855 See Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgements of 20 and 27 November 1950, [1950] ICJ Reports, Vol II, 
Part IV Correspondence, at 228. And see also, E. Valencia-Ospina, ‘Non-Governmental Organizations and the 
ICJ’, in Treves, T., et al. (eds.), Civil Society, International Courts, and Compliance Bodies (2005), at 228. 
192 
 
It is precisely in this light that investor-state tribunals could not refer to the ICJ’s 
practice for potential guidance or precedents with regards to allowing access to third 
parties in general, and civil society organizations in particular. Indeed, in the UPS v. 
Canada case, the tribunal noted that:  
it is true that in contentious cases in the International Court of Justice only states and in certain 
circumstances public international organisations may have access to the Court (the latter only to 
provide information relevant to cases before it). However, that limit appears to result directly from 
the wording of Articles 34, 35 and 61-64 of the Statute of the Court which carefully regulate those 
matters as well as from the practice under them extending over several decades.856  
The UPS tribunal highlighted the stark contrast between the ICJ’s strictly inter-state 
dispute settlement process with the one contemplated under NAFTA Chapter XI, which 
involves private persons (NAFTA investors) acting as claimants against states (NAFTA 
parties). This fundamental difference allowed the tribunal to part with ICJ practice, and 
ultimately accept amicus intervention by two civil society organizations – the Canadian 
Union of Postal Workers and the Council of Canadians.  
 Finally, some question whether article 50 of the ICJ Statute could be ‘mooted as a 
possible vehicle for amicus curiae participation in contentious cases upon the initiative of 
the Court’.857 The article provides that ‘the Court may, at any time, entrust any individual, 
body, bureau, commission, or other organization that it may select, with the task of 
carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion’.858 That said, article 50 has not yet 
been utilized for such purpose.  
1.2 Advisory proceedings  
The same principles apply to advisory proceedings. No express provision on 
amicus curiae participation exists.859 Yet, article 66(2) of the ICJ Statute states that:  
The Registrar shall also, by means of a special and direct communication, notify any state entitled 
to appear before the Court or international organization considered by the Court, or, should it not 
be sitting, by the President, as likely to be able to furnish information on the question.860 
                                                 
856 UPS v. Canada, infra note 517, para 64. 
857 See P. Sands and R. Mackenzie, supra note 55, at para 6. 
858 Article 50, ICJ Statute, supra note 94.  
859 See P. Sands and R. Mackenzie, supra note 55, at para 7. 
860 Article 66, ICJ Statute, supra note 94. (our emphasis).  
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The term used is ‘international organization’ as opposed to ‘public international 
organization’ as in Article 34(2) of the Statute. The difference in wording has indeed 
caused ambiguity.861  
In practice, the ICJ has for instance solicited information from ICAO, which is 
clearly an inter-state international organization.862 The ICJ has only once accepted to 
receive a written submission by a civil society organization, the International League of 
the Rights of Man, in the International Status of South-West Africa advisory opinion.863 
As mentioned above, the ICJ did not consider the League to be a ‘public international 
organization’ in the Asylum Case, and this meant that the ICJ had shown flexibility by 
opening a window for non-state actors in its advisory proceedings.864 The ICJ has in fact 
accepted submissions by other non-state actors. 865  Could the ICJ’s acceptance of 
submissions by non-state actors be considered as a sign of flexibility in advisory 
proceedings? There are no clear indications that could reinforce such a contention at the 
moment. The ICJ has been, in any event, adopting a limited approach to amici curiae in 
general, even when filed by states.866 It does not indeed object to amicus briefs so long as 
they are appended to the disputing parties’ submissions. 867  
Conscious of the challenge posed by unsolicited amicus submissions, the ICJ has 
nevertheless clarified its position on unsolicited submissions in advisory proceedings 
through the adoption of Practice Direction XII in 2004. The Direction reads as follows:  
                                                 
861 E. Valencia-Ospina, supra note 850, at 230. 
862 See Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Observations of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization of 4 December 1992, [1989]. 
863 The League did not however submit its statement to the Court within the prescribed time limit. See South-
West Africa Cases; Advisory Opinion Concerning the International Status, Judgment of 11 July 1950, [1950] ICJ 
Reports, at 130.  
864 E. Valencia-Ospina, supra note 850, at 230. 
865  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Order of 19 
December 2003, [2003] ICJ Reports, at 429; and Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Order of 17 October 2008, [2008] ICJ Reports, at 409-410. 
See also E. De Brabandere, supra note 852, at 91. Although both Palestine and Kosovo are now widely 
recognized as states. See also J. Crawford, supra note 74, at 196-200.  
866 It is even argued that the ICJ should be more open to amicus submissions by states as an alternative to the 
more burdensome third state intervention. See in general P. Palchetti, infra note 1153 and the discussion on third 
state intervention at the ICJ under Part II – Section 4.2.1. 
867 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v. Slovakia, infra note 875. See also A. Von Bogdandy and I. 
Venzke, supra note 162, at 62. 
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1. Where an international non-governmental organization submits a written statement and/or 
document in an advisory opinion case on its own initiative, such statement and/or document is not 
to be considered as part of the case file. 
2. Such statements and/or documents shall be treated as publications readily available and may 
accordingly be referred to by States and intergovernmental organizations presenting written and 
oral statements in the case in the same manner as publications in the public domain. 
3. Written statements and/or documents submitted by international non-governmental 
organizations will be placed in a designated location in the Peace Palace…868 
Prior to its adoption, the ICJ Registrar had placed the numerous documents and 
statements it received from NGOs and other civil society organizations in the wake of the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion at the Court’s library 
without considering them as amicus curiae submissions. 869  Practice Direction XII 
confirms this practice and reasserts the Registrar’s position for not considering 
unsolicited information or briefs as amicus curiae submissions.  
Against this backdrop, the ICJ’s acceptance of submissions by non-state actors in a 
limited number of advisory proceedings and the adoption of Practice Direction XII are 
indeed noteworthy. However, the practice of the Court still does not show any signs of a 
material change. Access to non-state actors in general, and to civil society in particular is 
significantly restrictive. It is generally understood, as a consequence, that civil society 
organizations including NGOs have had little impact on the Court’s proceedings to 
date.870 The prevalent view is that the ICJ remains committed to its strictly inter-state 
character both under its contentious and advisory functions.871 The ICJ’s commitment to 
its inter-state dispute settlement process is well-reflected in Judge Guillaume’s widely 
quoted words in The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion:  
… I dare to hope that Governments and inter-governmental institutions still retain sufficient 
independence of decision to resist the powerful pressure groups which besiege them today with 
the support of the mass media.872 
That said, the ICJ also acknowledges the existence of wider common concerns and 
interests, which – although not explicitly mentioned by the ICJ – de facto transcend states 
                                                 
868 Practice Direction XII, International Court of Justice.  
869 E. Valencia-Ospina, supra note 850, at 231. 
870 D. Shelton, ‘The International Court of Justice and Non-Governmental Organizations’, (2007) 9 International 
Community Law Review 139, at 143.   
871 Ibid., at 232. 
872 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume), 
[1996] ICJ Reports 66, at 287.  
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as they relate to each individual member of society as a whole.873 This is echoed in the 
ICJ’s position on the environment in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons opinion when it stated that ‘the environment is not an abstraction but represents 
a living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including 
generations unborn’. 874  In the same vein, in his separate opinion in the 
Gabcikovo/Nagymaros case, Judge Weeramantry stated that:  
… we have entered an era of international law in which international law subserves not only the 
interests of individual States, but looks beyond them and their parochial concerns to the greater 
interests of humanity and planetary welfare … International environmental law will need to 
proceed beyond weighing the rights and obligations of parties within a closed compartment of 
individual State self-interest, unrelated to the global concerns of humanity as a whole.875 
Whilst Judge Guillaume’s remarks explicitly signal a concern to safeguard the ICJ’s 
inter-state ethos, Judge Weeramantry comes as a refreshing reminder that contemporary 
international law transcends inter-state interests.876 A closer look subsequently below at 
WTO case law, where civil society actors sought to promote environmental protection, 
echoes Judge Weeramantry’s remarks that international law cannot be ‘unrelated to the 
global concerns of humanity as a whole’.877  
2. Standing for civil society – A look at international human rights jurisdictions  
Civil society acts as a directly affected applicant in cases where it has been itself 
the victim of a human rights violation. In such cases, international human rights 
jurisdictions afford civil society, as they do to ‘any person’, standing as a disputing party. 
There are indeed two ways through which civil society may be afforded standing before 
international human rights jurisdictions. In the event a civil society organization is (a) a 
victim of a human rights violation and (b) a representative of victims of human rights 
violations.878  
                                                 
873 D. Shelton, supra note 400, at 34.  
874 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Reports 66, at para 29. See 
also Ibid., at 34. 
875 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v. Slovakia, Judgement, Merits (Separate Opinion of Vice-President 
Weeramantry), [1997] ICJ Rep 88, at 115. See also Ibid., at 33.  
876 See also Ibid., at 33.  
877 See Part II – Section 3.2. 
878 As will be shown, the representation of victims is still not permissible – in principle – before the ECtHR.  
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Access to justice to civil society at international human rights jurisdictions is 
guaranteed by virtue of relevant treaties and conventions. 879 This reflects the increasing 
recognition of the individual as a subject of international law, and the underlying 
emphasis of international law on the protection of individuals’ human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.880 It is argued against this backdrop that ‘the key participant in 
each international community is the individual … the individual is the true basic unit for 
the international system’. 881  This fits within a broader scheme of progressive 
development of international human rights law – as explained by Francioni:  
The progressive development of international human rights law has endowed every person with 
the abstract capacity to invoke international law, customary law, and treaty law against a state, 
including the national state, which is responsible for an abusive exercise of its governmental 
powers.882  
As will be shown in Part III, civil society petitioners requested ‘standing’ in 
investor-state proceedings as ‘third party intervenors’. Unlike international human rights 
conventions such as the ECHR, IIAs or BITs do not enunciate any procedural rights with 
respect to persons other than foreign investors and contracting states, let alone third 
parties – this difference is essential in understanding the limited procedural modalities 
that may be available to civil society before investor-state tribunals.  
2.1 Civil society as a victim of human rights violations before the ECtHR  
The European human rights system is portrayed as ‘the most effective 
international system of human rights protection ever developed’.883 The direct access of 
individuals to the ECtHR was not granted upon the implementation of the ECHR in 1950. 
It was rather acquired progressively through numerous amendments and developments. 
                                                 
879 See Hitoshi Mayer’s empirical survey of NGO involvement in international human rights jurisdictions. See L. 
Hitoshi Mayer, infra note 911. 
880  On the increasing importance of human rights, see V. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 118, at 248.  
881 S. Charnovitz, supra note 36, at 910. For further analysis on the impact of the position of individuals, and 
ultimately individualism, on international law, see also M. Majlessi, supra note 110, at 80-81. 
882 F. Francioni, ‘The Rights of Access to Justice under Customary International Law’, in F. Francioni (ed.), 
Access to Justice as a Human Right (2007), at 6-7 (our emphasis).  
883 Citing judge Wildhaber, former president of the ECtHR, in D. Popović, The Emergence of the European 
Human Rights Law (2011), at 15. It is particularly crucial in granting access to international justice to individuals 
where the credibility of domestic justice may be questioned. For instance, up to 2010, there were 34,000 pending 
applications at the ECtHR against the Russian Federation. Figures are provided up to 31 March 2010, and 
represented 27.7% of the backlog of applications at the ECtHR. See K. Koroteev, ‘Approches nationales: Russie’, 
in P. Dorneau-Josette, and E. Lambert Abdelgawad (eds.), Quel filtrage des requêtes par la Cour européenne des 
droits de l’homme? (2011), at 471.  
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Initially, individuals and civil society organizations did not have direct access; it was only 
the European Commission of Human Rights or a state-party that could submit cases to 
the ECtHR.884 Admitting the victims’ attorneys to the proceedings modified this practice, 
victims were later allowed to sit with the European Commission of Human Rights; they 
were then allowed to file written statements, and finally, they were permitted to directly 
address the ECtHR subsequent to the entry into force of Protocol 11 in 1998 and Article 
34.885  
2.1.1 Standing as a redress for violations of ECHR rights 
Article 34 is the bedrock of standing under the ECHR. It opens the door to ‘any 
person’ to stand before the ECtHR in the following terms:  
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the 
rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake 
not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.886 
The article forms the basis on which individuals or ‘any person’, including civil 
society organizations, may file claims against states for violations of the rights 
guaranteed to them under the ECHR. As is clear from the drafting of Article 34, it sets 
out both a ratione personae and sine qua non condition in relation to the status of a 
‘victim’; i.e. solely victims may submit claims to the ECtHR.887 This would typically 
mean that actiones populares are excluded from the scope of Article 34.888 That said, 
there is a need to consider the extent to which Article 34 may or may not close the door 
in front of the representation of victims by civil society organizations that are not 
themselves victims per se. A first look at how Article 34 is applied by the ECtHR’s case 
law is thus merited, which will be followed by a consideration of whether the ECtHR 
may be opening the door for such representation in practice.  
                                                 
884 T. Meron, supra note 846, at 339-340. 
885 Ibid., at 339-340. 
886 ECHR, supra note 844. 
887 Conka and others v. Belgium, Decision on admissibility of 13 Mars 2001, [2001] ECtHR (51564/99), at 11. 
888  M. Frigessi di Rattalma, ‘NGOs before the European Court of Human Rights: Beyond Amicus Curiae 
Participation?’, in Treves, T., et al. (eds.), Civil Society, International Courts, and Compliance Bodies (2005), at 
57; N. Vajic, supra note 36, at 94. 
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2.1.2 Representation on the basis of rights and not interests – Examples from 
the case law 
The landmark case of Association Ekin v. France illustrates a situation where 
civil society acts in international adjudication as a ‘victim’ pursuant to Article 34.889 Ekin 
sought redress for violations of its own right to freedom of expression under the 
ECHR.890 Ekin published a book entitled ‘Euskadi at War’891 which was censored and 
prohibited from circulation by French authorities. They portrayed Ekin as a porte-parole 
for ETA,892 thus as an association supporting terrorism.893 As per the requirements of 
Article 34 of the ECHR, in order for Ekin to successfully submit a claim against France, 
it had to justify its status as a ‘victim’ of a violation of a right guaranteed by the ECHR 
under the same test that applied to individuals.894 The ECtHR’s jurisprudence is clear on 
the matter: only persons who are actually affected by state measures, which could 
potentially amount to violations of the ECHR, may file claims as ‘victims’ under Article 
34.895 In this light, the ECtHR found, inter alia, that Ekin maintained its status as a victim 
of a violation of Article 10 on freedom of expression since state redress took place only 
nine years following the prohibition in question.896  
                                                 
889 See numerous other examples in Ibid., at 94. 
890 Ekin is a Basque association dedicated to the preservation of Basque culture and identity. Indeed, the Basque 
conundrum has for long triggered vigorous debates over minority-rights in Europe in general, and in Spain and 
France in particular. See Association Ekin v. France, Decision on admissibility of 18 January 2000, [2000] 
ECtHR (n˚39288198) (‘Ekin case’).  
891 Translation of the term ‘Euskadi’ is ‘Basque country’.  
892 ‘ETA’ stands for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna – which means ‘Basque Homeland and Freedom’ in Euskera. ETA 
is designated as a terrorist organization by the EU and US, amongst other states.  
893 Ibid., at 12. 
894 The French government contended that Ekin could no longer claim the status of a victim in light of a decision 
by Conseil d’Etat invalidating the government’s prohibitive decision with retroactive effect. See Association 
Ekin v. France case, supra note 890, at 10.  
895 Ibid., at 11. 
896 The Court noted in addition that a risk of a similar prohibition in the future was real and effective; which 
altogether was reinforced by the fact that France had recently rejected the legal registration of the association. 
Article 10 provides that : ‘(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises. (2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary’. See ECHR, supra note 844, as well as E. Lambert Abdelgawad, ‘La 
perte de la qualité de victime’, in P. Dorneau-Josette, and E. Lambert Abdelgawad (eds.), Quel filtrage des 
requêtes par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme? (2011), at 41. 
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Had it not been recognized as a victim, Ekin would not have been able to benefit 
from the direct access set forth under Article 34. The only opportunity Ekin would have 
had in terms of standing in front of the ECtHR would have been via the procedure set 
forth under Article 36(2), which allows amicus curiae submissions to be filed in on-going 
proceedings. Resorting to Article 36(2) essentially means that Ekin would not be 
considered as a victim. In such a hypothetical scenario, there would have been another 
claimant, which would be exclusively considered as the party claiming to be the victim in 
the case. This claimant would have initiated the proceedings independently and Ekin 
would have only intervened once proceedings would have commenced. Ekin as a third-
party would have no role in initiating or controlling proceedings. This highlights the 
limitations of the amicus curiae procedure – which will be discussed in further detail in 
the next section below.  
In Conka and others v. Belgium,897 the ECtHR did not accept the Ligue des droits 
de l’homme’s argument that it should be considered as an ‘indirect victim’. The Court 
upheld Belgium’s objection to the effect that the organization did not have adequate 
standing as it was not a victim of the alleged violations. The Conka family members, who 
are Rom of Slovak nationality, had essentially alleged violations to Articles 3 
(‘Prohibition of torture’)898 and 5 (‘Right to liberty and security’). This made the ECtHR 
come to the conclusion that the Ligue – an NGO based in Belgium – could not possibly 
claim to be a victim of such alleged violations.899 Here, although the Ligue undoubtedly 
had an interest as a civil society group to uphold the Conka family’s ECHR rights, this 
was found to be insufficient for justifying standing on the basis of article 34. Several 
precedents at the ECtHR do in fact confirm the position adopted in the Conka case.900  
In Gorraiz Lizarraga v. Spain, five individuals as well as an association, the 
Coordinadora de Itoiz, filed a claim against Spain.901 The dispute revolved around the 
construction of a dam in Itoiz, the area inhabited by the claimants, the expropriation of 
                                                 
897 Conka and others v. Belgium, supra note 887. 
898 Article 3 is inherently aimed at individuals or groups of individuals, and indeed may be difficult to apply to a 
civil society organization such as the Ligue. It states that: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’. See ECHR, supra note 844. 
899 Ibid., at 11.  
900 Such as Asselbourg and others and Greenpeace-Luxembourg v. Luxembourg, Judgment of 29 June 1999, 
[1999] ECtHR (29121/95). See also the analysis by N. Vajic, supra note 36, at 94. 
901 Gorraiz Lizarraga and others v. Spain, Final judgement of 27 April 2004, [2004] ECtHR (62543/00) (‘Itoiz 
case’).   
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their property and ensuing proceedings in front of Spanish courts. The claimants were 
members of the Coordinadora since its inception in 1988. It was created for ‘the defence 
of their civil rights and interests’ and had in fact been leading related proceedings before 
Spanish courts. The ECtHR found that the Coordinadora may therefore allege violations 
to Article 6 (‘Right to a fair trial’).902  
The ECtHR’s positive decision in Gorraiz Lizarraga is a precedent for the 
representation of victims by civil society at the ECtHR. Yet, the facts particular to this 
case makes it difficult to speculate on potential jurisprudential developments. 903  The 
ECHR did not envisage representation of victims by civil society. The practice of the 
ECtHR has not bypassed the principle enshrined in Article 34. Civil society organizations 
clearly do have standing so long as they claim to be victims of violations of rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR; thus, a civil society organization would be able to represent 
victims if it may be deemed as a victim itself as well as manifested in both the Ekin and 
Itoiz cases. 904 Alternatively, Article 36(2) allows them to partially access the ECtHR 
through the amicus curiae procedure – as examined in further detail subsequently.905 
With that being said, it is questioned whether the ECtHR would ultimately need to adopt 
a more liberal approach, similar to that of the IACtHR or the ACHPR, given the 
tremendous and ever-increasing backlog of cases it is currently facing. Indeed, in a recent 
case, Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania – Helsinki Committee on 
Behalf of Ionel Garcea v. Romania, the ECtHR noted that 
…the Court has recently established that in exceptional circumstances and in cases of allegations 
of a serious nature, it should be open to associations to represent victims, in the absence of a 
power of attorney and notwithstanding that the victim may have died before the application was 
lodged under the Convention. It considered that to find otherwise would amount to preventing 
such serious allegations of a violation of the Convention from being examined at an international 
level, with the risk that the respondent State might escape accountability under the Convention.906  
                                                 
902 The Court also found that the five applicants can claim to be ‘victims’ although they were not part of the 
domestic proceedings. See Ibid., at 12, 14.  
903 N. Vajic, supra note 36, at 104. 
904 D. Popović, The Emergence of the European Human Rights Law (2011), at 139.  
905 See Part II – Section 3.3. 
906 Case of Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania – Helsinki Committee on Behalf of Ionel 
Garcea v. Romania, Final judgment of 24 June 2015, [2015] ECtHR (2959/11), at para 42 citing Centre for 
Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania, Judgement of 17 July 2014, [2014] ECtHR 
(47848/08), at para 112. 
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This decision has been welcomed by civil society groups.907 Developments in that 
respect at the ECtHR will have to be monitored closely. In any event, the fact remains 
that, for the purposes of this research, the ECtHR’s practice sheds light on the importance 
of the nexus between the violation of ECHR-recognized human rights and civil society’s 
standing – a crucial point to recall when the issue of the adequacy of civil society’s 
standing before investor-state tribunals will be discussed subsequently.908  
2.2 Representation of victims of human rights violations before the IACtHR and 
ACHPR  
Civil society has the capacity to act as a representative of victims before the 
IACtHR (and the Commission)909  as well as the ACHPR.910  In such cases, the civil 
society organization involved is not personally or directly prejudiced by the contested 
violation, it is not a victim per se, nor does it act as the legal counsel of victims; rather, it 
is representing a group of individuals or communities that have been themselves the 
                                                 
907 Mental Disability Advocacy Center, ‘European Court Reaffirms NGOs Standing to Secure Justice for Victims 
of State Abuse’, 25 March 2015, available at: http://www.mdac.info/en/news/european-court-reaffirms-ngos-
standing-secure-justice-victims-state-abuse (last accessed 1 February 2016).  
908 See Part III – Section 2.  
909 The function of representation of victims is clearly defined in Article 23 of the revised Rules of Procedure of 
the Inter-American Commission, which provides the right to civil society organizations to act on behalf of third 
parties (i.e. victims) in front of the Commission. It states the following: ‘Any person or group of persons or 
nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more of the member States of the OAS may submit petitions 
to the Commission, on their behalf or on behalf of third persons, concerning alleged violations of a human 
right…’ (our emphasis). See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Article 23, 
available at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/rulesiachr.asp (last accessed 10 July 2012) (our 
emphasis). 
910 The ACHPR was inaugurated as a supervisory body – although it does not monitor state compliance – of the 
Banjul Charter, which entered into force in 1986 after being adopted in 1981, and has been ratified by all 52 
African Union state-members. The ACHPR is considered as unique for creating an adjudication system 
combining civil and political rights on the one hand; and socio-economic and cultural rights on the other. The 
ACHPR has the functions of a quasi-judicial body with protective and promotional mandates. The ACHPR’s 
decisions are only binding once confirmed by the African Union, and cases of non-compliance could be referred 
to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights – the decisions of which are final and not subject to appeal 
or political confirmation. The Court’s first judges were sworn in on 2 July 2006 and, up to now; it has issued 22 
final decisions. See G. Lynch, ‘Becoming Indigenous in the Pursuit of Justice: the African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights and the Endorois ‘, (2011) 111 African Affairs 24, at 36; A. Boyle, infra note 622, at 
631; K. Sing’Oei, supra note 766, at 526.  See also Article 28(2) of the Protocol establishing the Court states that: 
‘The judgment of the Court decided by majority shall be final and not subject to appeal’. See Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and People's 
Rights, entry into force June 9 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), available at: 
http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/about-the-court/court-establishment  (last accessed 06 October 2014); 
and African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’s website: http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/2012-
03-04-06-06-00/finalised-cases-closed/22-recient-judgements/250-recent-dec (last accessed 06 October 2014). 
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victims of that violation by acting on their behalf.911 This is possible before the IACtHR 
and the ACHPR.  
2.2.1 Flexible ratione personae and exacting ratione materiae criteria  
At the ACHPR, the distinction between filing a complaint and representing 
victims can seem quite elusive. This is because Articles 55 to 59 of the Banjul Charter on 
‘Other Communications’ do not address the issue of the identity of complainants and do 
not set any ratione personae criteria. The only indication that is given is that persons 
other than state parties to the Charter may also submit communications to the ACHPR. 
Article 55 reads as follows:  
1. Before each Session, the Secretary of the Commission shall make a list of the communications 
other than those of States parties to the present Charter and transmit them to the members of the 
Commission, who shall indicate which communications should be considered by the Commission. 
2. A communication shall be considered by the Commission if a simple majority of its members so 
decide.912  
Instead the Charter sets exhaustive ratione materiae criteria on the requirements for, and 
content of, such communications.913  
The most extensive and detailed provisions on the representation of victims are on 
the other hand set out in the IACHR. 914 Article 44 of the IACHR is broad in scope. Not 
                                                 
911 L. Hitoshi Mayer, ‘NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human Rights Courts and Commissions’, (2011) 
36 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 911, at 913.  
912 Banjul Charter, supra note 845, Article 55 (our emphasis).  
913 Article 56 states that: ‘Communications relating to human and peoples' rights referred to in 55 received by the 
Commission, shall be considered if they: 1. Indicate their authors even if the latter request anonymity, 2. Are 
compatible with the Charter of the Organization of African Unity or with the present Charter, 3. Are not written 
in disparaging or insulting language directed against the State concerned and its institutions or to the 
Organization of African Unity, 4. Are not based exclusively on news discriminated through the mass media, 5. 
Are sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged, 6. 
Are submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted or from the date the 
Commission is seized of the matter, and 7. Do not deal with cases which have been settled by these States 
involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity or the provisions of the present Charter’. 
914 The IACtHR intervenes only if a state decides to challenge the Inter-American Commission’s conclusions. 
Unlike the European human rights system, a commission – the Inter-American Commission – still exists. It 
receives complaints, engages in fact finding, attempts to bring about friendly settlements, and if it attributes the 
human rights violation to the state, it may make recommendations as per Article 50(3) of the IACHR. Article 50 
of the IACHR provides that: ‘(1) If a settlement is not reached, the Commission shall, within the time limit 
established by its Statute, draw up a report setting forth the facts and stating its conclusions. If the report, in 
whole or in part, does not represent the unanimous agreement of the members of the Commission, any member 
may attach to it a separate opinion. The written and oral statements made by the parties in accordance with 
paragraph 1.e of Article 48 shall also be attached to the report. (2) The report shall be transmitted to the states 
concerned, which shall not be at liberty to publish it. (3) In transmitting the report, the Commission may make 
such proposals and recommendations as it sees fit’. The Inter-American Commission may submit a case to the 
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only does it allow victims or their family members to file complaints, but also any person, 
group of persons or non-governmental entity that is legally recognized in a member state 
who could allege that an individual’s, or group’s, rights have been violated. The Article 
reads as follows:  
Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more 
member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing 
denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party. 915 
In the same vein as Article 34 of the ECtHR, Article 44 opens the door as well for 
civil society organizations to file complaints if they were themselves victims of violations 
of rights guaranteed by the IACHR. This is indeed confirmed by Article 23 of the revised 
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission, which allows victims to 
participate directly and autonomously in all phases of the proceedings. It explicitly 
provides the right to civil society organizations to act ‘on their behalf’ or ‘on behalf of 
third parties’ (i.e. victims) in front of the Commission. It states the following:  
Any person or group of persons or nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more of 
the member States of the OAS may submit petitions to the Commission, on their behalf or on 
behalf of third persons, concerning alleged violations of a human right…916 
The ‘non-governmental entity’ subject to both Articles 44 and 23, i.e. the civil society 
organization involved, is not merely acting as the legal counsel of victims; rather, it is 
representing a group of individuals or communities that have been themselves the victims 
of that violation by acting ‘on their behalf’. Once proceedings have reached the IACtHR, 
victims and their representatives still benefit from the standing they were entitled to in 
front of the Inter-American Commission by virtue of Article 25 of the Rules of Procedure 
                                                                                                                                                 
IACtHR contingent, however, on the state’s acceptance of the IACtHR’s jurisdiction as per Article 62 of the 
IACHR. See the IACHR on Human Rights, supra note 843. For a further analysis on the Commission’s 
procedure, see J.M. Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(2003), at 25. The IACtHR’s decisions are final, and Article 65 provides the IACtHR with a function of 
monitoring and supervising compliance with its judgements as it can refer to the OAS General Assembly cases of 
non-compliance and can make recommendations to that effect. See Article 65 states that: ‘To each regular 
session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States the Court shall submit, for the 
Assembly's consideration, a report on its work during the previous year. It shall specify, in particular, the cases in 
which a state has not complied with its judgments, making any pertinent recommendations’. See the IACHR on 
Human Rights, supra note 843. 
915 Ibid.  
916  Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Article 23, available at: 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/rulesiachr.asp (last accessed 10 July 2012) (our emphasis).  
204 
 
of the IACtHR.917 The general formulation of these rules even open the door for other 
organizations such as national human rights committees and ombudsmen to file petitions 
against their own states. 918  
2.2.2 Access to justice on the basis of actio popularis – A look at the case law 
In Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe,919 a coalition of twelve 
human rights NGOs submitted a complaint against Zimbabwe alleging grave violations to 
the Banjul Charter as a result of the violence that ensued the rejection of the 
constitutional referendum of February 2000 – then considered as a no-confidence vote to 
President Robert Mugabe’s rule. Zimbabwe contested the communication on the basis 
that (i) it was solely based on facts circulated by the media; and (ii) local remedies had 
not been exhausted. The ACHPR delved straight into the details of the requirements to 
the communication’s admissibility without going into the details of who exactly were the 
victims represented by the Forum, nor did Zimbabwe seem to object to such 
representation.920 The ACHPR ruled that the communication was admissible and then 
shifted onto substantive matters. It noted that the Zimbabwean state had passed Clemency 
Order 1 of 2000, which was an order prohibiting prosecution and setting free perpetrators 
of ‘politically motivated crimes, including alleged offences such as abductions, forced 
imprisonment, arson, destruction of property, kidnappings and other human rights 
                                                 
917 It is worthy to mention here the illustrative heading of Article 25 – ‘Participation of the Alleged Victims or 
their Representatives’. The Article reads as follows: ‘(1) Once notice of the brief submitting a case before the 
Court has been served, in accordance with Article 39 of the Rules of Procedure, the alleged victims or their 
representatives may submit their brief containing pleadings, motions, and evidence autonomously and shall 
continue to act autonomously throughout the proceedings’. See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, Article 25, available at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento/regla_ing.pdf (last accessed 10 
July 2012) (our emphasis). 
918 Nonetheless, there are formalistic restrictions such as the submittal of a power of attorney signed by the victim 
or the family of the victim, and issues regarding the validity of representation of victims have arisen before – as 
reflected by the Castillo Petruzzi case below. See Article 23(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR. See 
also the analysis of J.M. Pasqualucci, supra note 914, at 102. See also J. Anaya, and C. Grossman, ‘The Case of 
Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples’, (2002) 19 Arizona 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, at 1 and 8. 
919 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, Decision of 11 May 2006, ACHPR (128/2006). 
920 The Commission acknowledged nonetheless the fact that the claimant consisted of a coalition of twelve NGOs, 
and noted the deaths of 82 individuals including those of prominent political dissidents, but no additional details 
were noted as to exactly which victims were represented. 
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violations’.921 This constituted a violation of the victims’ right to judicial protection and 
to have their cause heard pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Banjul Charter.922  
In CEMIRIDE and MRG on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya,923 the 
Endorois, an indigenous community, complained of displacement from the area of Lake 
Bogoria, which became a location for a wildlife reserve, hotels, universities, and energy 
and mining companies.924 The Endorois called on MRG, which espoused their claim by 
accepting to act as their representative/claimant. Again, the fact that two civil society 
organizations were representing the Endorois did not seem to stir any debate, nor did 
Kenya seem to object to such representation, and the ACHPR has not dealt with this issue 
in its final decision. 925 Instead, the ACHPR focused on the substantive matters raised by 
the claimants, who argued that the Endorois’ displacement violated collective rights 
guaranteed by the Banjul Charter, namely the right to religious practice (Article 8) and 
culture (Article 17), property (Article 14), free disposition of natural resources (Article 
21),926 development (Article 22), and that it jeopardized a ‘sustainable way of life which 
                                                 
921 It was ultimately of the view that by issuing Clemency Order 1, Zimbabwe encouraged impunity and denied 
victims the right to seek the investigation of, and redress from, the alleged human rights violations that were 
committed. See Ibid., para 211. 
922 Article 7(1) of the Banjul Charter provides that: ‘1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause 
heard. This comprises: a. the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his 
fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; b. the 
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal; c. the right to defence, 
including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice; d. the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an 
impartial court or tribunal’. See also Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe case, supra note 919, 
para 212. 
923  The title of the case, including the term ‘on behalf of’ is indeed illustrative and self-explanatory. See 
CEMIRIDE and MRG on behalf of EWC v. Kenya case, supra note 608. 
924 The Endorois constitute an indigenous community made up of roughly 6,000 people inhabiting the area of 
Lake Bogoria, Rift Valley Province in Kenya, which was regarded during the British colonial era as one of the 
most backward and desolate in the region. Kenya gained independence in 1963 and the Endorois remained 
marginalized, they were displaced by the state between 1973 and 1986 due to the establishment of the Lake 
Bogoria Game Reserve, and their disenfranchisement allegedly persisted thereafter. The Endorois’ cultural and 
economic pastoralism was side-lined in favour of more capital and labour intensive economic sectors such as 
tourism, mining and energy. G. Lynch, supra note 910, at 43; K. Sing’Oei, supra note 766, at 515, 521.   
925 The complaint initially originated when Minority Rights Group (MRG), a UK-based NGO, solicited groups or 
communities potentially interested in African human rights litigation by launching a ‘call for cases’. See G. 
Lynch, supra note 910, at 35.   
926 It is worthy here to quote Article 21, which states that: ‘(1) All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and 
natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be 
deprived of it. (2) In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its 
property as well as to an adequate compensation. (3) The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be 
exercised without prejudice to the obligation of promoting international economic cooperation based on mutual 
respect, equitable exchange and the principles of international law. (4) States parties to the present Charter shall 
individually and collectively exercise the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view 
to strengthening African unity and solidarity. (5) States parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate 
all forms of foreign economic exploitation particularly that practiced by international monopolies so as to enable 
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was inextricably linked to their ancestral land’.927 This in a way reflects the ACHPR’s, 
and also the disputing parties’, concern in dealing primarily with substantive matters 
given that the underlying procedural rules afford significant flexibility for civil society 
representation. The ACHPR’s decision in CEMIRIDE and MRG on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v. Kenya was in fact particularly influenced by the newly-adopted UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the IACtHR’s decision in 
Saramaka People v. Suriname.928 As previously mentioned, with this case, the ACHPR 
became with this case the first international jurisdiction to deal with the right to 
development; it thus tackled the notions of ‘capabilities’ and ‘choices’ put forward by 
development experts such as Amartya Sen.929 The ACHPR also cited the UN Declaration 
on Development in clarifying that the right of development includes ‘active, free and 
meaningful participation in development’.930  
Similarly, in SERAC v Nigeria,931  SERAC, which describes itself as a NGO 
concerned with the promotion and protection of economic, social and cultural rights in 
Nigeria, along with the Center for Economic and Social Rights, an American-based NGO, 
filed a communication to the ACHPR seeking to hold Nigeria accountable for human 
rights violations suffered by the Ogoni. The latter are an ethnic group inhabiting the oil-
rich Niger Delta region, which were prejudiced by the operations of the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Company (a state-owned company), the majority shareholder in a 
consortium with Shell Petroleum (an Anglo-Dutch multinational). Specifically, 
environmental degradation and health problems allegedly resulted from systematic oil 
contamination. The complainants alleged that Nigeria violated, inter alia, the following 
Banjul Charter rights: the right to life (Article 4), property (Article 14), best attainable 
                                                                                                                                                 
their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their national resources’. See Banjul Charter, 
supra note 845. 
927 CEMIRIDE and MRG on behalf of EWC v. Kenya case, supra note 608, para. 283. See also G. Lynch, supra 
note 910, at 25.   
928 Saramaka People v. Suriname, supra note 776. See also G. Lynch, supra note 910, at 39; A. Nienaber, ‘The 
African Human Rights System and HIV-Related Human Experimentation: Implications of Zimbabwe Human 
Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe’, (2009) 9 African Human Rights Law Journal 524, at 541. 
929 See A. Sen, ‘Development As Freedom’ (1999). 
930 CEMIRIDE and MRG on behalf of EWC v. Kenya case, supra note 608, para. 283 citing Article 2.3, U.N. 
Declaration on the Right to Development, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1986).  
931 SERAC and Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Decision of 13 October 2001, ACHPR 
(60/2001). 
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state of physical and mental health (Article 16), free disposition of their wealth and 
natural resources (Article 21), and a general satisfactory environment (Article 24).932  
From a procedural standpoint, as in the previously discussed Endorois Welfare 
Council933 and Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum934 cases, the issue of representation 
by civil society organizations – rather than a communication submitted by members of 
the Ogoni community, i.e. the direct victims of the alleged human rights abuses – did not 
seem to stir any legal debates given that Nigeria did not object to such representation (nor 
to any of the allegations for that matter).935 The ACHPR’s only commentary in such 
regard was as follows:  
The Commission thanks the two human rights NGOs who brought the matter under its purview: 
the Social and Economic Rights Action Center (Nigeria) and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights (USA). Such is a demonstration of the usefulness to the Commission and individuals of 
actio popularis, which is wisely allowed under the African Charter.936 
This passage clearly reflects the ACHPR’s liberalism in openly accepting 
communications from civil society on human rights abuses.  
 On the substantive issues of the case, the ACHPR recognized Nigeria’s right to 
exploit oil resources by stating that ‘undoubtedly and admittedly, the Government of 
Nigeria … has the right to produce oil, the income from which will be used to fulfil the 
economic and social rights of Nigerians’.937 Notwithstanding such recognition, it found 
that this should not have led to the alleged violations.938 Environmental degradation, 
                                                 
932 In further detail, it is alleged that the consortium disposed toxic wastes into the environment and local 
waterways, neglected and/or failed to maintain its facilities causing numerous avoidable spills in the proximity of 
villages, and that the resulting contamination of water, soil and air has had serious short and long-term health 
impacts, including skin infections, gastrointestinal and respiratory ailments, and increased risk of cancers, and 
neurological and reproductive problems. See Ibid., para 2, 10. 
933 CEMIRIDE and MRG on behalf of EWC v. Kenya case, supra note 608. 
934 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe case, supra note 919.  
935 Nigeria indeed admitted the allegations and provided the Commission with a list of remedial measures it has 
taken since the return of a civil government, which included: the establishment of a ministry for the environment 
to address environmental related issues prevalent in Nigeria and as a matter of priority in the Niger delta area 
inhabited by the Ogoni; as well as a Niger Delta Development Commission to address the environmental and 
social related problems of the Niger delta area and other oil producing areas of Nigeria; and the inauguration of 
judicial commission to investigate human rights violations committed against the Ogoni. SERAC and Center for 
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, supra note 931, para 30. 
936 Ibid., para 44.  
937 The richness of their region, the Ogoni-land in the Niger Delta, has effectively plagued it and the Ogoni have 
resorted a number of times to foreign courts and international jurisdictions. Ibid., para 54; G. Akpan, supra note 
596, at 74-75. 
938 The ACHPR indeed concluded that Nigeria violated all of the previously mentioned Banjul Charter rights. It 
further ‘appealed’ to the government of Nigeria, inter alia, to (i) stop all attacks on Ogoni communities and 
leaders and permit citizens and independent investigators free access to the territory; (ii) conduct an investigation 
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marginalization, and grave human rights abuses939 were also key factors that lead the 
Ogoni to assert their distinctive identity.940 The ACHPR’s decision is thus perceived as 
an extreme example of the clash between economic, and foreign investment, activity on 
the one hand; and human rights and environmental protection on the other.941 Equally, it 
reflects the recognition of the need for a balance between both under the umbrella of 
sustainable development rather than the trumping of one over the other.942  
The Castillo Petruzzi case 943  provides an example of the IACtHR’s liberal 
approach on standing criteria. A Chilean civil society organization, the Fundación de 
Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas, filed a petition on behalf of four Chilean 
prisoners who were sentenced to life imprisonment in Peru by a military tribunal.944 The 
Inter-American Commission endorsed the case and raised it in front of the IACtHR by 
alleging that Peru violated – inter alia – the prisoners’ rights to humane treatment and a 
fair trial (Articles 5 and 8 respectively of the IACHR).945 In this case, the Fundación 
clearly aimed to represent individuals who were not in a position to submit a claim 
themselves. Peru objected to the Fundación’s representation and argued that the 
organization lacked legal capacity and standing since it was not recognized as a non-
                                                                                                                                                 
into human rights violations and prosecuting officials, most notably of the security forces and the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Company; (iii) ensure adequate compensation to victims of the human rights violations; and 
(iv) provide information on health and environmental risks and meaningful access to regulatory and decision-
making bodies to communities likely to be affected by oil operations. See Ibid., at para 70. 
939 For instance, the ACHPR noted that: ‘The government has destroyed Ogoni houses and villages and then, 
through its security forces, obstructed, harassed, beaten and, in some cases, shot and killed innocent citizens who 
have attempted to return to rebuild their ruined homes.’. See Ibid., at 62.  
940 The ACHPR recognized the Ogoni people ‘as a people’ enabling them to claim a wider array of rights under 
the Banjul Charter. Indeed, a working group of the ACHPR concluded that indigenous rights recognized how 
‘certain marginalized groups are discriminated in particular ways because of their particular culture, mode of 
production and marginalized position within the state’ with collective rights to land, territory, and natural 
resources. See G. Lynch, supra note 910, at 37. 
941 A. Boyle, supra note 622, at 631.  
942 R. Klager, infra note 1252, at 202. 
943 Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Republic of Peru, Final judgement of 30 May 1999, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (series C) No. 52 (1999). 
944 Those were: Mr. Jaime Francisco Sebastián Castillo Petruzzi, Mrs. María Concepción Pincheira Sáez, Mr. 
Lautaro Enrique Mellado Saavedra and Mr. Alejandro Luis Astorga Valdez. It is worthy to note that the prisoners 
were linked to the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement – which was long considered as a terrorist 
organization by the Peruvian government.  
945 Article 5(1) states that: ‘every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected’. 
While Article 8(1) provides that: ‘every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a 
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the 
substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and 
obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature’. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 
843. 
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governmental organisation in Chile.946  The foundation of Peru’s arguments lies in a 
strictly positivist interpretation of Article 44 of the IACHR which stipulates that ‘any 
nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of the 
Organization, may lodge petitions’.947 
The IACtHR dismissed the objection succinctly and came to the conclusion that, 
under Article 44, any ‘group of persons’ may lodge petitions, that the legal recognition of 
the organization is irrelevant, and more fundamentally, that ‘this broad authority to make 
a complaint is a characteristic feature of the system for the international protection of 
human rights’.948 Indeed, the Court did not proceed to an examination of the credentials 
of the Fundación. It regarded this as a question of form rather than substance, which is 
translated here in the priority of ensuring that alleged victims can seek redress to human 
rights violations.949 The Castillo Petruzzi case thus highlights the IACtHR’s liberalism in 
allowing unrelated parties to complain of human rights violations. This may prove to be 
particularly effective whenever access to justice is impeded by poverty, lack of education, 
scarce legal assistance, and resources to hire lawyers, who are often themselves the 
targets of reprisals and the same intimidation and retaliation as the victims and their 
families.950  
On the more substantive issues raised by the case, the IACtHR most notably 
found that Peru indeed violated both Articles 5 and 8 of the IACHR. The IACtHR noted 
that the military tribunal in question should have been competent, independent and 
impartial as required under Article 8(1) of the IACHR. However, this was not the case 
given that the Peruvian armed forces, fully engaged in the counter-insurgency struggle, 
were also prosecuting persons associated with insurgency groups; as well as in light of 
the fact that the judges who presided over the treason trials were ‘faceless’ – in 
contravention to internationally recognized standards against such practice,951 making it 
                                                 
946 Ibid., at para. 35. 
947 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 843, Article 44 (our emphasis).  
948 Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Republic of Peru, supra  note 943, at para. 77.  
949 J.M. Pasqualucci, supra note 914, at 101. 
950 Ibid., at 102. 
951 In fact, it is worthy to note that Principle 12 of the UN Draft Principles Governing the Administration of 
Justice Through Military Tribunals on the ‘Right to a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal’ provides 
that: ‘The organization and operation of military courts should fully ensure the right of everyone to a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal at every stage of legal proceedings from initial investigation to trial. The 
persons selected to perform the functions of judges in military courts must display integrity and competence and 
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impossible for defendants to identify the judges and, therefore, to assess their 
competence.952 
The Awas Tingni case is also relevant in relation to the representation of victims 
in front of the IACtHR. It is also a jurisprudential authority on international principles of 
indigenous property rights and their protection.953 The case involved the Awas Tingni, a 
community made up of around 208 families totaling 1,016 individuals who inhabit the 
North Atlantic Autonomous Region of Nicaragua; and Solcarsa, a forest management and 
timber exploitation company (which is a subsidiary of a Korean-based multinational).954 
Nicaragua had granted Solcarsa a logging concession comprising ancestral lands of the 
community. Although they were unable to obtain official title, the Awas Tingni claimed 
the communal property to their ancestral land, and contested the validity of the 
concession, which was granted without their prior consent.955  
The head and representative of the Awas Tingni community, Jaime Castillo Felipe, 
initially filed the complaint to the Inter-American Commission in 1995, which later 
decided to take the case to the IACtHR in 1998.956 The community’s and the Inter-
American Commission’s main objective was to seek the IACtHR’s recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ rights to the communal property and natural resources of their 
ancestral lands.957 This position was further reinforced with the substantial number of 
favourable amicus curiae submissions that were received by the IACtHR, which any non-
disputing party may file under Article 44(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR (as 
                                                                                                                                                 
show proof of the necessary legal training and qualifications.  Military judges should have a status guaranteeing 
their independence and impartiality, in particular vis-à-vis the military hierarchy. In no circumstances should 
military courts be allowed to resort to procedures involving anonymous or “faceless” judges and prosecutors’. 
See Draft Principles Governing the Administration of Justice Through Military Tribunals, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/58 at 4 (2006), available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/subcom/57/docs/ecn4sub2-
2005-9-E-final.doc (last accessed 06 October 2014). 
952 The IACtHR also found that the terms of confinement that the military tribunal imposed upon the victims 
constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading forms of punishment thereby constituting violations of Article 5 of the 
IACHR; which was reinforced by the fact that the prisoners’ statements were taken in the preliminary 
proceedings while they were either blindfolded or hooded, and either in restraints or handcuffs. See Castillo 
Petruzzi et al. v. Republic of Peru, supra  note 943, at para 130, 133, 192, 198. 
953 N. Boecher, supra note 43, at 58.  
954 L. Burgorgue-Larsen, and A. Úbeda de Torres, supra note 44, at 502. 
955 The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Republic of Nicaragua, Judgment of 31 August 2001, Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (series C) No. 79 (2001), para. 2. Also, it is worthy to note that the Awas 
Tingni have been struggling to protect their ancestral land. They were assisted in the past by the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF) to obtain the suspension of a similar large scale logging concession that was granted to a 
Dominican company. See J. Anaya, and C. Grossman, supra note 918, at 3.  
956 Ibid., para 6. 
957 The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Republic of Nicaragua case, supra note 955, para. 140. 
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detailed further below). The decision did not raise any procedural issues with respect to 
representation of victims.958 Instead, the IACtHR delved straight into substantive matters, 
and found that Nicaragua had violated Article 21 of the IACHR by not granting title to 
the Awas Tingni to their ancestral land. The right to property as recognized by Article 21 
was the basis for the IACtHR’s reasoning in asserting the protection of indigenous land, 
making it the first international tribunal to recognize the collective property rights of 
indigenous peoples.959 
2.2.3 Rationale for admissibility of actio popularis  
The practice of the IACtHR and ACHPR generally shows that civil society groups 
can easily represent victims.960 Broad representation, or actio popularis, may turn out to 
be crucial when entire communities claim to be victims of human rights violations.961 
Victims can be often vulnerable due to domestic socio-political dynamics, and more 
particularly, the limitations of their resources, lack of not only legal, but also technical 
and scientific knowledge or experience. 962  In such cases, any potential international 
judicial proceeding might pose substantial complexities and costs that could be mitigated 
when a ‘representative group of the host populations’ is afforded standing instead.963 
Civil society groups are often in a better position to file a complaint rather than 
                                                 
958 L. Alvarado, ‘Prospects and Challenges in the Implementation of Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in 
International Law: Lessons from the Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua’, (2007) 24 Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 609, at 609. 
959  The IACtHR referred to the travaux préparatoires of the IACHR, as well as recent developments in 
international law, to resort to ‘an evolutionary interpretation of international instruments for the protection of 
human rights’. It also took into account Article 29 of the IACHR which prohibits restrictive interpretations of 
rights guaranteed under the Convention, to deduce that ‘Article 21 of the Convention protects the right to 
property in a sense which includes, among others, the rights of members of the indigenous communities within 
the framework of communal property, which is also recognized by the Constitution of Nicaragua’. Most notably, 
the IACtHR underlined the fact that indigenous claims to the land transcend the mere possessive and productive 
elements, such as a real officially recognized title to property, but comprise a spiritual one related to their 
religious and cultural legacy, and thus the IACtHR asserted that the Awas Tingni saw themselves as ‘persons 
responsible for the forest’. See The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Republic of Nicaragua case, 
supra note 955, para. 148.L. Alvarado, supra note 770, at 609; L. Burgorgue-Larsen, and A. Úbeda de Torres, 
supra note 44, at 612. 
960 See also S. Charnovitz, supra note 36, at 906; and N. Boecher, supra note 43, 58.  
961 At the ECtHR, a mechanism for ensuring actio popularis through the Council of Europe Commissioner had 
been proposed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. This proposal was ultimately rejected. 
See Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1606 (2003), ‘Areas where the European Convention on Human 
Rights cannot be implemented’, 23 June 2003, available at: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-
XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17112&lang=en (last accessed 1 February 2016).  
962  D. Barstow Magraw and L. Baker, ‘Globalization, Communities and Human Rights: Community-Based 
Property Rights and Prior Informed Consent’, (2007) 35 Denver Journal of International Law 413, at 414.  
963 On the benefits of group representation in international litigation, see G. Akpan, supra note 596, at 57. 
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individuals themselves, particularly given that they are less prone to succumb to 
pressures on abandoning the litigation and can gather more resources to undertake it until 
it is completely adjudicated. The actio popularis in the landmark IACtHR decision in 
Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua has for instance propelled the problems of indigenous land 
demarcation and rights to natural resources ‘into the forefront of regional and national 
politics in Nicaragua’ – as shown above.964 
Civil society’s representation in front of international human rights jurisdictions is 
ultimately subject to the IACtHR or ACHPR’s decision on whether a complaint of human 
rights violations merits to be heard or not; regardless of civil society’s role in bringing the 
matter to the court’s attention – as clearly mentioned in the previously discussed Castillo 
Petruzzi v. Peru965 and SERAC v. Nigeria966 decisions. 
3. What is a ‘friend of the court’? – A cross-jurisdictional perspective outside 
the realm of investor-state arbitration 
When civil society acts as amicus curiae, it is in such cases concerned by, or self-
interested in, the dispute without having its rights affected, and thus it solely aims to 
intervene in on-going proceedings – that it has not initiated – in order to assist the 
tribunal in reaching a final decision. The amicus curiae procedure is largely inspired by 
US law. Because an amicus may be in principle ‘any person’, a potential amicus will 
generally be required to seek permission to make a submission as a ‘volunteer’, an 
‘assistant of the court’ and will be required to provide certain information in support of 
its petition, for example as to its identity, expertise, interest in the dispute, as well as 
funding. 967  It will be then for the court or tribunal to decide whether a particular 
submission should be received. These elements will be discussed below through the 
                                                 
964 L. Alvarado, supra note 770, at 609. Helton mentions several positive developments that ensued following the 
IACtHR’s landmark decision in Awas Tingni v. Republic Nicaragua. See T. Helton, ‘Introduction to the IACtHR 
Report on Indigenous and Tribal Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and 
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System’, (2010) 35 American Indian Law Review 257, at 
262. 
965 Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Republic of Peru, supra  note 943, at para 77. 
966 It is worthy to recall once more that in this case the ACHPR actually thanked the civil society groups who 
submitted the complaint against Nigeria. See SERAC and Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, 
supra note 931, para 44. 
967 P. Sands and R. Mackenzie, supra note 55, at para 2. 
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prism of US court practice (Section 4.1), WTO Panels and Appellate Body (Section 4.2), 
and international human rights jurisdictions (Section 4.3). Given that the amicus 
procedure has been previously discussed in an investor-state arbitration context, the aim 
of this section is to identify the features of such procedures from a comparative approach 
in order to better understand its potential and limitations.  
3.1 The amicus curiae procedure – A common law inspiration 
The amicus curiae procedure is a common law notion as previously mentioned.968 
It exists in the English judicial system where the procedure is generally associated to, and 
referred as, ‘third party intervention’.969 It exists as well in the Canadian legal system. 970 
                                                 
968 Yet, the UK approach to the amicus curiae is slightly different than the American or Canadian one. In its 
glossary, the UK Ministry of Justice defines it as ‘a neutral party who does not represent any individual party in 
the case who will be asked by the Court to make representations from an independent viewpoint’ – thereby 
emphasizing the non-adversarial aspect of the procedure. From a UK standpoint, an amicus curiae – as opposed 
to a third party intervenor – typically refers to the appointment of an ‘official figure, usually the Attorney-
General, Official Solicitor or Counsel from a list maintained by the Treasury Solicitor and has regularly been 
used in the Family Division’. See C. Harlow, infra note 1083, at 7; UK Ministry of Justice, ‘HM Courts & 
Tribunals Service Glossary of terms – Latin’, available at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/glossary-of-terms 
(last accessed 06 October 2014).  
969 There are no explicit procedural rules governing amicus curiae interventions under the Civil Procedure Rules 
(‘CPR’) (governing the High Court). However, CPR Rule 54.7 on the ‘Court’s Power to hear any person’ 
provides that: ‘(1) Any person may apply for permission – (a) to file evidence; or (b) make representations at the 
hearing of the judicial review. (2) An application under paragraph (1) should be made promptly.’ See CPR, infra 
1072. In its Practice Directions, the House of Lords does however state in Article 37 that: ‘A person who is not a 
party to an appeal may petition the House for permission to intervene... Petitions for permission to intervene 
orally or in writing or both must be lodged with the Judicial Office at least six weeks before the date of hearing 
of the appeal’. It is noteworthy that the main ‘informal’ requirement assessed by English courts is whether the 
proposed intervention would provide the court with some information, expertise or perspective not already 
provided by the parties. See Practice Directions and Standing Orders applicable to civil appeals, approved 8 
October 2007, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199697/ldinfo/ld08judg/bluebook/bluebk-1.htm (last accessed 06 
October 2014). The UK Supreme Court has a similar provision, Article 15 states that: ‘(1) Any person and in 
particular— (a) any official body or non-governmental organization seeking to make submissions in the public 
interest or (b) any person with an interest in proceedings by way of judicial review, may make written 
submissions to the Court in support of an application for permission to appeal and request that the Court takes 
them into account’. See Rules of the Supreme Court of the UK, entered into force 01 October 2009, available at: 
http://supremecourt.uk/docs/uksc_rules_2009.pdf  (last accessed 06 October 2014). See also E. Metcalfe, infra 
note 1074, 14-15, and C. Harlow, infra note 1083, at 7.  
970  It is noteworthy that the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada allow amicus curiae submissions. Article 92 
states that: ‘The Court or a judge may appoint an amicus curiae in an appeal’. See Rules of the Supreme Court of 
Canada (SOR/2002-156), last amended 01 January 2014, available at: http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2002-156/index.html (last accessed 01 March 2014).  
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It has been most extensively developed under US law, and it is for such reason that it is 
worthy to take a closer look at the practice from a US law perspective.971  
The Supreme Court adopted its first rule on amicus curiae in 1937.972 Historically, 
the procedure was instrumental in public interest litigation, which most notably included 
civil and minority rights as well as environmental law cases.973 It has allowed American 
civil society and advocacy groups such as the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (the ‘NAACP’) to engage in judicial advocacy.974 It has now become 
inherent to US litigation in general, and public interest cases in particular.975  
Under US law, an amicus is a bystander, who of his own knowledge makes a 
suggestion on a point of law or of fact for the information of the court.976 Inherently, an 
amicus cannot offer direct and rebuttal evidence, present oral arguments (unless 
otherwise authorized), and does not have the right to take an appeal – in stark contrast to 
intervenors or disputing parties.977  
This is well-reflected in Newark Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, a case 
regarding alleged employment discrimination by the Harrison municipality against 
African American citizens. Whilst commenting on an amicus brief submitted by seven 
Harrison residents, the Court of Appeal stated that an amicus curiae is not a disputing 
party in the following terms:  
                                                 
971 For instance, the first amicus curiae submission by a civil society group to be accepted at the US Supreme 
Court was in Ah How v. United States, 193 U.S. 65 (1904), where the Chinese Charitable and Benevolent 
Association of New York made an amicus curiae submission of favour of the appellant who was contesting the 
decision of his deportation; whereas, the UK House of Lords had only done so in the case of Regina v. Khan 
[1996] 3 WLR 162 when it accepted a submission by Liberty, a UK-based NGO. See also E. Metcalfe, infra note 
1074, at 5, 46. See also S. Krislov, ‘The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy’, (1963) 72:04 The 
Yale Law Journal 694, at 707. 
972 The Supreme Court rules constitute the first formalistic regulation of the practice. However, Krislov traces 
back the first formal use of the amicus procedure to a 1821 case - Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). 
See R. Garcia, ‘A Democratic Theory of Amicus Curiae’, (2008) 35 Florida State University Law Review 315, at 
321, and S. Krislov, supra note 971, at 694, 700. 
973 S. Krislov, supra note 971, at 694, 700, and more generally P. Appel, infra note 1095. 
974 For instance, the NAACP acted as amicus in the landmark case of Westminster School District of Orange 
County v. Mendez, which revolved around the segregation of Mexican-American schoolchildren. Westminster 
Sch. Dist. of Orange County v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1947). See also R. Garcia, supra note 972, at 
341. 
975  For instance, empirical research shows that amicus briefs were filed in 83% of US Supreme Court cases 
between 1986 to 1997. It is suggested that this figure has not substantially changed in recent years. See R. Garcia, 
supra note 972, at 315.   
976 T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 377 citing B. Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases used in American or 
English Jurisprudence (1879). 
977 G. Hazard et al., Pleading and Procedure: State and Federal Cases and Materials (1999), at 770. 
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Amicus curiae is a latin phrase for “friend of the court” as distinguished from an advocate before the 
court. It serves only for the benefit of the court, assisting the court in cases of general public interest by 
making suggestions to the court, by providing supplementary assistance to existing counsel, and by 
insuring a complete and plenary presentation of difficult issues so that the court may reach a proper 
decision. An amicus curiae is not a party to the litigation and therefore does not necessarily represent 
the views or interests of either party. Since an amicus does not represent the parties but participates 
only for the benefit of the court, it is solely within the discretion of the court to determine the fact, 
extent, and manner of participation by the amicus.
978  
The preceding passage is instrumental as it succinctly flags both the opportunities and 
limitations of amici curiae. Relevant in particular to public interest cases, courts typically 
consider the amicus as an assistant that plays a much more limited role than litigating 
parties; it provides specific information to the court solely through written submissions, 
and cannot control procedural developments.979 It cannot act as a litigant and is therefore 
not entitled to counter arguments raised by any of the litigating parties. More 
fundamentally, as outlined by the Court of Appeal, ‘the fact, extent, and manner of 
participation by the amicus’ is solely grounded on the court’s discretion; as such, it does 
not benefit from any substantive right enabling it to file briefs outside the court’s 
permission.980 It has been argued nonetheless that amicus petitioners should benefit from 
the same rights granted to parties under the US Constitution, in particular the right ‘to 
petition the Government’; however, no federal court has confirmed such position to 
date.981 This understanding is echoed in the relevant procedural rules – discussed below.  
Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure982 and Rule 37 of the Rules 
of the Supreme Court regulate the amicus procedure. State and federal courts do not have 
                                                 
978 Newark Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 940 F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1991), at para 808. See also G. 
Castanias, and R. Klonoff, infra note 985, at 154. 
979 D. Shelton, ‘The International Court of Justice and Nongovernmental Organizations’, (2007) 09 International 
Community Law Review 139, at 150.  
980 R. Garcia, supra note 972, at 348. 
981 It is argued that the right to file a lawsuit in the US is constitutionally protected under the First Amendment, 
which states that: ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances’. (our emphasis). Having said that, it is also 
recognized that the text of the First Amendment aims to protect aggrieved citizens, i.e. petitioners who seek a 
‘redress of grievances’. A narrow interpretation of this rule would therefore exclude amici curiae who by 
definition may only in ongoing petitions (or in other words – litigation). See First Amendment to the US 
Constitution, ratified 15 December 1791, available at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment 
(last accessed 06 October 2014). For further analysis, see also R. Garcia, supra note 972, at 336. 
982 Rule 29 states that: ‘… Any other amicus curiae may file a brief only by leave of court or if the brief states 
that all parties have consented to its filing. (b) The motion must be accompanied by the proposed brief and state: 
(1) the movant's interest; and (2) the reason why an amicus brief is desirable and why the matters asserted are 
relevant to the disposition of the case. (c) Contents and Form. An amicus brief must comply with Rule 32. In 
addition to the requirements of Rule 32, the cover must identify the party or parties supported and indicate 
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specific amicus procedural rules but generally refer instead to the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.983 Rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides that:  
1. An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to 
its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does 
not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored…984 
 
Essentially, it is argued that most courts are fairly liberal in permitting the filing of 
amicus briefs, in particular when these do not simply duplicate the briefs of the parties 
but instead provide the court useful arguments or information.985 However, the potential 
burden it might cause to the proceedings is also a factor taken into account by courts – as 
discussed below.  
US judges are in general fairly receptive to amicus briefs and liberally apply Rule 
29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 37 of the Supreme Court 
Rules.986 Yet, as is the case in other jurisdictions of interest, discussions over amicus’ 
interest, independence vis-à-vis disputing parties, and the additional burden it may 
potentially cause are also relevant to the US litigation context – as is reflected in Rule 
37(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court.  
For instance, in National Organization for Women Inc. v. Scheidler, a case 
involving abortion rights and access to abortion clinics, Priests for Life, Life Legal 
Defense Foundation, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference were denied a 
permission to file amicus curiae briefs in support of the appellants. The Court of Appeal 
explained its decision namely by noting that ‘amicus curiae briefs can be a real burden 
on the court system’ as well as on the disputing parties, and that they ‘are more often than 
                                                                                                                                                 
whether the brief supports affirmance or reversal. An amicus brief need not comply with Rule 28, but must 
include the following: (1) if the amicus curiae is a corporation, a disclosure statement like that required of parties 
by Rule 26.1… (4) a concise statement of the identity of the amicus curiae, its interest in the case, and the source 
of its authority to file; (5) unless the amicus curiae is one listed in the first sentence of Rule 29(a), a statement 
that indicates whether: (A) a party’s counsel authored the brief in whole or in part; (B) a party or party's counsel 
contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief; and (C) a person—other than the 
amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting 
the brief and, if so, identifies each such person; (6) an argument, which may be preceded by a summary and 
which need not include a statement of the applicable standard of review… (f) Except by the court's permission, 
an amicus curiae may not file a reply brief. (g) An amicus curiae may participate in oral argument only with the 
court's permission. See Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, available at: 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frap/rule_29 (last accessed 06 October 2014).  
983 R. Garcia, supra note 972, at 323.  
984  See Rules of The Supreme Court of The United States, adopted April 19, 2013, available at: 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/supct (last accessed 06 October 2014) (our emphasis).  
985 See also G. Castanias, and R. Klonoff, Federal Appellate Practice and Procedure (2008), at 250. 
986 G. Castanias, and R. Klonoff, supra note 985, at 251; See also A. Asteriti, and C. Tams, infra note 402, at 802. 
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not sponsored or encouraged by one or more of the parties’.987 In the same vein, the 
Court stated that it shall not accept amicus curiae briefs that ‘merely duplicate’ the 
arguments of a disputing party.988  
The following case law-developed criteria are aimed at curbing the often 
excessive and equally unhelpful flow of amicus curiae briefs, particularly from interest 
groups.989 These would be solely accepted if (i) a party is not adequately represented or is 
not represented at all; or (ii) the petitioner has a ‘direct’ interest in another case, and the 
case in which he seeks permission to file an amicus curiae brief may, by operation of 
stare decisis or res judicata, materially affect that interest; or (iii) the petitioner has a 
unique perspective, or information, that can assist the court of appeals beyond what the 
parties are able to do.990 In a similar vein, seemingly detracting judges refused to afford 
amicus arguments a weight equivalent to that of the disputing parties.991  
                                                 
987 National Organization for Women, Inc., on behalf of itself and others, et al., v. Joseph M. Scheidler, et al., 223 
F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000), at para 3-6 (our emphasis). See also, G. Castanias, and R. Klonoff, supra note 985, at 
250. Other landmark abortion cases include the Supreme Court case of Webster v Reproductive Health Services 
(1989) 492 US 490, where the constitutionality of a Missouri statute regulating the performance of abortions. 
The case attracted numerous amicus submissions including by the American Psychological Association which 
argued against the statute.  
988 Ibid., para 6. 
989 A Court of Appeal judge, Judge Posner, made the following somewhat unfavourable statement on amicus 
curiae briefs: ‘We court of appeals judges have heavy caseloads requiring us to read thousands of pages of briefs 
annually, and we wish to minimize extraneous reading. It would not be responsible for us to permit the filing of a 
brief and then not read it (or at least glance at it, or require our law clerks to read it), at least when permission is 
granted before the brief is written, and so reliance on our reading it invited’. See Ibid., para 3. In another case, 
Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Judge Posner denied a petition by the Chicago Board of 
Trade to file an amicus curiae brief, and stated that: ‘after 16 years of reading amicus curiae briefs the vast 
majority of which have not assisted the judges, I have decided that it would be good to scrutinize these motions 
in a more careful, indeed a fish-eyed, fashion’. See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 125 F.3d 
(7th Cir. 1997), at para 1063. See also R. Garcia, supra note 972, at 317, 326.  
990 Ibid., para 6. 
991  This is well-reflected in Eldred et al. v. Ashcroft, concerning the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act which extended existing copyright terms by an additional 20 years, where the 
Court of Appeal set forth the reasons why it had previously found it ‘particularly inappropriate’ to entertain a 
constitutional argument pressed by amicus but not by the parties. Indeed, the Court noted that it ‘deems it 
“particularly inappropriate” in this case to reach the merits of the amicus's position’. See Eldred et al. v. Ashcroft, 
255 F.3d (D.C. Cir. 2001), at para 849. See also, G. Castanias, and R. Klonoff, supra note 985, at 154. Another 
example of a restrictive approach would be Boumediene v. Bush where a group of former judges petitioned to 
file an amicus brief in support of greater due process for Guantanamo Bay detainees. The Appellate Court denied 
petitioners’ leave because they identified themselves as judges – citing a previous opinion which restricts the use 
of the title ‘judge’ in the courtroom or litigation documents to designate a former judge. See Boumediene v. Bush, 
476 F.3d (D.C. Cir. 2006), at para 934-935. See also R. Garcia, supra note 972, at 330. 
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3.2 WTO Panels and the Appellate Body’s restrictive approach 
Since its inception, civil society organizations have been active at the WTO. Their 
action has not been solely restricted to policy matters, but it has also covered dispute 
settlement amongst WTO member states. This section gives a succinct look at the WTO 
from an institutional perspective, the public interest issues and non-trade concerns that 
the WTO is increasingly addressing, followed by a more detailed analysis of some of the 
landmark cases involving civil society. These cases in fact served as an important 
precedent to investor-state tribunals.  
3.2.1 Brief background to WTO dispute settlement 
The end of the Second World War marked a series of international conferences 
aimed essentially at orchestrating the reconstruction of war-torn Europe as well as the 
regulation of the global monetary and financial order, particularly in light of the looming 
effects of the Great Depression of 1929. The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference created the 
IMF, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (commonly referred to 
as the World Bank). Four years later, the Havana Charter established the International 
Trade Organization (ITO).992 A global economic governance framework thus emerged. 
However, the establishment of the ITO never materialized, and the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),993 a multilateral framework rather than an international 
organization, became a de facto alternative to the ITO.994 Nearly half a century following 
the signature of the Havana Charter establishing the ITO, the WTO came into existence 
with the signature of the Marrakech Agreement in 1994.995 Member states resort to the 
                                                 
992 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, signed  24 March 1948, 1948 CAN. T.S. No. 32, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/havanae.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014) (the ‘Havana 
Charter’); M. Majlessi, supra note 110, at 28. 
993 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), entry into force 01 January 1948, 55 UNTS 194; 61 
Stat. pt. 5; TIAS 1700. 
994 The ITO never came into existence due to opposition from the US Senate. See Ibid, at 29.  
995 It is now recognized that both the GATT and the WTO have effectively set forth the regulatory framework for 
a significant proportion of global trade and have become symbols of global interconnectedness. The WTO 
currently has 159 member states and 25 others with observer status. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, entry into force 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994), available 
at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm (last accessed 02 October 2013); J. Kagan, ‘Making 
Free Trade Fair: How the WTO Could Incorporate Labor Rights and Why It Should’, (2011) 43 Georgetown 
Journal of International Law 195, at 195; and WTO, ‘members and Observers’ (2013), available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last accessed 06 October 2014). 
219 
 
WTO to settle their trade-related disputes.996 A crucial aspect of the organization is that it 
comprises a binding dispute settlement mechanism that has as primary objective to 
enforce the organization’s intricate regulatory framework.997 Given that WTO disputes 
relate to inter-state obligations and rights, non-state actors, including civil society and 
corporations, have remained essentially absent from the process. The WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) does not provide for any sort of procedural rules 
allowing non-member state actor access. 998  Whereas other international jurisdictions, 
notably through the creation of arbitration institutions to settle mixed disputes such as 
ICSID, have opened up to non-state actors, WTO members chose to maintain the inter-
state character of the dispute settlement mechanism set forth under the DSU – which can 
only be amended by consensus (as is the case for all WTO agreements).999 This strictly 
inter-state framework might seem anomalous since disputes amongst states are ultimately 
the result of diverging interests amongst corporations and other non-state actors.1000  
3.2.2 Non-trade concerns as the substantive context 
Both WTO policy-making, rules, and dispute settlement have had ramifications 
beyond the trade and economic spheres by increasingly touching upon environmental, 
public health, and other public interest-related issues.1001 This has brought the WTO both 
attention and pressure. It has been called upon to address such issues for the sake of 
balancing the global trade concerns it actively promotes.1002 Given that the WTO is a 
trade-centered organization, these issues have been branded under the notion of ‘non-
trade concerns’ when raised within the WTO context.1003 This term was in fact initially 
                                                 
996 Those cover a wide array of international obligations and rights that are guaranteed by WTO agreements such 
as the GATT, General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) or the agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). 
997  The WTO has more than 60 legal texts in place, see WTO website, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last accessed 02 April 2013).  
998 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 to the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the WTO, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) (‘DSU’). 
999 R. Buckley, and P. Blyschak, ‘Guarding the Open Door: Non-party Participation Before the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes’, (2007) 22 Banking and Financial Law Review 353, at 362.  
1000 E. De Brabandere, supra note 852, at 96.  
1001  C.E. Côté, La participation des personnes privées dans le règlement des différends internationaux 
économiques : L’élargissement du droit de porter plainte à l’OMC (2007), at 405. 
1002 J. Kagan, supra note 995, at 202. 
1003 The WTO Glossary defines it as: ‘similar to multifunctionality. The preamble of the Agriculture Agreement 
specifies food security and environmental protection as examples. Also cited by members are rural development 
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used in the preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture and included ‘food security and 
the need to protect the environment’.1004 It may also include labor conditions, which were 
indeed set forth in the non-ratified Havana Charter but were never included in the texts of 
neither the GATT nor WTO agreements. 1005  Since its inception, civil society has 
pressured the WTO to allow it to further non-trade concerns, as well as to enhance 
transparency, within its fora.1006 The WTO has been opening up to non-state actors in 
general, including to civil society, namely through the annual WTO Forum.1007 In fact, 
the Marrakech Agreement explicitly affords the organization’s General Council the right 
to ‘make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-
governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO’ – which 
not only include civil society organizations, but also business and industry 
associations.1008  
                                                                                                                                                 
and employment, and poverty alleviation’. See WTO Glossary, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/non_trade_concerns_e.htm (last accessed 10 August 2013). 
1004 ‘Noting that commitments under the reform programme should be made in an equitable way among all 
members, having regard to non-trade concerns, including food security and the need to protect the environment’. 
See preamble of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, entry into force 15 April 1994, Marrakech Agreement 
Annex 1A, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm (last accessed 10 August 
2013).   
1005  Article 7(1) of the Havana Charter states that ‘1. The members recognize that measures relating to 
employment must take fully into account the rights of workers under inter-governmental declarations, 
conventions and agreements. They recognize that all countries have a common interest in the achievement and 
maintenance of fair labour standards related to productivity, and thus in the improvement of wages and working 
conditions as productivity may permit. The members recognize that unfair labour conditions, particularly in 
production for export, create difficulties in international trade, and, accordingly, each member shall take 
whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory.’ (our emphasis). 
See Havana Charter, supra note 992. The WTO does recognize nonetheless that its member-states are committed 
to core labour standards which include the freedom of association, the prohibition of forced and child labour, as 
well as discrimination. These rights are indeed recognized by the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work. See WTO Website, ‘Labour standards: consensus, coherence and controversy’, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm (last accessed 06 October 2014). See also J. 
Kagan, supra note 995, at 198-199. See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, dated 
June 1988, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/425bbdf72.html (last accessed 28 February 2014). 
1006 C.E. Côté, supra note 1001, at 418. 
1007 The WTO Public Forum is an annual conference held since 2001 bringing together ‘civil society, academia, 
business, the media, governments, parliamentarians and inter-governmental organizations’. More than 8,000 
participants attended the 2013 edition (compared to 450 in 2001). See P. Lamy, supra note 30.  
1008 See Article V(2) of the Marrakech Agreement, supra note 995. The WTO’s General Council also adopted a 
set of guidelines aimed at clarifying the framework for cooperation with civil society, in which ‘members 
recognize the role NGOs can play to increase the awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities and agree 
in this regard to improve transparency and develop communication with NGOs’. See WTO General Council, 
‘members recognize the role NGOs can play to increase the awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities 
and agree in this regard to improve transparency and develop communication with NGOs’, 18 July 1996, 
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/guide_e.htm (last accessed 10 August 2013).  
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In turn, the WTO has increasingly addressed non-trade concerns. The waiver to 
the GATT in relation to conflict diamonds and the Kimberley Process1009  called the 
‘Kimberley Waiver’; as well as the TRIPS waiver, namely aimed at allowing developing 
nations to have an enhanced access to HIV/AIDS drugs, bear witness to the WTO’s 
endeavors in advancing, or at least, taking into account non-trade concerns. 1010  The 
Kimberley Waiver was initially granted in 2003, and then subsequently renewed in 2006 
and 2012 by the WTO General Council. 1011  It consists of excepting trade measures 
provided under the Kimberly Process from the application of a number of GATT 
obligations and prohibitions including – inter alia – quantitative restrictions (Article 
XI(1)), and most-favoured nation treatment (Article I(1)). As to the TRIPS waiver, it was 
first implemented in 2003 and was extended for the third time in 2011.1012 It originated 
during the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001 where member States passed a 
declaration in which they recognized the gravity of the public health problems afflicting 
many states, ‘especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics’.1013 The General Council’s waiver essentially creates a compulsory license 
system that enables the use of patents predominately for the supply of a given domestic 
market, subject to an obligation to pay adequate remuneration to right holders, in limited 
cases including ‘national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in 
                                                 
1009 Kimberly Protocol Certification Scheme has 54 participants including the European Union. It aims at curbing 
the trade in ‘conflict diamonds’ by establishing a certification system essentially to attest that transacted raw 
diamonds were ‘conflict free’. General Assembly resolution 55/56 defines ‘conflict diamonds’ as ‘rough 
diamonds which are used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to 
undermine or overthrow legitimate Governments’. See UN General Assembly, Resolution 55/56, ‘The role of 
diamonds in fuelling conflict’, dated 29 January 2001, available at: (last accessed 01 September 2013). See also 
the Kimberly Protocol Certification Scheme Core Document, entry into force 01 January 2003, available at:  
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document (last accessed 10 August 2013).  
1010 The Ministerial Conference of the WTO is the organ in charge of lawmaking and may enact waivers to 
existing WTO agreements pursuant to Article IX(3) of the Marrakech Agreement. However, most measures are 
often taken by the General Council, comprised of member States’ representatives based in Geneva, which 
undertakes the functions of the Ministerial Conference in the interval between meetings pursuant to paragraph 2 
of Article IV of the Marrakesh Agreement.     
1011  General Council, ‘Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds’, 
Decision of 14 December 2012, WT/L/876. See also I. Feichtner, supra note 597, at 616. 
1012 See General Council, ‘Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health’, Decision of 30 August 2003, WT/L/540, and General Council, ‘Amendment of the Trips 
Agreement – Third Extension of the Period For The Acceptance By members Of The Protocol Amending the 
Trips Agreement’, Decision of 05 December 2011, WT/L/829. 
1013 Ministerial Conference, ‘Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’, adopted on 14 
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/3_wtmin01dec2_e.pdf  (last accessed 10 August 2013).  
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cases of public non-commercial use’.1014 Such measures come as a reaction to detractors 
of the world trade regime who criticize a trade-centred approach to WTO law that could 
lead to the neglect of other international human rights and values, e.g. the human right to 
health care or the protection of indigenous traditional knowledge, which are arguably 
relevant to the international rights and obligations set forth under TRIPS for instance.1015 
In the same vein, Pascal Lamy, ex-director general of the organisation, declared that 
WTO law is, and should be, interpreted in light of other international law norms 
including those pertaining to human rights and environmental protection.1016 As will be 
examined directly below, the role of civil society – as amicus curiae – within WTO 
disputes has been effectively perceived as a means to potentially conciliate wider 
international law norms with WTO law.1017   
3.2.3 Amicus authorities: Shrimps and Asbestos 
The issue of civil society’s involvement in WTO disputes has first arisen in the 
Shrimps1018 case, and the criteria governing its intervention were further articulated in the 
Asbestos case. These two cases effectively constitute the most significant Appellate Body 
decisions on the matter, and thus merit further analysis. Numerous decisions later 
followed the position adopted in the Shrimps and Asbestos precedents.1019  
                                                 
1014 This effectively constitutes a waiver to Articles 31(f) and (h) of TRIPS which state that: ‘Where the law of a 
member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, 
including use by the government or third parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be 
respected (f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the 
member authorizing such use; (h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of 
each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization’. See section 1(b), General Council, 
‘Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’, supra 
note 1012. See also I. Feichtner, supra note 597, at 628. 
1015 The TRIPS agreement has been systematically associated with the promotion of strictly corporate interests, 
particularly the pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, it is argued that the Intellectual Property Committee, an 
international corporate-based organization, developed the basis for the TRIPS agreement. For a further analysis, 
see M. Majlessi, infra note 110, at 106, 120. See also I. Feichtner, supra note 597, at 616. 
1016 P. Lamy, ‘La place et le rôle du droit de l’OMC dans l’ordre juridique international’, 19 May 2006, 
available at: http://www.wto.org/french/news_f/sppl_f/sppl26_f.htm (last accessed 10 August 2013).  
1017 C.E. Côté, supra note 1001, at 419. 
1018 WTO, Report of the Panel, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58, (15 May 1998) (‘Shrimps case’).  
1019  See for instance the following Appellate Body reports: Australia — Measures Affecting Importation of 
Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R (20 October 1998), European Communities — Trade Description of Sardine, 
WT/DS231/AB/R, (23 October 2002); Thailand — Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron 
or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R (5 April 2001); United States — Final 
Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/ DS257/AB/R 
(17 February 2004); Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS30824 /AB /R (6 
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i. The Shrimps case 
The Shrimps case arose out of a complaint lodged by several Asian countries 
against the US, alleging the inconsistency of a ban on the imports of shrimps, and 
shrimp-related products, from those countries with WTO law. 1020 At issue were a series 
of US laws, regulations, and measures aimed at protecting certain sea turtles – which 
were recognized as endangered species – from harmful shrimp fishing practices allegedly 
adopted in those countries through an import ban on the shrimp produce of such 
fishing.1021 The matter was in fact addressed in US courts, prior to its adjudication at the 
WTO, as a result of a lawsuit filed by environmental groups, including the Earth Island 
Institute and others, against the US government.1022 It is worthy to mention here that a 
substantially similar dispute, although resulting in a different outcome, arose in the wake 
of the Tuna-Dolphin cases at the GATT – prior to the establishment of the WTO and its 
dispute settlement mechanism.1023  
Three NGOs – the Center for Marine Conservation, the Center for International 
Environmental Law and the WWF – directly requested the Panel to allow them to 
intervene in the dispute as amicus curiae. Their objective was to address environmental 
issues relevant to the dispute, and to put forward an interpretation of the GATT that 
                                                                                                                                                 
March 2006); Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R (3 December 2007). 
See also C.E. Côté, supra note 1001, at 218. 
1020 Those were: India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand. 
1021The US justified its prohibition under its Endangered Species Act (in addition to related regulations and 
judicial rules). In addition, as mentioned previously, the US argued that the need for the use of turtle excluder 
devices (TEDs) – aimed at protecting sea turtles from harmful shrimp fishing – was consistent with the 
international community’s recognition to protect endangered species pursuant to Agenda 21. See Ibid., at para. 
7.57, and Agenda 21, supra note 99, para 17.46(c).  
1022 Those were: the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Humane Society of the 
United States, the Sierra Club, and the Georgia Fishermen's Association. See Earth Island Institute v. Warren 
Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559 (CIT 1995). 
1023 At issues was the US import ban on tuna from GATT-members whose fishing standards were not aligned to 
the US Marine Mammal Protection Act, which is a US federal statute that sets dolphin protection standards. 
More specifically, an import ban would be triggered if dolphin deaths from tuna fishing exceeded deaths from 
U.S. tuna fishing by more than 25 per cent. It resulted in the ban of tuna imports from exporting states including 
Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, and the tiny Pacific island of Vanuatu; as well as other ‘intermediary’ 
states, i.e. which handle the banned tuna, such as Costa Rica, Italy, Japan, and Spain, and earlier France, the 
Netherlands Antilles, and the United Kingdom. A lengthy legal saga ensued, it is worthy to note, however, that in 
its first decision the GATT Panel essentially found that (i) the US could not embargo imports of tuna products 
from Mexico simply because Mexican regulations on the way tuna was produced did not satisfy US regulations; 
and (ii) GATT rules did not allow one country to take trade action for the purpose of attempting to enforce its 
own domestic laws in another country (extraterritorially) — even to protect animal health or exhaustible natural 
resources. The Panel’s decision was ultimately perceived as lacunary by environmental groups. See United States 
- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Panel Report, 3 September 1991, unadopted, BISD 39S/155; and 
United States — Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Panel Report, 16 June 1994,  unadopted, DS29/R.   
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would favour the protection of sea turtles from harmful shrimp fishing practices. 
Environmental groups perceived the GATT Panel’s first decision in the Tuna-Dolphin 
case as unsatisfactory as a result of its failure to adequately balance environmental 
concerns. It is thus argued that there was a need for them to actively participate in WTO 
disputes in general, and the Shrimps case in particular, in order to ‘enlighten’ WTO 
Panels on the environmental issues at stake, in what cannot be merely perceived – so it 
was argued – as strict international trade law disputes between WTO member-states.1024   
The Panel rejected the NGOs’ request and based its decision on Articles 13.1 and 
13.2 of the DSU, which state that:  
13.1 - Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual 
or body which it deems appropriate...  
13.2 - Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain 
their opinion on certain aspects of the matter…1025  
The Panel interpreted this rule as vesting it with an authority to seek information but not 
to accept it via unsolicited submissions such as the ones made by the WWF and 
others.1026 It made nonetheless a recommendation to the disputing parties, i.e. member 
states, to put forward any documents or information submitted by the amici curiae 
petitioners as part of their own submissions.  
The Panel’s decision was appealed, and the Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s 
interpretation of Articles 13.1 and 13.2 of the DSU. It found that the Panel’s authority to 
‘seek information’ should not be equated with a prohibition on accepting non-solicited 
information. It was thus decided that Panels have a discretionary authority to accept such 
non-solicited information so long as it remains pertinent to the dispute; and more 
fundamentally, without ‘unduly delaying the panel process’ pursuant to Article 12.2 of 
the DSU.1027 The fact that the information was or was not requested by the Panel itself 
                                                 
1024 Charnovitz indeed argues that: ‘An impetus behind NGOs' desire to participate in WTO dispute resolution is 
that GATT panels have not performed well in adjudicating environmental disputes, particularly in the tuna 
dolphin controversy. The tuna panel decisions were neither thorough nor entirely logical. The low quality of these 
environmental decisions - as compared to typically high quality GATT decisions in the more common 
commercial disputes - suggests a need to improve the information provided to a WTO panel’. See S. Charnovitz, 
‘Participation of Non Governmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization’, (1996) 17 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 331, at 352 (our emphasis).  
1025 DSU, supra note 998, Article 13.1 and 13.2. 
1026 Report of the Panel, Shrimps case, supra note 1018, para 7.8.  
1027 Article 12.2 of the DSU states that: ‘Panel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure 
high-quality panel reports, while not unduly delaying the panel process’. See WTO, Report of the Appellate 
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should not be relevant. Conversely, Panels are not bound to accept nor consider 
information submitted by non-disputing parties even in cases where it has propio motu 
requested such information. 1028  The Appellate Body confirmed the Panel’s 
recommendation by allowing disputing parties to attach to their own submissions entire, 
or parts of, briefs prepared by non-disputing parties such as the WWF or the Center for 
International Environmental Law.1029 
ii. The Asbestos case 
Another key decision is the Asbestos case,1030  a dispute between Canada and 
France (represented by the European Communities) that was triggered by a French ban 
on asbestos fibres and asbestos-based products on public health grounds in line with the 
exception set out under Article XX(b) of the GATT.1031  
The public interest issues at stake drew significant attention to the dispute, and the 
Appellate Body initially received applications for leave to submit amicus briefs from 13 
different NGOs and other non-state actors most notably including trade and business 
groups or associations from the asbestos industry.1032 17 applications were later filed 
following the adoption of the Additional Procedure (discussed below) submitted by a 
wide array of applicants including Greenpeace International, the WWF, and the European 
Chemical Industry Council.1033 What is fundamental to note here is that the Appellate 
                                                                                                                                                 
Body, United States: Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 
1998), para. 107-108 (our emphasis). 
1028 Ibid., para. 108. 
1029 Ibid., para. 110. 
1030 WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities: Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (12 March 2011) (‘Asbestos case’).  
1031 Article XX(b) of the GATT reads as follows: ‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied 
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (b) necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health…’. See GATT, supra note 993. 
1032  These were: Asbestos Information Association (United States); HVL Asbestos (Swaziland) Limited 
(Bulembu Mine); South African Asbestos Producers Advisory Committee (South Africa); J & S Bridle 
Associates (United Kingdom); Associação das Indústrias de Produtos de Amianio Crisótilo (Portugal); Asbestos 
Cement Industries Limited (Sri Lanka); The Federation of Thai Industries, Roofing and Accessories Club 
(Thailand); Korea Asbestos Association (Korea); Senac (Senegal); Syndicat des Métallos (Canada); Duralita de 
Centroamerica, S.A. de C.V. (El Salvador); Asociación Colombiana de Fibras (Colombia); and Japan Asbestos 
Association (Japan). Ibid., para 53. 
1033  These were: Professor Robert Lloyd Howse (United States); Occupational & Environmental Diseases 
Association (United Kingdom); American Public Health Association (United States); Centro de Estudios 
Comunitarios de la Universidad Nacional de Rosario (Argentina); Only Nature Endures (India); Korea Asbestos 
Association (Korea); International Council on Metals and the Environment and American Chemistry Council 
226 
 
Body referred to those potential amici as ‘persons’ or ‘non-governmental associations’ – 
notwithstanding the intricate diversity of such actors, and more particularly, the manifest 
dominance of trade and business groups from the asbestos industry. 1034  Indeed, the 
proliferation of these groups increased developing states’ wariness of ‘NGO involvement 
at the WTO’ – as will be discussed further below.  
In the wake of overwhelming interest by third parties to submit amicus briefs, the 
Appellate Body established an ‘Additional Procedure’ setting out the ratione materiae 
and ratione personae requirements for accepting amicus briefs.1035 These requirements 
included (a) information on the applicants’ interest in the dispute, (b) a description of 
their relations to the parties and their funding sources, (c) the extent to which they might 
‘make a contribution to the resolution’ of the dispute, and (d) the specific issues of law 
covered in the Panel report they would like to address.1036 The Appellate Body added that:  
[it] will review and consider each application for leave to file a written brief and will, without 
delay, render a decision whether to grant or deny such leave…The grant of leave to file a brief by 
the Appellate Body does not imply that the Appellate Body will address, in its Report, the legal 
arguments made in such a brief.1037 
Furthermore, the Appellate Body has set out additional conditions that are applicable in 
the event leave is granted to an applicant. These regulate both the form and scope of the 
written amicus curiae brief and essentially require that briefs should be concise and not 
exceed 20 pages; and to:  
set out a precise statement, strictly limited to legal arguments, supporting the applicant's legal 
position on the issues of law or legal interpretations in the Panel Report with respect to which the 
applicant has been granted leave to file a written brief.1038   
                                                                                                                                                 
(United States); European Chemical Industry Council (Belgium); Australian Centre for Environmental Law at 
the Australian National University (Australia); Associate Professor Jan McDonald and Mr. Don Anton 
(Australia); and a joint application from Foundation for Environmental Law and Development (United Kingdom), 
Center for International Environmental Law (Switzerland), International Ban Asbestos Secretariat (United 
Kingdom), Ban Asbestos International and Virtual Network (France), Greenpeace International (The 
Netherlands), World Wide Fund for Nature, International (Switzerland), and Lutheran World Federation 
(Switzerland). See Ibid., para 56. 
1034 Ibid., para 53-56. 
1035 Article 16.1 of the WTO - Working Procedures for Appellate Review provide that: ‘[i]n the interests of 
fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of an appeal, where a procedural question arises that is not covered 
by these Rules, a division may adopt an appropriate procedure for the purposes of that appeal only, provided that 
it is not inconsistent with the DSU, the other covered agreements and these Rules…’.  
1036 Report of the Appellate Body, Asbestos case, supra note 1030, para. 52(3).  
1037 Ibid., at para. 52(4)(5) (our emphasis).  
1038 Report of the Appellate Body, Asbestos case, supra note 1030, para. 52(7) (our emphasis).  
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The Appellate Body clearly asserted its discretion in accepting or rejecting amicus curiae 
submissions, and it eventually rejected all 17 of them simply because it was of the view 
that accepting them brought it no benefits.1039 However, it opened the door to disputing 
member states to append amicus briefs as an integral part of their own submissions – as 
also accepted by the ICJ. The Appellate Body’s conclusion in the Asbestos case is not 
inconsistent with the general legal understanding of what amicus curiae should and 
should not do. Indeed, the primary function of, and rationale behind, the amicus curiae 
procedure is the assistance of the court.1040 If a court deems that such assistance is not 
beneficial to it, then the whole idea of an amicus curiae submission becomes altogether 
obsolete.  
It is questioned whether civil society, through the amicus curiae procedure, 
caused any impact on Panels’ or the Appellate Body’s interpretation of WTO law. A 
breakdown both from procedural and substantive standpoints is therefore merited, as it 
shall also provide an état des lieux of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism’s position 
concerning civil society involvement.  
iii. Final remarks 
The Appellate Body has repeatedly asserted both its right, as well as Panels’ right, 
to accept non-solicited amicus curiae submissions. This is a procedural development in 
se that was triggered by civil society actors who solicited WTO Panels to open the door 
for their intervention in disputes through the amicus curiae procedure. The WTO’s 
official position is that amici curiae do not benefit from any substantive rights. The 
acceptance of civil society as amicus curiae has been made possible through a favourable 
interpretation of the DSU by the Appellate Body, which asserted Panels’ discretionary 
authority in deciding on the matter by virtue of Article 13 of the DSU. Having said that, 
civil society’s role at the WTO dispute settlement system has been nonetheless 
significantly limited.1041 It is clear that non-member states in general do not benefit from 
                                                 
1039 Although 6 of those applications were rejected having not been submitted in a timely manner. See Ibid., para 
55. See also R. Buckley, and P. Blyschak, supra note 999, at 363. 
1040 A. Moore, ‘Are Amici Curiae the Proper Response to the Public’s Concerns on Transparency in Investment 
Arbitration?’, (2006) 5 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 257, at 268.  
1041  C.E. Côté, ‘Obstacles et ouvertures processuelles pour les acteurs privés défendant des intérêts non 
commerciaux dans l’interprétation des accords de l’OMC’, (2009) 50 Les Cahiers de droit 207, at 217. 
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a substantive right to submit amicus curiae briefs under the DSU notwithstanding the 
public interest issues that are potentially at stake. This applies to civil society and trade or 
business groups for that matter. It is in this light that in the Hot-Rolled Lead case, the 
Appellate Body poignantly reiterated its position in the Shrimps case in the following 
words: 
Individuals and organizations, which are not members of the WTO, have no legal ‘right’ to make 
submissions or to be heard by the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body has no legal ‘duty’ to 
accept or consider unsolicited amicus curiae briefs submitted by individuals or organizations, not 
members of the WTO…1042  
The right to make amicus curiae submissions can only be secured through a 
reform to the DSU by WTO members, which was due to take place at the then-stalled 
Doha Round of negotiations.1043 Some states are in favour of substantiating the amicus 
curiae practice under the DSU in order to enhance transparency in public interest-related 
disputes.1044 Several developing states are, however, wary of such a prospect as this 
might entail the proliferation of submissions from trade lobbies or pressure groups from 
industrialized states (who all fall under the category of non-state actors).1045 This was 
manifestly reflected not only in the Asbestos case, but also in the Hot-Rolled Lead case 
where the American Iron and Steel Institute and the Speciality Steel Industry of North 
America association made amicus curiae submissions.1046 As such, the DSU has not been 
amended to date and the amicus curiae practice at the WTO remains the sole product of 
jurisprudential development. In turn, it has benefited other international jurisdictions such 
as ICSID and UNCITRAL-constituted investor-state tribunals.1047  
                                                 
1042 See WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States: Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-
Rolled Lead and Bismut Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R (10 May 
2000), para. 41 (‘Hot-Rolled Lead case’) (our emphasis). 
1043 C.E. Côté, supra note 1001, at 223. 
1044 This is the case of the United States for instance. The US delegation at Doha claimed that ‘the public has a 
legitimate interest in the proceedings’. See IISD, Doha Briefing Series: Developments Since the Fourth WTO 
Ministerial Conference, February 2003, online at: http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/dohabriefings/doha8-review-
dispute.pdf (last accessed 15 July 2013). 
1045 R. Buckley, and P. Blyshak, supra note 999, at 371. Developping states are also weary of ‘New Wave 
Protectionism’, the modern corollary of ‘Grandfather Protectionism’. The latter included discriminatory customs 
and tariff barriers with the aim of controlling the influx of foreign products into domestic markets.  In fact, one of 
the GATT’s objectives was to eliminate such barriers. New Wave Protectionism on the other hand refers to state 
practices involving environmental or labour measures indirectly but ultimately aim at restricting foreign products. 
See R. Ricupero, ‘Trade and Environment: Strengthening Complementarities and Reducing Conflicts’, in G. 
Sampson, and W. Bradnee Chambers (eds.), Trade, Environment, and the Millennium (2002), at 32. 
1046 Report of the Appellate Body, Hot-Rolled Lead case, supra note 1042. 
1047 Ibid., at 361. 
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That said, the Shrimps decision was perceived as a turning point in international 
law as it paved the way for non-state actor access in general, and civil society in 
particular, in an inter-state dispute settlement jurisdiction. 1048  It also dedicated 
environmental law questions a considerable portion of its analysis, namely by looking at 
the concept of sustainable development1049 and the precautionary principle, as well as 
citing other international environmental law instruments such as the 1992 UNCED Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, thereby effectively taking into account 
other international law norms when scrutinizing member state compliance to WTO 
law.1050 In particular, it did so in order to interpret the notion of ‘exhaustible natural 
resources’ cited in Article XX(b) of the GATT. This approach is consistent with Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, which opens the door for treaty interpretation in light 
of ‘any relevant rules of international law’. 1051  It can be generally argued that civil 
society organizations precisely aimed to influence Panels’ or the Appellate Body’s 
decisions towards a more favourable position on environmental protection. Yet, it 
remains unclear whether either has ever considered arguments contained in amicus curiae 
submissions in their decisions. This indeed echoes the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism’s restrictive position towards civil society involvement, which is in fact 
                                                 
1048 See P. Sands, ‘Turtles and Torturers: the Transformation of International Law’, (2001) 33 New York Journal 
of International Law and Politics 527. 
1049 The Appellate Body in the Shrimps case noted that sustainable development was recognized as an objective 
in se by the WTO Agreement, and allowed it to adopt an evolutionary interpretation of the concept of 
‘exhaustible natural resources’ under XX(g) of the GATT. See Report of the Appellate Body, Shrimps case, 
supra note 1027, at para 129. 
1050 It cited Principle 12 in support of state multilateralism when enacting environmental measures, which states 
that: ‘States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to 
economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental 
degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with 
environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental 
measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an 
international consensus’. See Rio Declaration, supra note 96. See also Report of the Appellate Body, Shrimps 
case, supra note 1027, at para 41, 68. 
1051 Article 31 states that: ‘(1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose…(3). There shall 
be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of 
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’. See United Nations, Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, entered into force 27 January 1980, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, at 331 (‘Vienna 
Convention’). See also D.A., Dam-De Jong, supra note 99, at 30. 
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further substantiated by the unwillingness of most member states to amend the DSU in 
order to formalize, and thus confirm the validity and relevance, of the amicus procedure.  
3.3 International human rights jurisdictions’ liberalism 
International human rights jurisdictions accept in a liberal fashion amicus curiae 
submissions. Yet, the rules governing such access do not substantially differ from the 
ones discussed hitherto as will be shown below when delving into the practice of the 
ECtHR, IACtHR, and ACHPR. 
The ECtHR has for long had a liberal approach regarding the acceptance of 
amicus curiae submissions.1052 Having said that, prior to the entry into force of Protocol 
11 in 1998, there was no explicit reference to the amicus curiae procedure under the 
Court’s relevant procedural rules. Article 36(2) ‘Third Party Intervention’ now governs 
the procedure,1053 which reads as follows:  
The President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration of justice, invite any 
High Contracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings or any person concerned who is not 
the applicant to submit written comments or take part in hearings.1054  
Rule 44(2)(a) of the ECtHR Rules of Court further provides that:  
Once notice of an application has been given to the respondent Contracting Party under Rule 51 § 
1 or Rule 54 § 2 (b), the President of the Chamber may, in the interests of the proper 
administration of justice, as provided in Article 36 § 2 of the Convention, invite, or grant leave to, 
any Contracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings, or any person concerned who is not 
the applicant, to submit written comments or, in exceptional cases, to take part in a hearing’.1055 
                                                 
1052 Laura van den Eynde’s empirical research shows that, up to 2013, NGOs have submitted amicus briefs in 
over 237 cases, i.e. 1.37 per cent of the ECtHR’s proceedings. However, in 307 of the total judgements delivered 
by the Grand Chamber up to that date, NGOs have intervened in 65 of them, i.e. in 21 per cent of the Grand 
Chamber’s cases. See L. van den Eynde, supra note 72, at 280. Indeed, amicus submissions were made in many 
seminal cases, most notably including: Malone v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 02 August 1984, [1984] ECtHR 
(8691/79); Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 May 1985, [1985] ECtHR (8225/78); Lingen v. 
Austria, Judgment of 08 July 1986, [1986] ECtHR (9815/82); Monell and Morris v. United Kingdom, Judgment 
of 2 March 1987, [1987] ECtHR (9562/81; 9818/82); Soering v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 07 July 1989, 
[1989] ECtHR (14038/88); Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 May 1993, [1993] 
ECtHR (14553/89; 14554/89); and more recently for instance - Opuz v. Turkey, Judgment of 9 June 2009, [2009] 
ECtHR (33401/02). See also E. Metcalfe, infra note 1074, at 23.  
1053 The ECHR refers to the amicus curiae procedure as ‘Third Party Intervention’. However, the term should not 
be confused with how third party intervention is conceptualized under the present research. See Introduction. 
1054 ECHR, supra note 844, Article 36. 
1055 Other more technical conditions are also set forth: ‘(b) Requests for leave for this purpose must be duly 
reasoned and submitted in writing in one of the official languages as provided in Rule 34 § 4 not later than 
twelve weeks after notice of the application has been given to the respondent Contracting Party. Another time-
limit may be fixed by the President of the Chamber for exceptional reasons… 5. Any invitation or grant of leave 
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Essentially, it is generally understood that the key conditions to the acceptance of 
an amicus submission are the following: (i) the participation by an intervener who is 
interested in the outcome of the proceedings; and (ii) the intervention is in the interests of 
the proper administration of justice.1056  
There are numerous ECtHR cases involving amicus curiae submissions by civil 
society. However, as an over-arching rule, it is argued that ‘the likelihood of an NGO 
participating in litigation depends, at least in part, on the case in question having a 
potential importance that extends beyond securing the rights of an individual 
applicant’.1057   
One of such cases is Muñoz Díaz v. Spain. María Luisa Muñoz Diaz – a Rom of 
Spanish nationality – filed a case against Spain under Article 34 of the ECHR for 
violations of her right against discrimination primarily because the civil effects of her 
Roma marriage were not recognized by the social security authorities.1058 The applicant 
exhausted local remedies when Spain’s Constitutional Court had rendered an unfavorable 
decision.1059 The ECtHR allowed Union Romaní – a Spanish Roma association – to file 
an amicus brief pursuant to Article 36(2) of the ECHR and Rule 44(2)(a) of the ECtHR’s 
Rules of Court 1060  – without providing any justification for its acceptance. 1061  The 
association acted as an interested third party to the dispute, and as a provider of 
information to the ECtHR on the solemnization of marriage under the rites of the Roma 
community. The submission of Union Romaní’s brief did not seem to stir any procedural 
                                                                                                                                                 
referred to in paragraph 3 (a) of this Rule shall be subject to any conditions, including time-limits, set by the 
President of the Chamber. Where such conditions are not complied with, the President may decide not to include 
the comments in the case file or to limit participation in the hearing to the extent that he or she considers 
appropriate.’ . See ECtHR Rules of Court, entered into force on 1 January 2014, available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/rules_court_eng.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014).  
1056 Ibid., at 98. 
1057 L. Hodson, NGOs and the Struggle for Human Rights in Europe (2011), at 63.  
1058 The applicant was claiming, inter alia, her right against discrimination under Article 14 of the ECHR had 
been violated when the National Institute of Social Security refused to pay her a survivor’s pension following her 
husband’s death on the grounds that her marriage solemnised under the rites of the Roma community had no civil 
effects. See Muñoz Díaz v. Spain, Judgment of 8 December 2009, [2009] ECtHR (49151/07), at 3. 
1059 Ibid., at 5-6. 
1060 The Court merely stated that: ‘The parties filed their observations. In addition, third-party comments were 
received from Unión Romaní which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure 
as amicus curiae (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2 of the Rules of Court)’. Ibid., at 5. 
1061 This was also the case in Opuz v. Turkey, where the Court merely acknowledged the fact that an amicus 
submission was made, and then delved onto the arguments raised therein: ‘Third-party comments were received 
from Interights, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the 
Convention and Rule 44 § 2 of the Rules of Court). The Government replied to those comments (Rule 44 § 5)’. 
See Opuz v. Turkey, supra note 1052, at 5. 
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debates, and the Court rather focused on the substantive matters of the case. Union 
Romaní had also clearly taken the side of the claimant by submitting arguments in its 
favour. It most notably claimed that the Spanish government’s refusal to pay the 
claimant’s survival’s pension was ‘disproportionate’ – an argument that was noted by the 
Court.1062  
This case merely reflects the ECtHR’s liberal practice in relation to the 
acceptance of amicus curiae submissions, which is no different than what is adopted by 
other international human rights jurisdictions, i.e. there are no cases which set out 
extensive ratione materiae and ratione personae criteria such as the Asbestos case at the 
WTO for instance – as will be shown further below.1063  
There is an extensive practice for amicus curiae participation in contentious cases 
at the IACtHR, as well as in advisory proceedings where human rights organizations tend 
to advocate liberal interpretations of the IACHR. 1064 This procedure is covered by Article 
44(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR and it therefore opens the door to 
individuals or organizations to file submissions. The Article reads as follows:  
1. Any person or institution seeking to act as amicus curiae may submit a brief to the Tribunal, 
together with its annexes, by any of the means established in Article 28(1) of these Rules of 
Procedure, in the working language of the case and bearing the names and signatures of its authors 
[…].1065 
The Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua case involved quite a substantial number of amici 
curiae and is therefore a suitable example. In this case, the IACtHR received amicus 
briefs submitted by various organizations such as the International Human Rights Law 
Group, the Assembly of First Nations of Canada – the national representative 
organization of Canada’s indigenous peoples, the Organization of Indigenous Syndics of 
                                                 
1062 Muñoz Díaz v. Spain case, supra note 1059, at 14. Cichowski points to other examples where the ECtHR 
quoted amicus briefs in its judgments and, therefore, argues that civil society has at times shaped the Court’s 
decisions. This includes most notably Soering v. United Kingdom, where the Court cited Amnesty International’s 
brief. The Court stated that: ‘This “virtual consensus in Western European legal systems that the death penalty is, 
under current circumstances, no longer consistent with regional standards of justice”, to use the words of 
Amnesty International, is reflected in Protocol No 6 to the Convention, which provides for the abolition of the 
death penalty in time of peace’. See Soering v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 1989, [1988] ECtHR 
(14038/88), at para 102. See also generally R. Cichowski, ‘Civil Society and the European Court of Human 
Rights’, in J. Christoffersen and M. Rask Madsen (eds.), The European Court of Human Rights between Law and 
Politics (2011).  
1063 Report of the Appellate Body, Asbestos case, supra note 1030.  
1064 J.M. Pasqualucci, supra note 914, at 74. 
1065  Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Article 44, available at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento/regla_ing.pdf. 
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the Nicaraguan Caribbean, the Mohawks Indigenous Community of Akewsasne, and the 
National Congress of American Indians.1066 The Court accepted the briefs without the 
need to raise any issues relating to their admissibility. Conversely, the IACtHR has rarely 
quoted from or cited amicus briefs; yet, there is evidence that the Court has relied on the 
research and analysis provided by the briefs.1067 It is worthy to note nonetheless that the 
recognition of the Awas Tingni’s communal rights may be regarded as a positive 
reception by the IACtHR of the amici curiae’s arguments. 
As far as the ACHPR is concerned, article 99(16) of the ACHPR’s Rules of 
Procedure states that:  
The Commission may receive amicus curiae briefs on communication. During the hearing of a 
Communication in which an amicus curiae brief has been filed, the Commission, where necessary 
shall permit the author of the brief or the representative to address the Commission. 1068 
The ACHPR’s amicus practice is reflected in CEMIRIDE and MRG on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, a Kenyan NGO called the Centre on Housing Rights 
and Evictions (COHRE) filed an amicus curiae brief that the ACHPR plainly considered 
as an integral part of the claimants arguments against Kenya. 1069  Again, COHRE’s 
amicus submission did not seem to have stirred any legal debates nor did Kenya object to 
it. The ACHPR did not make explicit reference to it in its final decision either. This case 
reflects the ACHPR’s liberal practice in relation to amicus curiae submissions, which is 
similar to the approach adopted by other international human rights jurisdictions. 
4. The peculiar case of third party intervention 
Although not accessible to civil society, there is a need to understand third party 
intervention as a procedural modality under municipal as well as international law prior 
to discussing civil society petitions for third party intervention in the UPS v. Canada and 
                                                 
1066 J.M. Pasqualucci, , supra note 914, at 215; The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Republic of 
Nicaragua, Judgment of 31 August 2001, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (series C) No. 79 (2001), para. 
29-62. 
1067 Ibid., at 75. 
1068 Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 99(16), available at: 
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/rules-of-procedure-2010/rules_of_procedure_2010_en.pdf. 
1069 CEMIRIDE and MRG on behalf of EWC v. Kenya case, supra note 608, at 31. 
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Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia cases in Part III1070 where both petitions were premised on 
the ‘direct interests’ at stake.1071 
4.1 Third party intervention before common law courts 
Third party intervention is extensively regulated under common law. As 
previously pointed out, in the UK, the term ‘third party intervention’ generally refers to 
the amicus curiae procedure.1072 A notion similar to ‘intervention of right’ – as it is called 
in US federal civil procedure law – does however exist under English law.1073 Having 
said that, intervention in public interest litigation, as known under US law, is far from 
similar under English law and jurisprudence, where such cases primarily involve to a 
lesser degree the amicus procedure.1074 Canadian law on the other hand is more similar to 
US law where both its rules1075 and practice1076 clearly distinguish between the amicus 
                                                 
1070 See Part III – Section 1.3.1. 
1071 UPS v Canada, infra note 1241, para 22 and Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra 716, at 
para 2.  
1072 This is also the case of the ECHR, which refers to the amicus curiae procedure as ‘Third Party Intervention’. 
As previously suggested, the term should not be confused with how third party intervention is conceptualized 
under the present research. See ECHR, supra note 844, Article 36. See also Introduction .  
1073 English courts have the power to ‘try two or more claims on the same occasion’ by virtue of Article 3.1 (2)(h) 
of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). In addition, Article 19.1 CPR indicates that any number of claimants or 
defendants may be joined as parties to a claim. It states that: ‘(2) The court may order a person to be added as a 
new party if – (a) it is desirable to add the new party so that the court can resolve all the matters in dispute in the 
proceedings; or (b) there is an issue involving the new party and an existing party which is connected to the 
matters in dispute in the proceedings, and it is desirable to add the new party so that the court can resolve that 
issue.’ See Civil Procedure Rules, entry into force 13 November 2013, available at: 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules (last accessed 06 October 2014). For a closer 
analysis, see also A. Zuckerman, infra note 1090, at 441. 
1074 E. Metcalfe, ‘JUSTICE Report: To Assist the Court: Third Party Interventions in the UK’, dated 26 October 
2009, available at: http://www.justice.org.uk/resources.php/32/to-assist-the-court (last accessed 06 October 2014), 
at 7-8. JUSTICE is UK-based civil society organization dedicated to ‘advancing the access to justice, human 
rights, and the rule of law’. 
1075 Rule 55 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada provides that: ‘Any person interested in an application 
for leave to appeal, an appeal or a reference may make a motion for intervention to a judge.’. The requirements 
and regulating criteria are provided further below under Rule 57, which provides that: ‘(1) The affidavit in 
support of a motion for intervention shall identify the person interested in the proceeding and describe that 
person’s interest in the proceeding, including any prejudice that the person interested in the proceeding would 
suffer if the intervention were denied. (2) A motion for intervention shall (a) identify the position the person 
interested in the proceeding intends to take with respect to the questions on which they propose to intervene; and 
(b) set out the submissions to be advanced by the person interested in the proceeding with respect to the 
questions on which they propose to intervene, their relevance to the proceeding and the reasons for believing that 
the submissions will be useful to the Court and different from those of the other parties.’. As mentioned 
previously, the amicus curiae procedure is on the other hand regulated under Rule 92. See Rules of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, supra note 970 (our emphasis), and the Ontario Rules of Civil Proceedings, infra note 1254. 
See also E. Metcalfe, supra note 1074, at 42-43. 
1076  In the landmark Reference re Secession of Quebec case, the Supreme Court of Canada accepted (and 
addressed the arguments of) both amicus curiae submissions and third party interventions. The latter were 
namely made by indigenous nations and groups such as Kitigan Zibi Anishinabeg, the Grand Council of the 
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and third party intervention procedures – as manifestly reflected in the judicial reviews of 
the already mentioned NAFTA awards of Metalclad v. Mexico and S.D. Myers v. Canada. 
In the first case, both the Attorney Generals of Canada and Quebec acted as third party 
intervenors in support of Mexico.1077 While in the second case, Mexico acted as a third 
party intervenor in support of Canada and the Canadian Alliance on Trade and 
Environment submitted an amicus curiae brief.1078 Interestingly, in the judicial review of 
S.D. Myers v. Canada, the Federal Court rejected the Canadian Alliance on Trade and 
Environment’s request to act as third party intervenor. 1079 The Alliance’s petition for 
appeal was also dismissed by the Federal Court of Appeal, which found that the 
Alliance’s intervention would be underlying to ‘jurisprudential’ issues.1080 The Alliance 
was nevertheless allowed to submit an amicus curiae brief as previously mentioned.  
As is the case with the amicus procedure, this section focuses on US law due to 
the extensive body of rules and case-law that regulate the procedure of third party 
intervention.1081  
4.1.1 Applicable procedural rules – A look at the US model  
Intervention is a relatively recent development in federal civil procedure.1082 It 
runs counter to the typical common law conception of private law litigation which is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Crees, the Makivik Corporation, but also other civil society groups such as the Minority Advocacy and Rights 
Council and the Committee of Canadian Women on the Constitution; whereas the former were made by a group 
of jurists including an eminent Quebec lawyer in the name of Anre Jolicoeur. See Reference re Secession of 
Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. See also B. Ryder, ‘A Court in Need and a Friend Indeed: An analysis of the 
Arguments of the Amicus Curiae in the Quebec Secession Reference’, (1998) 10 Forum Constitutionnel 01. 
1077 United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, supra note 314. 
1078 Canada (Attorney General) v. S.D. Myers Inc., supra note 320. 
1079 The Federal Court judge noted that: ‘I am not satisfied that the moving parties can bring to the Court a point 
of view with respect to these issues which will, in any material way, be different from that of the parties. The 
essence of the judicial review application is the correct interpretation of the NAFTA. The proposed intervenors 
do not have any particular or unique expertise in interpreting international treaty obligations that would assist the 
Court beyond that which is offered by counsel for Canada, the United States, Mexico, the respondent and the 
members of the Arbitral Tribunal itself. The social policy concerns of the moving parties, including Canada's 
trade policy, would not assist in the determination of the legal issues which arise under the Government's 
application for judicial review’. See Attorney General of Canada, and S.D. Myers, inc., and The Council of 
Canadians, The Sierra Club of Canada and Greenpeace, 2001 F.C.T. 317, Reasons for Order of 11 April 2001, 
para 21. See also Y. Fortier and S. Drymer, supra note 323, at 476.  
1080 Ibid.  
1081 Perhaps the extent of third party intervention (as well as amici curiae) in US litigation is well-reflected by a 
critical UK standpoint as echoed in Harlow’s remarks: ‘Using the deceptive metaphor of the courtroom as a 
political surrogate, campaigning groups are gaining entry to the legal process [which] is transmuting into a 
freeway and, unless we are much more careful, it could degenerate, as has notably occurred in America into a 
free- for-all’. See C. Harlow, infra note 1083, at 17. 
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described as ‘adversarial’ or ‘bipolar’,1083 and where litigation typically consists of two 
persons asserting directly opposed interests.1084 In the same vein, it is also recognized 
under common law that in essence litigating parties should not be ‘disturbed’ by non-
disputing third parties:  
the fundamental principle underlying legal procedure is that parties to a controversy shall have the 
right to litigate the same free from the interference of strangers.1085 
The reasons for permitting intervention are more compatible with public law 
litigation than with private law one and, therefore, intervention should be viewed more 
liberally in public law contexts. 1086  As extensively discussed previously, a similar 
argument is raised in relation to investor-state disputes. Detractors of broader third party 
involvement, i.e. whether through the amicus curiae or otherwise, pointedly ground their 
position on the consensual and private nature of international commercial arbitration; 
whereas proponents call for a need to distinguish between investor-state disputes that are 
public interest-related and those that are more akin to international commercial 
arbitration.1087  
Subject to limitations that may be imposed by courts, intervention typically takes 
the form of the right to present written arguments, oral arguments, evidence, and the right 
to tender issues, seek redress, compensation, as well as other remedies. 1088 Disputing 
parties may therefore be subjected to unexpected burdens, including additional costs and 
                                                                                                                                                 
1082 It is argued, however, that the practice originated long before its formal codification under federal procedural 
rules. Indeed, Krislov traces the practice of intervention back to a 1812 case – The Schooner Exchange v. 
McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 116 (1812), where the US Attorney General was allowed to intervene. See M. 
Harris, ‘Intervention of Right in Judicial Proceedings to Review Informal Federal Rulemakings’, (2012) 40 
Hofstra Law Review 879, at 880, and S. Krislov, supra note 971, at 698. 
1083 C. Harlow, ‘Public Law and Popular Justice’, (2002) 65 The Modern Law Review 01, at 1-2, 13. Taking a 
UK standpoint, Harlow generally argues that intervention is used as a complementary activity political 
campaigning by pressure and interest groups, and that ultimately, this model  runs counter the fundamental 
essence of a common law judicial process – where access should be limited to only those who can show legal 
interests.  
1084 R. Field et al., Civil Procedure: Materials for a Basic Course (2007), at 984 citing E. Jones’ commentary on 
the Superior Court’s refusal to grant the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s request 
to intervene in University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978). See E. Jones, ‘Litigation 
Without Representation: The Need for Intervention to Affirm Affirmative Action’, (1979) 14 Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 31.  
1085 See Consolidated Liquor Corp. v. Scotello & Nizzi, 21 N.M. 485, 155 Pac. 1089, 1093 (1916), at paras 494-
95, cited in S. Krislov, supra note 971, at 696. 
1086 Ibid., at 985 citing E. Jones. 
1087 See the discussion in Part I – Section 1.5.2. 
1088 G. Hazard et al., supra note 977, at 771. 
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delays to proceedings. As is the case with the amicus curiae procedure, it is argued that 
intervention often expands the information available to a court in its search for an 
equitable adjudication of the merits. This would justify expansive participation in the 
efforts to shape a suitable remedy. In this light, not only has the procedure been used by 
civil society actors such as civil rights advocates or environmental groups, but also 
lobbying groups and trade associations, state and federal government agencies.1089  
Under US law, a court may exercise its power to allow the addition of a party on 
the application of any disputing party or of the person who wishes to act as a third party 
on the basis of their interest in a particular dispute.1090 Under federal law, this is covered 
by Article 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the US District Courts on 
‘intervention of right’. Considered as a codification of the prevalent court practice at the 
time, the US Supreme Court adopted Rule 24 in 1938 and essentially restricted 
intervention ‘when the applicant could demonstrate an interest in property in the custody 
of the Court’.1091 It was later expanded in 1966 in order to grant ‘an applicant the right to 
intervene in any action in which the applicant can show an interest that the outcome of 
the action might harm’.1092 In its current formulation, Rule 24(a)(2) states that:  
On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who…claims an interest relating to 
the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless 
existing parties adequately represent that interest. 1093 
This provision then laid the foundation for American states to adopt similar 
provisions at the state level. 1094 The fundamental point to note here is that it is argued 
                                                 
1089 E. Shaver, infra note 1098, at 1558, G. Hazard et al., supra note 977, at 771, and C. Tobias, infra 1204, at 
317. 
1090 A. Zuckerman, Civil Procedure (2003), at 442. 
1091 The Rule was later amended in 1946 to extend intervention to interest in property not in the custody of the 
Court. See E. Shaver, infra note 1098, at 1556. 
1092 It is argued that the 1966 amendment was in response to the practice of lower federal courts of broadly 
construing the property interest requirement of the 1946 version of the Rule to permit more applicants to 
intervene. The 1966 amendment is still in force to this day. See E. Shaver, infra note 1098, at 1557, and M. 
Harris, supra note 1082, at 880.   
1093 See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, as amended on 01 December 2013, 
available at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_24 (last accessed 06 October 2014) (our emphasis).  
1094  See for instance, Articles 387 and 388 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which state that: ‘387.  (a) 
Upon timely application, any person, who has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of 
the parties, or an interest against both, may intervene in the action or proceeding. An intervention takes place 
when a third person is permitted to become a party to an action or proceeding between other persons, either by 
joining the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or by uniting with the defendant in resisting the 
claims of the plaintiff, or by demanding anything adversely to both the plaintiff and the defendant, and is made 
by complaint, setting forth the grounds upon which the intervention rests, filed by leave of the court and served 
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that the formulation Rule 24(a)(2) – which dates back to the 1966 amendment – has been 
broadly and expansively construed to include intervention by non-disputing parties in 
public interest cases.1095  Indeed, such an interpretation is seemingly in line with the 
intention of the Advisory Committee which drafted the Rule prior to its adoption in 
1966.1096  
From a more technical standpoint, Rule 24(a)(2) contains four elements: (i) 
timeliness; (ii) the interest of the applicant must relate to the specific property or 
transaction at issue in the pending litigation or, in other words, an interest in the property 
or transaction on which the action is based; (iii) the applicant must face at least practical 
impairment of that interest, even if the applicant would not formally be bound by a 
judgment in a civil action to which it is not a party, or in other words, a threat that the 
movant’s interest could be impaired by disposition of the action; and (iv) the conduct of 
the litigation by disputing parties must not vicariously protect the interest of the applicant 
or, in other words, a lack of adequate representation of the movant’s interest by either of 
the disputing parties.1097  
                                                                                                                                                 
upon the parties to the action or proceeding who have not appeared in the same manner as upon the 
commencement of an original action, and upon the attorneys of the parties who have appeared, or upon the party 
if he has appeared without an attorney, in the manner provided for service of summons or in the manner provided 
by Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1010) Title 14 of Part 2. A party served with a complaint in intervention 
may within 30 days after service move, demur, or otherwise plead to the complaint in the same manner as to an 
original complaint. (b) If any provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene or if the person seeking 
intervention claims an interest relating to the property to transaction which is the subject of the action and that 
person is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede that person's 
ability to protect that interest, unless that person's interest is adequately represented by existing parties, the court 
shall, upon timely application, permit that person to intervene. 
388.  In an action brought by a party for relief of any nature other than solely for money damages where a 
pleading alleges facts or issues concerning alleged pollution or adverse environmental effects which could affect 
the public generally, the party filing the pleading shall furnish a copy to the Attorney General of the State of 
California. The copy shall be furnished by the party filing the pleading within 10 days after filing’. See 
California Code of Civil Procedure, available at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/table_civil_procedure (last 
accessed 06 October 2014). See also, G. Hazard et al., supra note 977, at 728. 
1095 See P. Appel, ‘Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm’, (2000) 78 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 215, at 215, and M. Harris, supra note 1082, at 893. 
1096 US law professor Carl Tobias notes that ‘the Committee intended judges to apply the intervention device 
flexibly and pragmatically and evinced some cognizance of public law litigation and of intervention in it’. See C. 
Tobias, infra 1204, at 318. 
1097 Applications for adding parties must also be supported by evidence which shows the connection of the 
proposed party to the proceedings. Regarding timeliness, courts take into account the length of time that the 
applicant has had knowledge of the case, as well as when the applicant realized that the action would have some 
impact on its interests. See J. Oakley, and V. Amar, American Civil Procedure: A Guide to Civil Adjudication in 
US Courts (2009), at 151; E. Shaver, infra note 1098, at 1552; M. Harris, supra note 1082, at 892; P. Appel, 
supra note 1095, at 227.  
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4.1.2 A sine qua non condition: The existence of a ‘direct, significant, and 
legally protectable interest in an action to intervene’ 
It is worthy to delve into further details on the scope of points (i) and (iv) on 
interest and the lack of adequate representation, which are two key criteria that may be 
relevantly applied to other jurisdictions such as investor-state tribunals. Indeed, point (i) 
relating to interest is crucial. Typically, courts focus primarily on the adequacy of a 
potential intervenor’s interest in a given case.1098 There are two types of interests that fall 
under Rule 24(a)(2). First, intervenors may wish to seek the protection of a property 
interest – and in such cases the requirement would be satisfied. Third parties have 
accordingly intervened on the basis of in rem as well as other monetary interests.1099 
Indeed prior to the 1966 amendment, intervention of right was generally resorted to in 
commercial, real or personal property disputes.1100 In other more complex cases, which 
have in practice included public interest-related cases, the potential intervenor would 
need to ‘show that the outcome of the action will harm [its] legal interests’.1101 There is 
no guidance on the exact scope of such interest. Indeed, courts have not provided a 
precise definition of the notion of ‘interest’ under Rule 24(a)(2); rather, they have placed 
the burden on potential intervenors to demonstrate their interest in each particular 
case. 1102  For instance, in Tribovich v. United Mine Workers, 1103  the Supreme Court 
allowed a union member to intervene of right in an action by the Secretary of Labor to set 
aside a union election.1104 In Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt,1105 the Appellate Court 
granted the Audubon Society – an NGO dedicated to wildlife protection – the right to 
intervene to defend an order by the Secretary of the Interior to set aside land in Idaho as a 
                                                 
1098 E. Shaver, ‘Intervention in the Public Interest Under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’, 
(1988) 45 Washington and Lee Law Review 1549, at 1550. 
1099 R. Field et al., supra note 1084, at 982-983. 
1100 G. Hazard et al., supra note 977, at 754.  
1101 See E. Shaver, supra note 1098, at 1551 and G. Hazard et al., supra note 977, at 770-771. 
1102 Ibid., at 1569 referring to Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, (3d Cir. 1987), at para 596 (stating that 1966 
version of Rule 24(a)(2) permits courts to settle intervention questions flexibly). 
1103 404 U.S. 528, 92 S. Ct. 630 (1972).  
1104 The Court noted that the union member in question had filed the initial complaint to the Secretary against the 
election. It also stated that ‘the Rule is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of his interest ‘may be’ 
inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should be treated as minimal’. As the Secretary must 
represent the public interest in free union elections as well as protect the rights of the union member, ‘the union 
member may have a valid complaint about the performance of ‘his lawyer’. Ibid., at para 539. See also R. Field 
et al., supra note  1084, at, at 983. 
1105 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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refuge for birds. 1106 In Bustop v. Superior Court,1107  the California Court of Appeal 
overturned the denial of Bustop’s – an association of Bustop of predominantly white 
parents – right to intervene in a case which concerned a desegregation plan proposed by 
the Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles that the association opposed.1108 In 
Keith v. Daley,1109 however, as was the case in some of the abortion-related decisions 
discussed in the amicus curiae analysis, 1110  the Appellate Court denied intervention 
requests by ‘pro-life’ anti-abortion civil society groups on the basis of the inadequacy of 
their interest.1111 The Court reiterated that an applicant ‘must show a direct, significant, 
and legally protectable interest in an action to intervene’ and that the Coalition failed to 
meet the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2).1112 This position was also later confirmed 
by the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Charles, which was another case involving an 
intervention request by a ‘pro-life’ advocate.1113  
                                                 
1106 The plaintiff, Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc., had initially lobbied against the bird sanctuary and then challenged a 
decision by the Secretary of the Interior creating a wildlife refuge for birds; whereas the Audubon Society had 
lobbied for the creation of the bird sanctuary. The Appellate Court held that the Audubon Society (i) had filed a 
timely motion to intervene; (ii) clearly had an interest in the action because the group had supported the Snake 
River Wildlife Refuge; and (iii) its interest would be harmed if the Court rules in favour of the plaintiff. See Ibid., 
at paras 527-529. also E. Shaver, supra note 1098, at 1559-1561.  
1107 69 Ca. App.3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 793. 
1108 The Court confirmed that Bustop, its members, and the persons whom it purports to represent do have an 
interest in the litigation. In addition, it noted that a reformulation by the trial court of the desegregation plan does 
not relate to the legal right of Bustop or any other group, but those do have an interest in one plan rather than 
another. See Ibid., at paras 71-73. See also G. Hazard et al., supra note 977, at 765-769.  
1109  764 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1985).  
1110  See for instance National Organization for Women Inc. v. Scheidler, supra note 987. 
1111  The case concerned the constitutionality of a law enacted by the state of Illinois regulating abortions. 
Plaintiffs argued that it violated a woman's constitutional right of privacy and the doctors’ right to practice 
medicine. The applicant intervenors (the ‘Illinois Pro-Life Coalition’)  had initially lobbied the state of Illinois 
for the adoption of the law in question. See Ibid., at paras 1267-1268. See also E. Shaver, supra note 1098, at 
1562-1564. 
1112 The Court provided two reasons. First, the Seventh Circuit held that the Coalition’s lobbying efforts in favour 
of the abortion statute did not create a direct, legally protectable interest in the action. Second, the Seventh 
Circuit stated that the Coalition could not be a defendant in the action. Because the plaintiffs sought to prevent 
the State of Illinois from enforcing the allegedly unconstitutional statute, the Seventh Circuit stated that only 
officials of the State of Illinois charged with enforcing the statute could be defendants in the action. Because the 
Coalition could not enforce the statute, the Seventh Circuit held, the Coalition could not be a defendant in the 
action and had no interest in the action sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2). See Ibid., at para 
1269. See also E. Shaver, supra note 1098, at 1563 (our emphasis). 
1113 In Diamond v. Charles, Dr Diamond initially sought to intervene on the ground that ‘his interest as a 
conscientious objector to the practice of abortion, as well as his status as a father of a teenage girl, could be 
impacted by an outcome in the case’. The Supreme Court found that Dr Diamond lacked a ‘significantly 
protectable interest’, which calls for a direct and concrete interest that is accorded some degree of legal 
protection. In the same vein, it noted that the Article III of the Constitution standing requirement is necessary for 
intervenors to continue litigation on appeal if the original party has discontinued litigating. See Diamond v. 
Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986), at paras 74-76. See also M. Harris, supra note 1082, at 896. 
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In sum, it is argued that more recent jurisprudential developments indicate that the 
interest requirement is now ‘a fairly lenient one’.1114 Courts tend to engage in an analysis 
that takes into account the circumstances and practical effects on the prospective 
intervenors (and whether those justify their participation) rather than a rigid or technical 
one of the requirements above. 
Point (iv) on the other hand implies a requirement on the intervenor to establish 
that the disputing parties cannot adequately represent its interests. This may be done by 
showing that the parties’ interest are not identical to the intervenor’s, or are in conflict 
with the latter’s, or the parties ‘do not have the incentive to prosecute the action 
vigorously’.1115 In requests for interventions in cases involving government agencies, 
some courts have in the past rejected such requests on the basis of the presumption that 
the government would be capable of representing ‘the interests of all its citizens’.1116 In a 
similar vein, some courts – as well as commentators – have argued that intervenors were 
required to establish independent standing as per the case or controversy requirement 
under Article III of the US Constitution, 1117  or in other words to demonstrate an 
independent cause of action. This would thereby have the effect of significantly 
restricting the intervention of right practice.1118  
                                                 
1114 This position is reflected in the landmark case of United States v. Reserve Mining Co., where the Court of 
Appeals stressed that: ‘the ‘interest’ requirement in the context of this environmental case, should be viewed as 
an inclusionary rather than exclusionary device’. See United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. 
Minn. 1972), at para 413. See also P. Appel, supra note 1095, at 227, and R. Field et al., supra note  1084, at, at 
983 and M. Harris, supra note 1082, at 897.   
1115 See E. Shaver, supra note 1098, at 1554 referring to F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Miscellaneous Warehousmen's 
Union, 629 F.2d (7th Cir. 1980), at para 1204, as well as other Appellate Court decisions.  
1116 Appel argues however that: ‘More courts now recognize that outsiders might have interests that a government 
would overlook or fail to emphasize’. See P. Appel, supra note 1095, at 274, and M. Harris, supra note 1082, at 
898.  
1117 Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 states that: ‘1:  The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of 
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to 
Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of 
different States, --between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and 
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects’. See US Constitution, supra 
note 981. 
1118  Under US law, the test for individual standing contains three elements: (i) the plaintiff must have suffered an 
injury which must be ‘concrete and particularized’ or actual or imminent and not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’; 
(ii) the injury must be ‘fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant’; and (iii) it must be likely and 
not speculative that the relief will prevent or redress the injury. See E. Shaver, supra note 1098, at 1553 referring 
to Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1982), at para 185, as well as other Appellate Court decisions. 
See also G. Hazard et al., supra note 977, at 727-728, M. Harris, supra note 1082, at 899 citing Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), at para 560. See also Diamond v. Charles, supra note 1113, on the 
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In general, it is broadly recognized that intervention enhances a court’s ability to 
receive useful information and to, accordingly, structure appropriate remedies. It has also 
precluded injury to ‘absentees’. As is the case with the amicus curiae procedure, it has 
been argued, however, that courts should take into account the burden caused by 
intervention on the disputing parties in terms of additional costs and delays, as well as on 
the efficiency of the judicial system.1119 Commentators have thus pointed to the necessity 
for courts to balance the (i) protection of third parties’ interest, (ii) original disputing 
parties’ interest in controlling the litigation, and (iii) accuracy and efficiency of 
proceedings.1120 A narrow interpretation of the interest requirement is often the method 
for courts to restrict interventions in cases that could have caused unfair burdens onto 
disputing parties.1121  
4.2 A function unavailable to civil society: third party intervention as practiced 
before international jurisdictions  
State third party intervention is set forth under a wide variety of international 
treaties 1122  such as the ECHR, as previously mentioned, 1123  the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1124  or the WTO DSU 1125  where intervention is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Article III of the Constitution standing requirement in appeals by intervenors; P. Appel, supra note 1095, at 269-
270. 
1119  The Advisory Committee drafting Rule 24(a)(2) back in 1966 had also emphasized the necessity to ensure 
the conduct of efficient proceedings by subjecting intervention to any appropriate conditions or requirements. 
See P. Appel, supra note 1095, at 216, 256; and E. Shaver, supra note 1098, at 1571. 
1120 M. Harris, supra note 1082, at 881.   
1121 J. Scro, ‘Removing the Roadblock to Intervention of Right: Wilderness Society v. U.S. Forest Service and 
the Ninth Circuit’s Decision to Abandon Its Federal Defendant Rule’, (2012) 53 Boston College Law Review 
237, at 240. 
1122 For an exhaustive survey, see A. Zimmermann, supra note 55, at para 2. 
1123 See supra note 64. 
1124 Articles 31 and 32 of the Statute to ITLOS provide that: ‘Article 3l - “Request to intervene” (1). Should a 
State Party consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in any dispute, 
it may submit a request to the Tribunal to be permitted to intervene. (2). It shall be for the Tribunal to decide 
upon this request. (3). If a request to intervene is granted, the decision of the Tribunal in respect of the dispute 
shall be binding upon the intervening State Party in so far as it relates to matters in respect of which that State 
Party intervened. 
Article 32 - “Right to intervene in cases of interpretation or application” (1). Whenever the interpretation or 
application of this Convention is in question, the Registrar shall notify all States Parties forthwith. (2). Whenever 
pursuant to Article 21 or 22 of this Annex the interpretation or application of an international agreement is in 
question, the Registrar shall notify all the parties to the agreement. (3). Every party referred to in paragraphs 1 
and 2 has the right to intervene in the proceedings; if it uses this right, the interpretation given by the judgment 
will be equally binding upon it’. See Annex VI, Statute Of The International Tribunal For The Law Of The Sea, 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 85 (our emphasis).  
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premised on a ‘legal interest’ or a ‘substantial interest’. For the purposes of this research, 
and in light of the previous analysis, it is most relevant to focus at this stage on the 
existence of the procedure at the ICJ and under various BITs.  
The ICJ provides an extensive and authoritative body of jurisprudence on the 
question of third state intervention. A detailed look at the Court’s decisions, and judges’ 
dissenting opinions, on what constitutes, or should constitute, a ‘legal interest’ that would 
justify third state intervention largely exceeds the scope of this research. This section 
rather aims to identify third state intervention as a modality available under international 
law. In a similar vein, looking at a number of BITs sheds light on the possibility and 
modality of this procedure in an investor-state dispute context. Thereafter, a look at the 
rules governing third party intervention under the rules of international commercial 
arbitration is merited given that, as previously mentioned, these rules provide the basis 
for the arbitration rules of investor-state arbitration.1126  
4.2.1 States as third party intervenors before the ICJ on the basis of an 
‘interest of a legal nature’ 
Under its contentious proceedings, the ICJ may allow states that were not initial 
parties to pending proceedings to intervene as a ‘third state’. The Asylum case was the 
first instance in which a third state was allowed to intervene in on-going proceedings.1127 
In this case, Cuba’s application for intervention concerned the interpretation of the 
Havana Convention, to which Cuba is a contracting party.1128 The ICJ accepted Cuba’s 
application pursuant to Article 63 of the ICJ Statute.1129 
                                                                                                                                                 
1125 Article 10 of the DSU provides that: ‘1. The interests of the parties to a dispute and those of other members 
under a covered agreement at issue in the dispute shall be fully taken into account during the panel process. 2. 
Any member having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its interest to the DSB 
(referred to in this Understanding as a “third party”) shall have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to 
make written submissions to the panel. These submissions shall also be given to the parties to the dispute and 
shall be reflected in the panel report. 3. Third parties shall receive the submissions of the parties to the dispute to 
the first meeting of the panel. 4. If a third party considers that a measure already the subject of a panel 
proceeding nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to it under any covered agreement, that member may have 
recourse to normal dispute settlement procedures under this Understanding. Such a dispute shall be referred to 
the original panel wherever possible’. See WTO DSU, supra note 998 (our emphasis).  
1126 See Part I – Section 1.5. 
1127 Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), supra note 855. 
1128 Convention on Asylum, entered into force 21 May 1929, OAS Official Records, OEA/Ser.X/I. Treaty Series 
34. 
1129 Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), supra note 855, at 77. 
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The ICJ Statute sets forth two types of third state intervention.1130 The first type of 
intervention is premised on a third state’s ‘legal interest’ in on-going proceedings 
pursuant to article 62 of the ICJ Statute and is often referred to as ‘discretionary 
intervention’.1131 By contrast, the second type of intervention is premised on a third 
state’s right, in its quality as a contracting party to a treaty, to intervene in on-going 
proceedings where the interpretation of that treaty is at issue pursuant to article 63 of the 
ICJ Statute. This is often referred to as ‘intervention of right’.1132 Despite the fact that this 
procedure is not open to non-state actors, discretionary intervention remains relevant to 
the present research because it reflects an interesting aspect of third party intervention 
from a procedural standpoint, i.e. third states may intervene at the ICJ in on-going 
proceedings as ‘non-parties’ pursuant to Article 62 of the ICJ Statute.1133  This section 
will focus on this form of ‘discretionary intervention’ pursuant to Article 62.  
By way of context, it is important to note that any ICJ judgment is in principle 
only binding between the parties to the respective case, i.e. this is the limited effect of res 
iudicata of a given judgment pursuant to Article 59 of the ICJ Statute.1134 Therefore, any 
judgment is a res inter alios acta for third states.1135 The rationale behind third state 
intervention could be viewed as a recognition of the fact that, notwithstanding this limited 
res iudicata effect ratione personae, judgments could still at least exercise de facto an 
influence as to the position of third states. In addition, allowing third states to intervene 
attempts to avoid repetitive litigation and, eventually, contradictory determinations made 
in different cases.1136  
                                                 
1130 S. Rosenne, Intervention in the International Court of Justice (1993), at 12-13.  
1131 See infra note 1138. 
1132 Article 63 is specific to contracting parties to the same treaty: ‘(1) Whenever the construction of a convention 
to which states other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such 
states forthwith. (2) Every state so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this right, 
the construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it’. ICJ Statute, supra note 94 (our 
emphasis). According to Zimmermann, Article 63 of the ICJ Statute could be traced back to Article 56 of The 
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899, entered into force 4 September 
1900 (187 CTS 410); and Article 84 of The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes of 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910 (36 Stat. 2199,1 Bevans 577, 205 Consol. T.S. 233). See A. 
Zimmermann, supra note 55, at 1. 
1133 S. Rosenne, supra note 1130, at 95. 
1134 Article 59 states that: ‘The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in 
respect of that particular case’. See ICJ Statute, supra note 94. 
1135 A. Zimmermann, supra note 55, at para 4. 
1136 Ibid., at para 4. 
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 Discretionary intervention at the ICJ pursuant to Article 62 of the ICJ Statute 
encompasses the participation of third states in on-going proceedings while not being 
either the applicant or the respondent.1137 Article 62 of the ICJ Statute provides that a 
‘third state’ can intervene when its legal interests may be affected by the decision of the 
Court in said proceedings. It states that:  
l. Should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the 
decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene. 
2. It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request.1138 
Article 62 is further complemented by the Rules of the Court. According to 
Article 81 of the Rules, an application to intervene should set out the interest of a legal 
nature which the state applying to intervene considers may be affected by the decision in 
that case, the precise object of the intervention, as well as any basis of jurisdiction which 
is claimed to exist as between the third state applying to intervene and the state parties to 
the case.1139  
Once its application for intervention is accepted, the Rules of the Court provide 
that an intervening third state (i) gains access to case materials, including pleadings and 
documents; (ii) becomes entitled to submit a written statement; and (iii) make oral 
observations on the subject matter of its intervention.1140 A third state thus secures the 
right to be heard and submit arguments, albeit only with regard to the subject matter of 
its intervention .1141 
As mentioned, it is generally understood that the ICJ may in addition allow third 
states to intervene either as a ‘party’ to pending proceedings. 1142  The ICJ has never 
                                                 
1137 Ibid., supra note 55, at para 2. 
1138 ICJ Statute, supra note 94. 
1139  Article 81, ICJ Rules of Court, supra note 852. However, if the third state’s intervention lacks the 
jurisdictional link, then it does not become a ‘party’ to the dispute and the respective judgment does not amount 
to res iudicata. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute Case (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua 
Intervening), ICJ Rep 92 1990, where an ad hoc chamber of the ICJ found that Nicaragua might be allowed to 
intervene as a third state even without requiring such a jurisdictional link. See also Land and Maritime Boundary 
between Cameroon and Nigeria Case (Cameroon v Nigeria), ICJ Rep 1029 1999. and Sovereignty over Pulau 
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan Case (Indonesia/Malaysia), ICJ Rep 575  2001 cited by A. Zimmermann, supra note 
55, at paras 10, 13. See also S. Rosenne, supra note 1130, at 95, and B. Bonafe, supra note 1154, at 744.  
1140 Article 85,  ICJ Rules of Court, supra note 852. 
1141 A. Zimmermann, supra note 55, at para 13. 
1142 See B. Bonafe, infra note 1154, at 740 citing Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. 
Honduras), Application by Nicaragua for Permission to Intervene, Judgment of 13 September 1990, ICJ Reports 
1990 p. 92, para. 99; and  Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application by Malta for 
Permission to Intervene, Judgment of 14 April 1981(Judge Oda, Separate Opinion), ICJ Reports 1981, p. 3, at 
para. 23.  
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granted a third state leave to intervene as a ‘party’ to pending proceedings, but it is 
generally understood that third state intervention as a ‘party’ entails equivalent 
procedural status and rights as that of the disputing states in the proceedings.1143 Judge 
Oda’s separate opinion in the decision on Malta’s application to intervene in the 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) is often cited as a reference 
explaining the distinction between ‘party’ and ‘non-party’ intervention.1144 Firstly, Judge 
Oda explained some of the key characteristics of intervention as a ‘party’ in the following 
terms: 
I believe it is arguable that a jurisdictional link between the intervening State and the original 
parties to the case would be required if the intervening State were to participate as a full party, and 
that, in such a case, the judgment of the Court would undoubtedly be binding upon the intervening 
State. Such a right of intervention is basically similar to that provided for in the municipal law of 
many States. As a result of the participation of the third party as a full party in the principal case, 
the case will become a litigation among three parties. Similarly, before the International Court of 
Justice, there may be cases in which the third State seeking intervention to secure its alleged right, 
which is involved in the very subject-matter of the original litigation, is linked with the original 
litigant States by its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under the optional 
clause of the Statute or through a specific treaty or convention in force, or by special agreement 
with these two States.1145  
Therefore, as previously mentioned, in the absence of a jurisdictional link, a third 
state intervenor cannot be become a ‘full party’ in a pending case before the ICJ – 
confirming Judge Oda’s position.1146 That being said, Judge Oda went on to emphasize 
that, pursuant to Article 62 of the ICJ Statute, a third state may nevertheless intervene as 
a ‘non-party’ notwithstanding the absence of a jurisdictional link:  
For instance, in the case of the sovereignty over an island, or the delimitation of a territorial 
boundary dividing two States, with a third party also being in a position to claim sovereignty over 
that island or the territory which may be delimited by this boundary, or in a case in which a claim 
to property is in dispute, an unreasonable result could be expected if a jurisdictional link were 
required for the intervention of the third State. If this link is deemed at all times indispensable for 
intervention, the concept of intervention in the International Court of Justice will inevitably 
atrophy. Accordingly, in my submission, if the third State does not have a proper jurisdictional 
link with the original litigant States, it can nevertheless participate, but not as a party within the 
meaning of the term in municipal law. The role to be played by the intervening State in such 
circumstances must be limited.1147 
                                                 
1143 See B. Bonafe, infra note 1154, at 740-741. 
1144 See also S. Rosenne, supra note 1097, at 94-96. 
1145 Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), supra note 1142 (our emphasis), at para 5.  
1146 See supra note 1139. 
1147 Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), supra note 1142 (our emphasis), at para 9. 
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In this light, third state intervention as a ‘non-party’ entails less procedural rights, 
such as the impossibility to nominate a judge ad hoc. 1148  A third state seeking to 
intervene as a ‘non-party’ to pending proceedings does not need to establish that its rights 
may be affected, it does need to establish ius standi. 1149 The third state solely needs to 
establish that it has an interest of a legal nature that may be affected pursuant to Article 
62 of the Statute. In deciding on Costa Rica’s application to intervene in the Territorial 
and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), the ICJ found that applicant third states 
must show a legal interest that is based on law and is ‘real and concrete’:  
Article 62 requires the interest relied upon by the State seeking to intervene to be of a legal nature, 
in the sense that this interest has to be the object of a real and concrete claim of that State, based 
on law, as opposed to a claim of a purely political, economic or strategic nature. But this is not just 
any kind of interest of a legal nature; it must in addition be possible for it to be affected, in its 
content and scope, by the Court’s future decision in the main proceedings. 1150  
A ‘real and concrete’ interest is thus underlying to a legal norm. The third state 
must therefore assert that it has specific, legally protected interests that may be impinged 
on by a decision rendered, without at the same time introducing a new dispute with the 
main disputing parties.1151 This ‘legal interest’ fundamentally differs from a ‘general 
interest’ that is not likely to be affected by the Court’s judgement, e.g. an interest or a 
‘mere preoccupation’ of a third state in the general legal rules and principles likely to be 
applied by the ICJ – a potentially common concern for numerous states that is widely 
understood as excluded from the scope of Article 62 of the Statute.1152 This does not 
exclude, however, that a third state’s legal interest may be related to the reasoning of the 
Court.1153  
                                                 
1148 A. Zimmermann, supra note 55, at para 13.  
1149 Ibid., at 741 citing Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Application for Permission to 
Intervene, Judgment of 4 May 2011,  I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 348, at para 23-26. See also Barcelona Traction 
case, supra note 357, at para 46 on the question  of ius standi.  
1150 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), supra note 1149, at para 26 (our emphasis).  
1151 A. Zimmermann, supra note 55, at para 9. 
1152 See B. Bonafe, infra note 1154, at 742, 755 citing also Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. 
Colombia), supra note 1142, at para 76. See also A. Zimmermann, supra note 55, at para 9. 
1153 In this regard, a third state may opt to intervene if it aims to prevent the formation of a precedent that could 
be contrary to its own specific claims. However, such third state ‘must explain with adequate specificity how 
particular reasoning or interpretation of identified treaties by the Court might affect its claim’. See the ICJ’s 
rejection of the Philippines application to intervene in Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan Case,  
supra note 1139, at para 60. See also P. Palchetti, ‘Opening the ICJ to Third States: Intervention and Beyond’, 
(2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 139, at 156-158. 
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The ICJ has placed a heavy burden of proof on applicant third states to 
demonstrate the existence of a ‘real and concrete’ interest closely linked to pending 
proceedings. The second prong of Article 62, which states that ‘it shall be for the Court to 
decide upon this request’, effectively gives the ICJ wide discretion in deciding on the 
matter, and indeed third state intervention has only been granted in a limited number of 
cases. 1154  Yet, although the ICJ’s approach has been considered as restrictive, the 
acceptance of such applications heavily depends on the facts and circumstances of each 
case.1155 Having said that, criticism remains. In his dissenting opinion on the dismissal of 
Costa Rica’s application to intervene pursuant to Article 62 in the Territorial and 
Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judge Al-Khaswaneh noted that:  
This language is plainly liberal. The word “affected” is not qualified by a requirement that the 
effect be of a serious or irreversible nature. The word “interest” is likewise not qualified by any 
expression that suggests that the interest be a crucial or even an important one for the requesting 
State, all that is needed is that the interest be of a legal nature and not of a political, economic, 
strategic, or other non-legal nature. Finally the word “may” is also permissive. There is no need 
that the interest “must” or “shall” or is “likely to be” affected by the Court’s decision… 
Notwithstanding this liberal language, the record of Article 62 over the past 90 years or so since 
its inception must be judged to be dismal.
 1156 
It is worthy to concede that a comprehensive discussion on third state intervention 
at the ICJ in general, or what defines a ‘legal interest’ in particular, largely exceeds the 
scope of this research.1157 More fundamentally for the purposes of this research, the ICJ’s 
practice shows that a possibility exists, under international law, for a third party 
intervention procedure on the basis of ‘non-party’ intervention, i.e. third party intervenors 
do not become disputing parties. This could turn out to be a crucial model for investor-
state tribunals considering whether to recognize civil society as third party intervenors – 
as will be further discussed below.1158 As will be shown, both civil society petitioners and 
investor-state tribunals dealt with the issue of third party intervention as a question of 
‘party’ intervention as is referred to at the ICJ, or in other words, third party ‘standing’ as 
is more commonly referred to under municipal law. 
                                                 
1154 For an exhaustive survey, see B. Bonafe, ‘Interests of a Legal Nature Justifying Intervention before the ICJ’, 
(2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 739, at 739.  
1155 Ibid., at 756.  
1156 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), supra note 1149, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Al-Khaswaneh, at para 5 (our emphasis).  
1157 For a comprehensive analysis on the issue, see generally S. Rosenne, supra note 1130.  
1158 See Part III – Section 3. 
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4.2.2 Not ‘friends’, nor litigants: Contracting parties to IIAs or BITs as third 
party intervenors  
Some IIAs and BITs provide similar possibilities as the third state intervention 
procedure set forth pursuant to Article 63 of the ICJ Statute.1159 This is not anomalous 
given that, generally, when the object of a given dispute pending before an international 
court or tribunal is the interpretation of a multilateral treaty, third states which are also 
parties to that treaty are normally granted the right to intervene.1160 The US Model BIT 
provides the possibility for a non-disputing Party may, ipso facto, make oral and written 
submissions to investor-state tribunals regarding the interpretation of a given BIT.1161 The 
previously discussed United States-Peru BIT reflects such procedure in concreto:  
A Party that is not a disputing Party, on delivery of a written notice to the disputing Parties, shall 
be entitled to attend all hearings, to make written and oral submissions to the panel, and to receive 
written submissions of the disputing Parties…’.1162 
The ability to attend all hearings, make both written and oral submissions, receive 
written submissions from disputing parties, which entail a full access to their pleadings as 
well as case materials, capture the essence of the third party intervention role in an 
investor-state arbitration context – a fundamental point to note for the purposes of this 
research in general, and the subsequent discussion in Part III in particular.  
Separately, the role described above is articulated in a more expansive manner 
than the previously discussed role available to NAFTA parties under Article 1128.1163 As 
shown throughout this research, NAFTA case-law shows a consistent practice of 
intervention by NAFTA-contracting states as ‘non-disputing parties’ to make 
submissions on a question of interpretation of NAFTA in accordance with Article 
1128.1164 
                                                 
1159 For instance, Article 832 provides that: ‘1. On written notice to the disputing parties, the non-disputing Party 
may make submissions to a Tribunal on a question of interpretation of this Agreement. 2. The non-disputing 
Party shall have the right to attend any hearings held under this Section, whether or not it makes submissions to 
the Tribunal’. See Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement, supra note 170. 
1160 A. Zimmermann, supra note 55, at para 14. 
1161 Article 28(2), US Model BIT, supra note 498. 
1162 Article 21.11, United States-Peru BIT, supra note 505 (our emphasis). 
1163  Article 1128 of NAFTA states that: ‘On written notice to the disputing parties, a Party may make 
submissions to a Tribunal on a question of interpretation of this Agreement’. See Article 1128 of NAFTA, supra 
note 442.  
1164 In Bilcon, the US intervened pursuant to NAFTA Article 1128. Its submission states that ‘The United 
States of America hereby makes this submission pursuant to Article 1128 of the North American Free 
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The United States-Peru BIT provides that state-parties ‘shall be entitled’ to act as 
third party intervenors. The BIT thus bestows non-disputing state parties, i.e. either Peru 
or the United States, the right to act as third party intervenors. The articulation of such 
entitlement, or right, is starkly different from the previously discussed provision of the 
same BIT on amicus curiae submissions, which states that investor-state tribunals ‘may 
consider’ such submissions only if those are of assistance to them.1165 A substantially 
similar construction also exists under Article 36 of the ECHR as previously 
mentioned.1166  
As is the case with the ICJ, despite the fact that the third party intervention 
procedure available to IIA or BIT-parties only, and not to non-state actors, it remains 
nonetheless relevant in demonstrating the procedural differences between third party 
intervention on the one hand, and amicus curiae participation on the other. Specifically, 
the US Model BIT shows what does each procedure entail in terms of participation 
modalities and thus clearly sheds light on the expansiveness of third party intervention as 
opposed to amicus curiae participation – an issue that will be revisited in further detail 
below.1167 
4.2.3 ‘Joinders’ or ‘intervenors’? – Third parties in international commercial 
arbitration 
As previously discussed, under US law, third party intervention is applicable in 
both commercial and public interest litigation. At the ICJ, third states may intervene as 
non-parties in pending proceedings. The question here is whether third party intervention 
may be applicable within international arbitration proceedings to persons other than IIA 
or BIT-parties. There is therefore a need to look here at relevant international commercial 
arbitration rules governing third party intervention. 
i. Background 
                                                                                                                                                 
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), which authorizes non-disputing Parties to make submissions to a Tribunal 
on a question of interpretation of the NAFTA’. See Bilcon of Delaware Inc. et al. v. Government of Canada, 
Submission of the United States of America dated 14 July 2008,  para 1.  
1165 Article 21.10, United States-Peru BIT, supra note 505. 
1166 See supra note 64. 
1167 See Part III – Section 1.1. 
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In a commercial arbitration context, third party intervention in on-going 
arbitrations may arise in a number of circumstances. The most common involves insurers 
or guarantors acting as intervenors (or joinders) as well as sub-contractors or other parties 
involved in complex construction projects.1168 There is a subtle difference between third 
party intervention and joinder in an international commercial arbitration context. The 
joinder of a third party is necessarily subject to the application of one of the disputing 
parties to allow a third party to be joined as a disputing party to an on-going arbitration; 
whereas third party intervention is the result of the sole initiative of the third party in 
question and may be supported by one of the disputing parties. This last scenario appears 
to be quite rare in practice, particularly in cases where the respondent and claimant have 
not consented to the intervention. 1169  In any event, and notwithstanding the often 
inconsistent and confusing use of the terminology, the third party becomes an additional 
disputing party in both cases – again, in an international commercial arbitration context. 
It is precisely for this reason that the arbitral tribunal in the UPS v. Canada case, which 
was constituted under NAFTA Chapter XI and conducted in accordance with the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, dismissed a request by the Council of Canadians and the 
Canadian Union of Postal Workers to intervene as ‘parties to the dispute’ given that both 
Canada and UPS had not consented to their joinder.1170 Indeed, it is generally understood 
that absent unanimous consent, third party intervention (or joinder) would run counter the 
private and consensual nature of commercial arbitration.1171 
Against this backdrop, several institutional arbitration rules do not explicitly 
address third party joinder, including most notably ICSID, and the American Arbitration 
                                                 
1168 See Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), Multiple Party Actions in International Arbitration (2008), at 218; 
and J. Paulsson and G. Petrochilos, infra note 1193, at 73; and K. Kim and J. Mitchenson, ‘Voluntary Third-
Party Intervention in International Arbitration for Construction Disputes: A Contextual Approach to 
Jurisdictional Issues’, (2013) 30:4 Journal of International Arbitration 407, at 409-410.  
1169 In its discussions on revising the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the Working Group received input from the 
LCIA. The latter informed the UNCITRAL Secretariat that applications for joinder (pursuant to Article 22.1(h) 
of the LCIA Arbitration Rules – discussed below) were made in under ten cases since that provision was 
introduced in the Rules in 1998, and that those applications have rarely been successful. See UNCITRAL, 
Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) – ‘Settlement of commercial disputes: Revision of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’, 47th session, infra 1186, at, para 8. See also T. Bevilacqua, ‘Voluntary 
Intervention and Other Participation of Third Parties in On-going International Arbitrations: A Survey of the 
Current State of Play’, (2007) 01(4) World Arbitration and Mediation Review 507, at 507-508; K. Kim and J. 
Mitchenson, supra note 1168, 413.  
1170 UPS v Canada, supra note 517, para 39. 
1171 Bevilacqua states that ‘[t]he most obvious explanation why, absent unanimous consent, the intervention of 
third parties in commercial arbitration is not very common is that “it militates against the private and contractual 
nature of arbitration”’. See T. Bevilacqua, supra note 1168, at 508 [footnote ommitted].  
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Association (AAA).1172 Arbitral laws may be important in such cases as in the event of 
disagreement amongst disputing parties, and the absence of an express contractual 
provision or arbitration rule covering the issue, the admissibility of third-party 
intervention could be resolved in accordance with the applicable municipal law.1173 In 
fact, third party intervention is for instance contemplated under Dutch and Belgian 
arbitration laws. 1174  The LCIA, Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, Singapore 
International Arbitration Center (SIAC), and the newly amended UNCITRAL Rules are 
relevant examples – as discussed below.  
ii. Article 22.1(h) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules 
The LCIA Arbitration Rules allow third party joinder.1175 Article 22.1(h) provides 
that:  
Unless the parties at any time agree otherwise in writing, the Arbitral Tribunal shall have the 
power, on the application of any party or of its own motion, but in either case only after giving the 
parties a reasonable opportunity to state their views… (h) to allow, only upon the application of a 
party, one or more third persons to be joined in the arbitration as a party provided any such third 
person and the applicant party have consented thereto in writing, and thereafter to make a single 
final award, or separate awards, in respect of all parties so implicated in the arbitration.
 1176
 
                                                 
1172 Ibid., at 507. Gary Born specifies that ‘[h]istorically, most institutional rules did not provide for consolidation, 
intervention, or joinder. That was true, for example, of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, as well as the ICC, LCIA, 
AAA, VIAC, SCC and other institutional rules’. See G. Born, infra note 1173, at 2596. See also AAA, 
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, 1 October 2013, available at: 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103&revision=latestreleased (last accessed 
1 December 2015). 
1173  For an exhaustive survey of national arbitration legislation on the matter, see G. Born, International 
Commercial Arbitration, Volume II – International Arbitration Procedures (2014), at 2573-2589.   
1174 Article 1045 of the Netherlands Arbitration Act provides one of the few examples of such national legislation. 
It provides that: ‘(1). At the written request of a third party who has an interest in the outcome of the arbitral 
proceedings, the arbitral tribunal may permit such party to join the proceedings, or to intervene therein. The 
arbitral tribunal shall send without delay a copy of the request to the parties…. (3). The joinder, intervention or 
joinder for the claim of indemnity may only be permitted by the arbitral tribunal, having heard the parties, if the 
third party accedes by agreement in writing between him and the parties to the arbitration agreement’. See 
Netherlands Arbitration Act, 01 December 1986 Code of Civil Procedure, available at: 
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/netherlands.arbitration.act.1986/1045.html (last accessed 06 October 2014). Article 
1709 of the Belgian Judicial Code states that: ‘(1er). Tout tiers intéressé peut demander au tribunal arbitral 
d'intervenir dans la procédure. Cette demande est adressée par écrit au tribunal arbitral qui la communique aux 
parties. (§ 2) Une partie peut appeler un tiers en intervention. (§ 3) En toute hypothèse, pour être admise, 
l'intervention nécessite une convention d'arbitrage entre le tiers et les parties en différend. Elle est, en outre, 
subordonnée, à l'assentiment du tribunal arbitral qui statue à l'unanimité’. See Code Judiciaire, 10 Octobre 1967, 
available at: http://just.fgov.be/ (last accessed 06 October 2014). For further analysis, including on relevant 
provisions from Iranian and Italian law, see also T. Bevilacqua, supra note 1168, at 519, 520, 521. 
1175 G. Born, supra note 1173, at 2601. 
1176  LCIA Arbitration Rules, entered into force 01 January 1998, available at: 
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/LCIA_Arbitration_Rules.aspx#Article22 (last accessed 06 
October 2014).  
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It is generally understood that this provision allows the possibility of a party-initiated 
joinder of a third party even in cases in which one of the existing parties to the arbitration 
is opposed.1177  
iii. Article 24.1(b) of the SIAC Arbitration Rules 
The SIAC Arbitration Rules contain a similar provision under the heading of 
‘Additional Powers of the Tribunal’, which states that:  
In addition to the powers specified in these Rules and not in derogation of the mandatory rules of 
law applicable to the arbitration, the Tribunal shall have the power to…upon the application of a 
party, allow one or more third parties to be joined in the arbitration, provided that such person is a 
party to the arbitration agreement, with the written consent of such third party, and thereafter make 
a single final award or separate awards in respect of all parties…1178 
The formulation of this provision is practically identical to Article 22.1(h) of the LCIA 
Arbitration Rules.  
iv. Article 4(2) of the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration  
The Swiss Rules of International Arbitration leave open the possibility of third-
party intervention without necessarily requiring the consent of all parties.1179 The relevant 
provision is Article 4(2), which states that: 
Where one or more third persons request to participate in arbitral proceedings already pending 
under these Rules or where a party to pending arbitral proceedings under these Rules requests that 
one or more third persons participate in the arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on such 
request, after consulting with all of the parties, including the person or persons to be joined, taking 
into account all relevant circumstances.
1180  
This formulation differs fundamentally from the LCIA Rules. The Swiss Rules are indeed 
more liberal as they give the arbitral tribunal the discretion to decide on the intervention 
of a third party without requiring that one of the disputing parties to the arbitration give 
its consent to the participation of the third party, i.e. joinder.1181 It only imposes on the 
                                                 
1177 See also T. Bevilacqua, supra note 1168, at 509. 
1178  SIAC Arbitration Rules, 5th Edition of 01 April 2013, available at: http://www.siac.org.sg/our-
rules/rules/siac-rules-2013#siac_rule24  (last accessed 06 October 2014). For further elaboration, see G. Born, 
supra note 1173, at 2602-2605. 
1179 T. Bevilacqua, supra note 1168, at 510; G. Born, supra note 1173, at 2599-2601. 
1180 Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, entered into force 01 June 2012, available at: 
https://www.swissarbitration.org/sa/download/SRIA_english_2012.pdf. (last accessed 06 October 2014).   
1181 K. Kim and J. Mitchenson, supra note 1168, 413. 
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tribunal a duty to consult with all the parties and to take into account all the relevant and 
applicable circumstances.1182 
v. Article 17(5) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
A significant number of NAFTA and other investor-state disputes are resolved 
pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Article 17(5) of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules provides that, at the request of any disputing party, the tribunal may 
allow third persons to be joined in the arbitration if those were parties to the underlying 
arbitration agreement. 1183  The amendment Article 17(5) is in fact a significant 
development.1184 The UNCITRAL Working Group had extensively discussed joinder of 
third parties prior to the adoption of Article 17(5) in 2010 and reference was made to the 
practice under both the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration and LCIA Rules.1185 The 
Working Group noted that a provision on joinder would constitute a major modification 
to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 1186 UNCITRAL received input from the ICC,1187 
the LCIA and the Swiss Arbitration Association (ASA).1188 Accordingly, a proposal for 
                                                 
1182 See UNCITRAL, Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) – ‘Settlement of commercial disputes: 
Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’, 47th session, infra 1186, at, para 8. 
1183 See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 1303. 
1184 G. Born, supra note 1173, at 2596. 
1185 The Working Group stated that ‘the Swiss Rules, for instance, expressly provide, under Article 4, paragraph 
(2), that: “Where a third party requests to participate in arbitral proceedings already pending under these Rules or 
where a party to arbitral proceedings under these Rules intends to cause a third party to participate in the 
arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on such request, after consulting with all parties, taking into account 
all circumstances it deems relevant and applicable”.’. See UNCITRAL, Working Group II (Arbitration and 
Conciliation) – ‘Settlement of commercial disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’, 45th session, 
11-15 September 2006 (A/CN.9/WGII/WP.143), available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html#45thsession (last accessed 06 
October 2014), at, para 69-71. 
1186  UNCITRAL, Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) – ‘Settlement of commercial disputes: 
Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’, 47th session, 10-14 September 2007 
(A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.147/Add.1), available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html#47thsession (last accessed 06 
October 2014), at, para 8. 
1187 The Working Group noted the  ICC’s generally conservative view that only the claimant is entitled to identify 
the parties to the arbitration. However, it found that the ICC joined a new party to the arbitral proceedings at the 
request of a respondent in three recent cases. In this regard, it noted that: ‘It appears that the ICC may only allow 
a new party to be joined in the arbitration at the respondent’s request if two conditions are met. First, the third 
party must have signed the arbitration agreement on the basis of which the request for arbitration has been filed. 
Second, the respondent must have introduced claims against the new party’. See Ibid., at para 8. It is also worthy 
to note that the ICC has recently amended Article 7 of its arbitration rules capturing the conditions set out above. 
See ICC Rules of Arbitration, entry into force 01 January 2012, available at: http://www.iccwbo.org/products-
and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/#Article_7 (last accessed 06 October 2014). 
See also G. Born, supra note 1173, at 2599.  
1188 The ASA reported that it favours a liberal solution such as the one contained in Article 4(2) of the Swiss rules. 
No decision on joinder under Article 4(2) of the Swiss rules have yet been reported. See Ibid., at, para 8. 
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an additional paragraph to Article 15 of the Rules (relating to the general procedural 
powers of the tribunal), whereby the joinder of parties would be permitted, was worded 
as follows:  
The arbitral tribunal may, on the application of any party…allow one or more third persons to be 
joined in the arbitration as a party and, provided such a third person and the applicant party have 
consented, make an award in respect of all parties involved in the arbitration.1189 
The above wording is inspired by Article 22.1(h) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules.1190 
Additional wording was also proposed to the effect that third parties must be a party to 
the underlying arbitration agreement; and the exercise of the tribunal’s discretion is 
contingent upon the avoidance of ‘unnecessary delay and expense and to provide a fair 
and efficient process for resolving the parties’ dispute’.1191 Ultimately, the final wording 
adopted under Article 17(5) is as follows:  
The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of any party, allow one or more third persons to be joined 
in the arbitration as a party provided such person is a party to the arbitration agreement, unless 
the arbitral tribunal finds, after giving all parties, including the person or persons to be joined, the 
opportunity to be heard, that joinder should not be permitted because of prejudice to any of those 
parties.1192  
As mentioned previously, discussions revolving around the newly amended provision 
mentioned insurers as the most common intervenors in arbitral proceedings.1193  
4.3 Common denominators  
It is broadly understood that third party intervention entails the right to present 
written arguments including evidence, oral arguments, and full access to hearings and 
case documents. Once admitted, a third party intervenor has the right to be heard and to 
submit arguments, albeit only with respect to the subject matter of its intervention.1194 US 
law provides that third party intervention may be allowed on the basis of a direct, 
significant, and legally protectable interest in an action to intervene. Intervenors are not 
                                                 
1189 See UNCITRAL, Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) – ‘Settlement of commercial disputes: 
Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’, 46th session, 5-9 February 2007 (A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.145/Add.1), 
available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html#46thsession 
(last accessed 06 October 2014), at, para 2. 
1190 Ibid., at para 6.  
1191 Ibid., at para 2. 
1192 See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), infra note 1303. 
1193 J. Paulsson and G. Petrochilos, ‘Report: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’, 03 September 2006, 
available at: http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/arbrules_report.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014), at 73.  
1194 A. Zimmermann, supra note 55, at 13. 
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required to establish independent standing. This is similar to the ICJ where third state 
intervention as a non-party solely requires the establishment of an interest of a ‘legal 
nature’ also characterized as a ‘real and concrete’ interest in relation to the proceedings. 
The provisions of several IIAs and BITs as well as the ICJ’s practice shed light on the 
possibility for a contracting state or a third state to intervene as a ‘non-party’ in the 
absence of a jurisdictional link with the disputing parties. A third state seeking to 
intervene as a ‘non-party’ to pending proceedings does not need to establish that its rights 
may be affected, in other words, they do need to establish ius standi. This could turn out 
be a crucial precedent for civil society petitioners aiming to participate in investor-state 
disputes as third party intervenors and not merely as amici curiae – as further discussed 
in Part III.  
5. Concluding remarks 
To date, numerous courts and tribunals have had an extensive amicus curiae 
practice. Notwithstanding such liberalism, the position of courts and tribunals on amicus 
curiae may be poignantly summarized by the following words of the WTO Appellate 
Body’s decision in the Hot-Rolled Lead case: 
Individuals and organizations, which are not members of the WTO, have no legal ‘right’ to make 
submissions or to be heard by the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body has no legal ‘duty’ to 
accept or consider unsolicited amicus curiae briefs submitted by individuals or organizations, not 
members of the WTO…1195  
Third party intervention is, on the other hand, generally practiced in a limited 
manner and continues to be rather a rare exception.1196 The background is that dispute 
settlement largely remains of a bilateral nature.1197 When parties arbitrate or litigate, they 
generally have a legitimate expectation to do so amongst each other as per their 
agreement – and not with anyone else. In a commercial arbitration or litigation setting, 
the intervention of third parties is strictly confined to the realm of contractual 
                                                 
1195 See WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States: Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-
Rolled Lead and Bismut Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R (10 May 
2000), para. 41 (‘Hot-Rolled Lead case’). 
1196 See generally, A. Zimmermann, supra note 55. 
1197 Ibid., at para 17. 
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relationships, i.e. the third party must be, along with the disputing parties, bound by the 
same arbitration agreement or contractual agreement in which the former is contained.  
In domestic law settings, intervention could arise in public interest related 
litigation – as clearly reflected by US case law. A broad right to intervene is considered 
to ultimately allow third party intervenors to be heard, the taking into account of third 
party interests and, it is argued, the enhancement of the legitimacy of proceedings.1198 Yet, 
the burden caused by third party intervention on the proceedings and to disputing parties 
is a paramount factor that requires further reflection.1199 The protection of third parties’ 
interests ought to be balanced with the disputing parties’ interests on one hand, as well as 
the accuracy and efficiency of proceedings on the other. In this respect, tribunals have not 
hesitated in exercizing their discretion in modulating the intervention of third parties to fit 
the particular needs, and circumstances, of the litigation either by rejecting it, or 
restricting its scope.  
These questions are further addressed in Part III through the prism of investor-
state arbitration.1200 Indeed, IIAs and BITs contain an ‘offer to arbitrate’ by host states 
that is exclusively aimed at foreign investors. The intervention of third parties in the form 
of a joinder – as understood in an international commercial arbitration context – could 
lead to unwelcomed structural changes, and hurdles, to the investor-state dispute 
settlement regime. That said, intervention as a ‘non-party’ may turn out to be an 
interesting model that merits further scrutiny.  
                                                 
1198 On the impact of third party intervention in general on the legitimacy of proceedings, see P. Sands and R. 
Mackenzie, supra note 55, at para 29; W. Benedek, infra note 661, at 204.  
1199 E. Triantafilou, supra note 18. 
1200 See Part III – Section 3.2.2. 
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PART III: AN ENHANCED ROLE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY BEFORE 
INVESTOR-STATE TRIBUNALS? 
Introductory remarks 
Having looked at the rules and practice governing civil society’s role within 
investor-state disputes, attention towards its potential or future therein is now merited. As 
shown, the procedural role available to civil society is solely that of a friend of the court – 
an amicus curiae. It was a progressively acquired role that has allowed a wide array of 
civil society groups and organizations such as international NGOs and indigenous groups 
or associations to access investor-state tribunals. It allowed them to act as non-disputing 
parties and raise public interest issues and/or submit arguments as stakeholders, or 
representatives thereof. In other words, civil society’s participation as amicus curiae 
addressed the ‘broader’ public interest at stake and/or the ‘direct’ interests of third parties.  
The amicus role is not subject to any third party right, but is rather a matter of 
procedural discretion exerted by investor-state tribunals. In addition, amicus participation 
triggered – to a varying degree – limited substantive repercussions on investor-state 
tribunals’ decisions. A closer look in this section at the procedural characteristics that are 
inherent to the amicus role in general, and not solely within the realm of investor-state 
arbitration in particular, might provide further clarity in understanding these two findings.  
There is then a need to question whether civil society had solely requested access 
to investor-state tribunals as amicus curiae. A look back at the UPS and Bechtel cases 
sheds light on civil society’s request for standing as third party intervenors in light of its 
‘direct’ interests in these arbitrations. Indeed, third-party intervention presents 
fundamental differences with amicus curiae intervention. It generally entails a more 
expansive access to tribunals. A closer look at investor-state tribunals’ analysis on this 
question is thus merited. It will attempt to explain these tribunals’ decisions and flesh out 
the criteria that guided them in dismissing civil society’s requests (Section 2).  
In the UPS and Bechtel cases, civil society petitioners sought to intervene as third 
parties in order to effectively raise, assert, or defend the ‘direct’ interests of certain 
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communities or groups that had been, or have alleged to be, particularly affected by the 
activities or arbitral claims of foreign investors. These civil society petitioners advanced 
an ‘access to justice’ argument in support of their requests. This raises the question as to 
whether civil society could benefit from the right to take part in proceedings, or in other 
words, the right to be heard, before investor-state tribunals – as argued by civil society 
petitioners (Section 2). Once the petitioners’ arguments are scrutinized, Part III will aim 
to shed light on the numerous limitations raised by the third party intervention procedure 
before investor-state tribunals. These are both procedural and substantive. In particular, 
they relate to (i) the absence of rules governing third party intervention by third parties; 
and, more fundamentally, (ii) the inexistence of rights and obligations set forth under 
IIAs or BITs that relate to persons other than foreign investors and host states 
respectively. In this light, this research will advance a proposal on the conditions that 
could potentially render third party intervention acceptable before investor-state tribunals. 
The modalities of such proposal would remain within the limitations that are inherent to 
the investor-state dispute settlement regime (Section 4).  
1. Transcending amicus curiae submissions 
Part III questions the validity of civil society’s contentions to the effect that it has 
a right to take part in proceedings, or in other words, a right to be heard before investor-
state tribunals. There is thus a need to revisit the amicus procedure and attempt to 
understand whether an amicus benefits from the right to be heard. It is key to identify – 
from a holistic and cross-jurisdictional perspective – whether there are limitations to the 
amicus curiae role. Previous petitions by civil society to investor-state tribunals for 
standing as third party intervenors, and not merely as amici, are then explored in further 
detail. The aim of this section is therefore to highlight the fundamental differences that 
exist between the amicus curiae procedure on the one hand; and the third party 
intervention procedure on the other, by looking at the advantages and disadvantages of 
both. This is a necessary prelude to the analysis of civil society’s third party intervention 
petitions and access to justice arguments – as further explored below.1201  
                                                 
1201 Part III – Section 2. 
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1.1 The inherent limitations of the amicus curiae role – A comparative 
perspective 
The courts and tribunals that were examined throughout this research treated the 
amicus curiae in a fairly consistent manner. Although an analysis of the case law has 
already been engaged, it is necessary at this point to flesh out common denominators. A 
more detailed emphasis on these will constitute the background to exploring enhanced 
forms of procedural access to civil society, i.e. through third party intervention.  
Under US law, third party intervention and amicus curiae participation work in 
tandem. An alternative to third party intervention is participation in ongoing proceedings 
as amicus curiae. The inverse may also be true. 1202  This fact sheds light on the 
advantages and disadvantages to each alternative. On the one hand, an amicus inherently 
lacks the procedural rights of a party, particularly the right to offer direct and rebuttal 
evidence and the right to take an appeal.1203 Intervention may be thus considered as more 
advantageous as it typically takes the form of the right to participate in discovery, present 
written arguments, right to present oral arguments, right to present evidence, cross-
examine witnesses, and the right to tender issues, as well as the right to seek redress, 
compensation, and other remedies – all of which are not available to amici curiae. 1204 
Despite a widespread recognition that amici curiae have made over the years a 
contribution on numerous legal issues in US litigation, the extent to which judges accord 
scrutiny to amicus curiae briefs remains unclear.1205 
 On the other hand, precisely because intervenors become third parties to 
litigation, numerous third party stakeholders opt for the amicus curiae procedure in order 
to curb the costs and time of acquiring such a status.1206 Those who cannot participate as 
intervenors may request leave for an enhanced amicus role that could include – upon the 
exceptional approval of the court – the right to present oral argument.1207 It is equally 
                                                 
1202 See R. Garcia, supra note 972, at 342. 
1203 G. Hazard et al., supra note 977, at 770. 
1204 See C. Tobias, ‘Rethinking Intervention in Environmental Litigation’, (2000) 78 Washington University Law 
Quarterly 313, at 317, and G. Hazard et al., supra note 977, at 771. 
1205 C. Tobias, infra note 1204, at 318. 
1206 See R. Garcia, supra note 972, at 342. 
1207 Rule 29(g) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that: ‘An amicus curiae may participate in 
oral argument only with the court's permission’. See Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, supra note 982. See 
also R. Garcia, supra note 972, at 342. 
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recognized that participation as an amicus can in many instances prove an effective 
alternative to formal intervention of right, particularly because amicus briefs are less 
cumbersome on the judicial system.1208 It is in this light that courts do have the authority 
to limit or place conditions or requirements on third party interventions for the purposes 
of enhancing (or safeguarding) the efficiency of proceedings.1209 In any case, it is argued 
that procedural barriers should not be erected before third parties whose interests are 
affected by litigations.1210  
The treatment of the amicus curiae under WTO law has been extensively dealt 
with.1211 The WTO’s DSU does not regulate nor mention amicus submissions. The WTO 
has developed its amicus practice strictly through the jurisprudence of the Appellate 
Body. Furthermore, the Appellate Body emphasized that civil society or, more precisely, 
non-WTO member States, do not benefit from a substantive right to submit amicus curiae 
briefs under the DSU: 
Individuals and organizations, which are not members of the WTO, have no legal ‘right’ to make 
submissions or to be heard by the Appellate Body, The Appellate Body has no legal ‘duty’ to 
accept or consider unsolicited amicus curiae briefs submitted by individuals or organizations, not 
members of the WTO…1212  
Amici do not benefit from a right to take part in proceedings or, in other words, a right to 
be heard by WTO Panels nor the Appellate Body. They in turn may – at their sole 
discretion – accept un-solicited amicus submissions so long as they remain pertinent to a 
given dispute; and more fundamentally, for the sole and unique purpose of assisting a 
Panel or the Appellate Body, provided no undue delays or burdens affect the dispute 
settlement process. 1213  Against this backdrop, amicus submissions at the WTO have 
triggered the opposition of numerous member States who are wary of (i) the additional 
                                                 
1208 P. Appel, supra note 1095, at 308. 
1209 Ibid., at 309. 
1210 The example of minority representation in affirmative action litigation shows that intervention can serve as 
the vehicle through which such representation can be achieved. Ibid., at 986 citing E. Jones; P. Appel, supra note 
1095, at 295. P. Sands and R. Mackenzie, supra note 55, at para 29. 
1211 See Part II – Section 3.2. 
1212 See WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States: Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-
Rolled Lead and Bismut Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, supra note 1042, para. 41 
(our emphasis).  
1213 Article 12.2 of the DSU states that: ‘Panel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure 
high-quality panel reports, while not unduly delaying the panel process’. See WTO, Report of the Appellate 
Body, United States: Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra note 1027, para. 107-
108. 
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dispute settlement costs and burdens; and (ii) the proliferation of submissions from trade 
lobbies or pressure or interest groups from industrialized WTO member States.1214 
In an investor-state dispute context, the limitations of the amicus curiae role are 
well-reflected in a quote by the UPS tribunal. In comparing between the amicus curiae 
and third party intervention procedures, the tribunal questioned whether it might grant 
leave for a ‘lesser, amicus curiae role’ in light of its dismissal of the Canadian Union of 
Postal Workers and the Council of Canadians requests to be afforded standing as third 
parties to the proceedings as further discussed subsequently.1215 Again, amicus curiae 
involvement is confined to presenting solely written, but not oral, statements. Unlike with 
written statements by experts, disputing parties cannot call on amici curiae to examine 
their statements.1216 Tribunals rarely granted amici access to case materials, who only had 
the benefit of those that were publicly available, and thus it may be argued that amici 
could not really be in a position to thoroughly address the subject matter of a given 
dispute.  
It is worthy to emphasize once more the context that lead to the acceptance of 
amici curiae. Tribunals have repeatedly acknowledged the existence of public interest 
issues as and when raised by the amici. Here, it may be argued that the amicus curiae 
reform was a procedural development designed to address the issues of transparency and 
opacity of the investment treaty arbitral process. More fundamentally, it is underlying to 
public interest issues rather than a recognition of a given stakeholder right. This is 
precisely because amici are not intervenors in a technical sense; accordingly, they cannot 
challenge arguments or evidence put forward by the disputing parties, they cannot 
vindicate their own rights.1217 This is uniquely manifested in the Methanex decision, 
which laid the basis for amicus participation in investor-state disputes. While recognizing 
the public interest nature of the dispute, the tribunal acknowledged that it had the power 
to accept amicus curiae submissions pursuant to Article 15(1) and emphasized that ‘it is a 
matter of its power rather than of third party right’.1218  
                                                 
1214 R. Buckley, and P. Blyshak, supra note 999, at 371. 
1215 UPS v Canada, supra note 517, at para 59. 
1216 A. Moore, supra note 1040, at 269. 
1217 F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 740. 
1218 Cited in UPS v Canada, supra note 517, at para 61 (our emphasis). 
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Having said that, amicus curiae participation has now become an important 
feature of investor-state dispute settlement.1219 The amendment of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules1220 and entry into force of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency,1221 as well as 
numerous newly signed BITs,1222 confirm the practice. Amicus curiae briefs have been 
submitted hitherto in landmark cases and, as mentioned previously, have ultimately 
allowed civil society groups and organizations to raise public interest issues and/or 
submit arguments on behalf of stakeholders whose interests were affected by a given 
arbitral dispute.  
International human rights jurisdictions deal with the amicus curiae in a similar 
manner. Although they liberally accept amicus briefs, it remains unclear whether the 
ECtHR, IACtHR, or ACHPR have any substantive obligation to hear amici. The relevant 
rules of these jurisdictions clearly present the amicus as a ‘supplier of information’.1223 
The IACtHR and ACHPR allow civil society organizations to represent victims, and 
stand on their behalf, therefore interested third parties benefit from a broad access to 
those jurisdictions, i.e. their right to be heard may be secured through adequate and 
effective standing, which transcends the amicus curiae procedure. Whilst lacking this last 
possibility, the ECtHR on the other hand equally grants ‘any person’ standing so long as 
they can establish their status as a victim. Because of such broader procedural 
possibilities, which are similar to those existent in domestic jurisdictions, it would be 
difficult to assimilate an amicus – inherently considered as an assistant to the Court – to a 
disputing party who has a right to be heard.  
1.2 To be an amicus, or not to be: Fundamental differences with third party 
intervention  
An amicus curiae is defined as a friend of the court. The amicus curiae issue is 
first and foremost a procedural one and its acceptance is entirely subject to a court or 
                                                 
1219 F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 740. 
1220 See ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 411. 
1221 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 414. 
1222 See Part II – Section 2.2.3. 
1223 See Part II – Section 3.3. 
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tribunal’s discretion.1224 The ethos of the amicus is that of a bystander in a bipartite 
dynamic where two disputing parties resort to a court or a tribunal to settle their dispute. 
It should, and is expected to, solely and exclusively act as an assistant to the latter by 
bringing forward useful arguments, perspectives, and expertise that are distinct from the 
disputing parties’. Accordingly, the amicus cannot challenge arguments or evidence put 
forward by the disputing parties.  
Another look at the criteria governing amicus access also reflects the limitations 
of its role in a given dispute. These criteria are essentially reflected in Canada’s proposal 
in the UPS case. By following the criteria governing the practice in its domestic judicial 
system, Canada proposed the following factors for the UPS tribunal to consider:  
In exercising its discretion, the Tribunal should consider whether: (a) there is a public interest in 
the arbitration; (b) the Petitioners have sufficient interest in the outcome of the arbitration; (c) the 
Petitioners’ submissions will assist in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the 
arbitration by bringing a perspective or particular knowledge that is different from that of the 
disputing parties; and (d) the Petitioners’ submissions can be received without causing prejudice to 
the disputing parties.1225 
Indeed, the UPS tribunal noted that the above-mentioned criteria capture the essence of 
the ones developed by the WTO Appellate Body and the Methanex tribunal.1226 
Amici curiae do not therefore have the right to be heard. 1227  Rather, their 
intervention is entirely subject to a court or a tribunal’s discretion in assessing that the 
information brought forward by the amicus might assist it in settling the dispute.1228 By 
contrast, and as mentioned previously, third party intervention generally entails the right 
to present written arguments including evidence, oral arguments, and full access to 
hearings and case documents.1229 Once admitted, a third party intervenor has the right to 
be heard and submit arguments, albeit only with regard to the subject matter of its 
intervention.1230  
The amicus curiae procedure is generally understood to be premised on ‘broader’ 
interests that are stake in a pending dispute. In a rather telling passage, Palchetti argues 
                                                 
1224 A. Moore, supra note 1040, at 262; See also T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 388. 
1225 UPS v Canada, supra note 517, at para 7(iii). 
1226 Ibid., at para 51.  
1227 T. Ishikawa, supra note 108, at 404. 
1228 P. Sands and R. Mackenzie, supra note 55, at para 2. 
1229 See Part II – Section 4.3. 
1230 A. Zimmermann, supra note 55, at 13. 
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that the ICJ should consider accepting amicus interventions by states with ‘a less ‘direct’ 
interest’ notwithstanding the silence of the ICJ Statute on the issue:  
When a state seeks to participate for protecting a less ‘direct’ interest, a more limited form of 
participation would be adequate. For that purpose, the Court should consider the possibility of 
introducing an amicus curiae procedure.1231  
This difference sheds light on the need to shift to civil society’s previous petitions 
for third party intervention in investor-state disputes where it was precisely argued that 
‘direct’ interests’, and not merely ‘broader’ interests, were at stake and that, accordingly, 
civil society petitioners had the right to be heard – as further discussed directly below.  
1.3  Petitions to uphold the ‘direct’ interest in investor-state arbitration 
Whilst it might be challenging to determine the exact number of investor-state 
disputes in which civil society organizations could have potentially participated as third 
party intervenors, a request for ‘standing’ as third party intervenors has been submitted in 
two instances, i.e. the UPS1232 and Bechtel1233 cases. In the latter, Earthjustice was acting 
as a ‘representative’ of other stakeholders – which included numerous Bolivian civil 
society groups and individuals.1234 The NGO is familiar with petitioning for standing and 
representation as it systematically does so in public interest litigation in the US.1235 This 
is in contrast to the UPS case where solely two Canadian civil society organizations 
sought to personally intervene. Rather than requesting ‘standing’, civil society petitioners 
in both cases could have petitioned for third party intervention as ‘non-parties’. 1236 
                                                 
1231 Palchetti continues by stating that ‘since the Statute does not envisage expressly such procedure, the Court 
would be likely to resist any attempt by third states to present an amicus curiae brief in a particular case’. See P. 
Palchetti, supra note 1153, at 181 (our emphasis).  
1232 United Parcel Service v Canada , supra note 515.  
1233 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra note 533.  
1234 Ibid., at 3. 
1235 According to its website, Earthjustice is currently engaged in over 300 active legal cases in front of US courts. 
Those include for instance: Carpenters Industrial Council et al v. Kempthorne (Federal court case no. 1:08-cv-
01409-EGS, filed 09 January 2010, in the District of Columbia), where Earthjustice and other civil society 
groups have filed a motion to intervene on a challenge to two decisions by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
that impact northern spotted owls. See Earthjustice, ‘2014 Legal Docket: Our Litigation Spotlight’, (2014) 
available at: http://earthjustice.org/features/ourwork/2014-docket (last accessed 01 April 2014).    
1236 The difference between both types of third party interventions is highlighted under Part II – Section 4.2.1 
discussing the regulation of the procedure by the ICJ, and is further detailed under Part II – Section 4.2.2 which 
highlights ‘non-disputing party’ intervention by IIA or BIT contracting states. 
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Indeed, it will be later argued that investor-state tribunals might have come to a different 
decision had petitioners requested to intervene as ‘non-parties’.1237  
1.3.1 The impossibility of ‘adding strangers to the arbitration’ – UPS v. 
Canada  
In the UPS case, 1238  the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (‘CUPW’) and 
Council of Canadians did not merely petition the arbitral tribunal for leave to make an 
amicus submission; rather, they requested ‘standing as parties to any proceedings that 
may be convened’ to determine UPS’ claim against Canada.1239 The tribunal responded in 
a provisional order in 2001,1240 i.e. six years prior to rendering a final judgment, in which 
it has extensively discussed the issue of ‘adding a party’ – to use the tribunal’s 
terminology.  
i. Petitioners’ requests  
In its petition to the tribunal, the CUPW submitted that it represented 46,000 
Canada Post employees. Its interest is manifested in its commitment ‘within the broader 
labour movement, and with groups in civil society, to preserve the integrity of Canadian 
public services’.1241 The Council of Canadians on the other hand defines itself as ‘a non-
governmental organization’, composed of more than 100,000 members, that is concerned 
with social programs, democratic governance, and the protection of public health and the 
environment.1242  
First, the petitioners started by putting into question and criticizing the current 
investor-state framework, i.e. they considered investor-state tribunals as bodies that allow 
private interests to trump public ones.1243 They then argued that, through its arbitral claim, 
UPS – which described itself as the world’s largest express carrier and package delivery 
company – is challenging Canadian policy, programs, and law in relation to the activities 
                                                 
1237 See Part II – Section 3.2. 
1238 UPS v Canada, supra note 515. 
1239 UPS v Canada, infra note 1241, para 1(i).  
1240 UPS v Canada, supra note 517. 
1241 UPS v Canada, Submissions of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers and of the Council of Canadians dated 
8 November 2000, at para 8. 
1242 Ibid., at para 10.  
1243 Ibid., at para 17. 
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of Canada Post. If successful, UPS’ claim could entail the potential restructuring of the 
entire Canadian postal services framework, including the dismantling of certain courier 
and package delivery services, so the petitioners argued. This would cause ‘immediate 
and long term impacts’ on Canadian postal workers’ (many of which are CUPW 
members) job security including lay-offs and permanent job reductions. Equally, this 
would impact the citizens recipients of such services, particularly those living in remote 
rural areas (including Council of Canadians members and others).1244  
On their right to standing, the petitioners grounded their request on their (i) 
‘direct’ interests in the proceedings in light of the ‘immediate and long term impacts’ on 
Canadian postal workers; (ii) interests in the broader public policy implications of the 
dispute ‘that are of vital concern to the petitioners’; and (iii) interest in making 
submissions concerning certain matters that are exclusively reserved to the parties to the 
proceedings.1245  
More fundamentally, the petitioners acknowledged the inexistence of 
‘international commercial arbitration’ rules regarding third party intervention. They 
contended that third parties with legitimate interests in arbitral proceedings should be 
afforded a ‘much greater role’.1246 Equality and fairness as enshrined under Article 15(1) 
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules carry – so it is argued by the petitioners – ‘broader 
implications’ that are relevant to investor-state disputes. In particular, equality and 
fairness should extend to third parties in light of the public character of disputes and the 
diverse interests which may be (adversely) affected by foreign investors’ claims.1247 In 
addition, petitioners argued that intervention should be granted pursuant to the precepts 
of access to justice. They claimed that it would be ‘unfair and inconsistent with the 
principles of fundamental justice’ for the tribunal to deny them the opportunity to defend 
their interests in the proceedings. 1248 To this effect, they referred to both domestic and 
international sources by relying on the ‘authoritative definition’ of the sources of 
                                                 
1244 Ibid., at para 19-20. 
1245 Ibid., at para 23. 
1246 Ibid., at para 23. 
1247 It is worthy to quote here Article 15(1) once more with an emphasis on the notion of equality: ‘…the arbitral 
tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are 
treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting 
his case’ (our emphasis). See Article 15(1) UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 433. See also Ibid., at para 
64, and UPS v Canada, supra note 517, para 21. 
1248 UPS v Canada, supra note 1241, at para 2(i). 
268 
 
international law under Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, and in particular to ‘the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations’.1249 Articles 14 and 26 of the ICCPR1250 
were most notably cited as ‘support for the notion of extending the principle of equality 
to third parties with an interest in arbitral proceedings’.1251  
In their domestic sources analysis, the petitioners submitted that, under common 
law, the more a decision-making process takes the form of a judicial process, the more 
likely the courts will require a full range of procedural protections including that 
individuals affected by a decision be given adequate notice in respect of the proceedings, 
a fair opportunity to present their case and to respond to the opposing party, and a right to 
an independent and un-biased decision-maker.1252 In a similar vein, a person may be 
accorded standing if it is an ‘aggrieved person’, an ‘affected person’, or someone who is 
‘exceptionally prejudiced by the proceedings’.1253  The petitioners then pointed to the 
extensive third party intervention practice under Canadian law where a clear distinction is 
made between the right to intervene as a party or amicus curiae in civil proceedings. 
Citing the Ontario Rules of Civil Proceedings,1254 the petitioners argued that intervenors 
are afforded the same procedural rights as litigating parties which include the right to file 
                                                 
1249 See Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, supra note 94. See also UPS v Canada, supra note 517, at para 18. 
1250 Article 14(1) states that: ‘1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of 
any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a 
fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law…’. And Article 26 
states that: ‘All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal 
and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’. See ICCPR, supra note 93. 
1251 UPS v Canada, supra note 1241, at para 66. 
1252  Although it is also argued that, under common law, procedural fairness also applies in administrative 
decision-making processes , and aims to provide affected individuals with a fair opportunity to be heard in order 
to ensure a given decision’s integrity. Indeeed, it is broadly recognized that the audi alteram partem rule also 
applies in principle to such processes. See R. Klager, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment 
Law (2011), at 214, and Ibid., at para 86. 
1253 Ibid., at para 87. 
1254 Article 13.01 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Proceedings: ‘A person who is not a party to a proceeding may 
move for leave to intervene as an added party if the person claims, (a) an interest in the subject matter of the 
proceeding; (b) that the person may be adversely affected by a judgment in the proceeding; or (c) that there exists 
between the person and one or more of the parties to the proceeding a question of law or fact in common with 
one or more of the questions in issue in the proceeding. (2)  On the motion, the court shall consider whether the 
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the determination of the rights of the parties to the proceeding and the 
court may add the person as a party to the proceeding and may make such order as is just. Furthermore, Article 
13.02 states that: ‘Any person may, with leave of a judge or at the invitation of the presiding judge or master, and 
without becoming a party to the proceeding, intervene as a friend of the court for the purpose of rendering 
assistance to the court by way of argument’. See Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure [R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194], last 
amended 04 March 2014, available at: http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/english/elaws_regs_900194_e.htm 
(last accessed 06 October 2014). 
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pleadings, submit evidence, cross-examine witnesses and make oral statements. 1255 
Intervenors must, and most notably, establish in their petition to the tribunal that they 
have an interest in the subject matter of the proceedings or they may be (adversely) 
affected by a judgment in the proceedings.1256  
The petitioners have also referred to the then expanding practice of the WTO 
Appellate Body in asserting its, as well as Panels’, authority in accepting amicus briefs as 
strong support for the acceptance of the intervention of non-parties more generally. They 
referred to the Appellate Body’s findings in Shrimps1257 and Hot-Rolled Lead1258 as to the 
non-existence of a third-party right to make amicus submissions under the DSU. The 
petitioners called for the need to make a clear distinction between inter-state dispute 
settlement mechanisms such as the WTO’s and the investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanism established under NAFTA. The latter grants, so the petitioners argued, 
foreign investors (who are inherently non-parties to NAFTA) the opportunity to engage 
in disputes against NAFTA parties. By virtue of the precepts of equality and fairness, 
third parties, who are also non-parties to NAFTA just like foreign investors, should also 
be granted access via third party intervention when their interests are directly affected by 
a given dispute.1259 In sum, the over-arching idea suggested by the petitioners was to 
argue for the acceptance of the third party intervention procedure (or alternatively, the 
amicus curiae procedure), as it exists in civil proceedings under Canadian law, as well as 
in light of the requirements of judicial review of administrative decisions under common 
law and, more fundamentally, ‘natural justice’.1260  
ii. The tribunal’s response 
The tribunal responded with an extensive argumentation on third-party standing 
and clearly distinguished between its conclusions on the admissibility of the third party 
intervention and amicus curiae procedures.1261 The US and Mexico have also provided 
                                                 
1255 Ibid., at para 84. 
1256 Ibid., at para 85. 
1257 Report of the Appellate Body, United States: Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
supra note 1027. 
1258 Report of the Appellate Body, United States: Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Lead and Bismut Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, supra note 1042. 
1259 UPS v. Canada, supra note 1241, at para 83.  
1260 UPS v. Canada, supra note 517, para 26. 
1261 Ibid., para 11.  
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comments on the petitioners’ request by way of submissions made pursuant to Article 
1128 of NAFTA.1262  
The tribunal noted the disputing party’s position with regards to the petitioners’ 
requests. It noted that both UPS and Canada agreed that the tribunal does not have 
jurisdiction to ‘grant party status to strangers to the arbitration’.1263 This position was also 
supported by the US’ and Mexico’s submissions. The tribunal then shifted to the 
petitioners’ arguments. It acknowledged that their ‘direct’ interests’ stem from the 
potential consequences of the proceedings on Canada Post employees, which include 
CUPW members, and for those dependent on mail and other services provided by Canada 
Post, which include the Council of Canadians members and others.1264 In addition, it 
noted the petitioners’ contention as to the existence of ‘broader’ public interest issues at 
stake in the dispute.  
In its conclusion, the tribunal emphasized that it is established, and solely has the 
powers conferred, by NAFTA’s Chapter XI – which is of course a paramount limitation 
that binds the tribunal.1265 Following the Methanex tribunal’s analysis, the UPS tribunal 
found that NAFTA’s Chapter XI clearly does not set out any provisions conferring 
authority to the tribunal to accept third party intervention that essentially amounts to ‘add 
parties’ to the arbitration.1266 Indeed, it noted that ‘the disputing parties have consented to 
arbitration only in respect of the specified matters and only with each other and with no 
other person’.1267 Arbitration is therefore quintessentially restricted to the authority set 
forth under the agreement governing both parties’ dispute.1268  
The tribunal then shifted its attention towards interpreting the provisions of 
Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In its view, the Article essentially 
                                                 
1262 Article 1128 of NAFTA, supra note 442. 
1263 UPS v. Canada, supra note 517, para 5(i). 
1264 Ibid., at para 13.  
1265 Ibid., at para 35. 
1266 Ibid., at para 36. 
1267 Ibid., at para 36 (our emphasis). 
1268 The tribunal did note, however, that NAFTA provides a limited role for third parties to a given dispute under 
two exceptional circumstances as set forth under Article 1126 (which allows tribunals to consolidate cases), and 
1128 of NAFTA (which allows NAFTA parties to make written submissions in disputes to which they are third 
parties). Article 1126(2) states that: ‘2. Where a Tribunal established under this Article is satisfied that claims 
have been submitted to arbitration under Article 1120 that have a question of law or fact in common, the 
Tribunal may, in the interests of fair and efficient resolution of the claims, and after hearing the disputing parties, 
by order: (a) assume jurisdiction over, and hear and determine together, all or part of the claims; or (b) assume 
jurisdiction over, and hear and determine one or more of the claims, the determination of which it believes would 
assist in the resolution of the others’. See Article 1128 of NAFTA, supra note 446, and Ibid., at para 36. 
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recognizes two fundamental procedural powers for arbitral tribunals: (i) the ability to 
conduct the arbitration in an appropriate manner; and (ii) the need to secure the 
fundamental procedural rights of the disputing parties to a fair proceeding, natural justice 
or due process.1269 Article 15(1) is therefore about:  
…the procedure to be followed by an arbitral tribunal in exercising the jurisdiction which the 
parties have conferred on it. It does not itself confer power to adjust that jurisdiction to widen the 
matter before it by adding as parties persons additional to those which have mutually agreed to its 
jurisdiction or by including subject matter in it arbitration additional to what which the parties 
have agreed to confer.1270 
This is in line with the tribunal’s position in Methanex. 1271  Although civil society 
organizations did not request standing in the latter, the tribunal was clear in pointing out 
that Article 15(1) does not confer the authority to arbitral tribunals to add parties to a 
given dispute. Precisely in the same vein, it cannot be used to grant third parties any 
‘substantive status, rights, or privileges’ akin to those of the disputing parties.1272  
 Turning to the petitioners’ international law arguments, the tribunal confirmed 
their observation as to the non-existent or limited reference to third party intervention 
under international law and international courts and tribunals’ practice.1273 It deemed the 
reference to Article 14 of the ICCPR as remotely relevant given that it relates to persons 
whose rights and obligations are being determined by a tribunal, which is clearly not the 
petitioners’ case – according to the tribunal. In fact, it emphasized that the sole two 
parties whose rights and obligations are at stake are the disputing parties, i.e. UPS and 
Canada.  
1.3.2 Extreme circusmtances, standard limitations – Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia  
 The Bechtel case has been dealt with in earlier sections to discuss endeavors by 
civil society to promote and protect the human right to water at stake in investor-state 
disputes,1274 as well as investor-state tribunals’ analysis on the acceptance of amicus 
                                                 
1269 Ibid., at para 38. 
1270 Ibid., at para 39 (our emphasis).  
1271 Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 428. 
1272 Cited in UPS v. Canada, supra note 517, para 39 (our emphasis). 
1273 Ibid., at para 40.  
1274 See Part I – Section 4.3.3. 
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curiae petitions.1275 It is key to shift back to the case with the aim of discussing the issue 
of third party standing or intervention. As previously mentioned, the case arose following 
Bolivia’s termination of a privatization concession granted to AdT – a Bolivian 
subsidiary of Bechtel – for the provision of water and sewage services to the city of 
Cochabamba.1276 The peculiarity of this case also lies in the fact that Earthjustice acted as 
a representative of a number of stakeholders, 1277  and therefore filed a third party 
intervention, or alternatively amicus curiae, petition on their behalf. 1278  Indeed, the 
petition echoes the practice of international human rights jurisdictions such as the 
IACtHR or the ACHPR where standing on the basis of representation of stakeholders is 
explicitly permitted – as previously discussed.1279 Unlike the UPS tribunal, the Bechtel 
tribunal responded to the petitioners in quite a succinct manner. In fact, its decision on 
the matter of third party intervention did not extend the length of two pages.1280 A closer 
look at the petitioners’ requests, followed by the tribunal’s response thereto, is merited.  
i. Petitioners’ requests  
Given that the Bechtel case was filed later than the UPS case, the petitioners in the 
former case clearly had an extensive source of inspiration. However, the petitioners’ 
requests in the Bechtel case were more ambitious. In addition to their request for standing 
as third parties, they sought the public disclosure of all documents and transcripts related 
to the arbitration, the opening of all hearings in the arbitration to the public, and more 
particularly, for the tribunal to visit Cochabamba and hold a hearing on the facts of the 
claim in the city.1281 In line with the petitioners’ arguments in UPS, the petitioners in 
Bechtel grounded their request for standing as third parties not only on the basis of their 
                                                 
1275 See Part I  – Section 3.1. 
1276 The concession was concluded in September 1999 and ceased to be effective in April 2000. See Aguas del 
Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra note 721, at para 2. 
1277 Those were: Coordinadora para la Defensa del Agua y la Vida, La Federación Departamental Cochabambina 
de Organizaciones Regantes, SEMAPA Sur, Friends of the Earth-Netherlands, Oscar Olivera, Omar Fernandez, 
Father Luis Sánchez, and Congressman Jorge Alvarado. 
1278 The expression ‘on behalf of’ was in fact used by the Bechtel tribunal in its decision on jurisdiction. See 
Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra note 721, at para 15. 
1279 See Part II – Section 2.2.  
1280 The tribunal itself noted, while referring to the petitioners, that ‘the briefness of our reply should not be taken 
as an indication that your request was viewed in other than a serious manner’. See Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The 
Republic of Bolivia, supra note 539. 
1281 See the petitioners’ requests at Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra 716, para 34. 
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‘direct’ interest, but also ‘issues of broad public concern’ relevant to the dispute.1282 On 
the one hand, the ‘direct’ interest of the petitioners was premised on the potential adverse 
effects of the tribunal’s award on each of the petitioners. Indeed, it was particularly 
argued that any damages to AdT would be ultimately paid by the Servicio Municipal de 
Agua Potable de Cochabamba (SEMAPA), which is the municipal corporation in charge 
of water and sewage distribution prior to the concession granted to AdT. As a result, 
SEMAPA would most likely increase water price rates if Bolivia loses the arbitration. 
According to the petitioners, this would in turn limit Cochabamba’s residents’ access to 
water and undermine the petitioners’ extensive endeavors to secure the right to affordable 
and equitable access to water in Cochabamba.1283 It was additionally argued that one of 
the petitioners, the Federación Departamental Cochabambina de Organizaciones 
Regantes,1284 an association of small-scale farmers from the Cochabamba region, that 
works for the protection of customary water usage rights and practices, including the 
access as well as management of local water irrigation sources in the region of 
Cochabamba, is particularly affected by the dispute given it had been successful in 
obtaining formal legal recognition of those rights under Bolivian law. However, the 
privatization concession granted by Bolivia to AdT lead to the suspension of these rights, 
and the Federación’s members were therefore allegedly subjected to ‘discriminatory 
regulatory practices’ and financially burdensome usage fees. 1285  In the wake of the 
concession’s termination, and the ensuing investor-state dispute, the petitioners had a 
‘direct’ interest to ensure that their customary usage rights and practices, as recently 
recognized under Bolivian law, would not be perceived as inconsistent with the rights of 
foreign investors. A negative outcome of the dispute would most likely lead to pressure 
on Bolivian legislators to reconsider such recognition.1286  
Moreover, the petitioners argued that they all had a ‘direct’ interest in the 
proceedings in the following terms: 
An award against Bolivia will also harm the ‘direct’ interest of all the Bolivian petitioners in 
ensuring that the Government of Bolivia can implement legitimate measures to maintain public 
                                                 
1282 Ibid., at para 2.  
1283 Ibid., at para 18. 
1284 Meaning ‘the Cochabamba Federation of Irrigators’ Organizations’.  
1285 Ibid., at para 9. 
1286 Ibid., at para 19. 
274 
 
order and guarantee access to services and resources essential to the lives of all Bolivians without 
fear of major financial penalties for doing so.1287 
In a similar vein, with regards to ‘issues of broad concern’, the petitioners argued that the 
dispute was not merely private in character given that it raises issues that may have ‘far-
reaching impacts’ on a broad diversity of non-party interests ‘such as governmental 
authority to guarantee public order and the provisions of essential services’, and 
suggested that their request was aimed at addressing the lack of transparency ‘that 
traditionally attends international arbitral processes’, and called for issues that have broad 
public impacts to be resolved ‘through democratic processes that provide for meaningful 
public participation’. 1288 In this regard, they referred to the Methanex precedent where 
the tribunal explicitly recognized the broader implications of the proceedings – as 
previously discussed. 1289  Again, precisely because the dispute relates to actions by 
Bolivia aimed at securing the public order, and more fundamentally, access to water.1290  
Separately, in light of their ‘unique expertise and knowledge’, the petitioners 
claimed to have evidence showing that (i) Bechtel’s subsidiary increased water prices by 
an average rate of 50%; and (ii) thereby significantly restricted Cochabamba’s residents 
access to water, particularly poorer ones.1291 They also contended that their position is 
distinct from the Bolivian government’s as the latter might be ‘encumbered by conflicting 
objectives’ given the ‘strong pressure to attract foreign investment’ it faces, and that it 
does not fully represent petitioners’ interests in the proceedings. 1292  The petitioners’ 
intervention would, it was argued, enable the tribunal to have a fuller appreciation of the 
consequences of the broader issues raised by the dispute and, therefore, render a more 
just decision.1293  
More fundamentally, in line with the petitioners’ arguments in the UPS case, they 
grounded their intervention on the principle of access to justice. They argued that a denial 
                                                 
1287 Ibid., at para 20 (our emphasis). 
1288 Ibid., at para 2(ii),(iii).  
1289 See Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 428, at para 49 (our emphasis); and our discussion 
regarding the same in Part II – Section 2.1.2. See also Ibid., at para 33. 
1290 Ibid., at para 25. 
1291 Ibid., at para 35. 
1292 Ibid., at para 36. 
1293 Ibid., at para 2(iii).  
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by the tribunal to allow them to defend their rights in the proceedings would be ‘unfair 
and inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice’.1294 They contended that:  
…this Tribunal’s award will determine Petitioners’ rights. As such, it is essential that Petitioners 
have an opportunity to be heard by the Tribunal.1295 
Here, the petitioners argued that the tribunal should adopt fair and democratic procedures, 
which necessarily entail the participation of affected individuals and organizations.1296 
They also cited WTO precedents and the need to distinguish between inter-state dispute 
settlement mechanisms, and the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism set forth 
under the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT. The petitioners argued that they should be afforded 
access as affected and interested third parties by virtue of the principles of equality as 
well as fairness and, therefore, not to be treated less advantageously than foreign 
investors.1297 
From a procedural standpoint, the petitioners argued that Article 44 of the ICSID 
Convention, i.e. the corollary of Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
explicitly allowed tribunals to decide procedural matters – such as those relating to third 
party intervention – that were not covered by the ICSID Convention, ICSID Arbitration 
Rules or other agreements between the disputing parties. 1298  Again, using similar 
arguments as those raised by the petitioners in UPS, the petitioners here contended that 
the ICSID Convention and ICSID Arbitration Rules guarantee the principle of a fair 
hearing, and that this should transcend the disputing parties and be extended to take into 
account diverse interests which may be (adversely) affected by the foreign investors’ 
claims.1299 In support of their arguments, the petitioners followed the UPS example and 
quoted international law sources such as Article 14 of the ICCPR,1300 but also domestic 
                                                 
1294 Ibid., at para 2.  
1295 Ibid., para 48. 
1296 Ibid., at para 31. 
1297 Ibid., at para 45. 
1298  See Article 44 of the ICSID Convention states that ‘any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in 
accordance with the provisions of this Section and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the 
Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbitration. If any question of procedure 
arises which is not covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the 
Tribunal shall decide the question’. See ICSID Convention, supra note 379. 
1299 Ibid., at para 39. 
1300 See Article 14(1), ICCPR, supra note 1250. 
276 
 
ones, in particular the Bolivian Civil Procedure Code, which explicitly allows third party 
intervention.1301  
ii. The tribunal’s response 
In a letter addressed to Earthjustice dated 29 January 2003, the tribunal essentially 
considered that, in the absence of both disputing parties’ consent, the intervention of a 
third party would contravene the consensual nature of investment arbitration.1302 The 
petitioners’ request for standing would amount to joining a party to the proceedings, 
which clearly goes beyond the tribunal’s power or authority. This position is in line with 
the UPS precedent, as well as the provisions of Article 17(5) of the newly amended 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which provides that, at the request of any disputing party, 
the tribunal may allow third persons to be joined in the arbitration if those were parties to 
the underlying arbitration agreement.1303 Indeed, it noted that both the ICSID Convention 
and the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT refer to the disputing parties’ consent in order to deal 
with the procedural issue of joining a party – which was absent in this particular instance. 
This also applied to granting access to hearings to the public and the public disclosure of 
proceedings documents. The tribunal ultimately highlighted a fundamental aspect 
emphasized below:  
The Tribunal appreciates that you, and the organizations and individuals with whom you work, are 
concerned with the resolution of this dispute. The duties of the Tribunal, however, derive from the 
treaties which govern this particular dispute.1304 
Therefore, absent explicit treaty or arbitration rules provisions allowing tribunals to add 
third parties to a given dispute, or alternatively the consent of both disputing parties, 
                                                 
1301 See Articles 355-369 on third party intervention. Article 356 provides that: ‘the intervenor shall establish its 
intervention on the basis of a personal interest, a positive right, and certain existence , although its exercise may 
be subject to terms and conditions.’ (our translation). See Código de Procedimiento Civil, entry into force 02 
April 1976, available at: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/es/details.jsp?id=11445 (last accessed 06 October 2014). 
1302 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra note 539. 
1303 Article 17(5) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules states that: ‘The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of 
any party, allow one or more third persons to be joined in the arbitration as a party provided such person is a 
party to the arbitration agreement, unless the arbitral tribunal finds, after giving all parties, including the person 
or persons to be joined, the opportunity to be heard, that joinder should not be permitted because of prejudice to 
any of those parties’ (our emphasis). See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), entry into force 06 December 
2010, available at: http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-
e.pdf (last accessed 01 November 2013).  
1304 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra note 539, at 2 (our emphasis). 
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investor-state tribunals will be arguably reluctant to accept such petitions – as succinctly 
articulated by the tribunal.   
1.3.3 Jurisdictional barriers set by the UPS and Bechtel tribunals 
Both the UPS and Bechtel cases showed that third party intervention could have 
been permissible had both disputing parties consented to it.1305 In light of the absence of 
such consent, civil society organizations sought inspiration to request third party 
intervention on the basis of the prevalence of the practice under municipal law.1306 More 
fundamentally, Earthjustice sought to act as a representative of Bolivian civil society 
groups and individuals by petitioning the arbitral tribunal on their behalf; therefore, it 
followed a well-established standing model practiced at the IACtHR and ACHPR, which 
effectively means that Earthjustice is not a direct stakeholder per se, but is rather a 
representative of (adversely) affected civil society groups and individuals from the 
Cochabamba community. 
However, the petitioners in both the UPS and Bechtel cases formulated requests 
that are tainted with clear substantive and procedural deficiencies – from the tribunals’ 
perspective. Substantively, the UPS tribunal deemed the reference to Article 14 of the 
ICCPR as remotely relevant. It found that ‘the Petitioners’ rights and obligations are not 
engaged in that way or indeed at all’.1307 On the other hand, it further noted that ‘the 
Investor and Canada are the parties whose rights and obligations are to be determined 
by the arbitration, and no one else’s’.1308 Procedurally, the petitioners made a request that 
no investor-state tribunal could possibly accept, i.e. they requested their addition as a 
disputing party which, if granted by a tribunal, would certainly be ultra vires and a clear 
violation of the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT or NAFTA.1309 It would render a tribunal’s 
award an easy target for annulment or set-aside on the basis of excess of jurisdiction. 
                                                 
1305 A. Kawharu, supra note 393, at 287. 
1306 On Earthjustice’s experience as intervenor in US public interest litigation, see supra note 1235. 
1307 UPS v Canada, supra note 517, para 40. 
1308 Ibid., at para 41 (our emphasis).  
1309 This issue is further addressed in Part III – Section 3. 
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2. Could there be a basis for civil society’s third party intervention?  
The limitations of the amicus curiae role vis-à-vis disputing parties are evident. 
Civil society organizations have requested full standing whether as representatives of 
stakeholders to, or as directly (or adversely) affected by, investor-state arbitrations based 
on the access to justice principle. The question here is whether such requests are well-
founded. In other words, is there an over-arching basis justifying a more expansive 
procedural role for civil society through the prism of the access to justice principle? The 
aim of this section is to question whether the access to justice principle might constitute 
the basis for a more expansive civil society participation in investor-state disputes. It thus 
tests civil society’s access to justice arguments. In concreto, it considers whether the 
right to take part in proceedings, or in other words, the right to be heard could be secured 
if and when investor-state arbitration might affect the rights – and not merely the 
‘broader’ interests – of civil society, or those it purports to represent. 
2.1 Access to justice under international law 
Prior to engaging in the analysis of civil society’s requests to access justice, there 
is first a need to define what exactly is understood as access to justice and locate it within 
wider international law norms. There will be then a shift to an investor-state dispute-
specific analysis of access to justice that will be looked at through the standpoints of both 
foreign investors and civil society. This section will finally assess whether access to 
justice may be applicable to civil society in investor-state disputes.  
Access to justice is considered as a fundamental right as without it no other right 
can be effective.1310 It is nonetheless a broadly defined concept and its understanding 
varies depending not only on the context, but also legal traditions. Francioni captures a 
generic conception from the domestic realm that might be relevantly applied to the 
investor-state dispute settlement context by defining it as:  
…the possibility for the individual to bring a claim before a court and have a court adjudicate it. In 
a more qualified meaning access to justice is used to signify the right of an individual not only to 
enter a court of law, but to have his or her case heard and adjudicated in accordance with 
substantive standards of fairness and justice…Thus, from the point of view of the individual, the 
                                                 
1310 L. Burgorgue-Larsen, and A. Úbeda de Torres, supra note 44, at 503. 
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term would normally refer to the right to seek a remedy before a court of law or a tribunal which is 
constituted by law and which can guarantee independence and impartiality in the application of the 
law.’ 1311  
For present purposes, the right to be heard is a crucial element of the broader concept of 
access to justice. It is understood as the individual’s right to obtain the protection of the 
law and the availability of legal remedies before a court.1312 It is the ‘possibility for the 
individual to bring a claim before a court and have a court adjudicate it’ as shown with 
respect to civil society’s standing before international human rights jurisdictions.1313 In 
the same vein, the Appellate Body confirmed that member states are the sole 
beneficiaries of the right to make submissions, or to be heard by the Appellate Body; in 
other words, solely member states have access to the Appellate Body’s justice.1314  
Meron succinctly and poignantly sums up access to justice as the right to initiate 
or take part in proceedings.1315 Under IIAs or BITs, the sole persons entitled to initiate 
proceedings are foreign investors. Access to justice – from civil society’s standpoint – 
could potentially entail the right to take part in investor-state arbitrations, and not 
necessarily to initiate them.  
The overarching principle of access to justice is not underlying to any norm of 
customary international law. 1316  Access to justice is nonetheless considered to be 
enshrined under Article 10 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1317 It is 
further articulated in the provisions of international instruments such as Article 14 of the 
ICCPR,1318 Article 6(1) of the ECHR,1319 Article 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental 
                                                 
1311 See F. Francioni, supra note 882, at 1. 
1312 F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 729.  
1313 See Part II – Section 2. 
1314 The Appellate Body previously noted that: ‘Individuals and organizations, which are not members of the 
WTO, have no legal ‘right’ to make submissions or to be heard by the Appellate Body’. See Report of the 
Appellate Body, Hot-Rolled Lead case supra note 1042, para 41. 
1315 T. Meron, supra note 848, at 318. 
1316 Although aspects of it, such as denial of justice, which is a duty to provide ‘decent justice’ to foreigners, is a 
violation of customary international law – as further discussed below. See F. Francioni, supra note 882, at 41; 
and J. Paulsson, supra note 107, at 1, 4.                                   
1317 Article 10 provides that: ‘Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.’. 
See UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, infra note 672. See also J. Paulsson, supra note 107, at 5.  
1318 Article 14(1), ICCPR, supra note 1250. 
1319 Article 6(1) provides that: ‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be 
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the 
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Rights of the European Union,1320 Article 25 of the IACHR,1321 or Article 7(1) of the 
Banjul Charter1322 Some of these provisions have been tested in international adjudication, 
particularly in (i) an investor-state dispute context or (ii) international human rights cases 
involving foreign investment activities.  
i. References by investor-state tribunals  
Civil society petitioners in the previously discussed UPS v. Canada case 
requested to intervene as third parties, most notably on the grounds that ‘all persons shall 
be equal before the courts and tribunals’ and that ‘everyone shall be entitled to a fair and 
public hearing’ in accordance with Article 14 of the ICCPR. However, the UPS tribunal 
dismissed their petition and considered Article 14 to be inapplicable given that it relates 
to persons whose rights and obligations are being determined by a tribunal which, 
according to the UPS tribunal, was clearly not the petitioners’ case.1323 That is because 
the rights and obligations the tribunal was referring to are set out under the relevant 
investment treaty, in this case NAFTA’s Chapter XI, which is essentially concerned with 
regulating NAFTA party conduct towards, and treatment of, investors who are nationals 
of other NAFTA parties.1324  
                                                                                                                                                 
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the 
interests of justice’. See ECHR, supra note 844. 
1320 Article 47(2) provides that: ‘Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being 
advised, defended and represented.’. See European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
entry into force 01 December 2009, 2012/C 326/02. 
1321 Article 25(1) provides that: ‘1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective 
recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights 
recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation 
may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.’. See the IACHR on Human 
Rights, supra note 66. 
1322 Article 7(1) provides that: ‘1.Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: 
(a).The right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights as 
recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; (b).The right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal; (c).The right to defence, including the right to be 
defended by counsel of his choice; (d).The right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or 
tribunal.’. See Banjul Charter, infra note 845. For a global analysis on international instruments relevant to 
access to justice, see F. Francioni, supra note 882, at 32.  Article 7(1) is also the basis pursuant to which the 
ACHPR has also adopted Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, 
under E. Locus Standi which provides that: ‘states must ensure, through adoption of national legislation, that in 
regard to human rights violations, which are matters of public concern, any individual, group of individuals or 
non-governmental organization is entitled to bring an issue before judicial bodies for determination’. See 
ACHPR Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, adopted in 24 
October 2011, available at: http://www.achpr.org/instruments/fair-trial/?prn=1 (last accessed 06 October 2014).                                   
1323 UPS v Canada, supra note 517, para 40 (our emphasis).  
1324 Ibid., at para 40.  
281 
 
Although more relevant to a foreign investor perspective, another example is 
Mondev International v. the United States.1325 The Mondev tribunal applied Article 6(1) 
of the ECHR in a comparative analysis in order to determine a claim on the basis of 
Article 1105(1) of NAFTA on the fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security that should be afforded to NAFTA investors.1326 Article 6(1) requires that in 
order to right a wrong a court must be open to recourse and that ‘fair and public hearings 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law’ are 
guaranteed by the state.1327 The tribunal found in this regard that Article 6(1) positions 
the ‘right to court’ as an aspect of human rights relevant to all persons which has been 
interpreted in an evolutionary way; yet, it cannot fall under the purpose of investment 
protection set forth under Article 1105.1328 The reference to the ECHR in the Mondev 
award is interesting as the ECHR is a human rights instrument that neither the US nor 
Canada (the home state of the claimant) was a party to.1329  
ii. References by international human rights jurisdictions  
There are also examples from the IACtHR and the ACHPR, both applying the 
IACHR and the Banjul Charter respectively. In the previously discussed case of Awas 
Tingni v. Nicaragua, 1330  the indigenous community of Awas Tingni sought the 
recognition of its collective property right to its ancestral land. However, Nicaragua had 
granted a logging concession to Solcarsa, a subsidiary of a Korean-based multinational, 
on the Awas Tingni’s ancestral land without the latter’s consent. The IACtHR recognized 
                                                 
1325 The case is a NAFTA Chapter XI dispute that was settled pursuant to the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 
See Mondev International Ltd v. United States of America, ICSID (Additional Facility) Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 
Award of 11 Ocober. 2002.  
1326 The dispute arose out of a real estate development contract concluded between the City of Boston  and the 
Boston Redevelopment Authority, and a subsidiary of Mondev. The latter successfully filed a lawsuit against 
both in a Massachusetts court. However, the trial judge upheld the jury’s verdict for breach of the contract 
against the City, but found the Boston Redevelopment Authority immune from liability pursuant to a 
Massachusetts statute giving it immunity from suit for intentional torts. Mondev’s subsidiary failed as well in its 
appeal. Mondev claims that due to the Massachusetts court decision and the acts of the City and the Boston 
Redevelopment Authority, the US breached its obligations under Chapter XI, in particular Article 1105. See Ibid., 
at para 2. See also NAFTA Article 1105, supra note 263. 
1327 F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 736. 
1328 In addition, it found that the problematic issue of the Boston Redevelopment Authority’s immunity is a 
substantive issue given its stipulation under Massachusetts law; rather than a procedural one which would be 
more relevant to the scope of Article 6(1) of the ECHR. See Mondev International Ltd v. United States of 
America, supra note 1325, at para 144.  
1329 F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 736. 
1330 The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Republic of Nicaragua case, supra note 955. 
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the communal property of the Awas Tingni. In addition, and more relevantly for the 
purposes of this section, the IACtHR found that Nicaragua violated Article 25 of the 
IACHR, which guarantees the right of everyone to ‘simple and prompt recourse, or any 
other effective recourse…for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights’, 
on the basis of the absence of an effective procedure for the demarcation and registration 
of indigenous communal property. 1331  
The previously discussed SERAC v. Nigeria case is another example of 
international adjudication discussing the issue of access to justice. 1332  Although the 
ACHPR did not explicitly cite Article 7(1) of the Banjul Charter, in its analysis on 
admissibility of the complaint (and the fulfilment of the exhaustion of local remedies 
condition), it nonetheless found that:  
The Military government of Nigeria had enacted various decrees ousting the jurisdiction of the 
courts and thus depriving the people in Nigeria of the right to seek redress in the courts for acts of 
government that violate their fundamental human rights. In such instances, and as in the instant 
communication, the [African] Commission is of the view that no adequate domestic remedies are 
existent.1333 
The case ultimately shed light on the grave human rights abuses suffered by the Ogoni 
people, which were the direct result of oil exploitation by both Nigerian and 
multinationals in the Nile Delta region.1334 The Ogoni were indeed denied any adequate 
recourse by the Nigerian judicial system, which ultimately lead them to resort a number 
of times to international jurisdictions and foreign courts.1335 The prevalence of inadequate 
or ineffective domestic regulations and remedies lead several groups such as the Ogoni to 
seek remedy in other accessible domestic courts, particularly in the US under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act.1336 Indigenous groups, in particular those unrecognized domestically 
                                                 
1331 Ibid., para 138. See also F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 739. For a more in-depth analysis of the case, see 
Part II – Section 2.2.   
1332 As previously discussed, the complaint was filed to ACHPR by two civil society organizations, including 
SERAC – a Nigeria-based NGO, in relation to the human rights violations suffered by the Ogoni people who 
inhabit the oil-rich Niger Delta region. See SERAC and Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, supra 
note 931, para 30 (our emphasis). See also F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 740. For a more in-depth analysis of 
the case, see Part II – Section 2.2.   
1333 Ibid., at para 42.  
1334 Indeed, in its response to the ACHPR, the newly-appointed civilian government in Nigeria stated that ‘there 
is no denying the fact that a lot of atrocities were and are still being committed by the oil companies in Ogoni 
Land and indeed in the Niger Delta area’. See Ibid., at para 42.   
1335 G. Akpan, supra note 596, at 74-75. 
1336 The advantage of the Alien Tort Claims Act is that it allows victims to directly sue multinationals, generally 
those engaged in the exploitation of natural resources that give rise to torts, and damages for human rights abuses 
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such as the Ogoni or the Awas Tingni, resort to foreign and international human rights 
jurisdictions not only as a result of the unavailability of a domestic judicial system in 
redressing the violations they claim to be the victims of, but also often due to its 
ineffectiveness.1337 
2.2 Is there a civil society ius standi before investor-state tribunals?  
Is civil society’s access to justice relevant to the investor-state dispute context? 
An answer to this question will be given below from the standpoint of both foreign 
investors and civil society. It is clear from the outset that a fundamental difference exists 
between the two groups. IIAs and BITs bestow upon foreign investors rights. By contrast, 
any person, including civil society, that does not fall under the definition of an ‘investor’ 
under IIAs or BITs does not benefit from any rights under those treaties – as further 
shown below.  
2.2.1 Foreign investors as the primary beneficiaries of access to justice 
As previously mentioned, foreign investors historically relied on diplomatic 
protection or inter-state claims in order to seek redress from injuries caused by host state 
conduct such as unfair and discriminatory treatment or uncompensated expropriations of 
their investments. In addition, the international law on foreign investment evolved to 
establish a dispute settlement that is meant to be fair, independent, and impartial to 
                                                                                                                                                 
or environmental degradation. This is for instance clearly manifested in the case of Jota v. Texaco, a case brought 
by indigenous groups inhabiting the Oriente region in Ecuador, as well as others inhabiting the downstream area 
in Peru, against Texaco (now Chevron, a US-based multinational) for environmental and personal injuries that 
allegedly resulted from Texaco's exploitation of the region's oil fields between 1964 to 1992. Interestingly, a 
petition to the judge by an Ecuadorian legislator highlighted the importance of seeking remedy in a US court: 
‘only the adjudication of jurisdiction in the claim filed by Ecuadorians... in a federal court of N.Y. against the 
Texaco Company, will bring to those affected the possibility of finding just treatment and a solution to the 
serious situation that they are going through’. See Jota v. Texaco, supra note 141, at para 157. That said, lodging 
a successful claim in US courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act might be quite difficult; whereas, examples of 
successful claims in international human rights jurisdictions are abundant. It is argued that the repeated 
application by US judges of the forum non conveniens, international comity, and sovereign immunity rules are a 
significant impediment to the success of such claims. See G. Akpan, supra note 596, at 62, 67, 77. 
1337 G. Akpan, supra note 596, at 74-75. 
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adjudicate foreign investors’ claims against host states, i.e. an access to (an international) 
justice.1338 It is indeed argued that: 
investor-state arbitration serves fundamentally as a remedy to ensure access to justice, neutrality, 
and fairness by empowering individuals and corporations to participate directly in a dispute 
settlement process––arguably an option that may be unavailable to foreigners before domestic 
justice systems or elsewhere. 1339 
One of the main concerns of such a dispute settlement framework was to 
guarantee recourse to those foreign investors who suffered denial of justice in front of the 
judiciary of host states. Understanding the rationale behind securing such access to 
foreign investors, including the protection against denial of justice, is necessary in order 
to assess whether the access to justice principle may equally benefit civil society before 
investor-state tribunals – as will be discussed in the subsequent section. Holistically, it 
also reflects that foreign investor protection is concerned in fine with the upholding the 
international rule of law.1340  
Denial of justice is a violation of the customary international law duty to provide 
‘decent justice’ to foreigners, and thus foreign investors, i.e. it is a duty upon states not to 
administer justice to aliens in a fundamentally unfair manner, and whereby procedural 
fairness and due process is measured by an international standard.1341 Foreign investors 
often face arbitrary and discretionary conduct by host state institutions which (adversely) 
affect their investments, or lead to their outright expropriation for instance. 1342  The 
judiciary, as an instrument of the host state,1343 can also play a role in denying foreign 
                                                 
1338 See J. Paulsson, supra note 107, at 28, 55; and P. Dumberry, supra note 221, at 112. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Part I – Section 1.5.1.  
1339 S. Puig, infra note 1403, at 249 (our emphasis).  
1340  See supra note 80. 
1341 J. Paulsson, supra note 107, at 1, 4. See also Article 5(2)(a), United States of America Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Model, infra note 1350. 
1342  Host state arbitrary and discretionary conduct was alleged in the case of Siag v. Egypt. The Egyptian 
government confiscated the claimants’ property, which was intended for touristic development, partially due to a 
business agreement signed by the latter with an Israeli company (which was subsequently revoked by the 
claimants in the hope of avoiding the confiscation of their property). Having failed to enforce numerous domestic 
court judgements ruled in their favour against the government, the claimants dropped their Egyptian citizenship, 
and filed an ICSID claim against Egypt on the basis of the Italy-Egypt BIT given that they were dual citizens. 
Egypt was ultimately found liable to pay nearly $75 million dollars in damages to the claimants, most notably 
due to the unlawful expropriation of the latters’ investments and the violation of fair and equitable standard set 
forth in the Italy-Egypt BIT. See Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15 (‘Siag v. Egypt’). 
1343 This is consistent with Article 4(1) of the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, which states that: ‘The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever 
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investors the opportunity to adequately or effectively defend their rights and interests, or 
even to be heard. The problem in such cases may simply relate to the fact that the foreign 
investor is an alien, a national of a foreign state.1344  Although various investor-state 
disputes dealt with the issue of denial of justice,1345 the concept is particularly manifested 
in the Loewen International v. the United States case.1346  
The dispute concerns litigation brought in a Mississippi State Court against 
Loewen, a Canadian-owned group of companies with a subsidiary in the US engaged in 
the funeral home and funeral insurance business, by a Mississippi-based company called 
O’Keefe – Loewen’s competitor – as a result of a commercial dispute between the two 
companies. Although the value of the litigation was slightly under $7.5 million, the 
Mississippi jury awarded O’Keefe $500 million in damages, including $75 million for 
emotional distress and $400 million of punitive damages.1347 Following the settlement 
with O’Keefe, Loewen filed a NAFTA Chapter XI claim against the US alleging most 
                                                                                                                                                 
position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central 
Government or of a territorial unit of the State.’. See supra note 833 (cited in J. Paulsson, supra note 107, at 40), 
and Robert Azinian and others v. Mexico, infra note 1345, at para 98 (in which Jan Paulsson acted as president of 
the arbitral tribunal).  
1344 In this regard, see for instance the 1985 UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not 
Nationals of the Country in which They Live. Article 5 states that: ‘Aliens shall enjoy, in accordance with 
domestic law and subject to the relevant international obligations of the State in which they are present, in 
particular the following rights:… (c) The right to be equal before the courts, tribunals and all other organs and 
authorities administering justice and, when necessary, to free assistance of an interpreter in criminal proceedings 
and, when prescribed by law, other proceedings’.  See UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Human Rights 
of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live : resolution / adopted by the General 
Assembly, dated 13 December 1985, A/RES/40/144.  
1345 In the NAFTA case of Robert Azinian and others v. Mexico, the claimants sought to contest various Mexican 
courts’ decisions confirming the annulment of a waste disposal services contract for a suburb of Mexico city. The 
arbitral tribunal found that NAFTA Chapter XI tribunals cannot act as appellate jurisdictions to national court 
decisions. More fundamentally for our purposes, the tribunal articulated the concept of denial of justice by 
stating that: ‘a denial of justice could be pleaded if the relevant courts refuse to entertain a suit, if they subject it 
to undue delay, or if they administer justice in a seriously inadequate way’. It most notably found that there was 
no such evidence to that effect, and ultimately dismissed the claim. See Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian, & 
Ellen Baca v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/2, Award of 01 November 1999, at para 
99, 102 (‘Robert Azinian and others v. Mexico’). For a further discussion of the case, see also R. Klager, supra 
note 1252, at 217. Another example is the previously discussed case of Mondev International Ltd v. United 
States of America, supra note 1325. 
1346 Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 
(‘Loewen Group v. United States of America’).  
1347 Loewen argued that O’Keefe’s attorneys made irrelevant and discriminatory nationality-based, racial and 
class-based references in their pleadings, which were not discarded by the trial judge; and therefore sought to 
appeal the judgment to the Mississippi Supreme Court. However, Mississippi law requires an appeal bond 
equivalent to 125% of the value of judgment as a condition of suspending execution of the judgment. The 
Mississippi Supreme Court refused to reduce the appeal bond and required Loewen to post a $625 million bond 
within seven days in order to pursue its appeal and to avoid facing immediate execution of the judgment. Loewen 
was thus compelled to enter into a settlement with O’Keefe under which it agreed to pay the latter $175 million. 
See Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, Award of 26 June 2003, at para 
3-8. 
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notably that: (i) the Mississippi trial court, by admitting nationality-based, racial and 
class-based discrimination pleadings violated Article 1102 on national treatment as well 
as Article 1105 of NAFTA on the fair and equitable treatment it should have been 
afforded;1348 and (ii) notwithstanding the discriminatory aspects, the excessive verdict 
and judgment of the Mississippi State Court violated Article 1105.1349 Loewen did not 
allege a ‘denial of justice’ per se since NAFTA does not even contain that expression.1350 
The US argued on the other hand that Loewen’s claim is not arbitrable because the 
judgments of domestic courts, including the Mississippi court judgments complained of, 
in private disputes should not be considered as ‘measures adopted or maintained’ by a 
NAFTA party, and therefore should not fall under the scope of Chapter XI.1351 In addition, 
the US contended that these judgments cannot give rise to a breach by the US of Chapter 
XI because they were not final acts of its judicial system.1352  
The tribunal was unequivocal in finding that the judicial acts or wrongs of host 
states may be considered as relevant government measures within the scope of NAFTA 
Chapter XI.1353 On the second point, the tribunal found that Loewen failed to pursue 
                                                 
1348 The Article provides that: ‘1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable 
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors…’. See NAFTA Article 1102, supra note 514. 
Article 1105 on the other hand states that: ‘1. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party 
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security…’. See NAFTA, supra note 227. 
1349 Ibid., at para 39. 
1350 Rather, Loewen claimed a violation of the fair and equitable treatment, as well as treatment in accordance 
with international law, pursuant to Article 1105 of NAFTA. Although not mentioned under NAFTA, it is 
interesting to note that the concept of denial of justice falls under the fair and equitable treatment clause under 
the 2012 US BIT Model. Indeed, Article 5(2)(a) provides that: ‘“fair and equitable treatment” includes the 
obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the 
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world’. See United States of America 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Model, supra note 498; R. Klager, supra note 1252, at 213. See also Article 1105 of 
NAFTA, supra note 227; J. Paulsson, supra note 107, at 6. 
1351 Indeed, Article 1101 of NAFTA on the scope and coverage of Chapter XI, provides that: ‘1. This Chapter 
applies to measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to: (a) investors of another Party; (b) investments 
of investors of another Party in the territory of the Party…’. See Ibid. 
1352 The US argued that Loewen should have (i) pursued its appeal despite the risk of execution on its assets; or 
(ii) sought protection under Chapter Eleven of the US Bankruptcy Code which would have resulted in a stay of 
execution against Loewen’s assets; or (iii) filed a petition for certiorari and sought a stay of execution in the 
Supreme Court of the United States. For the present purposes, there are two main questions the tribunal had to 
decide upon, i.e. whether (i) the Mississippi courts decisions and judgements may be considered as ‘measures 
adopted or maintained’ by a NAFTA party, and therefore falling under the scope of Chapter XI; and (ii) the 
appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court was an available remedy which Loewen should have pursued before it 
could establish that the Mississippi State Court’s judgment constituted a US measure violating Article 1105 of 
NAFTA. See Ibid., at para 41, 207. 
1353  The tribunal resorted to a liberal interpretation of Article 201 of NAFTA, which defines ‘measure’ as 
including: ‘any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice’. See NAFTA, supra note 227. See Ibid., at 
para 218. See also J. Paulsson, supra note 107, at 42. 
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available domestic remedies, notably the Supreme Court recourse. In consequence, 
Loewen has not established a violation of customary international law or a violation of 
NAFTA.1354 Although it recognized that a failure by the US to provide adequate means of 
remedy may amount to an international wrong, and indeed reiterated its criticism on the 
improper conduct of proceedings in front Mississippi State Court, the tribunal warned 
nonetheless against an interpretation of NAFTA which would lead it to exercise an 
appellate function parallel to that which belongs to the courts of the host state.1355  
Loewen was (controversially) unsuccessful in its NAFTA claim against the US. 
Yet, the Loewen award is considered as ‘undoubtedly one of the most important 
international decisions rendered in the field of denial of justice’.1356 It confirms the broad 
recognition that access to justice is effectively guaranteed to foreign investors by virtue 
of IIAs or BITs. Indeed, foreign investors benefit from a direct access to an international 
justice system, as evidenced by the availability of a recourse to the NAFTA-constituted 
tribunal in Loewen, where they can directly petition an independent and impartial arbitral 
tribunal to order host states the payment of damages for injuries caused by their violation 
of investment protection obligations – also set out in IIAs or BITs, including any acts or 
omissions which amounted to a denial of justice. Again, such recourse is available 
without any intervention on behalf of the foreign investors’ home-state, whether by way 
of diplomatic protection or the initiation of inter-state claims. 1357 Essentially, foreign 
investors’ right to be heard is guaranteed by the availability of recourse to an independent 
and impartial investor-state tribunal, with the latter having the authority to decide 
adequate and effective legal remedies for injuries caused to foreign investors by host state 
conduct.  
2.2.2 Does civil society have a ‘right to be heard’ before investor-state tribunals? 
Having looked at the application of the principle of access to justice to the benefit 
of foreign investors in an investor-state dispute context, it is now essential to consider 
whether it may be relevantly applied to civil society in the same sphere. As mentioned, 
                                                 
1354 Ibid., at para 217. 
1355 Ibid., at para 242.  
1356 J. Paulsson, supra note 107, at 6, R. Klager, supra note 1252, at 221, and F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 734. 
1357 F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 731. 
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civil society organizations have previously petitioned for full standing whether as a 
representative of stakeholders to, or as directly (or adversely) affected by, investor-state 
arbitrations. From a more procedural standpoint, it is worthy to note once more that the 
amicus curiae role is the sole avenue currently contemplated for civil society 
organizations to access investor-state tribunals. Civil society petitioners’ requests for 
third party intervention were thus premised on the fundamentals of access to justice. This 
implies the right to take part in proceedings as defined by Meron, or in other words, the 
right to be heard, which are foreign to the amicus role – as previously mentioned. 1358  
i. Arguments in favour of applying access to justice principles to civil society 
The importance of environmental protection and human rights in an investor-state 
dispute context has been previously highlighted.1359 The possibility for civil society to 
raise, assert, or defend those ‘direct’ interests certainly falls under the rationale for 
applying access to justice principles to civil society. From a more holistic perspective, it 
is argued that the achievement of justice should be equally considered as a founding 
principle for the international law on foreign investment – just like it is for any other law 
– that complements the imperative of foreign investment protection.1360 The previously 
discussed Osgoode Statement, a ‘statement of concern about the international investment 
regime’ by eminent academics, reflects this argument:  
Private citizens, local communities and civil society organizations should be afforded a right to 
participate in decision-making that affects their rights and interests, including in the context of 
investor-state dispute settlement or contract renegotiation.1361  
It is thus contended that an opportunity should be afforded to those whose not only rights, 
but also interests, are affected by an investor-state dispute to adequately and effectively 
participate in the investor-state dispute settlement process. Also, in referring to the right 
of citizens, local communities and civil society organizations to participate in decision-
making, it could be argued that the Osgoode Statement alludes to earlier stages of the 
foreign investment process – which can be equally problematic if the free, prior and 
                                                 
1358 T. Meron, supra note 848, at 318. See Part III – Section 1.2. 
1359 See Part I – Section 4. 
1360  M. Sornarajah, supra note 8, at 330.  
1361 Osgoode Statement, supra note 670.  
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informed consent of the host-population was not sought for instance.1362 Although such a 
statement might be considered as more relevant to a political process, e.g. under a 
deliberative democratic mode of governance, rather than a judicial one, it is nonetheless 
argued that even judicial processes could be improved when a greater number of voices 
are involved.1363  
 These arguments are further supported by the fact that foreign investors benefit 
from a full access to justice; whereas civil society does not. In the UPS v. Canada case, 
the Council of Canadians and Canadian Union of Postal Workers precisely contended 
that third parties such as themselves, who are non-parties to NAFTA just like foreign 
investors such as UPS, should also be granted access to the tribunal because their 
interests are directly affected by a given dispute. 1364  The position of the Council of 
Canadians and Canadian Union of Postal Workers echoes Francioni’s arguments: 
Indeed, the increasing impact of foreign investment on the social life of the host state has raised 
the question whether the principle of access to justice, as successfully developed to the benefit of 
investors through the provision of binding arbitration, ought to be matched by a corresponding 
right to remedial proceedings for individuals and groups adversely affected by the investment in 
the host state...1365  
There is no converse right to access justice that is guaranteed to third-party stakeholders 
to the investor-state dispute that would be equivalent in any degree to what foreign 
investors are entitled to. This is manifestly reflected in the previously discussed case of 
Metalclad v. Mexico, where stakeholders from the Guadalcazar community were not 
afforded the right to raise arguments or issues at no stage of the arbitration. They could 
have had a myriad of potentially relevant arguments and issues to raise regarding the 
construction of a hazardous waste landfill by Metalclad within their community, 
including facts or allegations of sickness caused by the hazardous waste that had already 
been dumped on the site, or additional environmental scientific evidence or assessments 
on its potential adverse effects that Mexico did not raise as part of its pleadings. An 
adequate and effective participation of third party stakeholders could have contributed to 
                                                 
1362  See Article 32(2), UNDRIP, supra note 762; Article 6, ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
supra note 766;  K. Sing’Oei, supra note 766, at 520; and K. Engle, supra note 761, at 147-148. 
1363 R. Garcia, supra note 972, at 342, and C. Harlow, infra note 1083, at 13 – who counters such argument and is 
against the use of, what is viewed as, political advocacy by civil society groups within the realm of the judicial 
process.  
1364 UPS v Canada, supra note 1241, at para 83.  
1365 F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 738. 
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a reduction of the amount of damages Metalclad obtained for the expropriation of its 
hazardous waste site, or even the outright dismissal of its claim.1366  
Furthermore, again in the UPS v. Canada case, the Council of Canadians and 
Canadian Union of Postal Workers contended that, although initially construed for the 
benefit of disputing parties, and in particular foreign investors, the scope of the principles 
of equality and fairness – as enshrined under Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules – should also benefit third parties in light of the pubic character of investor-state 
disputes and the diverse interests which may be (adversely) affected by foreign investors’ 
claims.1367 Again, this view is in several ways supported by authors such as Francioni, 
who states that:  
The right of access to justice is inextricably linked to the principle of ‘fair and equitable’ standard 
enshrined in international investment instruments which entails that foreign investors who seek 
equity for the protection of their investments must also be accountable, under principles of equity 
and fairness, to the host state’s population affected by the investment. It is hard to conceive equity 
as a one-sided concept: equity requires fair and equitable balancing of competing interests, in this 
case the interests of foreign investors and the interest of those who seek judicial protection against 
possible adverse impacts of the investment on their life or their environment.1368  
Indeed, the fair and equitable standard set forth under Article 1105 of NAFTA also 
includes treatment in accordance with international law.1369 It is precisely in this regard 
that the claimants in the Loewen International v. the United States case alleged a denial 
of justice in front of US courts, and therefore sought redress in front of, and effectively 
had access to, a NAFTA Chapter XI-constituted tribunal – as previously discussed.1370 
ii. Arguments against applying access to justice principles to civil society 
Having said that, it is often nonetheless argued that civil society groups ought to 
seek redress in domestic courts given that investor-state tribunals have a specifically 
                                                 
1366 Whilst Metalclad contested the fact that it was not consulted by the Guadalcazar municipality prior to the 
rejection of its construction permit, did not have the right to be heard, and was therefore not treated equitably; the 
exact inverse could potentially be argued by local citizens from Guadalcazar at the level of the arbitral tribunal. 
The tribunal ultimately ordered Mexico to pay $16,685,000.00 in damages to Metalclad. See Metalclad 
Corporation v. United Mexican States, supra note 257, at para 50, 131. For a more detailed discussion on this 
aspect of the case, see Part I – Section 1.4. 
1367 It is worthy to quote here Article 15(1) once more with an emphasis on the notion of equality ‘…the arbitral 
tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are 
treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting 
his case’ (our emphasis). See Article 15(1) UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 433. See also UPS v 
Canada, infra note 1241, at para 64, and UPS v Canada, supra note 517, para 21. 
1368 F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 739. 
1369 See Article 1105 of NAFTA, supra note 227. 
1370 Loewen Group v. United States of America, supra note 1346. 
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defined purpose of solely adjudicating upon host states’ conduct towards, and treatment 
of, foreign investors.1371 In general, investor-state arbitration has been often perceived as 
an ill-suited place for civil society’s claims and concerns.1372 The right of access to a 
court for third party stakeholders, e.g. indigenous groups that may be (adversely) affected, 
should be typically guaranteed by the domestic law and judicial system of the host state. 
In most cases, third-party stakeholders do indeed have access to domestic courts where 
they may seek damages for the harm caused by foreign investors’ activities.  
Yet, the forum conveniens underlying to the investor-state dispute is not 
necessarily (and not only) the domestic one. 1373  Host state domestic court decisions 
against foreign investors may be contested by foreign investors before an investor-state 
tribunal on the basis of the violation of host state obligations towards foreign investment 
promotion and protection. 1374  This is clearly manifested in the previously discussed 
Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador legal saga. In this case, Chevron initiated an arbitration 
against Ecuador primarily to contest Ecuadorian court judgments ordering Chevron to 
pay billions of dollars in damages to indigenous groups inhabiting the area surrounding 
one of its former petroleum exploitation sites.1375 Accordingly, civil society actors who 
had an interest in ensuring the success of the contested Ecuadorian court judgments – 
such as the Canadian-based IISD and the Ecuadorian-based Fundación Pachamama – 
followed Chevron’s action in initiating investor-state arbitration, and sought to intervene 
in that arbitration.1376  
Although polemical, and rejected by a significant number of practitioners, the 
current trend at the procedural level towards a more expansive construction of civil 
society’s access to justice is supported by the increasing acceptance of amicus curiae 
participation in investor-state disputes – as further discussed below.1377  
iii. The right to be heard of amici curiae and third party intervenors  
                                                 
1371 N. Rubens, supra note 368, at 488; T. Wälde, supra note 51, at 33. 
1372 See discussion above on the impact of the international commercial arbitration model on civil society’s 
participation in investor-state disputes at Part I – Section 1.5. 
1373 F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 738. 
1374 Ibid., at 738. 
1375 Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador, supra note 141.  
1376 See discussion on the third party interests, as opposed to rights, at stake in investor-state arbitrations below at 
Part III – Section 3.1.1. 
1377 Although Francioni points to the fact access to justice is construed as a procedural guarantee dependent on 
other substantive rights that are protected under the relevant treaty. See F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 747. 
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It appears that defining access to justice in a relevant manner to civil society in an 
investor-state dispute context could potentially be unclear. This is particularly due to the 
fact that the investor-state regime, i.e. through the underlying IIAs or BITs, does not 
mention any rights or obligations pertaining to civil society as duly pointed out by the 
UPS tribunal when dismissing the petitioners request for standing as third parties.1378 
Access to justice could simply entail the right to take part in proceedings as suggested by 
Meron,1379 or in other words, the right to be heard. Again, this is a crucial element of the 
broader concept of access to justice,1380 and it is precisely what both amicus and third 
party intervention petitioners argued for in front of investor-state tribunals.  
Indeed, the petitioners in the UPS case claimed that it would be ‘unfair and 
inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice’ for the tribunal to deny them the 
opportunity to defend their interests in the proceedings.1381 The petitioners in the Bechtel 
case also made a substantially similar formulation. 1382  In the latter, the petitioners 
poignantly articulated that:  
…this Tribunal’s award will determine Petitioners’ rights. As such, it is essential that Petitioners 
have an opportunity to be heard by the Tribunal.1383 
This statement also echoes the amicus petitioners’ arguments in the Sociedad General de 
Aguas de Barcelona case where five civil society organizations, 1384  including local 
grassroots Argentine associations such as the Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la 
Justicia and Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, filed a ‘Petition for Transparency and 
Participation as Amicus Curiae’ on the basis of ‘the right of every person to participate 
and make their voices heard in cases where decisions may affect their rights’.1385  
                                                 
1378 As previously pointed out, the UPS tribunal dismissed the petitioners argument to the effect that ‘everyone 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing’ as set forth under Article 14 of the ICCP  and considered it  to be 
inapplicable given that it relates to persons whose rights and obligations are being determined by a tribunal 
which, according to the tribunal, was clearly not the petitioners’ case. See UPS v Canada, supra note 517, para 
40.  
1379 T. Meron, supra note 848, at 318. 
1380 F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 729.  
1381 UPS v Canada, supra note 1241, para 2(i).  
1382 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra 716, para 2. 
1383 See the petitioners’ requests at Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra 716, para 48. 
1384  The remaining three were: the Center for International Environmental Law, Consumidores Libres 
Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de Servicios de Acción Comunitaria, and Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores.  
1385 Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 731, at 2 (our emphasis). 
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The amicus curiae role is the sole avenue currently contemplated for civil society 
groups to access investor-state tribunals. It is a result of an extensive evolution of the 
entire investor-state regime, which included amendments to both arbitration rules and 
IIAs and BITs – as previously discussed.1386 It is indeed perceived as an improvement of 
the opportunities of access to justice for the benefit of affected third parties to investor-
state disputes.1387 Third party intervention on the other hand has not been accepted as 
investor-state tribunals essentially considered the authority to accept it as either (i) 
requiring the consent of both disputing parties, and/or (ii) falling outside their 
jurisdiction.1388 As previously mentioned, the difference between the two procedures is 
however fundamental. 1389  More significantly, this difference leads to a fundamental 
assumption: amici do not have the right to be heard; whereas intervenors do because they 
gain third party status.1390  
In any event, directing the principle of access to justice to the benefit of civil 
society is inexorably confined by the rights and obligations set forth under the 
international law on foreign investment and the investor-state dispute settlement regime, 
i.e. under IIAs or BITs. More specifically, the international law on foreign investment, as 
the lex causae of investor-state disputes, solely affords foreign investors the right to make 
claims against host states, who in turn – by virtue of the same law – have an obligation to 
abide by a certain set of conduct that promotes and protects foreign investments, and thus 
to solely respond to violations thereof. The normative reality – at least from a strictly 
positivist perspective – is such that there is no such ‘thing’ as a right to take part in 
proceedings, or a right to be heard, for communities or groups that may be (adversely) 
affected by investor-state arbitrations under IIAs or BITs. With that being said, a further 
elaboration of the scope and regulation of potential interventions in the investor-state 
arbitration realm is thus merited.  
                                                 
1386 See Part I – Section 2.1. 
1387 F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 740. 
1388 UPS v. Canada, supra note 517, para 39, and Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra note 
539, at 2. 
1389 See Part III – Section 1.2. See also, D. Shelton, supra note 979, at 150.  
1390 For a broader discussion on the characteristics of the amicus curiae and third party intervention procedures, 
see respectively Part III – Section 1.2. 
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3. Potential regulation of third party intervention in investor-state disputes  
Unless a fundamental overhaul of IIAs or BITs is undertaken, treaty-based 
investor-state arbitration is predefined, so it is argued, as a form of arbitrage 
unilatéral.1391 That is because only foreign investors may act as claimants, and thus seek 
damages from host states; whereas the latter may only act as respondents, with no 
opportunity to submit counter-claims for instance.1392 The question here is how to define 
civil society’s role in this bi-partite dynamic if (and when) it would be potentially 
recognized as a third party intervenor in a given investor-state dispute. Moreover, it is 
also clear from the UPS and Bechtel decisions that civil society may not participate as a 
‘party’, i.e. third party intervention cannot lead to granting civil society standing as a 
disputing party – a position adopted by this research.1393 The fact that several IIAs or 
BITs and the ICJ allow contracting or third states to act as ‘non-party’ intervenors may be 
a crucial source of inspiration in this regard. It is therefore key to locate the basis for civil 
society’s third party intervention before investor-state tribunals (Section 4.1), as well as 
to identify the procedural and substantive challenges thereto (Section 4.2).  
3.1 Rationalizing civil society’s third party intervention in investor-state 
arbitration 
For present purposes, the main question is to determine whether third party 
intervention should be based on a ‘broader’ public interest or third parties’ ‘direct or 
legal interests’.1394  This section thus focuses on the fundamental difference between 
                                                 
1391 W. Ben Hamida, ‘L’arbitrage Etat-investisseur cherche son équilibre perdu: Dans quelle mesure l’Etat peut 
produire des demandes reconventionnelles contre l’investissuer privé?’, (2005) 7 International law FORUM 261, 
at 263. 
1392 The notion of counter-claims in investor-state arbitration might constitute an effective means in achieving a 
more equitable balance within, what Walid Ben Hamida calls, l’arbitrage transnational unilateral. Such a 
statement might be regarded as an oxymoron because arbitration is inherently and intrinsically bilateral. It is 
suggested, however, that investment arbitration is unilateral because up to now the only party capable of lodging 
a claim, and thus initiating the proceedings against the State, is the foreign investor. The designation of a 
‘claimant’ and the role of a plaintiff are exclusively reserved to the latter, whereas the designation of a 
‘respondent’ and the role of a defendant are exclusively reserved to the former. In any case, the possibility for 
lodging such counter-claims will depend on the dispute settlement provisions in the BIT and the procedural rules 
of the arbitral institution concerned with the case. See Ibid., at 263-266; see also W. Ben Hamida, supra note 16. 
1393 UPS v Canada, supra note 517, and Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra note 539. 
1394 On the distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘legal interests’, see B. Bonafe, supra note 1154, at 741; and A. 
Kawharu, supra note 393, at 289. 
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direct or interests on the one hand; and ‘broader’ public interests on the other – as 
elaborated in concreto directly below. First, there is a need to shed light on the difference 
between rights and interests. The UPS tribunal rightly dismissed civil society petitioners 
assertion that ‘everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing’ in accordance with 
Article 14 of the ICCPR. The tribunal considered Article 14 of the ICCPR to be 
inapplicable given that it relates to persons whose rights and obligations are being 
determined by a tribunal which, according to the UPS tribunal, was clearly not the 
petitioners’ case.1395 The rights and obligations the tribunal was referring to are set out 
under NAFTA’s Chapter XI, which solely affords rights to investors who are nationals of 
other NAFTA parties.1396 Therefore, in any case, a proposal for third party intervention 
may not be underlying to civil society’s rights and, as such, it cannot equate to standing – 
as previously mentioned. 
3.1.1 Interests are not rights  
The rights v. interests question is relevant to standing criteria both in front of 
international and domestic jurisdictions. In the Barcelona Traction case, on Belgium’s 
ius standi, the ICJ held that ‘not a mere interest affected, but solely a right infringed 
involved responsibility…’.1397 The ICJ ultimately found that Belgium could not establish 
ius standi based on the affected interests of Belgian nationals – as previously 
discussed.1398 It is precisely for this same reason that the ICJ refuses to grant standing on 
the basis of actio popularis.1399 
In a similar vein, the debate over whether to justify third party intervention solely 
on the basis of rights rather than interests is relevant to domestic courts. The following 
opinion was raised in relation to affirmative action-related litigation in the US:  
                                                 
1395 UPS v Canada, supra note 517, para 40 (our emphasis).  
1396 Ibid., at para 40.  
1397 Barcelona Traction case, supra note 357, at para 46. On the requirements of standing, see also A. Del 
Vecchio, supra note 69, at para 15. 
1398 See Part I – Section 1.5.1. 
1399 J. Crawford, supra note 74, at 266-267.  
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Just because a case is of great interest in the community, broad intervention is not justified. Only 
when it is clear that the rights of persons outside the case are directly at stake should the action be 
expanded to include [third parties].1400  
This is essentially a warning against an expansive approach to intervention, its burden 
and costs, as well as both the difficulty in treating all potential third parties equally and 
drawing the line on their interventions.1401  
Having said that, third party intervention is permissible if there is a direct, 
significant, and legally protectable interest; or a ‘real and concrete’ interest underlying to 
a legal norm – as set forth by US courts and the ICJ respectively, as well as under a wide 
variety of international treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, or the WTO DSU where third state intervention is premised on a ‘legal interest’ or a 
‘substantial interest’ respectively. 1402 
The investor-state regime only guarantees the rights of foreign investors – a 
principle that this research does not contest. Conversely, investor-state arbitration serves 
as the remedy for the violation of such rights. 1403  The purpose of any third party 
intervention, whether by civil society or any other person, is not to vindicate rights or to 
seek remedy. Third party intervention is solely premised on interests.  
In sum, when rights are affected, then standing as a disputing party becomes 
warranted.1404 By contrast, when interests are affected, then third party intervention can 
be applied in a manner that does not equate to standing as a disputing party. 
3.1.2 ‘Broader’ interests that do not require enhanced access  
The question here is then whether civil society should be allowed to resort to third 
party intervention in investor-state disputes to raise, assert, or defend (i) ‘direct’ interests 
– if and when affected by investor-state arbitrations; and also (ii) the ‘broader’ public 
                                                 
1400 R. Field et al., supra note 1084, at 986 citing J. Friedenthal, ‘Increased Participation by Non-Parties: The 
Need for Limitations and Conditions’, (1980) 13 University of California Davis Law Review 259, at 261-263.  
1401 R. Field et al., supra note 1084, at 986-988. 
1402 See Part II – Section 4.2. 
1403 Puig reminds us that ‘in any given legal system there is no right without a remedy’. See S. Puig, ‘No Right 
Without a Remedy: Foundations of Investor-State Arbitration’, in Z. Douglas et al. (eds.), The Foundations of 
International Investment Law (2014), at 235.  
1404 A. Del Vecchio, supra note 69, at para 15.  
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interest. It is worthy to note nonetheless that civil society groups have not drawn a clear 
distinction between both issues in the previously discussed investor-state disputes. 
However, it will be argued below that this has blurred investor-state tribunals’ 
decisions on the matter and that, accordingly, there is a need to fundamentally distinguish 
between both issues when analyzing the adequacy of third party intervention in investor-
state disputes.  
i. The ‘direct’ interests of civil society, or those it purports to represent, as 
an underlying basis  
Under this first assumption, third-party intervention would be used in order to 
effectively raise, assert, or defend the ‘direct’ interests of communities or groups – if and 
when affected by investor-state arbitrations.1405 As discussed previously, in UPS v. the 
United States¸ the tribunal found that Article 14 of the ICCPR,1406 cited by the Council of 
Canadians and Canadian Union of Postal Workers as an authoritative international norm 
on the basis of which they should be granted standing, relates to persons whose rights and 
obligations are being determined by a tribunal. This was clearly not the petitioners’ case 
– according to the UPS tribunal. In fact, the tribunal emphasized that the sole two parties 
whose rights and obligations were at stake were the disputing parties, i.e. Canada and 
UPS.1407 Again, the rights and obligations the tribunal was referring to are set out under 
NAFTA’s Chapter XI. Clearly, both civil society petitioners and the UPS tribunal 
equated third party intervention to standing as disputing parties.  
                                                 
1405 In looking at the EU Commission’s amicus intervention in the case of AES Summit Generation Limited and 
AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, Triantafilou argues that ‘given the unavailability of 
intervention in investment arbitration, participation as amicus is, in effect, the only recourse an interested third 
party has to participate in the proceedings. AES shows that an amicus can have a significant, direct, legally 
protectable interest in the outcome of the case that the disputing parties have not addressed, or have no incentive 
to address. The proper defense of that interest from the position of amicus might require a pleading of more than 
30 pages, backed by evidence, and perhaps even targeted access to the record or the parties’ pleadings’. See AES 
Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, supra note 58; and E. 
Triantafilou, supra note 18. 
1406 Article 14(1) of the ICCPR states that: ‘1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall 
be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law…’. 
And Article 26 states that: ‘All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons 
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’. See ICCPR, supra note 93. 
1407 UPS v Canada, supra note 517, para 40. 
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However, would the outcome have been different had civil society petitioners 
formulated their third party intervention request on the basis of (i) non-party intervention, 
i.e. explicitly ruling out standing as a disputing party from their request; and (ii) their 
‘direct’ interests that are underlying to other international law norms or even applicable 
domestic law norms rather than NAFTA’s Chapter XI? Would this pave the way for a 
potential recognition by an investor-state tribunal that ‘non-party’ third party intervention 
could be acceptable in disputes where the ‘direct’ interests of third parties are at stake? 
An acceptance of ‘non-party’ third party intervention would allow civil society to 
raise, assert, or defend ‘direct’ interests pertaining to access to water or environmental 
protection for instance by (i) gaining access to case materials, including pleadings and 
documents, (ii) becoming entitled to submit a written statement, and (iii) making oral 
observations on the subject matter of the intervention.1408 In fact, they already do through 
the recently recognized amicus curiae procedure which solely entails, however, the 
submittal of a written brief that is typically limited to 15 to 20 pages. Once granted third 
party intervenor status, civil society groups would be able to put forward arguments more 
adequately and effectively given that they would be recognized as non-disputing third 
parties – with all the procedural advantages that that entails.1409  
ii. The ‘broader’ interests of civil society, or those it purports to represent, as 
an underlying basis  
It may be argued that the intervention of civil society generally aims the 
furtherance of ‘broader’ public interest issues; and the rationale for allowing their 
involvement revolves grosso modo around transparency.1410 But if rights are not at issue 
in a particular dispute, but merely ‘broader’ interests, then the answer should lie – so it is 
argued – in the political and decision-making process akin to the foreign investment or its 
                                                 
1408 See Article 85, ICJ Rules of Court, supra note 852. 
1409 On the differences between the amicus curiae and third party intervention procedure, see Part III – Section 1. 
1410 This argument is uniquely manifested in the previously discussed Methanex’ s tribunal’s decision to accept 
amicus curiae submissions. It is worthy to note once more the tribunal’s remarks in this regard that ‘there is an 
undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration….The public interest in this arbitration arises from its subject-
matter, as powerfully suggested in the [amicus] Petitions. In this regard, the Tribunal’s willingness to receive 
amicus submissions might support the process in general and this arbitration in particular, whereas a blanket 
refusal could do positive harm’. See Methanex Corporation v United States, supra note 428, at para 49 (our 
emphasis).  
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operations. 1411  Answers to underlying controversies would then be resolved under a 
participatory-deliberative democratic decision-making model where values such as free, 
prior and informed consent and consultations would be crucial in ensuring that public 
interest concerns are addressed at an early stage of the investment process. The various 
grievance or consultation mechanisms set forth under several IIAs or BITs,1412 or even 
the OECD National Contact Points,1413 would also be crucial in ensuring that adversely 
affected communities could voice their concerns. Alternatively, if a matter reaches the 
dispute settlement point, the ‘broader’ public interest may also be adequately addressed 
through the now-recognized amicus curiae procedure in investor-state disputes.  
Having said that, a closer look at the case law shows that the intervention of civil 
society certainly comprises, but also transcends, the furtherance of ‘broader’ public 
interest issues. Civil society does equally and distinctly raise, assert, or defend ‘direct’ 
interests of communities or groups, i.e. third parties, who are stakeholders to investor-
state disputes.1414 This is by all means congruent to the need for enhancing transparency 
and legitimacy. 1415  Addressing public interest, transparency, and participatory issues 
works in tandem with, and is intricately tied to, raising, asserting, or defending ‘direct’ 
interests of third parties – if and when affected by investor-state arbitrations. This is 
clearly reflected in petitioners’ arguments in investor-state disputes as further discussed 
directly below.  
3.1.3 Differences in civil society’s stakes in investor-state arbitration  
A closer look at the investor-state disputes examined hitherto sheds light on a 
fundamental point, i.e. while all disputes where civil society could have potentially 
intervened because the ‘direct’ interests of third parties were at stake are intrinsically 
public interest-related disputes; the inverse is not necessarily true, i.e. not all disputes 
                                                 
1411 C. Harlow, supra note 1083, at 5. 
1412 See for instance the previously discussed consultation mechanism set forth under the NAALC, supra note 
225. 
1413 P. Protopsaltis, supra note 89, at 255; and D. Collins, supra note 593; See A. Nienaber, supra note 928, at 
543. 
1414 see C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, infra note 617, at 1091. 
1415 E. Tramontana, ‘Civil Society Participation In International Decision Making: Recent Developments and 
Future Perspectives in the Indigenous Rights Arena’, (2012) 16 the International Journal of Human Rights 173, 
at 175. 
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where ‘broader’ public interests were at stake affected the ‘direct’ interests of third 
parties. This is uniquely manifested in the difference between some of the cases 
previously discussed.  
More specifically, there is a fundamental difference, and indeed an equally 
important need to make a clear distinction, between the stakes of (i) on the one hand, 
those civil society groups who sought to intervene as amici curiae in a case such as 
Methanex v. the United States,1416 whereby they essentially aimed to promote the validity 
under international law of the contested Californian ban on MTBE in the name of 
environmental protection and ‘the public interest at stake’; and (ii) on the other hand, 
those who sought to intervene as third party intervenors in a case such as Aguas del 
Tunari v. Bolivia. 1417 In the latter, the petitioners were against the excessive increase of 
water prices by Aguas del Tunari, and aimed to show the tribunal the harm caused to 
them and those they represent. The civil society Cochabamban groups’ right to access 
water was not only recognized under ‘soft’ international law instruments, but also under 
water customary usage rights that were claimed to be fully recognized under Bolivian 
law. 1418  Regardless of the substantive weight of the right to access water under 
international law, any such right recognized under Bolivian law could have been 
potentially relevant by virtue of the applicable law of the investor-state dispute.1419 The 
relevance of municipal law to investor-state arbitrations is in fact widely recognized 
                                                 
1416  In this case, it is worthy to recall that the International Institute for Sustainable Development, the 
Communities for a Better Environment and the Earth Island Institute submitted separate petitions for leave to file 
amicus curiae briefs: ‘on the basis of the immense public importance of the case and the critical impact that the 
Tribunal’s decision will have on environmental and other public welfare law-making in the NAFTA region’. 
Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 428, at para 5. 
1417 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra 716. 
1418 It is worthy to note once more that one of the petitioners, the Federación Departamental Cochabambina de 
Organizaciones Regantes (meaning ‘the Cochabamba Federation of Irrigators’ Organizations’) particularly 
affected by the dispute given it had been successful in obtaining formal legal recognition of customary water 
usage rights and practices, including the access as well as management of local water irrigation sources in the 
region of Cochabamba, under Bolivian law. The petitioners argued that Aguas del Tunari’s investment activities 
lead to the suspension of those rights, and the Federación members were therefore subjected to ‘discriminatory 
regulatory practices’ and financially burdensome usage fees. See Ibid., at para 2, 9.  
1419  Francioni argues for instance that municipal law provisions related to health, environmental, or social 
standards bind foreign investors in accordance with Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention. Article 42(1) of the 
ICSID Convention states that: ‘The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may 
be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting 
State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may 
be applicable’. See ICSID Convention, supra note 379. See also F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 740. See also 
the discussion on the relevance of human rights to investor-state disputes, in particular, the discussion on access 
to water under Part I – Section 4.3.2. 
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given that foreign investments underlying to investor-state arbitrations are ipso facto 
undertaken in a host state pursuant to the applicable municipal law. Moreover, the right to 
access water may be easily deemed as a ‘legal interest’.  
Just like the petitioners in Methanex, the Aguas del Tunari amicus petitioners 
additionally contended that there were ‘issues of broad public concern’ relevant to the 
dispute; whereas, the petitioners in Methanex did not ground their amicus intervention on 
the basis of any third party’s ‘direct’ interest.1420 It can be thus argued that the stakes in 
the Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia case are more direct than in Methanex – at least when 
looked at through the prism of third party interests. Indeed, when ‘direct’ interests are at 
stake, then there would be a more solid case for intervention. 1421  In such cases, 
intervention could potentially receive wider recognition.  
The debate on whether to justify third party intervention solely on the basis of 
‘direct’ interests rather than ‘broader’ interests is relevant to domestic courts and may be 
potentially transposed to investor-state tribunals. Although an intervention on the basis of 
‘broader’ interests may be perceived as a seemingly divisive issue, it is nonetheless clear 
that intervention is legitimate whenever the ‘direct’ interests of third parties are at stake 
in a particular dispute.  
The facts and circumstances of each case will ultimately be pivotal factors in 
assessing the adequacy and relevance of third party intervention. In addition, third party 
intervention is regulated differently in each jurisdiction examined hitherto. Any proposal 
for a recognition of a broader role to civil society as a potential third party intervenor in 
investor-state arbitration would have to take into account the extent to which such 
proposal would fit within the existing framework. 
                                                 
1420 Ibid., at para 2.  
1421  In looking at the potential expansion of the EU Commission’s amicus intervention into third party 
intervention in the case of AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, Triantafilou asserts that ‘the nature of the EC’s interest in this case was broader and more substantial 
than ensuring that the tribunal was aware of, say, environmental or cultural implications of the project at issue. 
The EC sought to assert the relevance of its legally prescribed regulatory mandate, which is replete with policy 
implications for the entire European Union, and to address the consequences of a conflict between that mandate 
and the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Given the nature of its interest in the dispute, a more effective legal recourse for 
the EC arguably would have been intervention, not an amicus submission’. See AES Summit Generation Limited 
and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, supra note 58; and E. Triantafilou, supra note 18. 
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3.2 Procedural void and substantive barriers: How to reconcile third party 
intervention with the investor-state arbitration regime? 
IIAs or BITs do not address the issue of civil society’s third party intervention in 
investor-state arbitration.1422 There is indeed a legal void. Any investor-state tribunal 
deciding to accept a third party intervention petition would face both procedural and 
substantive challenges. The first question here is whether international commercial 
arbitration rules on third party joinder may be used by civil society organizations as 
potential grounds for intervention. This requires a further look at Article 17(5) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the intention behind its drafting, as well as the 
conditions contained therein and how these may be relevantly applied to civil society. 
Faced with such legal void, it would appear that investor-state tribunals would have to 
exert their procedural discretion, which is in se problematic.  
3.2.1 Filling the legal void: A look back at the regulation of third party 
intervention 
As previously mentioned, third party intervention (or joinder) 1423  is regulated 
under a number of arbitration rules including the LCIA, SIAC, Swiss Arbitration 
Association, and more recently UNICTRAL – as previously discussed.1424 Article 17(5) 
of the UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules opens the door to third party joinder in international 
arbitrations governed by those rules.1425 The Article provides that:  
The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of any party, allow one or more third persons to be joined 
in the arbitration as a party provided such person is a party to the arbitration agreement, unless 
the arbitral tribunal finds, after giving all parties, including the person or persons to be joined, the 
                                                 
1422 Although referring to a possibility for the EU Commission to act as a third party intervenor in investor-state 
arbitration, see E. Triantafilou, supra note 18. 
1423 As mentioned previously, there is a subtle difference between third party intervention and joinder. The latter 
is necessarily subject to the application of one of the disputing parties; whereas third party intervention is the 
result of the sole initiative of the third party in question. See Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), supra note 
1168, at 217. 
1424 See Part II – Section 4.2.3. 
1425 Indeed, it is worthy to recall that a great number of NAFTA and BIT-governed investor-state disputes are 
resolved in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. This was in fact noted in the preamble of the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency which states that: ‘Bearing in mind that the Arbitration Rules are widely 
used for the settlement of treaty-based investor-State disputes’. See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra 
note 414 , para 4.  
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opportunity to be heard, that joinder should not be permitted because of prejudice to any of those 
parties.1426  
Simply put, the problem is that third party intervention under Article 17(5) of the 
UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules is premised on the basis of ‘party’ as opposed to ‘non-
party’ intervention, i.e. third party intervenors under Article 17(5) become additional 
disputing parties to the disputes.1427  
In addition, it is worthy to note once more that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
were initially construed for the settlement of commercial disputes; rather than investor-
state disputes which involve ‘broader’ public interest issues – as extensively discussed in 
previous sections.1428 As previously mentioned, UNCITRAL created a separate set of 
rules for investor-state disputes, i.e. the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in order to 
address the particular needs of investor-state disputes.1429  The UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency do not include a similar provision on third party joinder as Article 17(5); 
whereas the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not include any explicit provision 
regulating amicus curiae participation. When considering whether an express provision 
on third party intervention should be included in a revised version of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, the Working Group noted that civil society organizations, acting as 
third parties, may request for an opportunity to explain their positions, particularly in 
investment treaty arbitration.1430 The Working Group did nevertheless solely mention the 
possibility for those to act as amici curiae; and not as joined third party intervenors – 
which would place them at an equal footing with disputing parties (as opposed to the 
limited role akin to the amicus status).1431 It is therefore unlikely that Article 17(5) was 
                                                 
1426 See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 1303. 
1427 G. Born, supra note 1173, at 2596-2597. This is similar to the intervention of right procedure pursuant to 
Article 63 of the ICJ Statute. See discussion under Part II – Section 4.2.1. 
1428 See Part I – Section 1.5.2. 
1429 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 414.  
1430 In further detail, the Working Group stated that: ‘Third parties, for example non-governmental organizations, 
may request for an opportunity to explain their positions, particularly in investment treaty arbitrations. Article 15, 
paragraph (1), of the UNCITRAL Rules, which provides that “the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in 
such manner as it considers appropriate”, could be interpreted as encompassing power of the arbitral tribunal to 
accept such interventions, for example in the form of amicus curiae briefs’. See UNCITRAL, Working Group II 
(Arbitration and Conciliation) – ‘Settlement of commercial disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules’, 45th session, supra note 1185, at para 69. 
1431 Ibid., at para 69. 
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intended to potentially benefit civil society organizations as well by opening to them the 
door of third party joinder in investor-state disputes.  
Having said that, aside from the distinctions between the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules and the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, both set of rules are seemingly 
complementary as clearly indicated by the newly amended UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
effective as of 01 April 2014.1432 Could third party joinder be potentially an acceptable 
procedure in investor-state disputes? Article 17(5) contains certain conditions. Below is a 
discussion on how those might apply to civil society.   
Article 17(5) contains three fundamental conditions: (i) the joinder of a third party 
should be supported by the request of at least one disputing party; (ii) the third party in 
question is a party to the underlying arbitration agreement; and (iii) third party joinder 
should not be permitted if it causes prejudice to any of the disputing parties.1433  
First, in order to achieve condition (i), civil society would require the avail of the 
host state or the foreign investor prior to submitting a petition to intervene as a third party 
to an investor-state tribunal. This means that either disputing party would first have to 
recognize, and indeed acknowledge the need for civil society participation as a third party 
intervenor either because it would act as a representative of stakeholders, or is itself 
directly (or adversely) affected by the investor-state dispute.  
Condition (ii) may not – prima facie – be relevant to the investor-state dispute 
context, but is rather applicable to international commercial arbitrations. Foreign 
investors submit claims pursuant to an IIA or BIT; rather than a contract containing an 
arbitration agreement. The ‘arbitration agreement’ mentioned in Article 17(5) does not 
exist in an investor-state arbitration context. Rather, the underlying IIA or BIT contains 
an ‘offer to arbitrate’. That said, an IIA or BIT will typically include binding terms and 
                                                 
1432  Article 1(4) states that: ‘For investor-State arbitration initiated pursuant to a treaty providing for the 
protection of investments or investors, these Rules include the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty 
based Investor-State Arbitration (“Rules on Transparency”), subject to Article 1 of the Rules on Transparency.’  
See, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, effective as of 01 April 2014, available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-2013/UNCITRAL-Arbitration-Rules-2013-e.pdf 
(last accessed 01 December 2014). Aside from Article 1(4), those newly amended rules contain the exact same 
provisions as the 2010 version. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 1303. 
1433 Article 17(5), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 1303. See also G. Born, supra note 1173, at 
2596-2597. 
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conditions of that ‘offer’. These could include third party intervention. This means that 
either (i) IIAs or BITs need to be amended in order to set forth a right for third parties to 
request third party intervention or allow their joinder (just as is the case with numerous 
BITs recognizing the right of third parties to make amicus curiae submissions),1434 as is 
reflected in the recent TTIP proposal;1435 or (ii) arbitral tribunals would perhaps apply 
their discretionary powers in order to allow the intervention but not in the form of a 
joinder. In this respect, it is indeed clear that tribunals have a broad authority – previously 
confirmed in numerous arbitral precedents – most notably in order to take into account 
‘the public interest in transparency in treaty-based investor-state arbitration and in the 
particular arbitral proceedings’.1436  
Finally, condition (iii) echoes a widely held concern that third party intervention 
could burden proceedings in general, and cause prejudice to one of the disputing parties 
(if not both).1437 It is indeed worthy to recall that in exercising its discretion, such as 
potentially accepting third party intervention, tribunals must conduct the proceedings in a 
manner ‘so as to avoid unnecessary delay and expense and to provide a fair and efficient 
process for resolving the parties’ dispute’.1438 In this light, tribunals have full authority to 
                                                 
1434 See for instance Article 21.11, US Trade Promotion Agreement with Peru, supra note 505; or Article 834, 
Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement, supra note 170. 
1435 Article 23 of the draft TTIP text proposed by the European Commission provides that ‘(1) The Tribunal shall 
permit any natural or legal person which can establish a direct and present interest in the result of the dispute (the 
intervener) to intervene as a third party. The intervention shall be limited to supporting, in whole or in part, the 
award sought by one of the disputing parties… (3) If the application to intervene is granted, the intervener shall 
receive a copy of every procedural document served on the disputing parties, save, where applicable, confidential 
documents. The intervener may submit a statement in intervention within a time period set by the Tribunal after 
the communication of the procedural documents. The disputing parties shall have an opportunity to reply to the 
statement in intervention. The intervener shall be permitted to attend the hearings held under this Chapter and to 
make an oral statement’. See European Commission, supra note 17. 
1436 Under ‘discretion and authority of the arbitral tribunal’, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency provide that: 
‘4. Where the Rules on Transparency provide for the arbitral tribunal to exercise discretion, the arbitral tribunal 
in exercising such discretion shall take into account: (a) The public interest in transparency in treaty-based 
investor-State arbitration and in the particular arbitral proceedings; and (b) The disputing parties’ interest in a fair 
and efficient resolution of their dispute. 5. These Rules shall not affect any authority that the arbitral tribunal may 
otherwise have under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to conduct the arbitration in such a manner as to 
promote transparency, for example by accepting submissions from third persons. 6. In the presence of any 
conduct, measure or other action having the effect of wholly undermining the transparency objectives of these 
Rules, the arbitral tribunal shall ensure that those objectives prevail’. Articles 4, 5, and 6, UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency, supra note 414. 
1437 G. Born, supra note 1173, at 2568-2567, 2597. 
1438 Article 17(1), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 1303. This concern was indeed equally 
raised in the context of US litigation, where there has been an increasing recognition for the need to protect: (i) 
third parties’ interest, (ii) disputing parties’ interest in controlling the dispute, and (iii) the accuracy and 
efficiency of proceedings. See M. Harris, supra note 1082, at 881. 
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limit or place conditions or requirements on interventions for the purposes of enhancing 
(or safeguarding) the efficiency of proceedings. 
In sum, Article 17(5) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules not only was not 
intended to apply to investor-state arbitration, but also to civil society as a potentially 
joined third party. Perhaps the avail of the host state, acting as respondent, would be 
necessary in order to draw inspiration from Article 17(5) on third party joinder under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules – but this remains highly speculative. The sole possibility 
for civil society to act either as a third party intervenor, under the current investor-state 
arbitration framework, would solely depend on investor-state tribunals’ discretion. Such 
discretion would allow civil society petitioners to benefit from the procedural entailments 
available to non-party third party intervenors as articulated under several IIAs or BITs or 
the ICJ’s Statute – as further detailed below.  
3.2.2 A last resort: The exercise of investor-state tribunals’ discretion  
This research fully recognizes that the addition of civil society petitioners as a 
disputing party to an investor-state dispute is problematic. If granted by an investor-state 
tribunal, it would certainly amount to an ultra vires order. Indeed, not a single IIA or BIT 
allows investor-state tribunals to add any third party to a dispute between an investor and 
a contracting state – other of course than contracting states who may, under some of these 
treaties, intervene as non-disputing third parties. Therefore, the application strictu sensu 
of Article 17(5) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is simply not feasible. Investor-
state tribunals have to, instead, apply their procedural discretion and limit civil society’s 
access as third party intervenors to ‘non-party’ intervention.  
The United States-Peru BIT concretely reflects the modalities of such procedure:  
A Party that is not a disputing Party, on delivery of a written notice to the disputing Parties, shall 
be entitled to attend all hearings, to make written and oral submissions to the panel, and to receive 
written submissions of the disputing Parties…’.1439 
In addition, the ICJ Rules of the Court provide that an intervening third state (i) gains 
access to case materials, including pleadings and documents, becomes entitled (ii) to 
                                                 
1439 Article 21.11, United States-Peru BIT, supra note 505 (our emphasis). 
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submit a written statement, and (iii) make oral observations on the subject matter of its 
intervention.1440  
Third party intervention would thus entirely depend on investor-state tribunals’ 
discretion and authority under Article 17(1) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
(or 15(1) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules), Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Rules 
on Transparency,1441 or Article 44 of the ICSID Convention.1442 Civil society petitioners 
would face numerous challenges from both procedural and substantive standpoints – as 
evidenced by the arguments raised against, and the tribunals’ decisions’ on, petitions 
made to that effect in UPS v. Canada and Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia.1443  
There has been nonetheless a number of developments that have occurred since 
these two decisions, most notably including the full recognition of the amicus curiae 
procedure in investor-state disputes, as well as the possibility of allowing third party 
joinders under arbitrations governed by the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. It is 
therefore worthy to conclude this analysis with an état des lieux of those procedural and 
substantive challenges that might stand in the way of the possibility for civil society 
organizations to petition investor-state tribunals for third party intervention.  
i. Procedural challenges  
First, IIAs and BITs at this stage do not provide for the right to any third party to 
intervene in an investor-state dispute – aside of course from the now-recognized amicus 
curiae procedure and other states party to the investment agreement in certain agreements 
such as NAFTA. This legal void is paradoxically reminiscent of the state of the law at the 
time of the Methanex v. the United States decision.1444 At that time, the amicus procedure 
had only been (i) regulated under domestic law rather than under IIAs or BITs; and (ii) 
limitedly accepted as a matter of practice, and subject to tribunals’ procedural discretion, 
by the Iran US Claims Tribunal and the WTO Appellate Body. 
                                                 
1440 Article 85, ICJ Rules of Court, supra note 852. 
1441 Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency gives wide discretion and authority to investor-state 
tribunals: ‘Where the Rules on Transparency provide for the arbitral tribunal to exercise discretion, the arbitral 
tribunal in exercising such discretion shall take into account: (a) The public interest in transparency in treaty-
based investor-State arbitration and in the particular arbitral proceedings; and (b) The disputing parties’ interest 
in a fair and efficient resolution of their dispute…’. See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 414. 
1442 Article 17(1) UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 433; ICSID Convention, supra note 379.  
1443 UPS v Canada, supra note 1241; and Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra 716. 
1444 Methanex Corporation v. United States, supra note 428. 
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Having said that, the notion of third party intervention is far from alien to 
international law. As previously discussed, several BITs allow non-disputing state parties 
to act as third party intervenors. In addition, the ICJ allows third states to intervene in on-
going proceedings based on ‘non-party’ intervention if they have a ‘real and concrete 
interest’; i.e. that is underlying to a legal norm at stake. In such cases, third party 
intervenors do not become disputing parties – which may be of most relevance to civil 
society in investor-state arbitration.  
Although investor-state tribunals might apply their procedural discretion and 
authority under the relevant arbitration rules in order to accept civil society’s petitions to 
act as ‘non-party’ intervenors, criteria governing such acceptance would have to be 
developed. In this regard, investor-state tribunals might find it unhelpful to refer to the 
practice of previous international commercial arbitrations in an investment treaty 
arbitration context. Below is a proposition that might assist investor-state tribunals in this 
regard.  
ii. Proposed criteria 
Investor-state tribunals could refer to the criteria developed under US litigation 
where third party intervention is particularly resorted to in public interest cases, i.e. in 
cases that present numerous similarities with investor-state disputes.1445 They could also 
refer to the ICJ’s jurisprudence for guidance on determining the adequacy of third party 
intervention.1446  
More relevantly, the criteria already developed for amicus participation could be 
built upon and adapted to civil society’s third party intervention mutatis mutandis. As 
previously mentioned, the criteria governing amicus participation was summarized by the 
UPS tribunal as follows:  
In exercising its discretion, the Tribunal should consider whether: (a) There is a public interest in 
the arbitration; (b) The Petitioners have sufficient interest in the outcome of the arbitration; (c) 
The Petitioners’ submissions will assist in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to 
                                                 
1445 Article 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the US District Courts on ‘intervention of right’ 
contains contains four elements: (i) timeliness; (ii) the interest relating to the specific property or transaction at 
issue in the pending litigation; (iii) a threat that the movant’s interest could be impaired by disposition of the 
action; and (iv) a lack of adequate representation of the movant’s interest by either of the disputing parties. See J. 
Oakley, and V. Amar, American Civil Procedure: A Guide to Civil Adjudication in US Courts (2009), at 151; E. 
Shaver, supra note 1098, at 1552, M. Harris, supra note 1082, at 892; P. Appel, supra note 1095, at 227.  
1446 See Part II – Section 4.2.1. 
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the arbitration by bringing a perspective or particular knowledge that is different from that of the 
disputing parties; and (d) The Petitioners’ submissions can be received without causing prejudice 
to the disputing parties.1447 
It is worthy to emphasize once more that the acceptance of amicus curiae is 
subject to the tribunal ‘exercising its discretion’ as reiterated in the UPS decision. The 
same would apply to the acceptance of civil society’s third party intervention. Criteria (a), 
(c), and (d) would also remain relevant and could actually be transposed mutatis mutandis 
to third party intervention. Criterion (b) on the other hand requires a more stringent 
construction. A ‘sufficient interest in the outcome of the arbitration’ is not sufficient 
enough to justify third party intervention. As previously shown, non-disputing third party 
intervention is generally underlying to interests that are articulated as direct, significant, 
and legally protectable interests; real and concrete interests underlying a legal norm; legal 
interests; or substantial interests. 1448 Because third party intervention is an enhanced form 
of amicus participation, it logically entails a ‘direct’ interest that transcends the mere 
‘sufficient interest’ standard.1449 Therefore, this research proposes a standard on the basis 
of a ‘direct and substantial interest in the outcome of the arbitration’.1450  
Separately, the entire scope of what civil society may or may not do as a third 
party intervenor would entirely depend on an arbitral tribunal’s discretion. For instance, 
they could preclude intervenors from making arguments on jurisdictional questions – as 
is the case for amici curiae.  
In essence, nothing would preclude investor-state tribunals to use their 
discretionary powers in order to ‘tailor’ the third party intervention role of civil society in 
a manner that would best suit the arbitration process – as is done by US courts for 
example. As mentioned, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, investor-
state tribunals would finally have to decide the matter whilst taking into account the 
                                                 
1447 UPS v Canada, supra note 517, at para 7(iii) (our emphasis).  See also Part III – Section 1.2. 
1448 See Part II – Section 4.2. 
1449 P. Palchetti, supra note 1153, at 181; and A. Zimmermann, supra note 55, at 13. See generally, Part III – 
Section 1.2. 
1450 The draft TTIP text proposed by the European Commission suggests a slightly different wording. Article 
23(1) provides that ‘the Tribunal shall permit any natural or legal person which can establish a direct and present 
interest in the result of the dispute (the intervener) to intervene as a third party’. See European Commission, 
supra note 17. 
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potential burden on the (i) efficiency of the proceedings and, more fundamentally, (ii) 
prejudice to the disputing parties.1451  
There is undeniably an ‘equality of arms argument’ that could be made against 
third party intervention, even if it is premised on ‘non-party’ intervention as is suggested 
by this research.1452 Equally, this argument had been made with respect to amicus curiae 
intervention, and in fact it remains relevant until now notwithstanding the formalization 
of the amicus curiae procedure.1453 The answer of investor-state tribunals and institutions 
such as ICSID and UNCITRAL was to implement condition (d), i.e. ‘the Petitioners’ 
submissions can be received without causing prejudice to the disputing parties’.1454 In 
this respect, investor-state tribunals have a wide discretion. For instance, they could order 
petitioners to pay costs to either disputing party, a decision that was reserved by the 
Philip Morris v. Uruguay tribunal.1455 In essence, from a procedural standpoint, investor-
state tribunals would be adhering to a similar screening as the one they engage in when 
facing amicus petitions.1456 A screening that cannot be deemed as consistently in favour 
of amicus intervention in general, or civil society in particular, as clearly manifested by, 
inter alia, the recent decision in Bernhard von Pezold v. Republic of Zimbabwe.1457 In 
concreto, investor-state tribunals would merely have to decide whether a third party 
                                                 
1451  In looking at the potential expansion of the EU Commission’s amicus intervention into third party 
intervention in the case of AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, Triantafilou posits that ‘at the antipode of this argument [in favour of third party intervention] lies, of 
course, the additional time and money that the disputing parties must expend to address third party arguments 
that may be new, more expansive, and/or better informed than current practice allows for. Especially when such 
arguments support one side’s position over the other (as was the case, for example, in AES, where Hungary stood 
to benefit from the EC’s jurisdictional objection), tribunals will be wary of any prejudice introduced by increased 
amicus participation’. See AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, supra note 58; and E. Triantafilou, supra note 18. 
1452 Equality of arms is enshrined under the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Article 18 
of the latter provides that ‘the parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full 
opportunity of presenting his case’. See Article V(1)(b), New York Convention, supra note 381; and 
UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 109. See also M. Livingstone, supra note 392, at 532. 
1453 T. Wälde, supra note 51, at 33 and see more generally the discussion under Part I – Section 1.5. 
1454 UPS v Canada, supra note 517, at para 7(iii). It is worthy to recall here the relevant provisions the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, which states that ‘the Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not 
disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both parties are given an 
opportunity to present their observations on the non-disputing party submission’; and the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency . See 37(2), ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 411 and. 
1455 In its procedural order accepting the Pan American Health Organization’s amicus intervention, the tribunal 
decided ‘the Tribunal reserves the right to make at the appropriate time an order for costs to be paid or 
reimbursed by the Petitioner should either Party request the reimbursement of properly documented costs it has 
incurred by reason of the Submission’. See Philip Morris v. Uruguay, supra note 821, at para 32.  
1456 See investor-state tribunals’ analysis on amicus admissibility under Part I – Section 3. 
1457 Bernhard von Pezold v. Republic of Zimbabwe, supra note 823. See also Apotex v. the United States, supra 
note 56, at 43-44 and note 59, at 33, 37. For further elaboration, see the discussion under Part I – Section 5.1. 
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should be restricted to submitting a brief as an amicus curiae or engage in the arbitration 
as a third party intervenor – again, depending on the facts and circumstances of each 
case.1458  
iii. Substantive challenges  
Ideally, IIAs and BITs should be amended, or new agreements should be 
negotiated, to explicitly recognize that non-disputing parties’ ‘direct and significant 
interest in the outcome of the arbitration’ justifies intervention – if and when such 
interest is affected by investor-state disputes. This concept would not be foreign to the 
international law on foreign investment given that a number of IIAs and BITs already 
recognize third party intervention for non-disputing contracting parties as previously 
discussed.1459 
Having said that, the amicus curiae procedure is now recognized in investment 
treaty arbitration. It will be therefore necessary for civil society organizations seeking to 
act as third party intervenors to justify an alternative, more enhanced, more complex 
access to investor-state tribunals. This would likely require a motive that is not merely 
based on the ‘broader’ public interest’ issues typically at stake in investor-state disputes. 
A rather more robust argumentation would have to be put forward in cases where the 
‘direct’ interests of third parties, and not solely the ‘broader’ public interest, may be 
(adversely) affected. This would often require a compelling case for the relevance or 
nexus between human rights or environmental protection on the one hand, as recognized 
under international law instruments or municipal law, and the investor-state arbitration on 
the other. This means that the facts and circumstances of each case will be pivotal factors 
that civil society ought to coherently and robustly articulate in its favour if ever it wishes 
to gain a more enhanced access to investor-state tribunals. In turn, a coherent and robust 
articulation entails a challenging burden on civil society to show investor-state tribunals 
that issues raised by third party interventions would not only fall outside the scope of the 
substantive matters under their jurisdiction, but also not be repetitive of the disputing 
parties’ arguments. Civil society would be thus required to solely address those factual 
                                                 
1458 For a summary of the difference between both procedures, see Part III – Section 1.2. 
1459 See Part II – Section 4.2.2. 
312 
 
and legal matters that investor-state tribunals need to take into consideration to adjudicate 
host state responsibility vis-à-vis foreign investors pursuant to the applicable IIA or BIT.  
In more practical terms, part of the problem for civil society to come up with 
coherent and robust arguments is that case materials, or even the existence of an 
arbitration, are often confidential. Civil society petitioners would therefore be in a 
difficult position to seek leave from investor-state tribunals to participate in proceedings, 
and robustly articulate their substantive arguments for such participation accordingly, if 
they only have vague ideas about the case subject matter, the issues at stake and the 
disputing parties’ positions. The newly-amended ICSID Arbitration Rules and recently-
enacted UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency discussed above should change this situation 
and provide increasing opportunities for the publicity of investor-state arbitration.1460 In 
turn, and as mentioned, the onus would be on civil society to coherently and robustly 
articulate its arguments in a manner that matches the typical complexity of the subject 
matter as well as the level of sophistication of investor-state tribunals and the disputing 
parties, who are consistently represented by a selective pool of highly technical and 
qualified arbitrators and lawyers from international law firms.1461  
4. Concluding remarks 
This research posits that civil society should be recognized as a third-party 
intervenor when relevant and necessary as a ‘non-party’ intervenor. There are nonetheless 
challenges that may be arguably posed by broader stakeholder access to investor-state 
disputes. First, there is a question as to whether third party intervention should be 
premised on affected ‘direct’ interests or the ‘broader’ public interest. This debate is 
essential in understanding detractors’ arguments relating to the additional costs and 
burdens third party intervention might cause.1462  
                                                 
1460  See Part I – Section 1.5.3. 
1461  Various empirical studies clearly suggest the dominance by international law firms of the investor-state 
dispute settlement ‘regime’. See for instance C. Olivet and P. Eberhardt, infra note 1470. See also P. Sergio, 
‘Social Capital in the Arbitration Market’, (2014) 25:2 European Journal of International Law 388. 
1462 R. Field et al., supra note 1084, at 986 citing J. Friedenthal, ‘Increased Participation by Non-Parties: The 
Need for Limitations and Conditions’, (1980) 13 University of California Davis Law Review 259, at 261-263.  
313 
 
The UPS tribunal found that Article 14 of the ICCPR,1463 cited by the petitioners 
as one of the basis on which they should be granted standing, relates to persons whose 
rights and obligations – which according to the tribunal solely emanates from NAFTA. 
This shifts attention to the second challenge, i.e. civil society does not have any rights 
and obligations under IIAs or BITs – which provide that the sole two disputing parties in 
investor-state arbitration are the foreign investor, acting as claimant; and the host state, 
acting as respondent.  
Civil society’s third party intervention would be possible if both disputing parties 
give their consent. Otherwise, and notwithstanding the compelling access to justice 
arguments, investor-state tribunals would be venturing in a grey zone when deciding on 
the matter even if host states consent to civil society’s third party intervention. Investor-
state tribunals would most likely have to rely on their discretionary powers and authority 
– as they have done over a decade ago when the amicus curiae procedure was first 
accepted in the absence of any rules on the matter. The facts and circumstances of each 
case will be crucial and determinative factors in this regard, precisely because not all 
investor-state arbitrations are public interest-related disputes; and moreover, not all 
investor-state arbitrations that are in fact public interest-related involved the ‘direct’ 
interests of civil society and those it represents. 
Against this backdrop, it may be argued that, when the ‘direct’ interests, and not 
merely the ‘broader’ public interest, of communities or groups are at stake, there would 
be a compelling need to secure broader third party intervention to civil society petitioners 
that are acting on their behalf or on behalf of those affected communities or groups.  
                                                 
1463 Article 14(1) of the ICCPR states that: ‘1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall 
be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law’. 
And Article 26 states that: ‘All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons 
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’. See ICCPR, supra note 93. 
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CONCLUSION  
The first ever BIT was concluded between West Germany and Pakistan in 
1959. 1464  Makhdoom Ali Khan, Pakistan’s former Attorney General, recalled the 
rationale behind his country’s negotiation of BITs as ‘everyone simply considered the 
treaties a piece of paper, something for the press, a good photo opportunity and that was 
the end of it’.1465 States such as Pakistan have now realized that they have created, 
perhaps inadvertently, a formidable international law regime that bestows upon foreign 
investors both unprecedented substantive and procedural rights.  
With this realization, the investor-state arbitration mechanism thus created has 
come under severe criticism when public-national interests were perceived as being 
trumped by private-foreign ones. To say the least, investor-state arbitration has 
increasingly become a divisive issue that is being systematically debated not only by 
specialist international law practitioners, but also citizens, civil society, parliaments and 
politicians, and of course multinationals and investors.1466  
Stakeholders in this debate are often taking dogmatic and defensive positions on 
the basis of stereotypical perspectives, as opposed to empirical ones. The stereotype of 
the inherently inferior foreign investor who resorts to arbitration to seek remedies of the 
discretionary abuse committed by the inherently superior host state is simply flawed. 
Equally inaccurate is the assumption that host states are attempting to fend off claims by 
powerful foreign investors aimed at contesting measures taken in the public interest. This 
research comes to the rather obvious conclusion that facts and circumstances are 
fundamentally different in each particular investor-state arbitration. Yet, the current 
                                                 
1464   Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, signed 25 November 1959, available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1387  UNCTAD reports that Pakistan has concluded 
50 IIAs, see UNCTAD’s website, available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/160 (last 
accessed 01 July 2015).  
1465  Quoted in J. Kurtz, ‘Buidling Legitimacy Through Interpretation in Investor-State Arbitration’, in in Z. 
Douglas et al. (eds.), The Foundations of International Investment Law (2014), at 261–262.  
1466 In the wake of the ongoing TTIP negotiations, the EU Parliament called for ‘a new justice system, run by 
publicly-appointed judges and subject to scrutiny and transparency rules, [that] should replace private 
arbitration’ . See EU Parliament, ‘TTIP: ease access to US market, protect EU standards, reform dispute 
settlement’, 8 July 2015, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20150702IPR73645/html/TTIP-ease-access-to-US-market-protect-EU-standards-reform-dispute-
settlement (last accessed 01 August 2015).  
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debate over the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration has taken such a polarizing turn 
that this obvious assertion now appears rather blurred.  
There is no doubt that investor-state arbitration is important in order to guarantee 
access to justice to foreign investors, replace diplomatic protection, and uphold 
international principles and standards of investment protection as well as the international 
rule of law. The investor-state arbitration regime must equally ensure that host states 
could freely enact legitimate public interest measures. One of the key ways to ensure this 
is that investor-state tribunals need to get a full understanding of the issues at stake in 
order to ‘arrive at a correct decision’.1467 
As an example, upon deciding whether a host state violated its international law 
obligations towards a foreign investor who invested in a water distribution concession, 
should a tribunal consider whether the ability to access water of a segment or group of a 
host state’s population was undermined as a result of a water price increase by that same 
foreign investor? 1468  In essence, should an investor-state tribunal consider relevant 
environmental protection, public health, human rights or other public policy issues when 
adjudicating host state responsibility under international law vis-à-vis foreign investors? 
This was not the precise question of this research. In fact, it may be argued that 
the answer to this question has been settled long ago. Since the Methanex v. United States 
decision in 2001, the answer to that question is essentially yes. 1469  Some, primarily 
international commercial arbitration specialists, are nonetheless committed to a negative 
answer. It is based – from this research’s perspective – on anachronistic conceptions that 
are merely out of touch with an established reality, a fait accompli. The contemporary 
investor-state dispute settlement regime suffers from negative perceptions of systemic 
deficiencies partly as a result of such conceptions.1470 These detractors fail to recognize 
                                                 
1467 Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A et. al. v. The Argentine Republic, supra note 555, at para. 23. 
1468 See Introduction – Section 1. 
1469 It is worthy to recall here that, while deciding to accept amicus submissions by civil society, the Methanex 
tribunal noted that ‘there is an undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration….The public interest in this 
arbitration arises from its subject-matter, as powerfully suggested in the [amicus] Petitions. In this regard, the 
Tribunal’s willingness to receive amicus submissions might support the process in general and this arbitration in 
particular, whereas a blanket refusal could do positive harm’. See Methanex Corporation v United States, supra 
note 428, at para 49 (our emphasis). 
1470 Various sources were cited throughout this research to that effect. See here, inter alia, C. Olivet and P. 
Eberhardt, ‘Profiting from injustice: How law firms, arbitrators and financiers are fuelling an investment 
arbitration boom’ (November 2012), Transnational Institute and Corporate Europe Observatory, available at: 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/profitingfrominjustice.pdf (last accessed 06 October 2014); 
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that (i) there are public interest-related investor-state arbitrations that could potentially 
affect the public’s broader interest; and (ii) although limited in number, certain public 
interest-related investor-state arbitrations closely relate to environmental protection, 
public health, human rights or other public policy issues that could potentially affect the 
direct interests of certain communities or groups who are third parties to arbitration 
proceedings.  
The next logical question of interest to this research was ‘how?’, i.e. how would 
an investor-state tribunal consider environmental protection, public health, human rights 
or other public policy issues when adjudicating host state responsibility under 
international law vis-à-vis foreign investors? The amicus curiae procedure was accepted 
by investor-state tribunals, ICSID, UNCITRAL and an increasing number of states as an 
answer to that question. This research attempted to contribute to the debate by 
understanding the answer as to ‘how?’  
The amicus curiae answer is a novel development given its inadequacy and 
irrelevance in international commercial arbitration. International commercial arbitration 
rules had been adapted to investor-state arbitration. However, the subject matter of the 
latter widely transcends strictly commercial aspects of arbitrations between two private 
parties. This procedural interchangeability faded to some extent with (i) the increasing 
recognition by investor-state tribunals for the necessity of a shift in procedure where the 
public interest is at stake; (ii) both ICSID and UNCITRAL amending existing, or 
adopting new, arbitration rules; (iii) NAFTA parties setting out new guidelines to 
increase third-party participation and transparency under Chapter XI disputes; and (iv) an 
increasing number of recently negotiated IIAs and BITs confirming this trend. These 
developments indeed marked a clear paradigm shift, i.e. investor-state arbitration is 
increasingly perceived as distinct – both substantively and procedurally – from 
international commercial arbitration. The various examples cited in this research show 
that investor-state tribunals could render decisions with vast socio-economic implications 
                                                                                                                                                 
The Economist, ‘The Arbitration Game: Governments Are Souring on Treaties to Protect Foreign Investors’ (11 
October 2014), available at: http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-governments-
are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration (last accessed 05 January 2015). Also, see generally, 
UNCTAD 2013 Report, supra note 210; J. Maupin, supra note 48, at 62; A. Martinez, supra note 181. For a 
dismissal of much of this criticism, see generally C. Brower and S. Blanchard, supra note 8.  
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making them the target of mounting pressure ‘for the public voice to be heard’.1471 In this 
light, states have increasingly recognized the need for enhanced transparency and third 
party participation within investor-state arbitration. All of these factors lead to the formal 
recognition of the amicus curiae procedure.  
Against this backdrop, civil society now participates in investor-state arbitrations 
as amicus curiae and raises arguments that comprise, but also often transcend, the mere 
furtherance of ‘broader’ public interest issues. In some cases, civil society equally and 
distinctly aims to raise, assert, or defend the ‘direct’ interests of communities or groups 
that claim to be affected by investor-state arbitrations or the arbitral claims of foreign 
investors. Indeed, the acceptance of civil society’s amicus curiae participation in 
investor-state disputes is typically premised on an underlying ‘broader’ public interest to 
a given dispute. Yet, in certain cases, and in light of their particular facts and 
circumstances, tribunals explicitly noted that civil society petitioners sought to participate 
on the basis of their ‘direct’ interests’. 1472  Such ‘direct’ interests also relate to 
environmental protection, human rights or other public policy issues that are not 
necessarily brought forward by host states.  
Civil society also viewed the amicus curiae procedure as insufficient. The mere 
submittal of a 15 to 20 page amicus brief, along with an invariable access to hearings and 
case materials, was considered as an incomplete access to justice. The recently-
recognized amicus role before investor-state tribunals contrasts starkly with access to 
international human rights jurisdictions where civil society may benefit from three 
procedural roles, i.e. standing as a party, representation of victims, or participation as 
amicus curiae. Civil society has indeed adequate and effective access to these 
jurisdictions; whereas it arguably does not benefit from such access before investor-state 
tribunals. In the landmark Bechtel case, civil society organizations precisely sought 
standing as third parties in order to act on behalf of adversely affected groups from the 
city of Cochabamba and formulated their request on the basis of these stakeholders’ 
rights:  
                                                 
1471 R. Garcia, supra note 972, at 357. 
1472 See United Parcel Service v. Canada, infra note 517, at para 13. 
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…this Tribunal’s award will determine Petitioners’ rights. As such, it is essential that Petitioners 
have an opportunity to be heard by the Tribunal.1473 
These arguments were premised on the principle of access to justice, most notably 
on the basis of Article 14 of the ICCPR. 1474  Investor-state tribunals have correctly 
dismissed such arguments given that, under IIAs and BITs, foreign investors acting as 
claimants on the one hand, and host states acting as respondents on the other, are the sole 
parties whose rights and obligations are being adjudicated upon. Investor-state tribunals 
cannot therefore grant standing to additional disputing parties. There is simply no legal 
basis for a civil society ius standi before investor-state tribunals. As shown, this is 
consistent with the practice of international human rights jurisdictions where civil society 
benefits from standing in the same manner as ‘any person’ who seeks redress of 
violations to rights guaranteed under the ECHR, IACHR, or the Banjul Charter.  
This research has shown, however, that there may be procedural and substantive 
avenues to accommodate investor-state tribunals’ dismissal. From a procedural 
standpoint, courts and tribunals may, on the basis of their legitimate exercise of discretion, 
allow third party intervention based on ‘non-party’ intervention as is practiced at the ICJ 
for instance or the access given to some non-disputing IIA or BIT contracting parties.1475 
From a substantive standpoint, the fact that IIAs and BITs solely set forth the rights and 
obligations of foreign investors and host states respectively does not mean that investor-
state disputes might not affect the rights of communities or groups that are formally 
recognized under either international or municipal law. These rights could translate as 
‘direct’ interests before investor-state tribunals. The debate then shifts away from the 
jurisdictional barrier that was rightly set by investor-state tribunals, i.e. third party 
interests would not interfere (jurisdictionally) with the adjudication of foreign investors’ 
and host states’ treaty rights and obligations.  
In concreto, under the proposed third party intervention procedure, civil society 
would be considered as a third party to the dispute and not as an additional disputing 
party on the one hand, nor a mere assistant of an investor-state tribunal as amicus curiae 
on the other. This research thus adheres to the position that third party intervention 
                                                 
1473 See the petitioners’ requests at Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia, supra 716, para 48. 
1474 See Article 14(1), ICCPR, supra note 1250. 
1475 Article 85,  ICJ Rules of Court, supra note 852; Article 21.11, United States-Peru BIT, supra note 505. 
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should not lead to the ‘addition of a party to the dispute’ – to use the UPS tribunal’s 
terms.1476 In other words, foreign investors should not be faced with an ‘additional party’. 
Visually speaking, third party intervention stands somewhere between standing and 
amicus participation. Third party intervention does not (i) necessarily equate to standing 
as an additional party; and (ii) transcends the mere assistance of the court as a friend. 
Third party intervenors would be able to effectively scrutinize foreign investors’ claims 
and arguments, and in fact, have access to hearings, case materials, submit relevant 
factual and legal arguments accordingly, including by oral observations.1477 
Third party intervention is grosso modo an enhanced, more expansive, amicus 
curiae role. It is subject to a direct, significant, and legally protectable interest; or a ‘real 
and concrete’ interest underlying to a legal norm. This research thus proposed a standard 
for third party intervention on the basis of a ‘direct and significant interest in the outcome 
of the arbitration’. Otherwise, the remaining criteria regulating amicus curiae 
interventions simply apply mutatis mutandis.1478 
That said, two crucial points are worthy to reiterate here. First, despite being 
categorically recognized as non-underlying to any third party right, but rather as a matter 
of procedural discretion, and subject to the assistance of investor-state tribunals (amongst 
other conditions), the amicus procedure is now fully recognized in investor-state 
arbitration as a procedural means to channel ‘broader’ public interest concerns. Second, 
there is a need to ponder over a more expansive procedural role, i.e. through third party 
intervention, to those stakeholders whose ‘direct’ interests – and not merely whose 
‘broader’ interests – are affected by a given investor-state dispute. The amicus procedure 
would be the proper means to channel ‘broader’ public interests; and third party 
intervention would be resorted to raise, assert, or defend the ‘direct’ interests of affected 
communities or groups that relate to environmental protection, human rights or other 
                                                 
1476 United Parcel Service v. Canada, supra note 517, at para 13. 
1477 These modalities are well reflected in the US-Peru BIT: ‘A Party that is not a disputing Party, on delivery of 
a written notice to the disputing Parties, shall be entitled to attend all hearings, to make written and oral 
submissions to the panel, and to receive written submissions of the disputing Parties…’. See Article 21.11, 
United States-Peru BIT, supra note 505 (our emphasis). 
1478 The criteria are as follows: ‘in exercising its discretion, the Tribunal should consider whether (a) There is a 
public interest in the arbitration; (b) The Petitioners have sufficient interest in the outcome of the arbitration; (c) 
The Petitioners’ submissions will assist in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the arbitration 
by bringing a perspective or particular knowledge that is different from that of the disputing parties; and (d) The 
Petitioners’ submissions can be received without causing prejudice to the disputing parties’. See UPS v Canada, 
supra note 517, at para 7(iii).  See also Part III – Section 1.2. 
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public policy issues – if and when relevant to investor-state disputes. Both procedures 
need not be conflated. A clear distinction of the type of interest at stake in the arbitration 
is a paramount factor to take into account when assessing the adequacy of either 
procedure. 
This research has accordingly attempted to emphasize that the adequacy and 
relevance of civil society participation is a factual issue rather than a conceptual one. This 
research does not purport to call for a systematic approval of civil society participation in 
investor-state disputes. Investor-state tribunals would need to judge whether civil 
society’s factual and legal arguments would be relevant to the adjudication of the dispute 
between a foreign investor and a host state, i.e. in assessing whether a host state violated 
the rights bestowed upon a foreign investor by virtue of an IIA or BIT, and whether that 
foreign investor is entitled to damages. 
As the primary subjects of international law, states should maintain efforts to 
enhance transparency in general, and third party participation in investor-state disputes 
through the recognition of the amicus curiae procedure in particular. These efforts have 
benefited from continuous consolidation since the ground-breaking Methanex decision in 
2001.1479 Host states should also consider supporting a more expansive role for third 
party stakeholders that would compare, but not necessarily equate, to the adequate and 
effective access those stakeholders benefit from before several not only domestic 
jurisdictions, but also international ones. IIAs and BITs should be amended by states to 
explicitly recognize the right of non-disputing parties to act as third party intervenors if 
and when their direct interests are affected by investor-state disputes. Endorsing third 
party intervention requests, and calling on investor-state tribunals to exercise their 
discretionary procedural powers to accept them, would be a positive step towards that 
direction. In fact, the application of such discretion would be reminiscent of how the 
amicus curiae procedure was first introduced in investor-state arbitration over more than 
a decade ago.  
From a more holistic perspective, detractors of the intervention of third parties in 
a macro sense, i.e. amicus or other forms of intervention, often raise an ‘equality of arms’ 
argument against the proliferation of third party interests before investor-state tribunals 
                                                 
1479 Methanex Corporation v United States, supra note 428, at para 49.  
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that would ultimately prejudice foreign investors. There is a quasi-general recognition, as 
shown, that investor-state arbitration has been devised to ensure access justice to foreign 
investors. That said, it is unwarranted to assume that civil society acts exclusively ‘in 
favour of’ host states. Civil society could also submit arguments as a third party ‘in 
favour of’ a foreign investor-claimant in investor-state arbitrations.1480 The direction of 
civil society’s intervention will essentially depend on the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case. The question then is not whether civil society’s third party intervention 
would favour a host state over a foreign investor, or vice-versa. This issue should not be a 
source of concern. Rather, to use the example of the previously discussed Metalclad case, 
the main issue is to determine whether a foreign investor-claimant dumped 20,000 tons of 
untreated toxic waste near a community that could have had its representatives 
legitimately act as third party intervenors in the ensuing arbitration. 1481 In more concrete 
terms, third party intervention would allow investor-state tribunals to get a more 
complete picture of the factual and legal issues at stake, which could turn out to be 
crucial for the purposes of rendering more just and balanced decisions.1482 ‘Justice’ and 
‘balance’ would mean that investor-state tribunals would not award ‘polluters’ millions 
of dollars in damages – as Metalclad was described.1483  The absence of stakeholder 
participation in this precise case, including most notably community members inhabiting 
the Metalclad project area who had complained from widespread sickness and 
contamination, was particularly detrimental to the perception of the legitimacy of the 
Metalclad tribunal’s decision. Again, the fact that justice tilts in favour of either 
claimants (foreign investors) or respondents (host states) is inexorably dependent on the 
facts and circumstances, the merits, of each particular case. Rendering justice is 
ultimately the most relevant and compelling concern to take into account when discussing 
civil society’s, or any third party’s, access to investor-state tribunals, either via the 
amicus curiae or third party intervention procedures.  
                                                 
1480 In Grand River v. the United States, an amicus curiae submission was filed by a Canadian indigenous 
organization in support of the foreign investor (the claimant). See Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. 
v. United States of America, supra note 148. 
1481 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, supra note 257. 
1482 As previously mentioned, this was also an argument suggested in E. Triantafilou, supra note 18. 
1483 The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, supra note 314, at 5, 107. See also D. Schneiderman, 
supra note 304, at 82. 
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As thoroughly discussed throughout this research, ‘justice’ and ‘balance’ have 
been widely perceived to be deficient in the contemporary foreign investment regime.1484 
Judge Bruno Simma raises the following questions:  
…how we can mediate the tension between investment protection and human rights concerns? 
What legal mechanisms and arguments may we employ to assure a harmonious interface of the 
two? What are possible, and acceptable, legal avenues for an international investment tribunal to 
consider international human rights law in investor-state disputes? 1485 
Indeed, what happens if a foreign investor undermines, or impedes the fulfilment 
of, human rights or causes harm to the environment as a result of its protected investment 
activities? Should it benefit from the protection of an IIA or BIT? More specifically, if 
there is a close nexus between that violation or harm on the one hand, and the 
expropriation of the foreign investor’s investment on the other, should that constitute 
compelling factors for the reduction, or even dismissal, of its potential claim for damages 
against the expropriating host state in an investor-state arbitration, i.e. as ‘mitigating or 
off-setting effects’? 1486 The answers to these questions exceed the scope of this research. 
Yet, they capture the importance of the on-going debate over investor-state arbitration. A 
foreign investment and investor-state arbitration framework that solely takes into account 
the objectives of foreign investment promotion and protection, without adequately and 
effectively considering host states’ duty to address public interest issues and/or foreign 
investors’ potential obligations or responsibilities towards, or the potentially adverse 
impacts of their activities on, host states’ populations, communities or groups, clearly 
echoes with the anti-globalization slogan of ‘mondialisation à sens unique’.  
It was argued in this research that in order to ensure this much-needed balance 
that Judge Bruno Simma alluded to, affected stakeholders should be adequately and 
effectively involved in the investor-state arbitration process to the extent they have a 
‘direct and significant interest in the outcome of the arbitration’. This could be 
potentially achieved through the third party intervention procedure. Not only would just 
and balanced investor-state tribunals’ decisions progressively affect the international law 
                                                 
1484 It is evident that, as signalled by Judge Bruno Simma, ‘we are now confronted with claims of a lack of 
balance leading to apprehension, disillusionment and disappointment on the part of participants–voiced not just 
by left-wing regimes in Latin America or the usual suspects among the NGOs but, for instance, also by US 
presidential candidates in their electoral campaigns’. See Simma, supra note 196, at 575. 
1485 Ibid, at 573-574.  
1486 M. Wells-Sheffer, supra note 206, at 507. 
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on foreign investment, but also contribute to a more just and balanced process of 
economic globalization. Some have proposed the idea of counter-claims in investor-state 
arbitration to rid it of its ‘unilateral’ dimension and re-balance its dynamics.1487 In the 
same vein, others are re-thinking the entire investment treaty regime in order to allow 
adversely affected host state populations to directly participate in arbitration proceedings 
as disputing parties.1488 Others suggested the need to re-negotiate balanced IIAs or BITs 
that would clearly articulate foreign investors’ rights, but also their potential obligations 
and responsibilities not only towards host states, but also host states’ populations.1489 
Others prefer a ‘softer’ approach through the enhancement of corporate responsibility and 
self-regulation through codes of conduct and guidelines, the implementation of human 
rights impact assessments including prior public consultations with local 
communities. 1490  In sum, these proposals, including this research, fit within an 
increasingly widespread recognition for the need to address the ‘problem’ of, and the 
‘backlash’ towards, the investment treaty regime and investor-state dispute 
settlement…1491 
 
 
                                                 
1487 Under such a model, the host state would submit a counter-claim in an investor-state dispute on behalf of 
individuals or groups from its population that may be adversely affected by foreign investors-claimants’ 
activities. See F. Francioni, supra note 847, at 738. See also W. Ben Hamida, supra note 1391. 
1488 See J. Daniel Amado, ‘From Investors’ Arbitration to Investment Arbitration: A Mechanism for Allowing the 
Participation of Host State Populations in the Settlement of Investment Conflicts’ (2014), University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 8/2014. 
1489 See, inter alia, C. Olivet and P. Eberhardt, supra note 1470, at 73. 
1490  Berne Declaration, Canadian Council for International Co-operation (2010). Human Rights Impact 
Assessment for Trade and Investment Agreements. Report of the Expert Seminar, June 23-24, 2010, Geneva, 
Switzerland, available online: http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/report_hria-
seminar_2010_eng.pdf.   
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SUMMARY 
Introduction 
With over 3,000 bilateral (BIT) and international investment agreements (IIAs) 
worldwide, the contemporary global framework of foreign investment has for long 
addressed in limited ways environmental protection, public health, human rights, or other 
public policy concerns that may be affected by foreign investment activity. Arbitral 
tribunals have recognized, perhaps belatedly, that ‘there is an undoubtedly public 
interest’ in certain investment treaty arbitrations and that ‘[t]he substantive issues extend 
far beyond those raised by the usual transnational arbitration between commercial 
parties’. In one of the post-Argentine financial crisis investment treaty arbitrations, the 
tribunal recognized that the water systems at the heart of the dispute ‘provide basic public 
services to millions of people and as a result may raise a variety of complex public and 
international law questions, including human rights considerations’. In fact, an Argentine 
civil society petitioner sought to intervene as amicus curiae in this arbitration on the basis 
of ‘the right of every person to participate and make their voices heard in cases where 
decisions may affect their rights’.  
By promoting and protecting foreign investments under international law, states 
avidly seek to attract much-needed foreign capital into their economies, including in key 
sectors such as for instance natural resource extraction, energy, or water treatment and 
distribution – i.e. sectors that could potentially have adverse effects on host states’ 
communities and groups, including indigenous communities. Investor-state tribunals have 
now acknowledged the need to grasp the complexity of public interest issues when 
adjudicating host state responsibility under international law vis-à-vis foreign investors. 
The context is that some arbitral tribunals had been criticized for failing to go beyond the 
sole objective of upholding the promotion and protection of foreign investments. It was 
argued that this was primarily the result of a unidimensional analysis of, on the one hand, 
the facts that lead to the alleged violations of foreign investors’ international rights; and 
on the other, the letter of BITs and IIAs in isolation of other relevant international law 
norms.  
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The context of foreign investments in host states is often highly complex and 
investor-state tribunals are increasingly faced with utterly difficult mandates. The state is 
no longer the sole voice of the public interest. In fact, the interests of the state and civil 
society – including the groups and communities it purports to represent – are not 
systematically aligned. These include, for instance, international and local NGOs, faith-
based associations, indigenous associations or organizations, gender-focused associations, 
epistemic communities or research institutions, trade unions, and other associational 
bodies aimed at representing local communities or groups, including small-scale farmers 
for example. Accordingly, there could be a need for civil society to raise facts and 
arguments related to public interest issues in order to ensure a balanced adjudication of 
investor-state disputes.  
Problem statement and research aim 
If there is a need for civil society to have a role in public-interest related investor-
state arbitration, the question for this research then becomes: Which procedural capacity 
could govern civil society’s participation in investor-state arbitration and under what 
conditions? 
By first examining civil society’s recently recognized amicus curiae role in 
addressing the ‘broader’ public interest at stake in investor-state arbitration, this research 
aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of civil society’s role as practiced 
hitherto. It then considers whether such role may be equally adequate whenever investor-
state arbitrations closely relate to environmental protection, public health, human rights 
or other public policy issues that could potentially affect the direct interests of certain 
communities or groups who are third parties to arbitration proceedings.  
Structure  
This research has attempted to provide an appreciation of civil society’s role in 
investment treaty arbitration and, subsequently, reflect upon its status therein through 
three main Parts. Part I deals with ‘The Function and Modalities of Civil Society 
Participation Before Investor-State Tribunals’. Part II contains this research’s 
comparative analysis by addressing ‘The Function and Modalities of Civil Society Before 
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other Jurisdictions’. Finally, Part III addresses the question of: ‘An Enhanced Role for 
Civil Society Before Investor-State Tribunals?’.  
The Function and Modalities of Civil Society Participation Before Investor-State 
Tribunals 
Procedurally, an amicus role for civil society may be sufficient in ensuring a 
mechanism for broader public interests to be voiced before investor-state tribunals. This 
is in the result of a progressive and substantial development over the past fifteen years. 
With transparency and legitimacy concerns in mind, procedural rules governing amicus 
curiae submissions to investor-state tribunals have been gradually formalized. Tribunals 
went from accepting them on the basis of their inherent discretionary powers to applying 
clearly defined criteria under the relevant arbitration rules and treaties. For civil society to 
intervene as amicus curiae, investor-state tribunals generally take into account whether (a) 
there is a public interest in the arbitration; (b) the amicus petitioners have sufficient 
interest in the outcome of the arbitration; (c) their submissions will assist in the 
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the arbitration by bringing a 
perspective or particular knowledge that is different from that of the disputing parties; 
and (d) their submissions can be received without causing prejudice to the disputing 
parties. More fundamentally, investor-state tribunals have been systematic in 
emphasizing that ‘the need to safeguard the integrity of the arbitral process requires in 
fact that no procedural rights or privileges of any kind be granted to the non-disputing 
parties’; in other words, amicus intervention is not underlying to any third party right, 
including civil society’s, and is entirely subject to the exercise of a tribunal’s discretion. 
From a practical perspective, an amicus will generally be granted an opportunity to 
submit a short brief, following an inconsistent access to case documents as well as the 
disputing parties’ pleadings, and a generic access to public hearings if they take place.  
Notwithstanding this generally positive development, access as amicus curiae 
may not necessarily be sufficient whenever third parties’ direct interests are at stake. 
Public interest-related investment treaty arbitrations may closely relate to environmental 
protection, public health, human rights or other public policy issues that could potentially 
affect the direct interests of certain communities or groups who are third parties to 
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arbitration proceedings. Civil society has sought to represent such groups in a number of 
cases on that basis by requesting standing before investor-state tribunals, i.e. its addition 
as a disputing party. These included for instance adversely affected communities who 
opposed and contested a foreign investor’s water price increase in a water distribution 
concession granted by the host state, alleging therefore that their right to access water had 
been undermined. Such instances raise compelling arguments for a more expansive 
access before investor-state tribunals, a more enhanced opportunity to be heard.  
The Function and Modalities of Civil Society Before other Jurisdictions 
Civil society is in fact active in a slightly similar respect before international 
human rights jurisdictions where it could gain standing as a party acting on behalf of 
victims of human rights violations. The comparison with international human rights 
jurisdictions is of relevance. International human rights law and the international law on 
foreign investment are not, in the words of Judge Bruno Simma, ‘separate worlds’. Both 
in fact aim to protect the individual – as the ‘ultimate’ subject of international law – 
against wrongful state conduct. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), or even the more liberal African Commission for Human Rights 
(ACHPR), with respect to civil society’s standing sheds light on a fundamental point – 
civil society’s standing is premised on the adjudication of the human rights of victims on 
the one hand, and the obligations of their states on the other, by virtue of an international 
treaty such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms or the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
The comparison with other jurisdictions such as the WTO Dispute Settlement 
mechanism, including domestic ones in common law systems, sheds light on the 
fundamental limitations of the amicus curiae procedure. It is clear that an amicus has no 
right to be heard upon accessing a court or tribunal. Although not available to civil 
society before international jurisdictions, the third party intervention procedure as 
practiced at the ICJ provides opportunities for inspiration. There, a state may intervene as 
a non-disputing party. This procedure is indeed familiar to the investment treaty 
arbitration realm. Numerous IIAs and BITs explicitly recognize the right of non-
disputing contracting states to intervene without becoming additional parties to the 
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arbitration. In essence, it is a more enhanced form of amicus curiae. This procedure 
fundamentally differs with third party intervention (or joinder) that would equate to 
standing – as practiced in international commercial arbitration.  
An Enhanced Role for Civil Society Before Investor-State Tribunals? 
Civil society petitioners requested standing asserting that ‘…this Tribunal’s 
award will determine Petitioners’ rights. As such, it is essential that Petitioners have an 
opportunity to be heard by the Tribunal’. Notwithstanding the compelling access to 
justice arguments raised by civil society, the current architecture of investment treaty 
arbitration would not accommodate civil society’s standing. It is quintessentially 
construed as a unilateral form of dispute settlement where foreign investors act as 
claimants, and host states act as respondents. The international law on foreign investment 
encapsulates the rights of foreign investors, such as the right to fair and equitable 
treatment or prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the event of expropriation, 
that host states are under an international obligation to uphold. Calling for civil society 
standing in investor-state arbitration would therefore be a misnomer. However, civil 
society – or any third person’s – intervention as a non-disputing party appears as a 
procedurally feasible alternative, an enhanced, more expansive, amicus curiae role. It 
may be subject to a ‘direct and significant interest in the outcome of the arbitration’. It 
would entail the right to attend all hearings, to make written and oral submissions to the 
tribunal, and to receive the written submissions of the disputing parties.  
Conclusion 
Despite being categorically recognized as non-underlying to any third party right, 
but rather as a matter of procedural discretion, and subject to the assistance of investor-
state tribunals (amongst other conditions), the amicus procedure is now fully recognized 
in investor-state disputes as a procedural means to channel ‘broader’ public interest 
concerns. This research has sought to examine whether civil society could participate in 
investment treaty arbitration in a more expansive manner, i.e. beyond the amicus 
procedure or the mere assistance of tribunals. Unless the entire investment treaty 
arbitration regime is re-thought, civil society’s standing as an additional disputing party 
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would not be feasible, nor perhaps desired. That said, third party intervention as a non-
disputing party – as it is understood under the ICJ’s Rules of Court as well as numerous 
IIAs and BITs – would present a realistic alternative. Such intervention could be subject 
to a ‘direct and significant interest in the outcome of the arbitration’.  
In all cases, the adequacy of civil society’s access will inexorably depend on the 
facts and circumstances of each case – it ought not to be regarded as a droit acquis. 
Investor-state tribunals would get a fuller understanding and appreciation of the complex 
public interest issues at stake, which in turn would allow them to render balanced, less 
contested, awards. As instruments of global governance, these tribunals would secure 
further legitimacy, and dismiss their association with anti-globalization slogans of 
‘mondialisation à sens unique’. The right to intervene for third parties with ‘a direct and 
existing interest in the outcome of a dispute’ is recognized by the European Commission 
as part of its proposals for reforming investor-state arbitration that would be explicitly 
incorporated in the EU’s future investment treaties. Indeed, third party intervention is one 
of the many reforms that could ensure the sustainability of the adjudication of host-state 
responsibility vis-à-vis foreign investors through arbitration, as a non-politicized, fair, 
efficient, and a largely successful tool for dispute settlement.  
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SAMENVATTING 
DE ROL VAN HET MAATSCHAPPELIJK MIDDENVELD IN INTERNATIONALE 
INVESTERINGSARBITRAGE: STATUS EN VOORUITZICHTEN 
 
 
 Inleiding 
Wereldwijd zijn er meer dan 3,000 bilaterale 
investeringsbeschermingsovereenkomsten (IBO’s) en internationale 
investeringsovereenkomsten (IIO’s) van kracht. Deze overeenkomsten hebben gedurende 
een lange tijd slechts geringe aandacht besteedt aan milieubescherming, volksgezondheid, 
mensenrechten en overige kwesties van overheidsbeleid die beïnvloed kunnen worden 
door buitenlandse investeringsactiviteiten.. Arbitragetribunalen hebben in feite al erkend 
-mogelijkerwijs te laat-, dat er ‘ongetwijfeld een publiek belang’ speelt in internationale 
investeringsarbitrage en dat ‘de inhoud van de geschillen verder strekt dan in de 
gebruikelijke transnationale arbitrage tussen commerciële partijen’. In één van de 
investeringsgeschillen in de nasleep van de Argentijnse financiële crisis erkende het 
arbitragetribunaal dat het waterdistributiesysteem dat aan de basis lag van het geschil 
‘elementaire openbare diensten aan miljoenen mensen levert en bijgevolg verschillende 
complexe publiekrechtelijke en internationaalrechtelijke vragen met zich meebrengt, 
waaronder vragen van mensenrechtelijke aard’. Een vertegenwoordiger van het 
Argentijnse maatschappelijk middenveld trachtte in te grijpen in deze arbitrage als 
amicus curiae op grond van ‘het recht van eenieder om deel te nemen en hun stem te 
laten horen wanneer uitspraken hun rechten kunnen beïnvloeden’. 
Door buitenlandse investeringen te promoten en te beschermen onder 
internationaal recht, proberen staten het nodige kapitaal aan te trekken voor hun 
economieën, en in het bijzonder voor belangrijke sectoren zoals de ontginning van 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen, energie, of waterzuivering en –distributie – sectoren met 
potentieel nadelige effecten voor lokale (inheemse) gemeenschappen in de gastlanden. 
Investeringstribunalen hebben de noodzaak erkend om rekening te houden met de 
complexiteit van publieke belangen in hun beslissing omtrent de aansprakelijkheid van 
een staat ten opzichte van buitenlandse investeerders onder internationaal recht. Sommige 
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arbitragetribunalen werd verweten dat zij niet verder gingen dan het louter handhaven 
van de bevordering en bescherming van buitenlandse investeringen. Er werd aangevoerd 
dat dit voornamelijk het gevolg was van een éénzijdige analyse van, enerzijds, de feiten 
die leidden tot de vermeende schendingen van de rechten van buitenlandse investeerders, 
en anderzijds, de tekst zelf van IBO’s en IIO’s die geïnterpreteerd werd zonder rekening 
te houden met andere relevante internationale rechtsnormen.  
De context waarin buitenlandse investeerders in de gastlanden opereren is vaak 
zeer complex en arbitragetribunalen worden in toenemende mate geconfronteerd met 
uiterst moeilijke vraagstukken. De staat is niet meer de enige vertegenwoordiger van het 
publieke belang. De belangen van de staat en deze van het maatschappelijk middenveld – 
met inbegrip van de groepen en gemeenschappen die pretenderen het te 
vertegenwoordigen – zijn niet langer systematisch identiek. Maatschappelijke 
groeperingen omvatten, bijvoorbeeld, internationale en lokale NGO’s, op 
geloofsovertuiging gebaseerde verenigingen, inheemse verenigingen of organisaties, 
gendergerichte verenigingen, epistemische gemeenschappen of onderzoeksinstellingen, 
vakbonden, en andere organisaties gericht op het vertegenwoordigen van lokale 
gemeenschappen of groepen, zoals kleine en middelgrote landbouwers. Er kan bijgevolg 
behoefte zijn voor het maatschappelijk middenveld  om feiten en argumenten in verband 
met het publiek belang op te werpen met het oog op de evenwichtige beslechting van 
investeringsgeschillen tussen investeerders en staten.  
 
Probleemstelling en Onderzoeksdoel 
Als er behoefte bestaat aan een rol voor het maatschappelijk middenveld in 
internationale investeringsarbitrage met betrekking tot publiek belang, luidt de vraag voor 
dit onderzoek als volgt: Welke procedurele capaciteit zou het maatschappelijk 
middenveld toegekend kunnen worden en onder welke voorwaarden zou het kunnen 
deelnemen? 
Dit onderzoek richt zich eerst op de recent erkende rol van amicus curiae voor het 
maatschappelijk middenveld om het bredere publiek belang op te werpen in 
investeringsarbitrage. Hiermee beoogt dit onderzoek een volledig overzicht te bieden van 
deze rol zoals het maatschappelijk middenveld die tot dusver vervuld heeft. Vervolgens 
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wordt er gekeken of een dergelijke rol ook kan volstaan wanneer investeringsarbitrage 
betrekking heeft op de bescherming van het milieu, volksgezondheid, mensenrechten of 
andere aspecten van overheidsbeleid die invloed zouden kunnen hebben op de directe 
belangen van bepaalde gemeenschappen of derden in de arbitrageprocedure. 
 
Structuur 
 Dit onderzoek heeft gepoogd de rol van het maatschappelijk middenveld in 
investeringsarbitrage te waarderen en, vervolgens, te reflecteren op de status van het 
maatschappelijk middenveld hierin in drie delen. Deel I behandelt de ‘Functie en 
Modaliteiten van de Deelname van het Maatschappelijk Middenveld in 
Investeringsarbitrage’. Deel II bevat de rechtsvergelijkende analyse van dit onderzoek en 
kijkt naar de ‘Functie en Modaliteiten van het Maatschappelijk Middenveld in Andere 
Rechtsgebieden’. Tot slot behandelt Deel III de volgende vraag: ‘Een Grotere Rol voor 
het Maatschappelijk Middenveld in Investeringsarbitrage?’. 
 
De Functie en Modaliteiten van de Deelname van het Maatschappelijk 
Middenveld in Investeringsarbitrage 
Procedureel gezien kan een amicus rol voor het maatschappelijk middenveld 
ervoor zorgen dat bredere publieke belangen gehoord worden in investeringsgeschillen. 
Dit is het resultaat van een progressieve en aanzienlijke ontwikkeling in de voorbije 
vijftien jaar. Bezorgdheid omtrent transparantie en legitimiteit hebben geleid tot de 
formele introductie van procedurele regels inzake amicus curiae tussenkomsten in 
investeringsarbitrage. Tribunalen gingen van het aanvaarden van deze tussenkomsten op 
grond van hun inherente discretionaire bevoegdheid naar het toepassen van duidelijk 
gedefinieerde criteria onder de relevante arbitrageregels en –verdragen. Alvorens het 
maatschappelijk middenveld toe te laten als amicus curiae beoordelen arbitragetribunalen 
veelal of voldaan is aan de volgende voorwaarden: (a) er is sprake van een publiek belang 
in de arbitrage; (b) de amicus verzoekers hebben voldoende belang bij de uitkomst van de 
zaak; (c) hun tussenkomst moet een invalshoek of specifieke kennis bieden die 
verschillend is van die van de partijen in het geschil en die zou helpen bij het beslechten 
van een feitelijke of juridische vraag met betrekking tot de arbitrage; (d) hun tussenkomst 
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mag de partijen betrokken bij het geschil niet benadelen. Investeringsarbitragetribunalen 
hebben systematisch benadrukt dat ‘de noodzaak om de integriteit van de arbitrale 
procedure te waarborgen vereist dat er geen procedurele rechten of privileges van welke 
aard ook toegekend worden aan de niet in het geschil betrokken partijen’; met andere 
woorden, een amicus tussenkomst leidt niet tot enig recht als derde partij, inbegrepen 
voor het maatschappelijk middenveld, en is volledig onderworpen aan de discretie van 
het tribunaal. Vanuit praktisch oogpunt zal een amicus meestal de mogelijkheid krijgen 
om een korte nota in te dienen, waarna de amicus al dan niet toegang krijgt tot de 
procedurestukken, alsmede de conclusies van de partijen in het geschil, en een generieke 
toegang tot publieke hoorzittingen als deze plaatsvinden. 
Dit zijn zonder meer positieve ontwikkelingen, maar toegang als amicus curiae 
volstaat mogelijks niet wanneer de directe belangen van derde partijen op het spel staan. 
Investeringsgeschillen van publiek belang kunnen sterk gelinkt zijn aan bescherming van 
het milieu, volksgezondheid, mensenrechten of andere kwesties van overheidsbeleid die 
mogelijk gevolgen kunnen hebben voor de directe belangen van bepaalde 
gemeenschappen of groepen die derde partijen zijn bij een arbitrageprocedure. Om deze 
reden heeft het maatschappelijk middenveld getracht deze groepen te vertegenwoordigen 
in een aantal zaken door arbitragetribunalen te verzoeken om de mogelijkheid om in 
rechte op te treden, m.a.w. op de treden als een partij in het geschil. Deze hadden onder 
meer betrekking op de betwisting door benadeelde gemeenschappen van een verhoging 
van de waterprijs ten gevolge van de toekenning van een waterdistributie-concessie aan 
een buitenlandse investeerder door de staat, omdat hiermee hun recht op toegang tot 
water ondermijnd werd. In dergelijke gevallen klinken de argumenten voor een 
uitgebreidere toegang tot investeringsarbitrage en het recht om gehoord te worden des te 
overtuigender. 
 
De Functie en Modaliteiten van het Maatschappelijk Middenveld in Andere 
Rechtsgebieden 
Het maatschappelijk middenveld is in feite op ietwat vergelijkbare wijze actief bij 
internationale mensenrechteninstanties waar het in rechte kan optreden in naam van de 
slachtoffers van mensenrechtenschendingen. De vergelijking met internationale 
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mensenrechteninstanties is van belang. Internationale mensenrechten en het 
internationaal recht inzake buitenlandse investeringen zijn, met de woorden van Rechter 
Bruno Simma, geen ‘aparte werelden’. Beiden trachten ze het individu – als het ‘ultieme’ 
subject van internationaal recht – te beschermen tegen onrechtmatig handelen van de 
staat. De jurisprudentie van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens (EHRM), of 
zelfs van de meer liberale Afrikaanse Commissie voor  Mensenrechten  (ACHPR), met 
betrekking tot de mogelijkheid voor het maatschappelijk middenveld om in rechte op te 
treden werpt licht op een wezenlijk punt - de mogelijkheid voor het maatschappelijk 
middenveld om in rechte op te treden is gestoeld op het beoordelen van de 
mensenrechten van de slachtoffers enerzijds, en de verplichtingen van hun staten 
anderzijds, op grond van een internationaal verdrag, zoals het Europees Verdrag tot 
Bescherming van de Rechten van de Mens en de Fundamentele Vrijheden of het 
Afrikaans Handvest voor de Rechten van de Mens en Volken.  
De vergelijking met andere rechtsprekende instanties, zoals het 
geschillenbeslechtingsmechanisme van de Wereldhandelsorganisatie en nationale 
geschillenbeslechting in ‘common law’ systemen, werpt licht op de fundamentele 
beperkingen van de amicus curiae procedure. Het is duidelijk dat een amicus geen recht 
heeft om door een rechtbank of een tribunaal gehoord te worden. Hoewel het 
maatschappelijk middenveld deze mogelijkheid niet heeft bij internationale 
rechtsprekende instanties, kan de procedure voor tussenkomst van een derde zoals die bij 
het Internationaal Gerechtshof (IGH) bestaat inspiratie bieden. Voor het IGH mag een 
staat tussenbeide komen als derde partij. Deze procedure is inderdaad bekend binnen het 
gebied van internationale investeringsarbitrage. Tal van IIO’s en IBO’s erkennen 
expliciet een recht om tussenbeide te komen voor verdragsluitende staten die geen partij 
zijn bij het geschil zonder dat ze door die tussenkomst partij worden bij het geschil. 
Wezenlijk is dit een verbeterde vorm van amicus curiae. Deze procedure verschilt 
fundamenteel van tussenkomst van een derde partij (of samenvoeging van zaken), wat 
zou neerkomen op optreden in rechte – zoals de praktijk is in internationale commerciële 
arbitrage. 
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Een Grotere Rol voor het Maatschappelijk Middenveld in Investeringsarbitrage?  
Het maatschappelijk middenveld verzocht om in rechte op de treden aangezien 
‘… de uitspraak van het Tribunaal de rechten van de verzoekers zal bepalen. Als zodanig 
is het essentieel dat de verzoekers de mogelijkheid krijgen om gehoord te worden door 
het Tribunaal’. Niettegenstaande de overtuigende argumenten van het maatschappelijk 
middenveld in het voordeel van toegang tot de rechtsgang, is de huidige architectuur van 
investeringsarbitrage niet geschikt om het maatschappelijk middenveld in rechte te laten 
optreden. Het is wezenlijk opgebouwd als een eenzijdige vorm van geschillenbeslechting 
waar buitenlandse investeerders optreden als eisers en gastlanden als verweerders. Het 
internationaal recht aangaande buitenlandse investeringen omvat de rechten van 
buitenlandse investeerders, zoals het recht op een eerlijke en billijke behandeling of 
snelle, adequate en effectieve compensatie in geval van onteigening, die gastlanden op 
grond van een internationale verplichting moet respecteren. Een oproep om het 
maatschappelijk middenveld in rechte te laten optreden als procespartij in 
investeringsarbitrage zou dus bedrieglijk zijn. De tussenkomst van het maatschappelijk 
middenveld of een andere derde als een partij niet betrokken bij het geschil door middel 
van een betere, meer uitgebreide rol als amicus curiae kan beschouwd worden als een 
procedureel haalbaar alternatief, mogelijk op voorwaarde dat ‘er een direct en aanzienlijk 
belang is bij de uitkomst van de arbitrage’. Dit zou met zich meebrengen dat er een recht 
is om alle hoorzittingen bij te wonen, om schriftelijke en mondelinge conclusies in te 
dienen bij het tribunaal, en om de schriftelijke conclusies van de partijen in het geschil te 
ontvangen.  
 
Conclusie 
Ondanks de duidelijke erkenning dat de amicus procedure niet leidt tot een recht 
als derde partij, en het eerder gezien wordt als een kwestie van procedurele discretie 
afhankelijk (onder meer) van het arbitragetribunaal, is de amicus procedure nu volledig 
erkend in geschillen tussen een investeerder en een staat als een procedureel middel om 
‘bredere’ publieke belangen te kunnen behartigen. Dit onderzoek heeft getracht te 
bestuderen of het maatschappelijk middenveld zou kunnen deelnemen aan internationale 
investeringsarbitrage op een uitgebreidere wijze, dat wil zeggen buiten de amicus 
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procedure en het loutere bijstand verlenen aan tribunalen. Tenzij het gehele regime van 
internationale investeringsarbitrage herdacht wordt, is een status als derde partij voor het 
maatschappelijk middenveld niet haalbaar, en wellicht ook niet wenselijk. Een 
tussenkomst als derde partij niet betrokken bij het geschil – zoals voorzien in de Regels 
van het Internationaal Gerechtshof en in talrijke IIO’s en IBO’s – zou echter een 
realistisch alternatief zijn. Een dergelijke tussenkomst zou verbonden kunnen worden aan 
de voorwaarde van een ‘direct en aanzienlijk belang bij de uitkomst van het geschil’. 
Of de toegang van het maatschappelijk middenveld toereikend is, zal 
onverbiddelijk  afhankelijk zijn van de feiten en omstandigheden van elk geschil – het  
moet niet als een droit acquis worden beschouwd. Arbitragetribunalen zouden een beter 
begrip krijgen van de complexe kwesties van publiek belang in het geding, wat het 
tribunaal op zijn beurt in staat zou stellen om evenwichtige, minder omstreden, 
beslissingen te nemen. Als instrumenten van global governance zouden deze tribunalen 
meer legitimiteit verkrijgen en zich ontdoen van hun associatie met anti-
globaliseringsleuzen zoals 'mondialisering in één richting'. Het recht van tussenkomst 
voor derden met ‘een rechtstreeks en actueel belang bij de uitkomst van een geschil’ is 
een onderdeel van het voorstel van de Europese Commissie voor de hervorming van 
investeringsarbitrage en zal expliciet opgenomen worden in de toekomstige 
investeringsverdragen van de EU. De tussenkomst van derden is inderdaad een van de 
vele hervormingen die zouden kunnen zorgen voor de duurzaamheid van 
geschillenbeslechting tussen gastlanden en buitenlandse investeerders door middel van 
arbitrage als een niet-gepolitiseerd, eerlijk, efficiënt, en grotendeels succesvol instrument 
voor geschillenbeslechting.  
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